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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis analyses the different securitisations of cyberspace by the Digital Rights 
Community (DRC) and the British state. It considers both the internal and external 
characteristics of these securitisations, covering the power relations between a 
variety of securitising actors and their audiences and the use of language and 
metaphor to construct cyberspace threats. It considers the consequences of these 
securitisations, paying particular attention to the interplay between threats to 
national security and threats to digital rights, which are often framed as 
competitive and mutually exclusive. 
After considering the competitive nature of these securitisations, this work frames 
the conflict as a security dilemma, which has resulted in a spiralling, legal, public 
relations and technological conflict between the British state and the DRC. This has 
led to distrust, enmity, an inability to co-operate and a sub-optimal outcome for 
both national security and digital rights. The characteristics of this Cyber Security 
Dilemma (CSD) are analysed to help understand why it has arisen, why it has 
become so intense and why it is proving difficult to mitigate or transcend. Fear, 
uncertainty and a failure to appreciate the concerns of the other side are 
established as the most significant causes of the conflict. 
This thesis draws on historical examples, theoretical material and examples from 
the television show Hunted, where the researcher was both performer and 
ethnographer. Techniques to help resolve the CSD are discussed, with attention 
paid to the need for trust building, interpersonal bonding and security dilemma 
sensibility. Current and historical attempts to resolve the issue are analysed for 
their effectiveness and a range of principles are proposed to help guide future 
approaches to the issue. These include the need to establish trust, work in 
collaboration with others, reject extreme rhetoric and raise the quality of the 
debate.  
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1: INTRODUCTION, LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
The 2013 Snowden disclosures exposed and reinvigorated a conflict between 
governments and the Digital Rights Community (DRC) which originated in the 
1960s. The conflict reflects differing views on how digital rights and national 
security should co-exist in cyberspace and is fuelled by the potential for cyberspace 
to facilitate both crime and state surveillance, on a massive scale. Whilst the 
Foundation for Information Policy Research (FIPR) declared the conflict over in 
2005, the Snowden disclosures demonstrated that it has never ended; ‘the fight 
simply entered the next round, with stakes raised and gloves off’ (Moore & Rid, 
2016, p. 8; Foundation for Information Policy Research, 2005). The conflict has 
eroded trust between the British state and the DRC, which has led to widespread 
opposition to state surveillance and disputes between the government and 
technology companies over how they co-operate on criminal and terrorist 
investigations.  
Using the Copenhagen School’s Securitisation Theory, this thesis explores the 
origins of the conflict, the relationships between the key actors and the impact of 
language on its intensity and durability. It frames the conflict as a security dilemma 
and considers how suspicion and mistrust have created a spiralling conflict that 
reduces security for both sides. The thesis concludes with an assessment of past 
attempts to ease the conflict and suggests strategies that could be employed to 
help resolve it. 
1.1 CONTEXT 
The term cyberspace was introduced by William Gibson, within his 1982 story, 
‘Burning Chrome’ but was popularised in his 1984 novel, ‘Neuromancer’. Gibson 
describes cyberspace as ‘a consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of 
legitimate operators … Unthinkable complexity’ (Gibson, 1984, p. 67). Since then 
cyberspace has assumed a variety of meanings. The term is often used as a 
metaphor for space and is used to describe a virtual space which can be inhabited, 
owned and operated in. The US Air Force claims to fly and fight in cyberspace and 
digital rights activists, such as John Perry Barlow, claim that they ‘come from 
cyberspace’ (Barlow, 1996; United States Air Force, 2006). Cyberspace is also used 
as a synonym for the Internet, although it is generally considered to encompass a 
broader swathe of technology, including the Internet and any other information 
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systems that affect our lives (HM Government, 2011, p. 11). For this work, the term 
cyberspace is used to describe the environment that emerges from the connection 
of computing devices, including the geographical, political, legal and social 
characteristics of this space. 
Cyberspace is now accessed by over three billion people worldwide and has 
become a critical element of infrastructure within the United Kingdom (UK)  
(Internet Live Stats, 2015). It brings seemingly endless opportunities for states, 
industry and society, including enhanced communication, economic opportunities, 
networking tools and more open government. It also has more controversial 
applications for the security and military sectors and provides safe environments 
for individuals to oppose the state and circumvent the law.  Cyberspace is 
constructed as a space that threatens both individual rights and national security 
and this has led to an ongoing debate over how it should be governed.  
1.1.1 The Crypto Wars 
The Crypto Wars emerged in the 1960s and 1970s after cryptography became more 
accessible to the public and it became increasingly evident that the public’s desire 
for secure communication was at odds with the government’s approach to national 
security. In 1976, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman published proposals which 
allowed two parties, with no prior knowledge of each other, to jointly establish a 
shared secret key over an insecure network, thus allowing them to communicate in 
secret (Diffie & Hellman, 1976). For digital rights campaigners, this technique had 
potential to protect them from government intrusion, but for the British and 
American governments, it could further deny law enforcement the data they 
needed to prevent and investigate crime. 
In the US, one of the National Security Agency’s (NSA) first major actions on public 
encryption related to the Data Encryption Standard (DES), which was published in 
1977. The algorithm was developed by IBM and was submitted to the National 
Bureau of Standards in response to an invitation to companies to propose a secure 
encryption standard. After initial submission, the NSA worked with IBM to reduce 
the key size from 64 to 56 bits, which strengthened the algorithm against attacks 
such as differential cryptanalysis but weakened it against brute force attacks.  This 
made DES stronger against most attackers but weaker against those with massive 
computing power, such as the NSA itself. The algorithm was approved and put into 
widespread use around the world but many were suspicious of the NSA’s 
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involvement, considering it to be ‘born in sin’ (Stowsky, 2003, p. 18). The NSA’s plan 
to control encryption standards was a partial success since DES was widely adopted, 
but it also damaged trust in the NSA as an honest defender of cybersecurity.  
In 1991, Phil Zimmermann developed Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), which was 
designed to be used to sign, encrypt and decrypt texts, emails and files. 
Zimmermann, a long-time anti-nuclear activist, released the source code free-of-
charge to Peacenet, which supported grassroots political organisations, a Usenet 
newsgroup, and several internet bulletin boards. In 1993 Zimmerman was 
investigated by the US government for exporting the software without a license, as 
cryptosystems with keys larger than 40 bits were treated as munitions. Zimmerman 
then attempted to avoid regulations by publishing the entire source code in a book, 
which are protected under the US first amendment (Zimmerman, 1995). 
The next major salvo in the Crypto Wars came in 1993 with the introduction of the 
Clipper Chip, which was an advanced microchip that could provide strong 
cryptographic protection for communications. A copy of each chip’s decryption key 
would be stored in escrow by the US government so that they could decrypt 
messages if required. The Clipper Chip faced immediate opposition from technical 
experts who said it was insecure, and human rights advocates who said it was a 
huge breach of civil liberties. It was discredited in 1994 after Matt Blaze from AT&T 
published a paper on significant vulnerabilities in the hardware (Electronic Privacy 
Information Centre, 1994; Diffie, 1993; Blaze, 1994). Following the failure of the 
Clipper Chip, the US government continued its attempts to force companies to 
store encryption keys in escrow. In new proposals a government-certified third-
party would keep a key to every device used for communications so that the 
government could access it if required. The proposals were fiercely opposed by the 
same technologists and civil liberties advocates who had opposed the Clipper Chip. 
Many technology companies also objected due to the expense of implementing 
such a system and the US government eventually dropped the plans (Abelson, et 
al., 1997). In the following years, state intelligence agencies attempted to 
circumvent this problem of encryption by weakening encryption protocols, seeking 
to enforce hardware and software key escrow, infiltrating cryptographic services, 
co-opting encryption providers and banning the export of encryption (Bowcott, 
2015; The Guardian, 2013). On the other side, the DRC tried to improve 
cryptography and encourage its increased implementation amongst service 
providers and the public (Electronic Frontier Foundation, n.d.). 
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In the UK, the Crypto Wars followed a similar path to the US, although the British 
government restricted the sale of encryption services for longer. On 25th May 
2005, following the expiry of a sunset clause in the Electronic Communications Act 
which would have allowed the UK government to regulate companies selling 
encryption services, the Foundation for Information Policy Research (FIPR) declared 
that the ‘the "Crypto Wars" are finally over - and we've won!’ (Foundation for 
Information Policy Research, 2005). In 2010, as cyber attacks became more 
prominent and the threat of cyber warfare was brought to the fore, the UK 
government began to focus attention on the cyber threat. The 2010 National 
Security Strategy (NSS) labelled cyber attack as a tier one national security threat, 
alongside terrorism and an international military crisis (HM Government, 2010). 
The subsequent 2011 UK Cyber Security Strategy further highlighted the scale of 
the threat and committed the government to spending £650 million1 to combat it. 
Whilst many believed that the DRC had successfully won the Crypto Wars, the 
British and American governments continued their attempts to gain access to 
encrypted communications through alternative means. The 2013 Snowden 
disclosures revealed that the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) 
and the NSA had, for years, been undermining encryption standards, stealing 
encryption keys and coercing companies into installing backdoors into their 
software (The Guardian, 2013). Snowden’s intelligence disclosures placed state 
surveillance under the spotlight, turned the issue into mainstream news and 
intensified the conflict. The DRC argued that state surveillance intruded on 
everyone’s rights and compromised everyone’s security, whilst the British state 
suggested that encryption was making cyberspace anarchic and inaccessible to law 
enforcement (Open Rights Group, 2015). Following the murder of Lee Rigby, the 
intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) concluded that encryption was becoming 
increasingly problematic and the Director of GCHQ, Robert Hannigan accused social 
networks of acting as the ‘command and control centres of terrorism’ (Hannigan, 
2014). Following a terrorist attack on Westminster Bridge in London, the 
government called for social media companies to do more to ensure that their 
technology was not used to facilitate terrorism (Intelligence and Security 
Committee of Parliament, 2014; Rudd, 2017). 
                                                          
1 This later rose to £850 million 
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Whilst often fought behind the scenes, the dispute has occasionally erupted into 
open conflict. Following a terror attack in San Bernardino in the US, Apple and the 
FBI engaged in a very public conflict over access to data on the perpetrator’s 
encrypted iPhone. During the conflict Apple CEO, Tim Cook, accused the FBI of 
trying to create the software ‘equivalent of cancer’ and the FBI’s supporters 
accused Apple of supporting terrorism (Cotton, 2016; ABC News, 2016). The FBI 
wanted access to the iPhone belonging to the perpetrator of the attack, Syed 
Farook, because they believed that it could provide evidence of his motivations and 
potential intelligence on a wider terror network, but Apple refused as they believed 
that providing the FBI with access would grant them the ability to unlock any iPhone 
5c, not just Farook’s (Apple Inc, 2016). The FBI sought a court order forcing Apple 
to issue an update to the phone, which would then allow a brute force attack. But 
after Apple opposed the court order the FBI reportedly purchased knowledge of a 
vulnerability in the iPhone from an unnamed black-market vendor (Aspen Institute, 
2016). 
The dispute between the DRC and the British state reflects a wider conflict between 
individual rights and national security. Philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes and 
John Locke have long debated the degree to which individuals must surrender their 
freedoms in exchange for protection by a sovereign, but in cyberspace this is 
particularly challenging as the issue is constructed by each side as indivisible, 
intractable and binary (Locke, 2009; Hobbes, 2016). Encryption is constructed as 
the guarantor of digital rights but also as on or off, secure or not, broken or 
unbroken; ‘Either we build encryption systems to keep everyone secure, or we build 
them to leave everybody vulnerable’ (Schneier, 2016). Likewise, the state’s ability 
to enforce the rule of law is constructed as dependent on its ability to access all 
encrypted communications.  Without this, cyberspace will become ‘anarchic’ 
(Hogan-Howe, 2014). The conflict both inhibits co-operation, which could help 
improve both digital rights and national security, and justifies actions by both sides 
which might not ordinarily be deemed necessary or reasonable. 
1.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis is a study of the conflict between the British state and the DRC, covering 
the seven-year period following the release of the NSS. The aim of the research is 
to critically assess this conflict, help to identify strategies to help resolve it and 
address current gaps in our academic knowledge. 
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Despite much academic writing on surveillance, digital rights, the Crypto Wars and 
the securitisation of cyberspace, there is little research that addresses both the 
actions of the government and the DRC. There is a lack of research on how the DRC 
constructs cyberspace threats and the role they play in the conflict. This research 
aims to address this by providing a comprehensive assessment of threat 
constructions by both the DRC and the British state, highlighting similarities and 
differences. 
There are many proposed solutions to this conflict, but these primarily focus on 
how one side (usually the state) should change its policies to mitigate the concerns 
of the other (Cavelty, 2014). More research is required into how the interplay 
between the two sides serves to generate and exacerbate the conflict itself, which 
is the gap the research in this thesis aims to fill. Having established the nature and 
intensity of the conflict, this research also aims to help inform policymakers by 
identifying and analysing strategies that can benefit both digital rights and national 
security.  
1.2.1 Research Questions 
To achieve this, the following research questions and objectives are considered. 
Q1: How do the British state and the DRC construct cyberspace threats? 
An understanding of the following aspects will help to address this question; 
• The key actors and audiences involved in the construction of cyberspace 
threats; 
• The power relations between the key actors and how these influence the 
acceptance and institutionalisation of these threats; 
• How the linguistic and grammatical characteristics of these threat 
constructions influence the acceptance and institutionalisation of these 
threats. 
Q2: How have competing threat constructions led to conflict between the DRC 
and the British state? 
An understanding of the following aspects will help to address this question; 
• The degree to which the conflict between the DRC and the British state 
conforms to norms of conflict within international relations; 
• The factors that intensify or alleviate the conflict. 
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Q3: What strategies can be applied to help resolve this conflict? 
An understanding of the following aspects will help to address this question; 
• Whether challenging the threat constructions underpinning the conflict 
between the DRC and the British state can help to alleviate the conflict; 
• Existing attempts to resolve the conflict and their success or failure; 
• The most successful efforts and potential future strategies. 
1.2.2 Scope 
Due to the interconnected nature of cyberspace, it is difficult to establish precise 
geographic and political boundaries for this thesis. The following represents the 
general focus of this thesis, although additional material from outside these bounds 
is occasionally used, where necessary.     
1.2.2.1 Political Area of Interest 
Conflicts between digital rights campaigners and nation states exist in different 
forms throughout the world, but the dispute is particularly interesting in the UK. 
Due to its sophisticated surveillance capabilities and the exposure of these 
capabilities by Edward Snowden, its modern and comprehensive surveillance 
legislation and the high profile of its national security threat, the UK is a fascinating 
environment to study this dispute.  
• Alongside the US, the UK was one of two countries to have a significant 
proportion of its surveillance capabilities exposed to the world by Edward 
Snowden. Whilst the documents were taken from the NSA, they also included 
huge volumes of material about GCHQ and brought significant attention to the 
UK’s surveillance operations. 
 
• The UK has some of the most well-known intelligence agencies in the world, 
including the signals intelligence agency GCHQ. This agency has seen its funding 
increased, despite other government cuts, and is thought to ‘punch above its 
weight’ due to its close relationship with the NSA and other intelligence 
agencies (The Telegraph, 2015). GCHQ has risen to public prominence due to 
its increasing role in national security protection, as well as the Snowden 
disclosures. 
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• The Investigatory Powers Act (IPA) was enacted in November 2016 and whilst 
its justification and implications are disputed, it is unarguably one of the most 
modern and comprehensive pieces of surveillance legislation in the world. It 
provides both extraordinary powers and unprecedented oversight of the 
intelligence agencies. 
 
• Terrorism and national security have been major influences on public discourse 
since the 2001 attacks in New York. Periodic terrorist attacks in the UK have 
kept the terrorist threat in the news and public consciousness. The link 
between terrorism and cyberspace ensures that cybersecurity is an important 
facet of national security, giving it enhanced status and attention. 
Whilst the primary focus of this research is the UK, the interconnectedness of 
cyberspace, combined with the international nature of rights organisations and 
technology companies, means it is necessary to also consider external events. 
Events in the US are particularly relevant due to close political and security co-
operation and the fact that major technology companies, such as Apple and Google, 
are headquartered there. 
1.2.2.2 Timeframe 
This work focuses primarily on events that occurred in the seven-year period 
following the publication of the UK NSS, which include the Snowden disclosures, 
the passage of the IPA, the wide-scale rollout of end-to-end encryption and 
continued terrorist attacks. This work will also draw on historical events which have 
had an enduring impact on the conflict. 
1.2.2.3 Key Actors 
A variety of actors contribute to the conflict between national security and digital 
rights but, for this work, the securitising actors have been split into two broad 
groups, the Digital Rights Community (DRC) and the British state. The DRC is 
deliberately broad and encompasses all those who support digital rights and 
consider state surveillance to be a threat to those rights. Actors within the DRC 
include technology companies, whistle-blowers, academia, Members of Parliament 
(MPs), celebrities, human rights organisations, security experts and members of the 
public. To limit the scope of this project, the role of the media will not be directly 
addressed, although other research suggests it plays a significant role in 
securitisation and conflict (Hass, 2010). The opposing grouping could be labelled 
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the National Security Community, but can be more narrowly defined as the British 
state, which consists of those organisations responsible for defending national 
security. Whilst it is acknowledged that these groups are not homogeneous and 
individuals within them carry a wide spectrum of opinions, the terms DRC and 
British state are used to help identify the predominant attitudes and opinions 
within them. 
1.2.3 Analytical Frameworks 
To address the research questions, two separate and complementary analytical 
frameworks are used. The Copenhagen School’s Securitisation Theory is used to 
help understand how cyberspace threats are constructed, why these constructions 
are accepted or rejected by different audiences and how this empowers the state 
and the DRC. This constructivist framework is used because it facilitates the study 
of the relationship between the securitising actors and their audiences, rather than 
focussing on the nature of cyberspace threats themselves, which is the subject of 
other work (Deibert, 2012; Deibert & Crete-Nishihata, 2012; Stohl, 2006). By 
focussing on how threats are constructed, this research can avoid becoming 
entangled in the conflict itself and instead focus on the purpose and consequences 
of these threat constructions. As Dunn Cavelty argues, ‘the elusive and 
unsubstantiated nature of cyber threats means that approaches rooted in the 
constructivist mindset with a subjective ontology are particularly suitable for its 
analysis’ (Cavelty, 2007, p. 21). 
Herz and Butterfield’s concept of the security dilemma is also used to help 
understand how the actions of the state and the DRC create a spiralling conflict of 
insecurity. Whilst the security dilemma is not a constructivist approach, it does 
complement the use of Securitisation Theory. The security dilemma framework 
helps to expose how each side fuels the conflict by eliciting fear in the other. By 
focussing on this element this research can engage with the core question of how 
the conflict between the DRC and the British state has arisen. 
Figure 1.1 demonstrates how Securitisation Theory and the security dilemma are 
combined to help analyse the conflict. 
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Figure 1.1: The relationship between Securitisation Theory and the security dilemma 
1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review provides an overview of current research into the conflict 
between the British state and the DRC and highlights a variety of research gaps, 
including a lack of focus on the UK, a failure to adequately consider how non-state 
actors securitise cyberspace, and a lack of research into the potential applications 
of the security dilemma to the conflict. The review considers how existing research 
already addresses some elements of the research questions and enables data 
collection to be targeted towards these gaps in current knowledge. This review 
considers research from a wide range of disciplines, including Information Security, 
International Relations, Security Studies, War Studies and Geopolitics. The first half 
starts by considering the broad issues of cyberspace governance and then focusses 
on the conflict between digital rights and national security and the framing of 
surveillance as a form of control, through the concept of Panopticism. The second 
half considers how cyberspace threats are framed and discusses the theoretical 
frameworks of securitisation and the security dilemma. 
1.3.1 Cyberspace Governance 
The issue of cyberspace governance is critical to this work, since it is through control 
of cyberspace that the state can promote and deliver national security and the DRC 
can promote and deliver digital rights. There is a substantial body of work relating 
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to cyberspace governance, although this largely focusses on efforts by states to 
censor, control and filter cyberspace. The terms ‘internet governance’ and 
‘cyberspace governance’ are highly contested but, as Milton Mueller suggests, 
discussion of the issue is often framed around cyber-libertarian and cyber-
conservative rhetoric (Mueller, 2010). Either the state can extend its normal 
governance structures to the Internet or technological determinism means that 
central control is not achievable and power is in the hands of civil society. But the 
state and civil society are not the only actors involved in the governance of 
cyberspace.  The World Summit on the Information Society defines the key actors 
in cyberspace governance as states, the private sector, civil society, and 
intergovernmental and international organisations (World Summit on the 
Information Society, 2003). These groupings define the key stakeholders in internet 
governance and have been adopted widely, including by Jovan Kurbalija in his Guide 
to Internet Governance (Kurbalija, 2016, p. 225). Whilst much of the literature on 
internet governance is grouped around the state and civil society, the emergence 
of large and influential technology companies has led to additional scrutiny of the 
increasingly important role they play. 
1.3.1.1 The State 
In the 1980s and 1990s, many writers associated cyberspace with the general 
notion of the decline of the state. Michael D Birnhack, for example, discusses 
perceptions of cyberspace in the 1990s, which describe the Internet as a ‘post-
national situation’ ruled by a mixture of industry and anarchy (Birnhack & Elkin-
Koren, 2003, p. 2). The state had supposedly abandoned its role in governing 
cyberspace and left the domain to the ‘invisible hand’ of market powers. But 
Birnhack argues that the turn of the millennium marked the ‘comeback of the state’ 
which was reflected in attempts to recentralise and take control of existing private 
nodes of power. ‘These nodes of power and control are now being recruited, or co-
opted, to serve the State and in fact, many powerful private entities are 
volunteering to join the State’s efforts’ (Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, 2003, p. 2). 
Birnhack’s warning that ‘this convergence might lead to an unholy alliance with 
potentially troublesome results’, is echoed by other writers and institutions such as 
the Citizen Lab in Canada, which conducts research into increasing state authority 
in cyberspace (Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, 2003, p. 2; Senft, et al., 2014; Senft, et al., 
2014; Dalek, et al., 2013). Ronald Deibert counters early ideas that cyberspace 
could not be regulated and argues that states are now ‘moving to assert their 
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interests more forcefully in cyberspace’ by imposing increasing constraints on how 
their citizens interact with it (Ronald Deibert, 2012, p. 1). He highlights the tensions 
between the old norms and rules, which governed cyberspace and the state-based 
forms of control that are gradually replacing them. Milton Mueller follows similar 
thinking, arguing that previous questions of ‘can the net be governed?’ are now 
redundant and have been replaced by questions of whether it should be governed 
differently to everything else (Mueller, 2010, p. 1). He argues that there is a ‘battle 
for the soul of the internet’ and that ‘the problem of governing the Internet has 
proven to be a disruptive force in international relations’ (Mueller, 2010, p. 1). He 
dismisses both cyber-libertarian claims of ungovernability and state claims that 
cyberspace should be regulated like physical space, arguing that the Internet’s 
disruption of communications technology precludes a return to business as usual. 
1.3.1.2 Civil Society 
Other authors consider how cyberspace can be governed by alternative means than 
the state. Michael Mehta uses Foucault’s concept of governmentality or ‘the art of 
governance’, which includes not just state politics but also techniques to shape and 
control a population and an individual’s ability to control itself (Foucault, 2002). He 
applies the concept to cyberspace and argues that governments have shifted from 
a reliance on violence to discipline their populations, to mechanisms of state 
normalisation, self-control and self-regulation, aided by increased state 
surveillance (Mehta & Darier, 1998; Lemke, 2001). Mehta also addresses self-
governance, describing how unacceptable behaviour in internet chat rooms is 
punished by censorship. Kitchen, Dodge and Bartlett all consider how the absence 
of state authority can result in new forms of discipline arising. Rob Kitchen and 
Martin Dodge argue that customary laws play a significant role in cyberspace 
governance by facilitating the punishment of those who transgress the communal 
rules  (Dodge & Kitchen, 2001). 
If participants of Multi-User Domains or newsgroups transgress the 
bounds of customary laws then they must accept community 
administered punishment (Dodge & Kitchen, 2001, p. 58). 
Jamie Bartlett follows a similar train of thought, arguing that in ‘dark web’ markets, 
the lack of government enforcement results in greater scrutiny of the 
trustworthiness of sellers (Bartlett, 2015).  
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There are no regulators to turn to if the seller or the site 
administrators decide to take your money. It’s all illegal, at 
constant risk of take-downs or infiltration by law enforcement 
agencies. And yet dark net markets are thriving (Bartlett, 2015, p. 
141). 
Lawrence Lessig takes a different approach, considering the role that computer 
code plays in governing cyberspace. He argues that whilst laws, norms, market 
forces and architecture are the four major regulators of cyberspace, ‘code regulates 
all aspects of our lives, more pervasively over time than any other regulator in our 
life’ (Lessig, 1999, p. 233). 
1.3.1.3 Technology Companies 
Others consider the role of technology companies in cyberspace governance. Laura 
DeNardis considers the ‘privatisation of Internet Governance’ and the increasing 
role of internet content providers (DeNardis, 2010, p. 11). She highlights Facebook’s 
role in internet privacy, Yahoo’s cooperation with the Chinese government to 
expose dissidents, Twitter’s cooperation with the US government during Iranian 
protests and Google’s filtering of YouTube video (DeNardis, 2010, pp. 11-12). She 
also raises concerns over ‘the use of Internet governance techniques for 
competitive advantage’ (DeNardis, 2010, p. 16). In other work DeNardis and Andrea 
Hackl consider internet governance by, not of, social media platforms, considering 
their roles in anonymity, privacy and censorship (DeNardis & Hackl, October 2015). 
They argue that ‘because of their unique role as the intermediaries providing 
citizens with access to the digital public sphere, social media platforms are central 
points of control on the Internet’ (DeNardis & Hackl, October 2015, p. 1). 
As Kurbalija suggests, these different conceptualisations of cyberspace governance 
often result in disputes (Kurbalija, 2016). Kurbalija argues that telecoms specialists 
view cyberspace through the prism of infrastructure, computer specialists view it 
through standards and applications, human rights activists view is from the 
perspective of freedom of expression and governments view it through the prism 
of threats and the protection of national interests (Kurbalija, 2016). These different 
constructions of cyberspace may also have a significant influence on the 
construction of cyberspace threats. 
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1.3.2 Digital Rights and National Security 
The conflict between the British state and the DRC in cyberspace is situated within 
a wider conflict between human rights and national security and the literature in 
this area is grounded in the work of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Hobbes 
describes the ‘state of nature’ as an environment where every man is equal and 
must fight for survival, thereby creating a natural state of war (Hobbes, 2016). In 
Hobbes’ conceptualisation, every man has liberty but in the absence of security, life 
is ‘solitary, poor, brutish and short’ (Hobbes, 2016, p. 39). Hobbes suggests that to 
escape the state of nature individuals must lay down some liberty and confer 
strength in a single sovereign (the Leviathan), which can provide security for all. 
John Locke also considers the need for a sovereign but argues that absolute or 
arbitrary powers are a potential threat to liberty so the people should maintain the 
power to dissolve the sovereign when required (Locke, 1689, p. 133). Locke 
proposes the ‘prerogative’, which is the power held by the sovereign to act for the 
public good but suggests that this must only be exercised in the interests of the 
people. The problem of ‘who shall judge when this power is made right use of’ is 
left open as Locke concedes there that is no answer but to ‘appeal to Heaven’ 
(Locke, 1689, p. 168). 
The views of Hobbes and Locke are reflected in the ‘reason of state’ doctrine, which 
is outlined by Giovanni Botero and describes how state power can be exercised 
according to whatever is required to maintain itself (Botero, 2017). The doctrine 
argues that the state may act beyond the law if it does so for the common good, 
for the good of the people or the preservation of the state. Mark Neocleous 
demonstrates how ‘reason of state’ has morphed into ‘interest of state’, ‘security 
of state’ and finally ‘national security’ (Neocleous, 2006). Charles de Secondat 
argues that because the state is the creator of individual security and the guarantor 
of liberty, national security can be used to justify any action that is designed to 
protect the state, even if this transgresses the law or normal moral bounds 
(Secondat, 1749). 
If the legislative power believed itself endangered … it could, for a 
brief and limited time, permit the executive power to arrest 
suspected citizens who would lose their liberty for a time only so 
that it would be preserved forever (Secondat, 1749, p. 159). 
The argument that liberty must be traded for privacy is contested by Mark 
Neocleous who claims that ‘the supposed search for a balance between security 
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and liberty is misplaced’ (Neocleous, 2007, p. 132). Instead, he suggests that the 
idea of insecurity should be embraced.  
To keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding more 
security (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t 
damage out liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of 
building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in 
contemporary politics … simply accepting insecurity as part of the 
human condition would, for a start, help in resisting everything 
being described as a security issue’ (Neocleous, 2007, p. 147). 
The conflict between national security and human rights in cyberspace is 
particularly intense because it is framed as absolute and extreme. Either the state 
is abusing individual liberties through mass surveillance or we risk anarchy due to 
the state’s lack of ability to access areas of cyberspace. Most literature focusses on 
these extremes, although some commentaries argue that a balance between the 
two should be struck (Amnesty International, 2013; Clegg, 2014; Huppert, 2013). 
1.3.2.1 Digital Rights 
Since the 2013 Snowdon disclosures, the volume of research into the impact of 
cyberspace on digital rights has increased and a range of writers conclude that 
surveillance is disproportionate and damaging to digital rights. David Lyon argues 
that surveillance is a prominent means of power for governments but is ‘out of 
control’ and carries ‘major risks for ordinary citizens’ (Lyon, 2015, p. preface VII). It 
has, he argues, ‘ballooned in recent decades’ and become ‘increasingly 
unaccountable and less and less visible to ordinary people’ (Lyon, 2015, p. 12). The 
UN’s special rapporteur for human rights, Frank L Rue argues that states are 
increasingly acting to ‘restrict, control, manipulate and censor content 
disseminated via the Internet without any legal basis’ (Rue, 2011, p. 8). He suggests 
that these actions are being taken in a manner incompatible with human rights and 
create a ‘chilling effect’ on the right to freedom of opinion and expression (Rue, 
2011, p. 8). Deibert covers the same theme and writes extensively on the impact of 
surveillance and filtering measures on both citizens and cyberspace itself (Deibert 
& Rohozinski, 2008). Deibert divides cyberspace into three spheres of agency to 
understand how the state ‘targets’ cyberspace; civic networks, resistance networks 
and darknets. He then examines how the state exerts its power over these groups 
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through increasing use of Internet filtering, censorship and surveillance, at the 
expense of individual rights (Deibert, 2008). 
1.3.2.2 National Security 
Whilst there is a significant body of literature which considers how the state 
impinges on digital rights, there is also a substantial body of work that invokes the 
Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ to focus attention on threats to national security. David 
Tohn, for example, argues that without a cyber sovereign, cyberspace is a wild and 
ungoverned place. 
‘If Philosopher Thomas Hobbes lived today, he would say man's 
cyber-life is nasty, brutish, and if you are not careful, short. The 
world of cyber-crime, cyber-terrorism, and cyber-warfare is truly a 
wild, unruly, and ungoverned place’  (Tohn, 2009). 
Tohn argues that today’s ‘cyber world’ is akin to medieval Europe and needs state 
intervention to tame it. Speaking at the Munich Cyber Security Conference, the 
President of Estonia, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, also compares cyberspace to a state of 
nature claiming that ‘Our world is Hobbesian’ and ‘we need our Locke, Jefferson 
and Voltaire for the digital age’ (Ilves, 2014). Although Ryan Kaminski argues that 
whilst there are no international institutions that remotely resembles a Hobbesian 
Leviathan, the cyber state of nature can still be escaped as the reality of the 
situation forces states to commit the ‘political muscle’ to do so (Kaminski, 2010, p. 
91). 
Other authors draw attention to specific threats to national security from 
cyberspace. Dan Verton warns that the next terrorist attack on the United States 
(US) could come from cyberspace and it could ‘wreak havoc’ and have a ‘debilitating 
effect on the economy’ (Verton, 2003, p. 9). He argues that countries are making it 
easy for would-be attackers by publishing ‘vast amounts of data about our 
infrastructures’, including information about vulnerabilities (Verton, 2003, p. 9).  
Richard A. Clarke paints a similarly apocalyptic image of cyberspace, arguing that 
the speed with which cyber weapons can be deployed creates the prospect of a 
‘highly volatile crisis’ between states. This, he argues, cannot be avoided through 
deterrence, in the same way that nuclear war is (Clarke, 2010, p. 9). 
Other authors have written of the threat to national security from the dark web 
and other spaces online that are inaccessible to the state. Gabriel Weimann 
highlights several examples where terrorists have communicated and planned 
23 
 
attacks online using encrypted applications such as Telegram (Weimann, 2016). 
Whilst noting that we should not impair legitimate and lawful freedom of 
expression, he argues that ‘the alarming infiltration of Internet-savvy terrorists to 
the “virtual caves” of the Dark Web should trigger an international search for a 
solution’ (Weimann, 2016, p. 204). Moore and Rid also identify the dangers of dark 
webs, by producing analysis demonstrating that ‘the most common uses for 
websites on Tor hidden services are criminal, including drugs, illicit finance and 
pornography involving violence, children and animals’ (Moore & Rid, 2016, p. 21). 
1.3.3 Panopticism 
A central element of the conflict between the DRC and the British state is the DRC’s 
fear that state surveillance compromises individual rights. Whilst the state 
considers surveillance to be targeted towards criminals and terrorists the DRC fear 
that surveillance is not just passive but acts as a form of control, undermining 
individual choice, privacy and personal freedoms. This idea is often expressed in the 
literature through the concept of Panopticism, which is based around Jeremy 
Bentham’s 18th century design for an ideal prison. The Panopticon allows a single 
guard to observe all inmates and is designed to condition good behaviour because 
the inmates never known when they are being observed. 
Foucault develops the concept of Panopticism as a metaphor for modern 
disciplinary societies and their desire to normalise behaviour (Foucault, 1975). 
Foucault argues that the Panopticon creates a consciousness of permanent visibility 
as a form of power, where bars, chains, and heavy locks are no longer necessary for 
domination and discipline. He contends that Panopticism is not just limited to 
prisons, but can be applied to many different areas of society, including schools, 
hospitals and factories. Whilst his work preceded the widespread use of computers, 
his invocation of the Panopticon as a metaphor for societal control has been applied 
by other writers, to areas such as biometric passports, identity chips, and the 
commercial sector (Jensen & Draffan, 2004; Haiven & Stoneman, 2004; Head, 
2014). Panopticism was first applied to cyberspace by Shoshana Zuboff, who 
describes how computer power makes the output of workers more observable, 
whilst workers cannot tell when they are being observed (Zuboff, 1989). 
The literature around Panopticism can be grouped into approaches that consider 
the state as the operator of the Panopticon and approaches that consider the role 
of technology companies and the public. Several authors suggest that state 
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intelligence agencies, including GCHQ and the NSA, are attempting to turn the 
whole of cyberspace into a global Panopticon. Zachary Bruno argues that the NSA’s 
PRISM program, combined with the increasing popularity of smartphones, has 
resulted in the Foucauldian Panopticon being everywhere at all times (Bruno, 
2014). Whilst most academic writing focusses on the US and the NSA, various media 
reports in the UK have highlighted the similarities between GCHQ and the 
Panopticon. John Lanchester, for example, writes in the Guardian that ‘we risk 
becoming a society which is in crucial respects a giant Panopticon, where the 
people with access to our secrets can see, hear intercept and monitor everything’ 
(Lanchester, 2013). 
Other authors, such as Stephanie Fast, address the role of social media companies 
and their ability to observe and influence user behaviour. Fast compares the social 
network Facebook with the Foucauldian Panopticon and finds significant parallels 
in its structure and use of surveillance, examination and normalisation (Fast, 2015). 
She describes how the structure of Facebook encourages users to share data, which 
is then widely accessible and used to deliver advertising and normalise user 
behaviour. Fast also compares the Foucauldian idea of the Panopticon as a 
laboratory with an experiment by Facebook’s Core Data Science Team, which 
altered users’ newsfeeds to see how this changed their mood.  (BBC News, 2014). 
The voluntary nature of social media panopticons is addressed by Lilian Mitrou et 
al, who consider how social media draws users into self-participatory Panopticons 
that enable sensitive information to be reconstructed from seemingly anonymous 
data (Mitrou, et al., 2014). They demonstrate how YouTube and Twitter can be used 
to profile users, with only limited computing power and publicly available data. 
Susan Barnes also considers the participatory nature of Cyber-Panopticons but 
focusses on the ‘privacy paradox’, which describes how, despite increased concern 
over online privacy, individuals still share increasing volumes of personal 
information on sites such as Facebook and Twitter (Barnes, 2006). Utz and Kramer 
describe the paradox as an apparent discrepancy between privacy concerns and 
privacy behaviours and Nissenbaum claims that people appear to want and value 
privacy, yet simultaneously appear to not want or value it (Nissenbaum, 2009; Utz 
& Kramer, 2009).  
These different perspectives on who controls, utilises and participates in the Cyber 
Panopticon reflect the wider issues of cyberspace governance and the conflict 
between national security and digital rights. 
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1.3.4 The Construction and Framing of Cyberspace Threats 
In addition to a host of work identifying cyberspace threats, several writers have 
also considered how the dispute between national security and digital rights has 
been framed and constructed by a range of actors. 
Author’s including Myriam Dunn Cavelty, consider the framing of cyber threats by 
states. Cavelty highlights the fact that cyber threats have consistently been framed 
as a grave danger by the US, despite a large attack having never materialised 
(Cavelty, 2007). She suggests that both ‘hypers’ and ‘de-hypers’ agree on this point 
but differ as to whether a future attack is imminent or not (Cavelty, 2007, p. 20). 
Cavelty suggests that in the wake of the September 11 terror attacks on the US, 
cyberspace is linked seamlessly with the concepts of terrorism and technology, thus 
ensuring that cyber threats are ‘inevitably presented as a national security issue’ 
(Cavelty, 2007, p. 29). Hansen and Nissenbaum explore how different forms of 
discourse are used to securitise cyberspace as a threat to national security by 
employing different grammars of security (Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009). 
Other authors consider the impact of this discourse on cyberspace threat 
construction. Yury Kabanov analyses the discourses and policies of the European 
Union (EU) and Russia to help understand the obstacles to cooperation on 
cybersecurity issues (Kabanov, 2014). After comparing the different contexts, 
actors, referent objects, security sectors and grammars of the discourse, Kabanov 
argues that the different policies of the EU and Russia and the problems of co-
operation are the result of major dissimilarities in the understanding of cyberspace 
threats as well as different grammars of security. 
David Gorr and Wolf Schünemann also consider the differences in cybersecurity 
discourses between different regions, focussing on a comparison between 
Germany and Russia (Gorr & Schünemann, 2013). Employing the ‘Sociology of 
Knowledge Approach to Discourse’ (SKAD), they place discourse into interpretative 
schemes such as ‘Perception of Cyberspace’, ‘Challenges’, ‘Framework for Action’ 
and ‘Propositions for Action’ (Keller, 2006; Foucault, 1971). Using this system, they 
dissect, categorise and compare German and Russian discourse and find that whilst 
securitisation is evident in both countries, perceptions of cyberspace and risk differ 
significantly. German discourse is more heavily focussed on the stability of the 
economy whilst Russian discourse is more focused towards the stability of the 
political system. 
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Whilst these approaches compare different cyberspace constructions across 
different geographic regions, they do not consider different approaches within the 
same region but pertaining to different issues. For example, there is no current 
work that compares the construction of threats to digital rights in the UK with the 
construction of threats to national security. 
1.3.5 Cyber Securitisation 
Myriam Dunn Cavelty considers how threat construction impacts on the 
cybersecurity discourse (Cavelty, 2013). She classifies threats into technological, 
socio-political and human-machine clusters and considers how these are 
represented in cybersecurity discourse. Threats in the technological cluster are 
often represented through biological and military metaphors, such as viruses and 
weapons; threats within the socio-political cluster are often associated with 
lawlessness and anonymity, and threats in the human-machine cluster are often 
associated with vulnerability and unknowability. Cavelty suggests that this use of 
language has a significant impact on cybersecurity debates. Biological and military 
terminology speak to deep-seated fears in the human psyche that make national 
security solutions the logical choice. The spatial metaphor of cyberspace 
encourages activists to perceive cyberspace as a frontier and place of freedom, 
whilst also encouraging law enforcement to see it as a lawless space that must be 
tamed (Barlow, 1996; Hogan-Howe, 2014). 
The most common theoretical framework used to consider the construction of 
threats in cyberspace is Securitisation Theory, which proposes that issues become 
securitised in response to speech acts by securitising actors. Securitisation involves 
a referent object, which is perceived to be threatened, a securitising actor who 
carries out securitisation by means of a speech act and an audience who are 
receptive to this securitisation (Waever, 1989). If the securitising actor carries 
authority and performs the speech act in accordance with particular grammar rules, 
then the securitising act will be successful. If an issue becomes securitised then it is 
removed from political debate and ‘extraordinary means’ can be used to address 
the threat. 
Whilst Securitisation Theory has been widely accepted as a useful mechanism for 
understanding how discourse influences the construction of security, some have 
criticised the rigidity of such an approach. Thierry Balzacq, for example, criticises 
the high degree of formality to the discursive action of security, arguing that this 
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results in the concept of security as a speech act having a fixed, permanent, 
unchanging code of practice (Balzacq, 2005). For Balzacq, this reduces securitisation 
to a conventional procedure, with rigid conditions for success. Instead, Balzacq 
suggests that securitisation should consider the role that context plays in a 
securitising act, arguing that how an act resonates with an audience’s feelings, 
beliefs, histories and culture, is critical to its success. Others criticise Securitisation 
Theory’s narrow focus on the speech act itself. Matt McDonald claims that ’the 
form of act constructing security within the Copenhagen School is defined narrowly, 
with the focus on the speech of dominant actors’ (McDonald, 2008, p. 563). This 
focus excludes other forms of representation, such as images, and encourages 
focus only on the discursive interventions of those voices deemed institutionally 
legitimate to speak on behalf of a particular collective, usually a state.   
Securitisation Theory has been applied to a wide range of different issues including 
the ‘war on terror’, Islam and migration (Vultee, 2010; Cesari, 2009; Boswell, 2007). 
Several authors have addressed the securitisation of cyberspace by the state, 
including Citizen Lab, which produces a variety of work designed to ‘monitor, 
analyse and impact the exercise of political power in cyberspace’ (Citizen Lab, n.d.). 
Ronald Deibert, the Director of Citizen Lab, focusses largely on the increasing 
spread of cyberspace controls and argues that despite a past widespread belief that 
‘cyberspace was immune to government regulation’, scholarship now shows that 
‘governments can shape and constrain access to information, freedom of speech 
and other elements of cyberspace’ (Deibert & Crete-Nishihata, 2012, p. 339). 
Deibert claims that commercial actors also securitise cyberspace and inflate threats 
to ‘serve their more parochial market interests’ and that this has an impact on 
government decision making (Deibert & Crete-Nishihata, 2012, p. 340). Deibert is 
highly critical of the spread of cyberspace controls, which he says represents a 
‘norm regression’ (Deibert & Crete-Nishihata, 2012, p. 345). 
Several authors argue that the state’s securitisation of cyberspace is not justified. 
Clement Guitton argues that putting cyber threats at the national level is not 
justified and is inconsistent with how cybersecurity budgets are spent (Guitton, 
2013).  Helen Nissenbaum argues that state claims of national security threats in 
cyberspace have led to excessive reactions such as reduced restraints of 
government powers, breaks from normal democratic procedures and steep 
incremental funding for security agencies. She also warns that this form of 
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securitisation can ‘open the population to the risk [of] suppression’ (Nissenbaum, 
2005, p. 72). 
Other research has focussed specifically on the speech acts of government figures. 
Ola Hjalmarsson investigates state securitisation of cyberspace in the US, focussing 
particularly on the speech acts of the Obama Administration. He concludes that by 
invoking catastrophic disaster scenarios, such as Pearl Harbour and September 11, 
‘the securitizing actors can relate previous catastrophes to hypothetical disaster 
scenarios involving cascading effects that present existential threats to a range 
of referent objects linked to cyberspace’ (Hjalmarsson, 2013, p. 20). 
Others consider the means through which securitisation is achieved. Kevin Schwarz 
considers how the state securitisation of cyberspace in the US is achieved through 
‘technification’, the process by which issues are constructed as technical, removed 
from political debate and left in the hands of experts (Schwarz, 2016). He concludes 
that ‘cyberspace became conceived as a realm that was purely technical’ and that 
this has led to ‘technical experts acting as securitizing agents, securitizing 
cyberspace through technification’ (Schwarz, 2016, p. 68). Most research in this 
area is focussed on the securitisation of cyberspace in the US and there is a lack of 
research specifically focussing on the UK. 
The literature is often highly critical of state surveillance and the securitising acts 
which serve to legitimise it. Kingsmith, for example, concludes that ‘closed 
censorship of the Internet translates to an Orwellian future, devoid of open-
information, agency or digital freedom’ (Kingsmith, 2013, p. 11). In doing so, 
Kingsmith and others are making their own securitising moves by constructing the 
state’s securitisation of cyberspace as an existential threat to liberty, freedom and 
democracy. Michael Williams terms this concept ‘the securitisation of 
securitisation’ and outlines a strategy of utilising fear to ‘inhibit processes of 
securitisation’ (Williams, 2011, p. 454). Deibert applies a similar concept to 
cyberspace arguing that ‘the securitization of cyberspace may be inevitable, but 
what form that security takes is not’ (Deibert, 2012, p. 274). Deibert wants to 
securitise state surveillance because he believes that doing so will inhibit the 
securitisation of cyberspace as a threat to national security. 
Whilst most of the literature focuses on the state as the securitising actor, there 
are some attempts to consider alternative perspectives. A.T. Kingsmith, for 
example, criticises both the hyper-libertarian and hyper-fascist conceptualisations 
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of cyberspace which he says creates a ‘false dichotomy which makes simplistic and 
deterministic suppositions that new technologies perpetuate either freedom or 
control’ (Kingsmith, 2013, p. 5). He argues that technologies are never about 
freedom or control but depend entirely on the social context in which they are 
situated. 
Jens Kremer considers how cyberspace threats are conceptualised in different 
ways, which he calls different ‘security mind-sets’ (Kremer, 2014, p. 220).  He 
considers a ‘military security mind-set’ that is primarily concerned with national 
security and a ‘liberal security mind-set’ which considers human rights and 
balancing interest. Kremer sees the issue of different security conceptualisations as 
‘the core of the problem when it comes to security and cyber threats’ (Kremer, 
2014, p. 221).  His paper is illuminating but misses out a particularly significant 
‘security mind-set’. He suggests that the ‘military security mind-set’ calls for a 
massive militarisation of cyberspace, whereas the ‘liberal security mind-set’ 
attempts to regulate cyberspace threats through increased policing. Both mind-
sets, according to Kremer, call for increased state activity in cyberspace and this 
neglects the widespread mind-set (highlighted in the literature above) that the 
state itself poses the greatest threat in cyberspace. 
One author who fully considers the notion of securitising threats to digital rights is 
Mariya Georgieva, who considers the impact of alternative securitising actors, such 
as Edward Snowden (Georgieva, 2015). Georgieva argues that whilst the state has 
traditionally held the powers to ‘identify threats, exaggerate their significance to its 
survival and employ far-reaching countermeasures to protect itself’, Snowden 
demonstrated that alternative non-state securitising actors can challenge state 
securitisations (Georgieva, 2015, p. i). Georgieva argues that Snowden successfully 
reversed the thinking around cyberspace threats by replacing fear of threats to the 
state with a fear of the state itself. In doing so Snowden ‘successfully shifted the 
focus of the securitisation of cyberspace from values such as the survival of the 
state and effective national security to the survival of privacy and personal choice’ 
(Georgieva, 2015, p. 44).  
Securitisation Theory was formulated to address how states construct threats and 
legitimise their security responses, so it is understandable that the literature 
focusses on the securitisation of cyberspace by the state. However, in the dispute 
between the DRC and the British state, the DRC also plays a significant role in 
constructing cyberspace threats by warning that surveillance threatens to destroy 
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both democracy and human rights (Berners-Lee, 2012; Muižnieks, 2013). This 
aspect has not been adequately addressed. Addressing securitisations by both the 
state and the DRC will not only provide a more complete picture of the conflict but 
will also help to inform how these competing securitisations interact with one 
another.  
Further consideration of the security dilemma literature is made throughout 
Chapters 2, 3 and 5. 
1.3.6 The Cyber Security Dilemma 
Whilst Securitisation Theory addresses the concept of competing securitisations, it 
does not consider how these competing securitisations interact with each other. To 
address this issue, it is necessary to consider the literature on security competition. 
Former White House security adviser Richard A. Clarke addresses the issue of cyber 
conflict between states. He argues that not only is state-based cyber conflict a 
serious threat, but is also increases the likelihood of traditional war (Clarke, 2010). 
James Farwell and Rafal Rohozinski analyse the Stuxnet cyber attack and warn of 
the danger posed by a confluence between cybercrime and state action (Farwell & 
Rohozinski, 2011). They argue that the existence of the broader ‘Olympic Games’ 
programme, which incorporated Stuxnet, undermines the argument that fears of 
escalation would make state-based cyber conflict implausible (Farwell & 
Rohozinski, 2012).  Thomas Rid also engages with the concept of cyber conflict, but 
takes an alternative perspective, arguing that war is inherently violent and ‘cyber 
attacks help to diminish rather than accentuate political violence’ (Rid, 2013, p. xiv). 
Helen Nissenbaum divides cybersecurity into two distinct conceptions; technical 
security and cybersecurity (Nissenbaum, 2005). Technical security is concerned 
with protecting computer systems and their users from attack through the three 
components of confidentiality, integrity and availability. Cybersecurity links 
computer security with notions of national security. Nissenbaum suggests that the 
inherent differences between the two means that they are placed in opposition and 
‘vie for public and expert support’ (Nissenbaum, 2005, p. 73). 
A substantial theoretical framework through which to study competing cyberspace 
securitisation is the security dilemma which addresses two interrelated issues; how 
to interpret the security actions of another and how to respond to these actions. 
The concept was proposed by John Herz and Herbert Butterfield and suggests that 
fear of the other can lead to spiralling arms races, insecurity and potentially war 
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between states, despite the benign intentions of each side (Butterfield, 1951; Herz, 
1950). The security dilemma is applied to cyberspace by several writers including 
Ben Buchanan, who applies it to cyber espionage, Nicholas Rueter who applies it to 
cyber warfare and Myriam Dunn Cavelty who applied it to the conflict between 
national security and digital rights (Buchanan, 2016; Rueter, 2011; Cavelty, 2014). 
Ben Buchanan uses the security dilemma to consider the offensive/defensive 
information problem with regards to state hacking in cyberspace (Buchanan, 2016). 
He argues that whilst state hacking may appear to be an offensive pursuit, such 
activity is often driven by defensive requirements. ‘Two nations, neither of which 
seeks to harm the other, but neither of which trusts the other, will often find it 
prudent to penetrate each other’s systems’ (Buchanan, 2016, p. cover).  One 
nation’s attempt to secure itself through hacking and information gathering results 
in escalating tensions, increased hacking and less security for all. Buchanan suggests 
that there is no single solution to the problem, which must be addressed through 
multipronged efforts that establish stability, start to build trust and then begin to 
minimise the risks of misinterpretation.  
Nicholas Rueter considers a similar dilemma between states but focusses on the 
prospect of cyber warfare (Rueter, 2011). He argues that cyberspace is particularly 
prone to the security dilemma because it is easier to attack than defend in 
cyberspace and it is difficult to determine whether a state’s investment in cyber 
capabilities is designed for offensive or defensive purposes. Whilst describing the 
situation as grim, Rueter suggests it can be improved by the establishment of 
international institutions and norms to facilitate co-operation, technological 
developments to increase the cost of attack and better signalling of state intentions 
through cyber doctrine and increased transparency.  
Myriam Dunn Cavelty argues that there is a security dilemma between the state 
and the public, which despite huge efforts and vast spending on cybersecurity, has 
resulted in cyberspace becoming more insecure (Cavelty, 2014). Dunn Cavelty 
argues that national security and a form of security that is relevant to the people 
‘should not and must not be at loggerheads with each other’ and in cybersecurity, 
in particular, the two can meet (Cavelty, 2014, p. 703). However, unlike traditional 
conceptualisations of the security dilemma, which blame the emergence of security 
problems on the inability of two parties to understand the defensive nature of each 
other’s security moves, Dunn Cavelty blames the state for the emergence of the 
Cyber Security Dilemma (CSD). She cites the militarisation of cyberspace, the 
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weakening of security through state-based malware, state attempts to de-
anonymise cyberspace and the extension of the notion of national security to 
cyberspace as evidence of the state’s role in reducing both individual and national 
security. In addressing the dilemma between national security and individual 
freedoms, Dunn Cavelty’s work is the most applicable to this thesis, however she 
only addresses the CSD from the perspective of individual security and human 
rights. More research is required into the national security perspective and their 
fears that totally secure communications impede the ability of law enforcement to 
prevent and investigate criminal and terrorist activity. 
Further consideration of the security dilemma literature is made throughout 
Chapters 4, 6 and 7. 
1.3.7 Research Gaps 
Existing research covers a wide range of themes related to this thesis. Research into 
cyberspace governance provides a good appreciation of the different types of 
governance that may be favoured by the DRC and the British state. Jovan Kurbalija’s 
suggestion that different perspectives on the nature of cyberspace might cause 
disputes over cyberspace governance is useful to help unravel the different 
perspectives of the British state and the DRC.  Research into national security and 
surveillance provides historical and real-world context to the dispute over national 
security and human rights and adds depth to the current understanding of the 
conflict between the British state and the DRC. Applications of Hobbes and Locke 
to cyberspace by Tohm, Hendrick and Kaminski provide insight into why the British 
state and the DRC consider cyberspace to be threatening and why this has resulted 
in conflict. But there are still gaps in the research, which are summarised below. 
1.)  There is a substantial body of work on the securitisation of cyberspace, which 
focusses primarily on the state as the securitising actor. This work is largely 
focussed on the US government as the key securitising actor and there are no 
comprehensive assessments of how the British state constructs cyberspace 
threats. Likewise, research into cyberspace discourse largely focusses on the 
US, Russia and the EU rather than the British state. Further work in this area 
will help build an appreciation of how the British state convinces the public of 
cyberspace threats and how this impacts on the conflict with the DRC. 
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2.) Whilst Mariya Georgieva studies Edward Snowden as an alternative securitising 
actor, there is a significant absence of work on the securitisation of cyberspace 
by the DRC. The conflict between the state and the DRC can only be understood 
if the actions and motivations of both sides are addressed, but current research 
is heavily focussed on the state. This is a significant shortcoming of the 
literature and needs to be addressed within this thesis.  Such work can lead to 
a greater understanding of the conflict between the state and the DRC as it will 
provide a parallel understanding of how each side has constructed cyberspace 
threats and how these constructions interact to fuel the conflict.  Likewise, 
existing research into cyberspace discourse is also focussed on states but needs 
to include DRC discourse as well. 
 
3.) The security dilemma has been applied to cyberspace to help understand 
competition relating to cyber warfare and cyber espionage but only Myriam 
Dunn Cavelty applies it to the conflict between the state and the DRC. This work 
relates directly to the subject of this thesis, although its applicability is limited 
by its short length and failure to consider how the interaction between the two 
sides exacerbates the conflict. This thesis will thoroughly apply the security 
dilemma to the dispute between digital rights and national security, to consider 
how this conflict has arisen and why it has resulted in spiralling insecurity. 
 
4.) Whilst current literature covers the consequences of state actions in 
cyberspace, such as the creation of cyber Panopticons, there is very little that 
covers the issues from the state’s perspective. To understand the conflict 
between the state and the DRC it will be necessary to develop a greater 
understanding of the British state’s fears and why they act as they do. 
To address these research gaps a range of research techniques and data collection 
methods are considered. 
1.4 APPROACH 
The following three research questions will be addressed within this thesis; 
1. How do the British state and the DRC construct cyberspace threats? 
2. How have competing threat constructions led to conflict between the DRC and 
the British state? 
3. What strategies can be applied to help resolve this conflict? 
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To consider how to answer these questions it is first useful to consider some 
existing approaches and their limitations.  
1.4.1 Existing Approaches 
A range of techniques have been used within the literature to address similar 
questions. When considering the securitisation of cyberspace most authors use 
primarily open source documentation. For example, in her analysis of US cyber 
threat discourse, Myriam Dunn Cavelty draws upon a range of sources, including 
formal US government policy documents, senate testimony, speeches, lectures and 
official statements (Cavelty, 2007). Research into the securitisation of cyberspace 
by the DRC is limited to Mariya Georgieva’s study of Edward Snowden as an 
alternative securitising actor (Georgieva, 2015). Georgieva uses open sources 
throughout her research including newspaper reporting, comments by his 
supporters and a variety of interviews he gave to the media. 
Some authors have used comparative discourse analysis techniques to consider 
different acts of securitisation. These have also collected data from primarily open 
sources. In their comparative analysis of the different securitisations of cyberspace 
from the German and Russian governments, Gorr and Schünemann use data from 
open sources, including a relatively small sample of Russian (15) and German (17) 
government documents and existing interviews (Gorr & Schünemann, 2013). 
Kabanov takes a similar approach when considering the different securitisations of 
cyberspace by Russia and the EU (Kabanov, 2014). He uses specific government 
documents to demonstrate the evolving Russian and EU discourse on cyber threats 
and combines these with analysis of government policy and the creation of new 
institutions.  
These works make significant contributions to the literature, but their reliance on 
government documents and published interviews limit their ability to reflect the 
motivations and intentions of the key influencing actors, which could be better 
understood through interviews or ethnographic work. However, the intelligence 
community is notoriously difficult to access for academic researchers, due to trust 
issues, secrecy and national security. 
Academic work, utilising interviews and ethnography from the intelligence 
community is limited and is normally produced by those with some form of insider 
status. However, there are still some examples such as Rob Johnston, of the Centre 
for the Study of Intelligence (CSI), who studied the analytic culture in the US 
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Intelligence Community (Johnston, 2005). Johnston conducted ethnographic work 
and interviews with hundreds of analysts across the US intelligence community, 
including those within military intelligence, the CIA, FBI, NGIA and NSA. The CSI is 
embedded within the CIA and was established to introspect on the agencies’ 
intelligence functions, so Johnston was well positioned to conduct the study. 
Bridget Nolan conducted an ethnographic study of the National Counter Terrorism 
Centre (NCTC) in the US, which involved interviews with and observation of 
intelligence analysts (Nolan, 2013). Nolan conducted the study whilst working as an 
intelligence analyst, as part of a graduate fellowship program at the CIA, and 
acknowledges that this placed her in a unique position to conduct research into the 
intelligence community.  
External reviews have been non-existent partly because the IC 
(Intelligence Community) tends to eschew evaluation by outsiders, 
so any sociological exploration of information sharing and 
collaboration at NCTC would require a sociologist who was already 
an insider to the IC (Nolan, 2013, p. 6). 
Nicolas Hare and Paul Collinson also focus on the culture of intelligence agencies 
within their analysis of organisational culture and intelligence analysis within the 
Defence Intelligence Assessments Staff (DIAS) (Hare & Collinson, 2012). They 
conducted several interviews with senior managers and considered how factors 
such as the personality of the analyst affected their work. Hare and Collinson are 
both Ministry of Defence (MoD) employees, demonstrating the benefits that 
insider status provides when seeking access to the UK intelligence community. In 
one example of a non-insider using interviews with the intelligence community, 
Mandeep Dhami interviewed 22 staff within GCHQ’s Joint Threat Research 
Intelligence Group (JTRIG) and seven other staff from GCHQ who support JTRIG 
operations (Dhami, 2011). The interviews were conducted in pairs or individually 
and lasted about an hour. Her report is classified, designed to support GHCQ’s work 
and not meant for public consumption, but was disclosed to the public by Edward 
Snowden in 2013. 
Existing approaches demonstrate that much can be achieved through the collection 
and analysis of information available within the public domain. However, to address 
the research gaps and research questions a more comprehensive approach is 
required. 
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1.4.2 Methodology 
The thesis attempts to address a multifaceted conflict between a range of different 
actors. The conflict exists on several levels, including the public statements that 
serve as acts of securitisation, the referent objects each individual actor values, and 
the actors’ own individual interpretations of the threats to these referent objects. 
Therefore, it is necessary to analyse a range of data from both sides of the conflict, 
covering public statements, private opinions and individual reactions to perceived 
threats. 
The conflict is fought largely within the public arena, through statements, legal 
arguments, policies, debates, campaigns and legislation so it can be studied by 
analysing the large body of publicly available data on surveillance and digital rights 
discourse. This provides a good understanding of the conflict’s origins, causes, and 
grammars and is in line with existing research into the securitisation of cyberspace. 
But, whilst this information is extensive it is less effective in helping to explain why 
the state and DRC securitise cyberspace and how these competing threat 
constructions lead to conflict. To understand the motivations of the DRC and the 
state, as well as their fears and personal understanding of the threat, it is necessary 
to acquire more nuanced information. This can be achieved by conducting 
interviews with key actors from within the state and the DRC, who can explain what 
they fear, why they fear it and how they are affected by the actions of the other 
side. 
This thesis frames the dispute between the state and the DRC as a security 
dilemma, which, at its heart, is an inability of each side to understand the actions 
and intentions of the other. Whilst this can be mitigated by information sharing, 
security dilemma theory indicates that it can only be overcome when each side has 
directly experienced the fears and anxieties of the other. To understand the 
strategies that can be applied to help overcome this conflict it is therefore helpful 
to observe and learn from scenarios where actors from each side are exposed to 
some of the experiences of the other. To acquire this insight, an ethnographic study 
of surveillance actors is also required. 
The following section considers each of the three methods used throughout this 
thesis: 
• open source data collection and analysis; 
• interviews; 
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• an ethnographic study. 
1.4.3 Open Source Data Collection 
This thesis uses information from a wide range of sources but focusses on several 
key actors, events and other data, which have been selected for their relevance and 
prominence in the conflict. 
1.4.3.1 Actors 
Whilst a variety of actors from across the state and DRC are considered throughout 
this work, the following represent the key actors. 
• GCHQ is the UK’s signals intelligence agency and is associated with both 
digital surveillance and cybersecurity. Alongside the NSA it was the focus of 
the Snowden leaks and has been prominent in articulating the dangers of 
encryption. It is also the focus of anger and distrust from the DRC2. 
• Whilst there are several rights organisations within the UK which cover 
surveillance, the Open Rights Group is the only one which focusses solely 
on digital rights and freedoms. It contributed significantly to the IPA and 
positions itself in strong opposition to GCHQ. 
• By disclosing thousands of documents from GCHQ and the NSA, Edward 
Snowden not only kickstarted a new public debate around digital rights and 
surveillance powers, but he also made himself the central focus of much of 
that debate. He has been highly critical of GCHQ and remains an inspiration 
for the DRC. 
• The big technology companies, such as Google, Facebook and Apple, play a 
critical role in the dispute between digital rights and national security. They 
control technology that can significantly assist or thwart digital rights and 
                                                          
2 It is important to note that whilst GCHQ’s public voice is carefully managed, and 
it is often viewed as a single entity (see Chapter 7), it is staffed by individuals with 
a wide range of different views. Likewise, the DRC are comprised of a diverse range 
of individuals and whilst it is fair to say that the majority of this community mistrust 
GCHQ, this cannot be said definitively of all. Whilst actors such as the state, GCHQ 
and the DRC are often treated as singular throughout this work, attempts have also 
been made to reflect these individual perspectives.   
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surveillance. Prominent individuals, such as Tim Cook, are often vocal in 
their opposition to state surveillance. 
The following lists the key information sources available to support this thesis. 
GCHQ 
GCHQ is responsible for both cybersecurity, through the National Cyber Security 
Centre (NCSC) and intelligence collection. The GCHQ website now provides a large 
amount of information on policy and how the organisation works. It also provides 
transcripts of public speeches and a list of press releases. The following are some 
of the key information sources from GCHQ. 
• Press and Media pages. Press releases, news articles and events. 
Transcripts of public speeches made by GCHQ staff. 
• How We Work page: Background on GCHQ policy, partnerships and 
oversight. 
• Who we are page: Information on the staff who work at GCHQ. 
• What we do page: Information on threats and how GCHQ combats them. 
• Twitter Account: Commentary on news events. 
Open Rights Group 
The output from several digital rights organisations is used within this thesis but 
data collection is focussed primarily on the Open Rights Group.  It’s web site, 
Facebook and Twitter accounts provide information on its activities, opinions and 
perspective. The following are some of the key information sources from the ORG, 
although, in addition to these sources, ORG representatives also provide quotes to 
the media and express their opinions through their own social media accounts.   
• Blog: Blogs by ORG staff, published every few days and including public 
comments. 
• Press Releases: Press releases published in response to major news. These 
are often quoted within news reports. 
• Campaigns Web Page: Details and updates on major ORG campaigns. 
• Correspondence Page: A reproduction of all correspondence between ORG 
and official bodies.  
• Reports and Publications Page: All reports produced by ORG. 
• Policy Updates Page: A weekly update with information on all ORG 
activities. 
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• Facebook and Twitter Accounts: Commentary on news events and user 
comments. 
• Twitter Account: Commentary on news events. 
Edward Snowden 
In addition to the influence of the material he disclosed, Edward Snowden is now 
an influential actor himself, despite his current exile in Russia. Information on his 
opinions is available from a range of sources, including the following; 
• Interviews: Several interviews have been conducted with Snowden since 
his exile. These include a two-hour question-and-answer session with 
Guardian readers and reporters and an extensive interview with NBC News. 
• Twitter: Frequent Twitter statements published by Snowden. 
• Appearances: Recordings and reports of Snowden’s ‘appearances’ at 
various events around the world. 
• Other Media: Several books on Edward Snowden, including Luke Harding’s 
‘The Snowden Files’ and ‘Glenn Greenwald’s ‘No Place to Hide’. These 
provide an insider’s view into Snowden and his time in Hong Kong. 
Technology Companies 
The large technology companies, including Apple, Google and Facebook, are 
influential within surveillance and digital rights discourse. Through the websites 
and public statements listed below, they provide a range of information on their 
policies and opinions. 
• Policy Pages: Policy information provided by Apple, Google and Facebook 
through their policy and ‘Community Standards’ pages. 
• Press Releases: Press releases related to surveillance and digital rights 
available through Apple Newsroom, Facebook Newsroom and Google 
‘Press Corner’. 
• Reform Government Surveillance: A joint campaign between technology 
companies, which provides their perspective on surveillance, through a 
website, twitter account and Facebook page. 
1.4.3.2 Events 
Several key events have shaped the conflict between digital rights and national 
security. The government labelled cyber attack as a tier one threat to national 
security for the first time within the SDSR, NSS and UKCSS and articulated its view 
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of the cyber threat and the necessary countermeasures against it. The Snowden 
disclosures focussed international attention on the capabilities and accountability 
of intelligence agencies and the dispute between Apple and the FBI, in 2016, 
highlighting the increasingly important role of technology companies in the conflict. 
The Investigatory Powers Act of 2017 provided the first post-Snowden legislation 
on surveillance powers and provided a significant focus for both the DRC and the 
state. 
SDSR, NSS and UK CSS 
The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), National Security Strategy (NSS) 
and UK Cyber Security Strategy established cybersecurity as a key government 
priority and they provide insight into the government’s thought processes around 
cybersecurity. They provide good examples of the government’s securitisation of 
cyberspace and, as key policy documents, they also set the tone and style of other 
securitising acts from other government. 
• Published reports of the SDSR, NSS and UK CSS 
Snowden Disclosures 
When Snowden took around 50,000 files from the NSA and fled to Hong Kong, he 
gave access to this data to a select group of journalists and associates. A small 
percentage of this was released into the public domain and is accessed through the 
following sources.  
• Snowden Surveillance Archive: Searchable archive of all documents 
disclosed by Edward Snowden, which have appeared in the media. 
Produced by the University of Toronto. 
• Newspapers: Newspapers with direct access to the Snowden disclosures, 
including the Guardian, the New York Times, the Washington Post, Der 
Spiegel, Le Monde, El Mundo and The Intercept. 
• No Place to Hide: Book by Glenn Greenwald detailing the Snowden 
disclosures. 
• Snowden Twitter Account: Commentary by Edward Snowden on 
surveillance issues and his disclosures. 
Apple versus FBI 
Information on the dispute between Apple and the FBI over access to the San 
Bernardino iPhone is widely available in the media. The Electronic Privacy 
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Information Centre (EPIC) also provides a comprehensive resource, including all 
court documents from the case. The following are the main sources of legal 
documents related to the case: 
• Amicus Briefs: Expert witness statements presented to the court in support 
of Apple or the FBI. 
• Official Legal Documents: Initial application by the FBI, Apple’s defence and 
subsequent rebuttals. 
Investigatory Powers Act 
The IPA was a major focus for the state and DRC during the period of this work. The 
official IPA website contains versions of the draft and final bill alongside thousands 
of pages of evidence provided by the DRC and the British state. The following are 
some of the key information sources on the IPA: 
• Written and Oral Evidence: 830 pages of transcribed oral evidence and 
1532 pages of written evidence, submitted by state institutions, individuals 
and the DRC. 
• Other Information: Copies of the draft and final Bills, amendment reports, 
press notices and briefing papers. 
1.4.3.3 Other Data Sources 
A wide range of additional data sources are used throughout this thesis including 
Twitter comments, newspaper reporting, television reports, polling data and a 
range of websites and blogs. Online search engines are particularly useful for 
finding the most influential discourse as they provide results weighted towards 
more popular web pages, which helps to identify the most influential discourse. 
However, as outlined by Anderson and Kanuka, they are also influenced by the 
user’s location, the websites they have visited and their previous search history 
(Anderson & Kanuka, 2003). Within this thesis, data from a range of search engines 
that do not personalise data is combined with data from search engines with 
personalised search disabled, to try to limit this potential source of bias. 
Advanced search features are also used to discover specific information. For 
example, specific date and regional settings are used to discover popular discourse 
related to particular events, within particular countries. In addition, the snowball 
technique is used to discover discourse related to particular issues by chaining 
information from news reports, social media and public statements.  For example, 
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a submission to the IPB may include a reference to a news report, which is then 
accessed directly. This report may provide a partial quote from a digital rights 
activist, which is also accessed directly and may, itself, provide additional material 
for research. 
Other prominent sources of information include the Intelligence and Security 
Committee, as it provides a repository for information relating to surveillance 
legislation and activities, the WikiLeaks website, which provides an insight into 
secret communications between the state and technology companies, and a range 
of official government sources, which provide the official position of the state. 
Intelligence and Security Committee 
The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) oversees the intelligence and 
security agencies. It produces reports following major events such as the murder of 
Lee Rigby, the proposed Investigatory Powers Bill and the Edward Snowden 
disclosures and makes recommendations to the government. The following are 
some of the key information sources on the ISC: 
• ISC Reports: Reports produced by the committee, including several on 
surveillance powers; 
• Transcripts and Public Evidence: Oral and written evidence provided to the 
ISC. 
Official Government Sources 
The government website and social media pages provide official information 
including statements and speech transcripts by the Prime Minister and other 
officials, press releases and policy information. Key elements related to surveillance 
and digital rights include: 
• Prime Minister’s Office: Speeches and statements by the Prime Minister; 
• Home Office: Speeches and statements by the Home Secretary; 
• Foreign & Commonwealth Office: Speeches and statements by the Foreign 
Secretary. 
Wikileaks 
Wikileaks provides a leaked archive of emails involving Hillary Clinton’s campaign 
chairman, John Podesta. They expose Clinton’s relationship with technology 
companies and their private views on surveillance and digital rights. 
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1.4.4 Interviews 
Analysis of the discourse helps to provide an understanding of the major storylines 
within the conflict between the state and the DRC and indicates how these lead to 
the securitisation of cyberspace and the emergence of the CSD. But this discourse 
does not provide a comprehensive understanding of the different perspectives of 
the British state and the DRC and fails to address issues such as how analysts at 
GCHQ feel about allegations that are made against them. Aside from leaks and 
reports from private events, cyberspace discourse from the state is heavily 
controlled and sanitised and tends to conform to pre-determined political 
positions. Whilst the DRC is generally more willing to share their personal views, 
they still focus on slogans and pre-determined storylines, which fit their model of 
communications campaigning. In addition, it is rare for a member of the DRC to be 
provoked or challenged, which might provide an insight into their feelings, 
motivations and desires and this leaves a potential gap in understanding. 
To address this issue, interviews are conducted with members of the British State 
and the DRC to provide insight into their feelings, motivations and desires. A semi-
structured approach is used to enable the author to pursue interesting lines of 
enquiry and encourage interviewees to introduce new ideas and topics. ORG staff 
are used to represent the DRC as it is the only organisations within the UK 
specifically focussed on digital rights and GCHQ staff are used to represent the 
British state as they are the UK’s predominant state intelligence actors. 
1.4.4.1 GCHQ 
Due to the sensitivity of GCHQ’s work, their public statements are carefully 
controlled and only media trained senior leadership tend to appear in public. The 
GCHQ website contains interviews with other GCHQ staff, but these provide only a 
superficial insight into their individual perspectives (GCHQ, 2016). To understand 
how and why the state securitises cyberspace and why there is a conflict with the 
DRC, it is necessary to understand the views, emotions and thought processes of 
state intelligence actors and a good way to achieve this is to speak to them directly. 
GCHQ provided permission for interviews to be conducted with their staff. This may 
have been assisted by my perceived insider status3 and the organisation’s support 
for the Royal Holloway Centre for Doctoral Training in Cyber Security (CDT). This 
                                                          
3 I previously worked with GCHQ as a liaison officer to an MOD agency. See 1.5.3 Ethics for 
further details. 
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research is used throughout this thesis and provides additional material that is not 
accessible within the public discourse. Whilst the Open Rights Group is relatively 
easy to observe through open events and published recording of its events, GCHQ 
is much more difficult. Ethnographic work at GCHQ would provide additional 
information on the practices and experiences of state intelligence actors, but this 
was not possible to arrange. 
To satisfy GCHQ’s security requirements, several criteria were established before 
interviews were conducted. Permission was required from GCHQ before each 
interview. Interview questions were made available to GCHQ before the interviews 
and were adapted slightly at their request, although during the interviews, 
spontaneous follow-up questions were permitted. Interview transcripts were 
provided to GCHQ following the interviews to ensure that they accurately reflected 
what was said, although no alterations or omissions were made. 
Interviews lasted between one and two hours and were held within GCHQ's 
headquarters in Cheltenham. The following GCHQ employees were selected, after 
negotiation with GCHQ over their availability and suitability and were chosen to 
cover viewpoints relating to policy, communications and analysis. At the request of 
GCHQ, only their first names are provided below. 
• Cyber Policy Advisor (David) 
• Head of Cyber Crime (Adrian) 
• Head of Communications and Campaign Planning (Matt) 
• Head of News (Emily) 
• Public Communications and Campaign Planning (Fiona) 
The interviews are semi-structured and focus on the topics listed in Table 1.1.  
Introduction: To establish their backgrounds, general views and 
motivations for working at GCHQ  
 
Cyber 
Worldview: 
To establish their opinions on surveillance and digital rights, 
including what powers the intelligence community should 
hold and what restrictions should be placed on them. 
Cyberspace 
Threats: 
To establish their opinions on cyberspace threats; where they 
come from and what they threaten. 
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GCHQ: To establish their opinions on GHCQ’s purpose, how it seeks 
to achieve this and what limitations there are on its work 
GCHQ’s 
Message: 
To establish their opinions on how GCHQ communicates with 
the public and what challenges it faces in doing so. 
Alternative 
Views:  
 
To establish their opinions on the DRC including why they are 
thought to oppose GCHQ, how widespread their views are 
and how this affects GCHQ and its staff. 
Use of Language To establish their opinions on phrases used by the DRC to 
denigrate GCHQ such as ‘Snoopers’ Charter’ and ‘Mass 
Surveillance’. To establish their opinions on the public use of 
language by GCHQ staff, such as the former director’s claim 
that social networks were the ‘command and control centres 
of choice’ for terrorists. 
Table 1.1: GCHQ interview topics 
1.4.4.2 Open Rights Group (ORG) 
The opinions of the DRC are more easily accessible than those of the British state 
because there are no security restrictions on their pronouncements and their focus 
is on communications campaigning and getting their message heard. ORG make 
extensive use of their website and blog to spread their message and their staff are 
freely available to talk to at events and meetings. Staff also frequently express their 
views on social media and news websites and occasionally take part in television 
interviews. However, whilst ORG frequently comments on the actions and policies 
of the state, they are rarely questioned on their own policies and motivations. To 
understand what motivated their policies, how they approach state surveillance 
and why they use particular language to promote their cause, interviews were 
conducted with two senior ORG policymakers. ORG director, Jim Killock and Policy 
Director, Javier Ruiz were selected for interview to cover the viewpoints of those 
involved in policy making and communication. 
Interview questions were made available to ORG before the interviews, although 
during the interviews spontaneous follow-up questions were permitted. Interview 
transcripts were provided to ORG following the interviews to ensure that they 
accurately reflected what was said although no alterations or omissions were 
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made. Interviews lasted between one and two hours and were held at a public 
location near to the ORG headquarters. 
The interviews are semi-structured and focus on the topics listed in Table 1.2. 
Introduction: To establish their backgrounds, general views and 
motivations for those involved with ORG  
 
Cyber 
Worldview: 
To establish their opinions on surveillance and digital rights, 
including what powers the intelligence community should 
hold and what restrictions should be placed on them 
Cyberspace 
Threats: 
To establish their opinions on cyberspace threats; where they 
come from and what they threaten 
ORG: To establish their opinions on ORG’s role, how it seeks to 
achieve this and what difficulties it experiences 
ORG’s Message: To establish their opinions on who ORG targets and how it 
gets its message across 
Alternative 
Views:  
 
To establish their opinions on the intelligence services, 
including why they act in the way they do and what might 
motivate them 
Use of Language To establish their opinions on phrases such as ‘Snoopers’ 
Charter’ and ‘Mass Surveillance’, which they often use. To 
establish their opinions on the public use of language by 
GCHQ staff, such as the former director’s claim that social 
networks were the ‘command and control centres of choice’ 
for terrorists 
Table 1.2: Open Rights Group interview topics 
1.4.5 Hunted Ethnographic Case Study 
The culture of state intelligence actors, the pressures and ethical dilemmas they 
face and how their attitudes and opinions are affected by exposure to surveillance 
practices, are all factors that are difficult to study but play a significant role in the 
conflict. Whilst discourse analysis and interviews provide a good appreciation of 
the policies, perspectives and approaches of the state and the DRC, they cannot 
address how actors on both sides would react to exposure to the lives of the other, 
including their perspectives, their fears and their anxieties. 
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Participant observation is an extremely useful tool for the study of securitisation as 
it provides ‘an account of the world from the standpoint of “insiders”’ (Balzacq, 
2011, pp. 44-45). As Balzacq explains, ‘participant observation has been especially 
important to researchers who investigate the “backstage” of securitizaion, that is 
processes of securitisation that are obscured from the view of outsiders’ (Balzacq, 
2011, p. 45). This makes participant observation particularly useful to the study of 
surveillance and state intelligence actors who are, by their nature, obscured from 
the view of outsiders. As Scott Watson highlights, ethnographic research has been 
poorly utilised by securitisation scholars and ‘there is a need to move away from 
the sole reliance on content and discourse analysis, towards other approaches, 
such as ethnographic research that explore how audiences interpret and negotiate 
securitised representations’ (Watson, 2012, p. 299).  
Whilst GCHQ provided staff for interview they declined to permit an ethnographic 
study due to security concerns. However, an alternative opportunity existed in the 
form of the reality crime show, Hunted. Within the show, several members of the 
public take on the role of state fugitives and attempt to stay on the run for 28 days. 
Meanwhile, a collection of current and former police, military and intelligence 
actors attempt to track them down using the powers of the state. Due to my 
experience, working for the police and the Royal Air Force, I was able to take part 
in the show as the lead analyst within the hunter’s headquarters, Hunted HQ. 
Taking part in the show, observing the participants and conducting interviews 
provides a valuable opportunity to gain insight into the world of state intelligence 
actors. It also provides a unique opportunity to observe their reaction when they 
themselves are subject to surveillance, through the mechanics of the show. The 
insights gained supplement the information gathered through discourse analysis 
and interviews. More information on the nature of the show is provided in Chapter 
7. 
Whilst there are some who would argue that reality television shows are an 
ethnography in themselves, ethnographic studies of reality television shows are 
rare (Clement, n.d.). Some, for example Deligiaouri and Popovic, study reality 
television shows by conducting interviews with participants, while others, such as 
Annette Hill, focus on audience reactions (Deligiaouri & Popovic, 2010; Hill, 2005). 
This thesis’s use of interviews and its observation of Hunted participants is unique 
as it considers Hunted not as a television show but as an environment where 
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participants simultaneously perform the role of state intelligence actors, whilst also 
being monitored and observed by the public.  
Whilst Hunted can provide an appreciation of the behaviour and motivations of 
state intelligence actors, it also provides an opportunity to study how these actors 
are perceived by the public. There has been some previous research into the 
influence of entertainment media on the perceptions of the security services, 
although this has mainly focussed on the police, rather than state intelligence 
agencies. A poll carried out by Fitzgerald et al revealed that 29% of Londoners 
derived their knowledge of the police from ‘media fiction’, with only 20% deriving 
their knowledge from direct experience (Fitzgerald, et al., 2002, p. 78). It is likely 
that the percentage who derive their knowledge of the intelligence services from 
media fiction is even higher given the lack of direct contact most people have with 
state intelligence actors. Donovan and Klahm reveal that most of the literature on 
television crime drama focuses on the processes, the nature of the crimes, the 
ethnicity of the suspects and the nature of the criminal justice system, whilst having 
‘relatively little to say about the portrayal of police on TV’ (Donovan & IV, 2015, p. 
1263). Their own study reveals that viewers of crime dramas are more likely to have 
a positive image of the police and ‘are more likely to believe the police are 
successful at lowering crime’ (Donovan & IV, 2015, p. 1261). Whilst low error and 
misconduct rates in crime dramas might contribute to this positive impression, 
Donovan et al also highlight the humanisation of police officers including their 
portrayal as ‘passionate and well-intentioned … good guys’ (Donovan & IV, 2015, p. 
1275). 
1.4.5.1 Hunted Ethnography Design 
To observe the thoughts and motivations of the state intelligence actors 
participating in Hunted, I acted as a participant/observer by taking part in the show 
as lead intelligence analyst within Hunted HQ. This role provided a unique 
opportunity to conduct an ethnographic study of the show’s participants and to 
experience the practices, emotions and personal experiences of state intelligence 
actors. Within this role I observed the other participants and the culture of the unit 
and experienced the pressures, emotions and challenges involved. The study was 
conducted over 28 days during Series 2 of the show, which was filmed in London. 
Notes were kept throughout filming and interesting issues were investigated 
through formal interviews and conversations with the participants. The 
ethnographic study engaged with the following issues; 
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• How state intelligence actors conceptualise issues of surveillance and 
digital rights, whilst conducting work that intrudes on individual privacy. 
• How state intelligence actors respond to operating in an environment with 
far greater transparency than they are accustomed to. 
• How exposure to state intelligence actors affects different audiences.  
• How state intelligence actors react to becoming surveilled themselves and 
how this affects their thoughts, feelings and actions. 
Listed below are key additional sources of information on the show, which are 
widely available online, including the episodes, audience reaction and media 
reporting. 
• Episodes: Recordings and transcripts4 of each episode capture the thoughts 
and actions of the show’s participants. 
• Audience Reaction: Twitter and Facebook postings available through the 
Twitter account @Hunted_HQ and the hashtag #hunted. 
• Media Reporting: Articles published in a variety of newspapers and 
magazines, which include interviews with participants. 
1.4.5.2 Hunted Interviews 
Whilst episodes of the show and media reporting provide useful information, they 
do not afford a comprehensive understanding of the views, thoughts and emotions 
of the participants, particularly with regards to how the show changed or 
embedded their views. To address this, semi-structured interviews are conducted 
with the following Hunters and TV producers;  
• Peter Bleksley (Chief) 
• Ben Owen (Deputy Chief) 
• Aisha Ishaq (Intelligence Officer) 
• Paul Vlissidis (Head of Cyber) 
• Aaron Eccles (Production) 
Interviews with the Hunters focus on their experiences and motivations during the 
show, the impact of being filmed and whether their views changed during the 
experience. The interview with Aaron Eccles focusses on his expectations for the 
show and the public’s response to it. 
                                                          
4 https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/episode_scripts.php?tv-show=hunted-uk-2015 
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The interviews are semi-structured and focus on the topics listed in Tables 1.3 and 
1.4. 
Hunters 
Introduction: To establish their backgrounds, general views and 
motivations for taking part in the show 
 
Cyber 
Worldview: 
To establish their opinions on surveillance and digital rights, 
including what powers the intelligence community should 
hold and what restrictions should be placed on them 
Cyberspace 
Threats: 
To establish their opinions on cyberspace threats; where they 
come from and what they threaten 
Motivation To establish their motivations whilst taking part in the show 
The Other To capture how they felt about the ‘other side’ during the 
show. How the hunters felt about the fugitives. 
Post Filming To establish whether filming the show affected their views on 
surveillance and digital rights 
Post Screening 
 
To establish whether these views changed once the show was 
broadcast and the participants were able to observe the 
actions and emotions of the ‘other side’. 
Table 1.3: Hunter interview topics 
Production Staff 
Introduction: To establish their role within the show  
 
Approach: To establish how they approached issues of surveillance and 
digital rights within the show. 
Engagement To establish how the producers engaged the audience using 
the @Hunted_HQ Twitter account. 
Reaction To establish how the audience reacted to the show and the 
show’s use of Twitter to interact with them. To assess how 
the audience’s reaction shifted during the show. 
Personal 
Experience 
To establish their personal experience whilst producing the 
show and if it changed their attitudes towards surveillance 
and digital rights.  
Table 1.4: Production interview topics 
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Further information on Hunted is provided in Chapter 7. 
Data Analysis 
To utilise this data, a range of qualitative analytical techniques are considered, 
including content and discourse analysis. 
1.4.5.3 Content Analysis 
Content analysis is a research method, which involves the systematic analysis of a 
range of texts or other communication artefacts to determine their properties. 
Texts are codified and ordered and then systematically analysed to identify 
correlations and generate statistics such as word frequencies and associations. 
Content analysis is increasingly used to measure the success of public relations and 
the impact of political scandals but is rarely applied to securitisation (Balzacq, 2011, 
p. 52). Whilst it is a powerful statistical technique, it can only be used to address 
the language used within a text and does not consider the wider context of that 
text. As a result, it is not used in this work. 
1.4.5.4 Critical Discourse Analysis 
Instead of focussing exclusively on the language of a text, discourse analysis also 
considers its context and other social aspects. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
treats discourse as a social practice, considering power relations, ideology and 
politics, through a critical lens. It is, therefore, a useful tool to help understand why 
actors have securitised cyberspace, why these acts have been successful and how 
they are viewed by others. CDA provides a tool to critically analyse the discourse 
from securitising actors to help understand why they use particular language in 
certain contexts and why that language leads to successful securitisation or not. 
CDA is used within this thesis to analyse the most prominent discourse around 
surveillance and digital rights, from both the British state and the DRC.  
1.4.5.5 Intertextual Analysis 
There are two methods by which CDA can be applied to the surveillance and digital 
rights discourse; intratextual analysis and intertextual analysis (Balzacq, 2011, p. 
43). Intratextual analysis considers a specific element of discourse and assesses its 
meaning, intent and performative power. Different texts are then compared based 
on these characteristics. Intertextual analysis considers the storylines that emerge 
through the interplay of bodies of texts. Through the repetition of themes, 
storylines are generated that give overall coherence to a range of discourses. The 
notion that backdoors are inherently dangerous is an example of a storyline that 
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has emerged from the body of surveillance and encryption discourse, rather than 
from one particular text. The securitisation of cyberspace and the conflict between 
the state and the DRC is reflected in a wide range of securitising acts, conducted by 
a wide range of securitising actors, which makes it particularly suitable for 
intertextual analysis. This technique is used throughout the thesis, to determine 
how different acts and discourses combine to influence the dispute between the 
British state and the DRC. 
The first stage of this intertextual approach is to identify the common storylines 
that emerge from the digital rights and surveillance discourse. This is achieved 
through a review of storylines identified by other authors and an analysis of the 
most common themes within the discourse. After these storylines are established, 
the discourse is analysed within the context of these storylines. Within Chapter 2, 
for example, the storylines of hypersecuritisation, technification and everyday 
security practices, which are identified by Hansen and Nissenbaum, are combined 
with storylines of darkness, shadows and silence, which were evident within the 
discourse (Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009). The discourse is then analysed in relation 
to these storylines to establish the role they play in the dispute between the British 
state and the DRC. 
1.5 CHAPTER STRUCTURE 
This thesis is organised into three parts. Part 1 considers the securitisation of 
cyberspace. Part 2 considers how this has led to conflict. Part 3 considers existing 
efforts to resolve this conflict and presents some general principles that could help 
address the conflict in the future. 
Part 1:  
This part addresses how cyberspace has been constructed as a threatening space 
by the DRC and the British state. It utilises the CS’s approach to securitisation, whilst 
also drawing upon other useful adaptions of the theory including Hansen and 
Nissenbaum’s application of Securitisation Theory to cyberspace (Hansen & 
Nissenbaum, 2009). It considers the two categories of facilitating conditions as laid 
out by the Copenhagen School; the external, contextual and social conditions, 
which include the context and power relations between the audiences and the 
securitising actors and the internal, linguistic-grammatical rules, which include the 
format and structure of the speech act itself (Barry Buzan, 1998). 
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Chapter 2 identifies the key securitising actors from within the state and 
DRC as well as the key audiences that are influenced by securitising acts. It 
addresses the authority, reach and trustworthiness of each securitising 
actor, their relationships with the audiences and the degree to which they 
can convince these audience of their securitising claims. 
Chapter 3 identifies the securitising claims made by the DRC and the British 
state and provides examples of securitising acts that have constructed 
cyberspace as threatening to digital rights and national security.  It 
considers how the acts’ structure, grammars and heuristic artefacts, 
combine to increase the likelihood that they will be accepted by their 
audiences.  
Part 2: 
This part addresses the role of the security dilemma in exacerbating the conflict 
between the DRC and the British state. It utilises the original conceptions of the 
security dilemma introduced by Herbert Butterfield and Robert Jervis, as well as 
drawing on more contemporary interpretations and recent applications of the 
security dilemma to cyberspace (Butterfield, 1951; Herz, 1950; Jervis, 1978). 
Chapter 4 demonstrates how the security dilemma applies to the conflict 
and how the competing securitisations identified in Part 1 have resulted in 
a spiralling arms race and a breakdown in trust between the British state 
and the DRC. It considers how the unique characteristics of cyberspace 
make it susceptible to the security dilemma and addresses the impact this 
has had on the conflict. 
Part 3: 
This part considers strategies for resolving the dispute between the DRC and the 
British state. It considers how issues can become desecuritised and returned to 
normal politics and how security dilemmas can be overcome. It also presents a case 
study from the television show Hunted, which is used to make several observations 
that could help to solve the conflict. 
Chapter 5 considers the negative impacts of the securitisation of 
cyberspace and the normative dilemma of how to approach the issue. It 
also considers different approaches to desecuritisation and why these have 
proven to be so difficult to apply to cyberspace. 
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Chapter 6 considers some of the factors that exacerbate or mitigate the 
conflict between the state and the DRC, which has resulted in the CSD. It 
considers the factors that enable security dilemmas to be overcome and 
considers how various actors have attempted to overcome the conflict 
between the British state and the DRC. It considers unilateral attempts to 
win the conflict and more collaborative approaches. It also considers why 
these approaches have so far failed 
Chapter 7 is a case study using the television show Hunted. It explores 
some of the findings of the previous chapters through the environment of 
Hunted, including how exposure to the other and their experiences impacts 
on sensibility and trust.  
The thesis concludes with a summary of how cyberspace has been securitised and 
how the logics of the security dilemma have created a spiralling conflict between 
the state and the DRC. It then describes several principles that could be applied to 
overcome these issues. 
1.6 ETHICS 
Funding for this thesis was provided by the Engineering and Physical Sciences 
Research Council (EPSRC). Research was conducted within the EPSRC Centre for 
Doctoral Training (CDT) in Cyber Security at Royal Holloway, which is supported by 
the UK government as part of the 2011 Cyber Security Strategy. The author has 
previously worked within the intelligence community, including a placement at 
GCHQ, although he was not employed directly by GCHQ itself. GCHQ interviewees 
were aware of the author's background and whilst this may have encouraged 
interviewees to provide more open and honest answers, it may also have caused 
them to make assumptions about the interviewer’s opinions and omit information 
that was assumed to be already known. To mitigate these issues, the interviewees 
were encouraged to consider the author as an academic rather than a past 
colleague and the author conducted the interviews to reflect this. 
As part of the ethnographic study into the television show, Hunted, the author 
worked in Hunted HQ as the lead intelligence analyst. The experience could 
potentially lead to bias towards state intelligence actors and bias against digital 
rights campaigners. To mitigate this, the author acknowledged this potential source 
of bias and made sure to maintain neutrality throughout the research. 
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The author’s role could also have impacted on interviews with other participants in 
the show. He worked closely with the other Hunters who were later interviewed 
and this relationship helped to establish trust before the interviews. He also worked 
in opposition to the Fugitives, although never came in direct contact with them 
during the show. Some of these were later interviewed and these interviews may 
have been influenced by consideration of the author as part of the rival unit who 
had been opposed to them. Interviewees may also have been influenced to hide 
critical opinions of the surveillance efforts used within Hunted so as not to offend 
the author. To mitigate these issues, interviewees were encouraged to consider the 
author as an academic and not as a fellow participant on the show. Interviews were 
conducted away from the TV studios; sufficient time was allowed between the 
show’s filming and the interviews and the author presented questions as an 
outsider with no insider knowledge of the show. 
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2 THE SECURITISATION OF CYBERSPACE: POWER RELATIONS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
According to the Copenhagen School, the success or failure of an act of 
securitisation relies upon the internal characteristics of the act, including the 
language and its meaning and the external characterises of the act, which are the 
power relations between the security speaker and the audience. ‘To study 
securitisation’ according to the Copenhagen School, ‘is to study the power politics 
of a concept’ (Barry Buzan, 1998, p. 32). The power relationship between the 
security speaker and the audience relies on how audiences judge the authority and 
trustworthiness of the security speaker. 
In cyberspace, there are a range of securitising actors who have differing 
relationships with different audiences and differing abilities to convince each 
audience that a referent object is under threat. Digital rights organisations might 
be trusted by the public but have limited reach, whereas whistle-blowers such as 
Edward Snowden might have the ability to reach millions but are mistrusted by 
many. This complex web of relationships helps to determine which acts of 
cyberspace securitisation are accepted, by whom and why. 
This chapter considers the actors involved in the securitisation of cyberspace and 
their relationship with a variety of audiences. It considers how these power 
relationships impact on the acceptance or not of securitising acts and demonstrates 
which actors are most influential with which audiences and why. In doing so, this 
chapter contributes to a greater understanding of how cyberspace has become 
securitised. 
2.2 AUDIENCES 
According to the Copenhagen School, there are four key elements of Securitisation 
Theory; the referent object, the securitising actor, the threat and the audience. 
However, as Ole Waever acknowledged in 2014, the role of the audience had not 
been well explored (Waever, 2014). 
A key concept in securitisation which has received too little 
attention in the early versions of the theory, but I would today say 
is the most important, is the audience. Because it’s not just a 
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matter of threat speak; anyone can stand up and say this or that is 
a threat. Something happens at the moment when an audience 
accepts that because of this alleged threat they are willing to 
accept that we to go to war, keep secrets, shut down this debate, 
make whatever extraordinary measures we otherwise wouldn’t do. 
So the crucial decision is, in some sense taken by the relevant 
audience (Waever, 2014). 
Thierry Balzacq pays particular attention to the audience, describing it as one of the 
three faces of securitisation alongside political agency and context. He describes 
the centrality of the audience as one of the three core assumptions of securitisation 
theory.  
The success of securitisation is highly contingent upon the 
securitising actor’s ability to identify the audience’s feelings, needs 
and interests. To persuade the audience (e.g. the public), that is, to 
achieve a perlocutionary effect, the speaker has to tune his/her 
language to the audience’s experience (Balzacq, 2011, p. 9) 
The ‘empowering audience’ is one which has a direct causal link with the issue and 
which can enable the securitising actor to adopt measures to tackle the threat. A 
securitising move is successful when the empowering audience accepts the threat 
and empowers the securitising actor to combat it. The audience can support the 
securitising actor by both formal and moral means. Formal support is tangible, such 
as the provision of legal authority via a vote, or the granting of authority through 
an election, whereas moral support is more abstract, taking the form of general 
support and solidarity for a cause. 
According to Balzacq, to persuade an audience the speaker must resonate with 
their language. 
An effective persuasion requires that a speaker’s argument employ 
terms that resonate with the hearer’s language by speech, gesture, 
tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying [her/his] ways 
with [her/his] (Balzacq, 2005, p. 184).  
But often, an actor must persuade multiple audiences, each of which is subject to 
different logics of persuasion. Securitisation can be achieved through a single 
speech act or it may be necessary to target different acts towards different 
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audiences. It is therefore necessary to consider the nature of each audience and 
ask why they might be susceptible to particular logics of persuasion. Opinion within 
each audience may also differ so it is also necessary to consider the degree to which 
an issue has been securitised by an audience and the degree to which this has 
empowered the securitising actor. 
This chapter considers the legislature, who can grant the security and intelligence 
agencies power and restrict their activities, the public, who can provide informal 
support or opposition to government policies, and technology companies who 
provide the government with intelligence data and produce the software and 
hardware used by most of the public. 
2.2.1 The Public 
Whilst individual citizens have little influence over the state, collectively they are 
the largest audience and can influence who forms the government and what their 
policies are. The public can provide formal support to the government by voting 
them in or out of office and they can also resist the state by opposing surveillance 
and utilising technologies that impede the state’s ability to conduct it.  
The public can support the DRC by engaging with digital rights campaigns, 
contributing funding and utilising and promoting security technologies such as 
encryption and Tor, which becomes more secure the more users it has. The public 
also has significant influence over the other two audiences, the legislature and 
technology companies. When voting on surveillance legislation, Members of 
Parliament (MPs) are likely to take into consideration the views of their 
constituents as well as the public at large. Technology companies also rely on the 
public to purchase their products and use their services, so a privacy and 
surveillance policy that is in tune with public demands is desirable. 
2.2.2 The Legislature 
The legislature establishes the law that governs intelligence and security agencies, 
technology companies and the public. Whilst the sitting government can propose 
legislation, majority votes in the House of Commons and House of Lords are 
required for bills to pass into law. As support or opposition to surveillance 
legislation often crosses party lines, individual MPs have significant power to 
determine the scope and scale of surveillance activities in the UK. The legislature 
also has the power to hold technology companies to account by legislating to 
govern their activities.  
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2.2.3 Technology Companies 
Whilst technology companies can be considered either securitising actors or threat 
actors, they can also be viewed as an audience. The technology industry has the 
power to hinder state surveillance by resisting requests to access customer data, 
producing transparency reports, designing products to be more resilient to state 
surveillance, acting as an expert witness against surveillance legislation and 
providing finance and moral support to the DRC.  Conversely, the technology 
industry can assist the state by complying with state data requests in a timely 
manner, facilitating state access to customer data, blocking terrorist accounts, 
removing terrorist material, reporting suspicious activity on their platforms and 
remaining opaque about how they co-operate with state surveillance activities. 
2.3 SECURITISING ACTORS AND POWER RELATIONS 
According to the Copenhagen School, the securitising actor is the initiator of the 
securitising act and utilises particular language to convince the audience of the 
existence of an existential threat. To achieve this, they must be trusted, be able to 
reach the audience and have the authority to speak security. 
2.3.1 The State 
The British government and the security and intelligence agencies are the two main 
securitising actors within the state and each has different reach, trustworthiness 
and authority. As the following section demonstrates the government can reach a 
huge audience but lacks trust and finds it difficult to speak with authority on 
technical issues. Whereas the intelligence and security agencies carry more 
authority but have a more limited reach. The role of each as a securitising actor and 
the power relations between them and the audiences are discussed in the following 
section. 
2.3.1.1 The Government 
The British government’s ability to communicate on matters of surveillance and 
privacy is unrivalled amongst the other securitising actors. Statements by the Prime 
Minister and Home Secretary will invariably make the national news and the Prime 
Minister’s official Twitter account has over five million followers.  The government 
can also spread its message through engagement with the media and technology 
industry and the production and publication of government policy reports such as 
the UK Cyber Security Strategy (UK CSS). It has the authority to demand meetings 
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with large technology companies, such as Facebook and Google, and can also 
summon senior officials to Parliament (Independent, 2017). 
But, despite this platform, the government’s ability to speak with authority on 
issues of surveillance and digital rights is limited by the widespread belief that 
politicians do not understand modern technology (see Section 3.2.3). Official 
reports such as the UK CSS carry the gravitas of government, but pronouncements 
by politicians are less authoritative and often re-enforce views about government 
ignorance of technology. At a side event, hosted by the Spectator, during the 2017 
Conservative Party Conference, Home Secretary Amber Rudd claimed that she 
didn’t need to understand end-to-end encryption to understand that it was helping 
criminals.  
We will do our best to understand it … I don't need to understand 
how encryption works to understand how it's helping - end-to-end 
encryption - the criminals (Rudd, 2017). 
Whilst her comments were reportedly met with huge applause from the audience, 
for many they were evidence that the government simply does not understand how 
the Internet works (Spectator Events, 2017; The Register, 2017; Open Rights Group, 
2017). 
The government is unrivalled in its ability to reach a wide audience and it can use 
the gravitas of public office and the authority of state institutions to support its 
claims, but its ability to securitise is weakened by doubts over its credibility, 
especially with regards to highly technical issues such as encryption. 
Relationship with the public 
Whether government claims on surveillance and terrorism are accepted by the 
public depends on the degree to which they are trusted. As Jamie Bartlett suggests, 
‘the online surveillance debate is about whether you trust the government or not 
– not privacy v security’ (Bartlett, 2015; Bartlett, 2015). Trust in the British 
government has been declining in the last few years. A 2016 Ipsos MORI survey 
revealed that politicians are the least trusted profession with only 15% of the public 
claiming to trust them to generally tell the truth; a reduction of 6% since 2015 
(IPSOS Mori, 2016). This compares poorly with the most trusted professions such 
as nurses (93%), doctors (91%) and teachers (88%). 
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Several factors have contributed to falling levels of trust in the British state, 
including the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the expenses scandal and the 2007 
financial crash. The war in Afghanistan was supposed to be swift but in 2009, eight 
years after its start, 106 British personnel were killed and Lieutenant General David 
Richards admitted that Afghanistan was ‘more intense and prolonged than any 
other conflict in the last 50 years’ (BBC News, 2006). Before the invasion of Iraq in 
2003, the British government had promised a swift conflict, but on the 23 June 2003 
six British soldiers were killed by an angry mob in Basrah and this marked the start 
of an insurgency in the province which led to the death of 179 UK servicemen (The 
Telegraph, 2009). Tony Blair and George Bush were widely believed to have lied 
about their reasons for invading Iraq after the Iraq Survey Group report rejected 
most of their original claims (Iraq Survey Group, 2004). The Report of the Iraq 
Inquiry (aka Chilcott Report) also condemned some of Tony Blair’s behaviour and 
indicated that he had committed to the war before the issue had been debated in 
Parliament (Chilcott, 2016). The heavy casualties, allegations that British troops 
took part in torture and the lack of significant evidence of WMDs in Iraq vindicated 
those who had opposed the wars and caused significant damage to the reputation 
of the British government (The Baha Mousa Public Inquiry, 2011). As a result, 
opinion on national security and counter-terrorism measures begin to shift with 
many believing the terms were used to justify authoritarian state powers. 
Another event that contributed to falling trust in the British state was the MPs 
expenses scandal, which revealed that many had abused the system on a massive 
scale.  Eight MP’s faced criminal charges and four were jailed. One case which 
attracted public interest was Sir Peter Viggers’ claim for £1600 for a duck house on 
the pond on his second home. The case came to symbolize the dishonesty, 
detachment and self-centred nature of MPs and led to a significant drop in trust in 
the government. The global financial crash of 2007-08 also diminished faith in the 
government after they failed to predict the crash and then failed to meet their own 
targets to bring subsequent austerity programmes to an end. Whilst the 
government can easily reach the public their ability to securitise is constrained by a 
lack of trust in them. 
Relationship with technology companies 
The government is keen to attract technology companies to the UK and in 2010 
David Cameron vowed to establish the east end of London as a ‘world leading 
technology city to rival the US’s Silicon Valley’. This effort has been supported by 
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subsequent governments making the UK the most desirable location for foreign 
technology workers in Europe (Cameron, 2010; City AM, 2016; City AM, 2017; 
YouGov, 2016). 
Whilst technology companies generally accept the government’s claim that 
cyberspace can be threatening to national security, they do not accept that this 
justifies co-operating unquestioningly with the security and intelligence services. As 
a result, the government has resorted to alternative means to achieve this co-
operation, including regulation, the threat of financial penalties, public shaming 
and diplomatic pressure through the US. Before the general election in 2017, 
Theresa May threatened to fine social media companies if they did not take down 
extremist material quickly enough, mirroring a policy that had already been 
instigated in Germany (Politico, 2017).  In January 2015, Prime Minister David 
Cameron asked the US President, Barrack Obama, to ‘step up pressure’ on 
technology companies to ensure they do more to co-operate with intelligence 
agencies and,  on multiple occasions, the government attempted to publicly shame 
technology companies by accusing them of not doing enough to prevent attacks 
(Hannigan, 2014; May, 2017; Cameron, 2015).  
But a deteriorating relationship has left the government frustrated and the Home 
Secretary, Amber Rudd, accused the technology industry of ‘patronising’ and 
‘sneering’ at politicians who try to regulate them (Rudd, 2017). The technology 
industry has responded to criticism by claiming that the British government ‘paints 
an inaccurate picture’ of how much work they do to combat terrorism, but 
politicians, such as Keith Vaz, have said that with their wealth and power they 
should be doing more (Vaz, 2016). 
Relationship with the legislature 
To pass legislation relating to cyberspace and national security the government 
needs to achieve majority votes in both Houses of Parliament and so must convince 
the legislature that cyberspace threats are significant enough to justify new 
legislation. The ability to achieve this relies on several factors, including the size of 
the government’s majority, the existence of a coalition, the authority of the Prime 
Minister and the amount of goodwill held by the ruling party. 
One method that the government can use to influence MPs is to appeal to their 
fear of being responsible for a terrorist attack. ORG director Jim Killock suggests 
that the government gains support for surveillance policies by suggesting to MPs 
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that in the aftermath of an attack they should not want ‘to be the minister that 
didn’t provide us with the powers that therefore led us to not knowing [about the 
threat]’ (Killock, 2016)? This is, perhaps, a powerful persuasion technique. 
Politics itself plays a significant role in the ability of the government to pass 
surveillance legislation, as demonstrated by the rhetoric of the Conservative and 
Labour parties, which switched when there was a change in government. Whilst in 
opposition, the Conservative Party led by David Cameron fiercely opposed new 
surveillance powers, accusing the Labour government of ‘ignoring warnings’ of a 
‘surveillance society’, which had been issued by Information Commissioner Richard 
Thomas (Grieve & Laing, 2009, p. 3). In a report published on the Conservative 
website titled ‘Reversing the rise of the surveillance state’, the Conservatives 
accused Labour of expanding surveillance powers and overseeing ‘a seismic shift in 
the relationship between the citizen and the state, at the expense of the former’ 
(Grieve & Laing, 2009, p. 4). The report quotes a range of evidence from the DRC 
including Privacy International, Professor Ross Anderson and Liberty, and promises 
that a Conservative government will examine ‘the current level of protection of the 
individual against the surveillance state, with a view to strengthening personal 
privacy in a Bill of Rights’ (Grieve & Laing, 2009, p. 11). 
In 2010 the Conservatives were elected into Government in coalition with the 
Liberal Democrats and shortly afterwards proposed the Communications Data Bill, 
which was designed to increase the power of intelligence agencies. It was defeated 
when Nick Clegg, withdrew his party’s support, claiming it required a ‘fundamental 
rethink’ (Clegg, 2012). But in May 2015, after early results indicated that the 
Conservative Party would be elected into government with an absolute majority, 
the Home Secretary Theresa May announced that new surveillance legislation 
would again be a priority. 
We believe that it is necessary to maintain the capabilities for our 
law enforcement agencies so that they can continue to do the 
excellent job, day in and day out, of keeping us safe and secure 
(May, 2015). 
Despite receiving an overall majority in the 2015 general election, the government 
still had to gain the support of Parliament due to opposition to the bill from within 
their own party. The proposed legislation was initially rejected by MPs after it was 
heavily criticised by the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), but after months 
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of debate in Parliament and a series of amendments, MPs voted in favour of the bill 
by a majority of 266 and the Investigatory Powers Bill was enacted on 29 November 
2016 (Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, 2016). 
The legislature is entirely responsible for the passing of new legislation and must, 
therefore, be convinced by the government that new powers are justified. As a 
result, they often act as a moderator on surveillance legislation, initially rebuffing 
government attempts to pass new laws and then finally voting for them once 
greater safeguards are introduced. 
2.3.1.2 The Security and Intelligence Agencies 
The security and intelligence agencies are restricted in their ability to communicate 
their message due to issues of secrecy and national security, but whilst they cannot 
discuss capabilities or specific investigations, they can talk in general terms about 
threats to national security and how surveillance powers are used. 
GCHQ was originally established during the First World War as the Government 
Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) and is famous for its role in breaking the German 
Enigma codes during World War Two. The agency reports to the Foreign Secretary 
and according to the Intelligence Services Act (1994), which placed the organisation 
on a legal footing for the first time, GCHQ’s focus is on supporting ‘the defence and 
foreign policies or Her Majesty’s Government’ as well as the ‘prevention and 
detection of serious crime (HM Government, 1994). GCHQ’s Twitter feed has 
around 57,000 followers and public statements by senior figures within the security 
and intelligence agencies are usually broadcast and published by the media. Whilst 
MPs are frequently accused of not understanding modern technology, the same 
cannot be said of GCHQ because the case against modern surveillance partially 
relies on the argument that GCHQ and NSA’s surveillance capabilities are so 
sophisticated that they pose a substantial threat to individual privacy.  Intelligence 
officials such as GCHQ director Jeremy Fleming are much more able than the 
government to speak with authority on issues of encryption and surveillance, even 
if they might not be trusted to use surveillance powers for the public good. 
Relationship with the public 
Whilst polling suggests that only 15% of the public trust politicians to generally tell 
the truth, 71% still trust the police, more than the clergy (69%), news readers (67%) 
and the ordinary man/woman in the street (65%) (IPSOS Mori, 2016). But the public 
appears to be more suspicious of the intelligence agencies. When asked whether 
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the public trusted GCHQ not to abuse their capability to intercept the internet-
based communication of every British citizen if they had the resources and 
capability to do so, 42% said Yes compared to 52% who said no (YouGov, 2015). 
Whilst the British Intelligence Agencies have historically been trusted by the British 
public, several recent events may have diminished that trust.  Having operated 
largely behind the scenes for decades, the public’s perception of the intelligence 
agencies has changed since the 2011 attacks in New York due to their increased 
prominence in the ‘War on Terror’. The securitization of terrorism following 9/11 
resulted in huge increases to the budgets and remits of intelligence agencies, but 
they have also been accused of failing to prevent attacks, being complicit in torture, 
providing misleading intelligence on WMD in Iraq and committing unnecessary 
intrusions into individual privacy. 
In September 2002, the government published a dossier titled ‘Iraq’s Weapons of 
Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government’. The report claimed 
that Iraq was developing chemical and biological weapons and attempting to 
reconstitute its nuclear program.  The report, which was billed by many as the 
‘dodgy dossier’, was much maligned at the time and was later proven to be largely 
incorrect. Large parts of the dossier were also confirmed to have been plagiarised 
from a student’s thesis. The Chilcot report said that the intelligence community had 
worked from the start on the misguided assumption that Saddam had WMDs and 
did not consider the possibility that he had destroyed them (Chilcott, 2016). It also 
reported that the ‘overstated firmness of the evidence’ for WMD had produced a 
‘damaging legacy, including undermining trust and confidence in Government 
statements, particularly those which rely on intelligence which cannot be 
independently verified’ (Chilcott, 2016, p. Executive Summary p131). 
The 2005 London bombings and their aftermath also damaged faith in the 
intelligence agencies. An ISC report into the attacks revealed that two of the 
perpetrators had previously been under surveillance by MI5 and this led to 
questions about MI5’s competence (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2009). 
Two weeks after the London bombings, an additional attempt was made to attack 
the London transport system, which led to the mistaken police shooting of Jean 
Charles de Menezes. An inquest into the incident returned an open verdict, but 
protests were staged against the Metropolitan Police and many saw the incident as 
an example of an overzealous counter-terrorism strategy and poor police 
surveillance and intelligence gathering procedures (Vaughan-Williams, 2007). 
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The reputation of the intelligence agencies was also damaged by allegations of their 
involvement in torture during the ‘war on terror’. At Guantanamo Bay, UK 
Intelligence officials were accused of complicity in torture and turning a blind eye 
by leaving a room when torture was about to take place (Blakeley & Raphael, 2016). 
Polling by YouGov revealed that 64% of the public believed that the British 
intelligence agencies had been involved in torture, although 34% said that there 
were circumstances where torture was necessary and 47% said that there were 
circumstances where using information obtained through torture was justified 
(YouGov, 2014). 
Trust in GCHQ, was also damaged by the Snowden disclosures and subsequent legal 
judgements against them. In December 2014, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal 
ruled that the PRISM and Upstream intelligence sharing agreements between the 
UK and US did not comply with human rights laws because rules and safeguards 
designed to protect privacy had been kept secret (The Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal, 2014). The ruling did not claim that the programmes themselves were 
illegal. Once the rules governing the programmes were published they became 
compliant with human rights law but the case was damaging to GCHQ’s reputation. 
A more serious breach was revealed in 2016 when the Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal ruled that GCHQ had unlawfully collected data for 17 years. The tribunal 
revealed that GCHQ’s bulk data collection ‘failed to comply with article 8’ of the 
European convention on human rights (Investigatory Powers Tribunal, 2016).  
Whilst the Security and Intelligence agencies can speak with authority on issues of 
terrorism and are far better placed than the government to speak on technical 
issues such as surveillance, the Snowden disclosures and subsequent legal rulings 
against GCHQ have damaged public trust. The securitising claim that GCHQ’s ability 
to monitor crime and terrorism online is diminished due to encryption and other 
security measures is particularly difficult to uphold, given the widespread public 
belief that GCHQ already has overwhelming powers (YouGov, 2013). 
The government, police and intelligence agencies have an unparalleled ability to 
speak to the British public. Whilst the government often lack the authority to speak 
on technical issues, this is mitigated by the expertise of GCHQ. However, several 
incidents including the ‘dodgy dossier’, the expenses scandal and the Snowden 
disclosures have had a significant impact on trust in the state and its institutions, 
which has lessened the impact of the state’s securitising claims on cyberspace. 
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Relationship with technology companies 
The intelligence agencies and technology companies such as Google and Facebook 
have many similarities and are in competition for the same valuable resource of 
information. Facebook and Google collect and exploit information on their users 
for profit, whilst GCHQ use the information they gather to protect national security. 
Like the security and intelligence agencies, technology companies are also accused 
of threatening digital rights by creating panoptic platforms that allow them to 
observe the public without their knowledge (Fast, 2015; Mitrou, et al., 2014; Bruno, 
2014). 
This common desire to master information is demonstrated by similar investments 
that are made by the intelligence agencies and the technology industry. For 
example, the US intelligence’s agencies investment arm ‘In-Q-Tel’ and Google both 
invested heavily in the intelligence start-up ‘Recorded Future’, the intelligence 
analysis platform Palantir was founded by Facebook Board member and initial 
funder Peter Thiel, and Keyhole, the precursor to Google Earth, was also funded by 
‘In-Q-Tel’ (Fast Company, 2013; Wired, 2010). There has also been a great deal of 
cooperation between the intelligence agencies and technology companies. In the 
UK, telecoms companies including BT and Vodaphone allowed GCHQ to tap their 
fibre optic cables, whilst in the US, Microsoft has partnered with the New York 
Police Department to create a real-time monitoring system that combines 
intelligence on criminals and terrorists with CCTV and automatic number plate 
recognition (Fast Company, 2012; The Guardian, 2013). Privacy Advocate Mark 
Weinstein claims that it is this competition that leads technology companies to 
oppose state surveillance rather than any actual concerns for digital rights 
(Weinstein, 2014). 
These companies are not railing against the government for data 
mining. It’s their go-to moneymaker. What they’re fighting against 
is someone else doing it using their sites. They want to be Top Dog, 
left alone to secretly conduct business as usual without regulations 
or intervention. Handing over their treasure trove of information 
to the government makes them pawns. Holding onto that 
information for themselves makes them capitalist kings 
(Weinstein, 2014). 
The relationship between the security and intelligence agencies and technology 
companies was damaged by the Snowden disclosures, which revealed the extent to 
68 
 
which they had been subverted and infiltrated by GCHQ and the NSA (The Guardian, 
2013). Despite previous allegations of collusion between technology firms and the 
intelligence agencies, the Snowden disclosures showed that GCHQ and the NSA 
were intercepting data from companies without their knowledge through programs 
such as ‘Muscular’, which gave GCHQ and the NSA ability to intercept unencrypted 
data when in transit between Google data centres (Washington Post, 2013; 
Cryptome, 2000). The technology companies reacted angrily to these revelations, 
which is demonstrated by a Google Engineer’s blog post, which he wrote in 
response to NSA slides that explained how they compromised Google’s system. 
A giant Fuck You to the people who made these slides. I am not 
American, I am a Brit, but it's no different - GCHQ turns out to be 
even worse than the NSA. We designed this system to keep 
criminals out. There's no ambiguity here … In the absence of 
working law enforcement, we therefore do what internet 
engineers have always done - build more secure software. The 
traffic shown in the slides below is now all encrypted and the work 
the NSA/GCHQ staff did on understanding it, ruined (Hearn, 2013). 
In response, Google, Microsoft and Yahoo all announced that they would now 
encrypt traffic between their data centres and in a blog post Microsoft claimed ‘that 
snooping potentially now constitutes an “advanced persistent threat’’,’ effectively 
comparing NSA and GCHQ surveillance with sophisticated state-sponsored cyber 
attacks from China and Russia  (Microsoft, 2013; Tech Crunch, 2013). 
In some cases, technology companies went beyond boosting their security and took 
measures to deny the government, even whilst providing the same data to 
commercial organisations. In 2017, Twitter blocked any companies who supported 
law enforcement from accessing their data feeds, explaining that they did not want 
Twitter to be involved in surveillance (The Telegraph, 2017). 
We prohibit developers using the Public APIs and Gnip data 
products from allowing law enforcement — or any other entity — 
to use Twitter data for surveillance purposes. Period (Twitter, 
2016). 
The intelligence agencies and technology companies are in competition for access 
to the same data, but prior to the Snowden disclosures, the relationship survived 
through mutual interest and secrecy. However, the power of technology companies 
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has grown, and following the Snowden disclosures, they have demonstrated their 
unwillingness to submit to the demands of the intelligence community. 
Relationship with the legislature 
The intelligence agencies do have significant influence over MPs, reporting directly 
to the Home and Foreign Secretaries and sitting on the Cabinet Office Briefing 
Room (COBR) when necessary. When a new Prime Minister is appointed, one of 
their first briefings is on security and defence. Opposition leaders and shadow 
cabinet ministers also get briefed by intelligence and security chiefs on issues 
relating to national security threats (Huffington Post, 2015). 
Intelligence agency bosses also make public appeals to MPs for new powers to 
combat threats to national security. Between the first and second readings of the 
Investigatory Powers Act, Robert Hannigan, the Director of GCHQ made a speech 
that raised the severity of threats to national security and claimed that MP’s had a 
responsibility to provide GCHQ with the powers to deal with these threats. 
It is not for me, as an intelligence official and civil servant, or for a 
law enforcement officer, to make these broad judgements, 
whether about the use of data in general or encryption in 
particular; nor is it for tech company colleagues nor even for 
independent academics … it must surely be for elected 
representatives to decide the parameters of what is acceptable 
(Hannigan, 2016). 
Parliament does have the ability to scrutinise the activities of the intelligence 
agencies through either the Home Affairs Select Committee or the Intelligence and 
Security Committee (ISC), which publicly questioned the heads of the three major 
intelligence agencies for the first time in November 2013 (The Guardian, 2013). But 
there are also allegations that the intelligence agencies have abused their 
relationship with MPs. An investigation by Computer Weekly alleged that GCHQ 
was routinely accessing the content of MP’s private emails and former Cabinet 
Minister Chris Huhme who had sat on the National Security Council (NSC) claimed 
that GCHQ had misled ministers by failing to inform them about programmes such 
as Tempora and Prism, before they were revealed by Edward Snowden (Huhne, 
2013; Campbell & Goodwin, 2016). 
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2.3.2 Digital Rights Community 
The DRC is comprised of a wide range of actors, but the main influencers can be 
broken down into four key categories: rights organisations, technical experts, 
whistle-blowers and the technology industry. Rights organisations such as Open 
Rights Group (ORG) are the most consistent opponents of state surveillance, 
although they have difficulty reaching and convincing a large audience. Technology 
experts and academia add authority to the cause but also have limited reach. 
Whistle-blowers, such as Edward Snowden, have been able to raise digital rights 
issues to a wide audience and technology companies such as Apple are also 
becoming particularly vocal on the issue. 
Without the gravitas of the state to provide them with reach and authority, the DRC 
relies significantly on individuals to make their case. Security experts such as 
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman, whistle-blowers such as Edward Snowden and 
William Binney and technology executives such as Tim Cook are lauded by the DRC 
as heroes (Sell, 2016; Chakrabarti, 2015). An ‘Access Now’ awards ceremony 
honours the year’s digital rights heroes, as well as castigating the alleged villains 
(Access Now, 2016).  
2.3.2.1 Technical Experts and Academia 
The DRC’s case is strengthened by the support of a wide range of technical experts 
from academia and the technology industry, who bring credibility to the argument 
for digital rights. The security and privacy literature is dominated by criticisms of 
state surveillance, which can be broadly divided into social scientists and 
international relations scholars who criticise the ethics and negative outcomes of 
state surveillance and information security specialists who criticise efforts by the 
state to weaken encryption and hoard zero-day vulnerabilities (Cavelty, 2014; 
Taylor, 2002; Lyon, 2014; Bigo, et al., 2014; Paterson, et al., 2015). Some scholars, 
such as Raphael Bossong, argue that ‘academics should challenge the prevalent 
securitising discourses and ideas’ of surveillance and academic institutions, such as 
Citizen Lab, have been established specifically to advocate for digital rights and to 
investigate digital espionage against civil society (Citizen Lab, 2018; Bossong, 2008, 
p. 24). 
Security experts are considered technical experts who can comment impartially on 
issues of surveillance and digital rights and their research is often used by digital 
rights organisations such as Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) to add weight to 
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their arguments (Electronic Frontier Foundation, n.d.). Academic experts are also 
called upon to provide expert commentary on cybersecurity news stories and they 
have also been active in making the case for digital rights by contributing 
submissions to consultations on legislation (Parliament.uk, 2016). When several 
academics wrote open letters to the US government criticising state surveillance, 
the EFF boasted that ‘academics have joined the fight against mass surveillance’ 
(Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2014).  
The fight to bring the surveillance programs of governments 
around the world within the bounds of human rights law is an 
international effort, and we are heartened to see that academics 
have embraced this global strategy (Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, 2014). 
Whilst academics and other technical experts carry authority and are widely 
considered trustworthy, their reach is more limited than other securitising actors 
and they often play a more supporting role within the DRC. To address this, 
academics often group together to write letters and express their collective 
opinions, which allows them to have a greater impact on the news agenda (US 
Researchers, 2014; US Researchers in Cryptography and Information Security, 
2014; Pateron, et al., 2013; InfoSecurity Group, 2014; The Guardian, 2015; Bernal, 
2014; Wray, 2015). 
The role of experts as securitising actors is critical as they carry authority and 
provide trustworthiness for the DRC’s cause and, as Hansen and Nissenbaum 
explain, cybersecurity experts have achieved a greater ability to speak to the public 
than in other fields. 
In the case of cybersecurity, experts have been capable of defying 
Huysmans (2006:9) description of the invisible role of most security 
experts as they have transcended their specific scientific locations 
to speak to the broader public in a move that is both facilitated by 
and works to support cyber securitizations claimed by politicians 
and the media (Huysmans, 2006, p. 9; Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009, 
p. 1167). 
Relationship with the public 
According to the 2017 Edelman Trust Barometer, academic experts are the most 
trusted category of ‘spokesperson’, with 60% of the public believing them to be 
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extremely credible or very credible, followed by technical experts at 59% (Edelman, 
2017). Whilst trust was less than in 2016 (66% each), it is still twice the number who 
trust government officials (30%) and demonstrates the importance of technical and 
academic expertise to the securitisation of cyberspace. Whilst experts hold a wide 
range of different positions, for the DRC they can provide the science and expertise 
to back-up the securitising claims of whistle-blowers such as Edward Snowden and 
NGOs such as ORG. 
Relationship with technology companies 
Technology experts, academia and technology companies often conduct research 
in similar areas and have a close and symbiotic relationship. Experts need data from 
technology companies to help their research and implement their security findings, 
and technology companies need research to improve their security offerings and 
stay ahead of the competition. During Apple’s conflict with the FBI, there were 18 
amicus (expert witness) submissions in support of Apple. These included a 
submission by 32 law professors, a submission by the EFF and 46 ‘technologists, 
researchers and cryptographers’, and a submission from security experts including 
Bruce Schneier (Electronic Privacy Information Centre, 2016; Zovi, et al., 2016). This 
contrasts with just four amicus submissions in support of the FBI, with a submission 
from the families of victims of the San Bernardino shootings representing the only 
non-official source. 
Expert support for Apple also seems to have influenced the ideology of its CEO, Tim 
Cook. In an interview with Time Magazine, Cook appeared to echo the words of the 
Berkman Centre, who had recently published a report into the ‘Going Dark’ 
problem, suggesting that the amount of information available to law enforcement 
was greater than ever (The Berkman Centre, 2016) 
We shouldn't all be fixated just on what's not available. We should 
take a step back and look at the total that's available, because 
there's a mountain of information about us (Cook, 2016). 
The relationship between technical experts and the technology industry allows 
experts to influence the views and direction of the industry, usually in a direction 
away from surveillance and towards greater digital rights. 
Relationship with the legislature 
Technical experts and academia are an essential element of the legal process and 
their input can influence legislation or even stop it from passing.  An open letter by 
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academic experts helped to support the case against DRIPA and a wide range of 
technical experts also provided evidence to the IPB consultation, including 
Professor Ross Anderson of the University of Cambridge, Mark Ryan, professor of 
computer science at the University of Birmingham and Paul Bernal, lecturer in 
information technology, intellectual property and media law at the University of 
East Anglia School of Law (Parliament.uk, 2016; Bernal, 2014). 
Prior to the IPA, Nick Clegg commissioned the Royal United Services Institute to 
establish a Surveillance Review Panel to consider surveillance practices and David 
Cameron commissioned The Independent reviewer of terror to investigate 
surveillance legislation (Anderson, 2015; Royal United Services Institute, 2015; 
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, 2015). Each report was 
researched and written by independent academics and technical experts and was 
highly influential in the formulation of the IPA, demonstrating the influence of 
technical and academic expertise.  
2.3.2.2 Whistle-blowers 
Whistle-blowers have had a significant influence on the securitisation of cyberspace 
because they generate extensive news headlines, carry authority due to their 
insider view of the organisations they are exposing, and are often granted mythic 
status amongst the DRC because of their personal sacrifice. Several whistle-blowers 
have exposed classified information about GCHQ and the NSA, including Katherine 
Gunn (GCHQ) and William Binney (NSA), but by far the most influential is Edward 
Snowden. Labelling Snowden a whistle-blower is contentious as many believe that 
he acted illegally by exposing classified intelligence, disproportionately because he 
leaked thousands of documents, and unethically because he assisted the enemies 
of the UK and US and damaged the national security of both (Kaplan, 2017). 
What is certain is that Snowden’s opinions on surveillance and privacy have reached 
a huge audience around the world. When his disclosures were first published by 
the Guardian Newspaper and New York Post, they made headlines around the 
world for weeks and were often front-page news in British newspapers. The 
magnitude of the disclosures, the revelation of their content and the intrigue of his 
escape to Hong Kong and exile in Russia kept the story alive, and Snowden became 
a household name.  
Despite his exile in Russia, Snowden established a Twitter account with over three 
million followers, which he uses to criticise UK and US surveillance policies. He also 
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regularly attends talks and conferences around the world using a BeamPro 
‘telepresence robot’ that acts as a video conferencing device and can be driven 
around a stage remotely. His first use of the system was to deliver a talk to the TED 
conference in 2014 titled ‘Here’s how we take back the Internet’, which has over 
four million views on the TED website (TED, 2014). 
Snowden is also able to speak directly to key security advocates, technology experts 
and academics. In what was reported as a ‘call to arms’ to tech companies, 
Snowden appeared by video conference at SXSW 2015 to a private audience of 
technology and policy experts, including Twitter’s senior product counsel and 
Evernote’s CEO (Verge, 2015). Snowden urged them to foil government surveillance 
by implementing better security technologies such as end-to-end encryption (The 
Verge, 2015). Snowden has also featured in several books including Glen 
Greenwald’s ’No Place to Hide’, ‘The Snowden Files’ and ‘Snowden’ by Kieran 
Fitzgerald. In 2016 Oliver Stone directed the film, ‘Snowden’ which focussed on his 
whistleblowing. Snowden is backed by several organisations such as the Courage 
Foundation and has received celebrity endorsement from individuals such as 
Russell Brand and Vivienne Westwood, who along with other celebrities signed a 
joint statement vowing to ‘stand in support of those fearless whistle-blowers and 
publishers who risk their lives and careers to stand up for truth and justice’ (The 
Guardian, 2014).  
Whilst Snowden is physically exiled in Russia, one main advantage he has over 
GCHQ and the NSA is his ability to speak openly about intelligence matters, whereas 
GCHQ and the NSA are restricted in their ability to discuss surveillance capabilities 
due to the need to keep state secrets. Asked about how they get their message 
across to the public, the Head of Communications and Planning at GCHQ showed 
his frustration that GCHQ is unable to tell their side of the story. 
This is relatively new for us so because it’s new there are different 
opinions about the extent to which we should be open. We have 
one arm tied behind our back because we can’t talk about specific 
cases (Matt, 2016). 
Alongside his ability to reach a huge audience, Edward Snowden also carries 
substantial authority given his previous role within the NSA and his position as an 
insider to state surveillance, which gave him access to state secrets. Compared to 
digital rights organisations who criticise state surveillance from the outside, 
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Snowden was on the inside of the world’s most powerful signals intelligence agency 
and can claim to understand the threat they pose to digital rights. He frequently 
uses this experience when making his case against the NSA. 
You could watch entire villages and see what everyone was doing. 
I watched NSA tracking people's Internet activities as they typed. I 
became aware of just how invasive U.S. surveillance capabilities 
had become. I realized the true breadth of this system. And almost 
nobody knew it was happening (Greenwald, 2014, p. 43). 
But there is some disagreement about exactly what responsibilities Snowden held 
at the NSA and how senior he was. His supporters claim he was a talented and high-
level analyst with direct access to an understanding of advanced surveillance 
capabilities, but his detractors claim he was a systems administrator. An internal 
NSA memo claimed that he gained access to some documents by tricking his 
colleagues into sharing their passwords (Reuters, 2014). Oliver Stone’s movie, 
Snowden, reflected the view of many Snowden supporters that he was an 
exceptionally gifted systems administrator who was handpicked by the deputy 
director of the NSA to be a high-level analyst and chosen to work on a special 
project, but when author and journalist Fred Kaplin contacted Chris Inglis, the 
Deputy Director at the time, he vehemently denied this claim. 
The claim is simply and utterly preposterous—both the claim that 
a Deputy Director would assign such a task to a low-level contractor 
(that just does not happen for many many reasons) and the idea 
that Snowden was working on some special project, separate and 
apart from his contracted duties to perform system administration 
and SharePoint server updates (Kaplan, 2017). 
Whilst the NSA repeatedly refers to Snowden as a systems administrator, Snowden 
himself denies the claim, insisting that he was a spy because he had previously 
worked undercover. 
I was trained as a spy in sort of the traditional sense of the word -- 
in that I lived and worked undercover, overseas, pretending to 
work in a job that I'm not -- and even being assigned a name that 
was not mine  … when they say I'm a low-level systems 
administrator, that I don't know what I'm talking about, I'd say it's 
somewhat misleading (Snowden, 2014). 
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Much of this disagreement may lie in the semantics of what it is to be a spy but 
reflects the differing degrees to which Snowden is trusted by different audiences. 
Relationship with the public 
To some, Edward Snowden is considered a hero, who made great personal 
sacrifices to expose wrongdoing, but to others he is a traitor, who betrayed his 
country and exposed its most important secrets to everyone, including its greatest 
enemies. Academic literature demonstrates the polarisation of views and several 
studies have considered the framing of Snowden as a hero or a traitor in the media 
and the wider world (Caster, 2016; Salvo, 2016; Qin, 2015; Branum & Charteris-
Black, 2015; McLoud, 2015; Moretti, 2015). Whilst each considers how Snowden’s 
reputation differs across countries, media type and ideological bias, each agrees 
that Snowden is portrayed and viewed as either inherently good or inherently bad; 
a hero or a traitor. 
Snowden himself has repeatedly rejected the notion that he sees himself as a hero 
or a traitor, but instead claims to be an ordinary American citizen. 
I don't see myself as a hero because what I'm doing is self-
interested (Snowden, 2013) 
If I had to describe myself, I wouldn't use words like 'hero.' I 
wouldn't use 'patriot,' and I wouldn't use 'traitor.' I'd say I'm an 
American and I'm a citizen, just like everyone else (Snowden, 
2014).  
However, many of Snowden’s pronouncement use the language of martyrdom, 
focussing on the justness of his cause, the pre-eminence of his cause, his self-
sacrifice and his persecution. These are visualised in table 2.1. 
Claim Quote 
Justness of the 
cause 
My sole motive is to inform the public as to that which is done 
in their name and that which is done against them (Snowden, 
2013). 
The reality is, the situation determined that this needed to be 
told to the public. The Constitution of the United States had 
been violated on a massive scale (Snowden, 2014). 
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Table 2.1: Snowden’s language of martyrdom 
To defend himself against charges of criminality and accusations of treachery to the 
US, Snowden has also argued that his actions were conducted in the best interests 
of the country, the government and the NSA, even if they didn’t know it. 
Sometimes to do the right thing, you have to break a law (Snowden, 
2014). 
I didn't want to change society. I wanted to give society a 
chance to determine if it should change itself (Snowden, 2013). 
Pre-eminence 
of the cause 
What happens to me is not as important; I simply serve as the 
mechanism of disclosure (Snowden, 2016). 
I care more about the country than what happens to me 
(Snowden, 2014). 
I may have lost my ability to travel, but I've gained the ability to 
go to sleep at night and to put my head on the pillow and feel 
comfortable that I've done the right thing even when it was the 
hard thing (Snowden, 2014). 
Personal 
Sacrifice 
I could not do this without accepting the risk of prison. You can't 
come up against the world's most powerful intelligence 
agencies and not accept the risk (Snowden, 2013) . 
I do not expect to see home again, though that is what I 
want (Snowden, 2013). 
I think it's important to remember that people don't set their 
lives on fire. They don't walk away from their extraordinarily, 
extraordinarily comfortable lives ... for no reason (Snowden, 
2014). 
Persecution 
I have been made stateless and hounded for my act of political 
expression (Snowden, 2013). 
I understand that I will be made to suffer for my actions 
(Snowden, 2013). 
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I am not trying to bring down the NSA, I am working to improve the 
NSA. I am still working for the NSA right now. They are the only 
ones who don't realize it (Snowden, 2013). 
I don't want to harm my government. I want to help my 
government (Snowden, 2014). 
Snowden’s self-portrayal as a martyr is a view shared by many in the UK and 
throughout the world, and opinion polls show that his actions were supported by 
around 40-55% of the UK population, whilst only 25%-35% opposed them (Cable, 
2015). For some, Snowden has become a cult figure and is viewed in the same light 
as revolutionary leaders such as Che Guevara. Foreignpolicy.com report how the 
production of t-shirts, coffee mugs and posters portraying his image demonstrate 
that Snowden has ‘officially joined the pantheon of leftist icons-turned unwitting 
money makers’ and The Guardian described him as ‘a fitting poster hero for our 
times’ (Foreign Policy, 2013; Jones, 2013) (see Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1: The Guardian - ‘A fitting poster hero for our 
times’ 
Figure 2.2: ‘Prison Ship Martyrs’ war memorial 
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In America, Snowden supporters installed a Snowden bust (see Figure 2.2) at the 
‘Prison Ship Martyrs’ War memorial5,  Snowden fan-pages have been established6 
and marches and campaigns have been organised in his name.7 In the last months 
of the Obama administration, Snowden made the case for a presidential pardon, 
arguing that his actions had left America better off, but despite support from 
Amnesty International and the American Civil Liberties Association, President 
Obama refused to commute his sentence as he had done for fellow leaker Chelsea 
Manning (The Guardian, 2016). 
Not only does Snowden appear to have made huge personal sacrifices to expose 
wrongdoing, but his claims against the government were made at a time when trust 
in the establishment was falling. However, there is also a large amount of suspicion 
about his motives and whether he did the right thing. This is reflected in the finding 
of the official US House of Representatives report on the disclosures, which 
concluded the following (US House of Representatives, 2016, p. i); 
1.) Most disclosures did not relate to privacy issues. 
2.) Snowden had lied when he said he had checked all documents to ensure 
they did not harm national security, something which he later admitted. 
3.) Snowden had previously been disciplined for his behaviour at work. 
4.) Snowden had contact with the Russian Intelligence Services. 
5.) Snowden is a ‘serial exaggerator and fabricator’. 
Snowden was also heavily criticised in a book by Edward Lucas who claims to have 
dismantled Snowden’s claim to want to expose wrongdoing and argues that he 
deliberately set out to damage the NSA (Lucas, 2014). Lucas also claims that the 
damage done to western security, diplomacy and western interests far outweighs 
any benefits from the disclosures. 
But whilst many view Snowden’s actions as illegal and disproportionate, he has had 
a major impact on the debate over state surveillance. Due to a loss of trust in the 
establishment, whistle-blowers are now considered a more trustworthy source of 
                                                          
5 http://animalnewyork.com/2015/theres-a-massive-illicit-bust-of-edward-snowden-stuck-
to-a-war-monument-in-brooklyn/ 
 
6E.g.  https://edwardsnowden.com/, https://cms.fightforthefuture.org/snowden/ 
 
7 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/26/nsa-rally-stop-watching-washington-
snowden, https://pardonsnowden.org/ 
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information. Worldwide, almost twice as many people believe leaked information 
to be more trustworthy than official press statements (Edelman, 2017). In a 2015 
survey, 30% of respondents said that following the Snowden disclosures they had 
taken at least one step to shield their information from the government, 15% use 
social media less often and 13% avoid certain terms in online communications (Pew 
Research Centre, 2015). Despite his exile in Russia, Snowden is still able to reach 
significant numbers of people and to many, his views and warnings are credible and 
authoritative. 
Relationship with technology companies 
Snowden has stated that he intends to focus his efforts on technical rather than 
political reform of state surveillance because he sees this as a more universal and 
long-lasting solution to the problem (Snowden, 2014).  To achieve this, he needs 
technology companies to implement strong security measures, resist government 
attempts to access user data and expose government data requests. 
In the aftermath of the Snowden disclosures, the technology companies were 
fighting to save their reputations after allegations that they had colluded with the 
NSA over PRISM and other surveillance programs. Initial disclosures indicated that 
the NSA could collect data ‘directly from the servers of … Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, 
Facebook, PalTalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube, Apple’ and this data was also shared with 
GCHQ (Washington Post, 2013). According to Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, professor 
of internet governance and regulation at the Oxford Internet Institute, this claim 
caused a substantial backlash against technology companies, who rely on public 
trust. 
These companies depend on their users being sufficiently trusting 
to give them personal data. Many of us are perfectly fine for these 
companies to use this information for their own commercial 
benefit, to place more relevant adverts on the right-hand side, but 
we do not want it passed on to the government or to tax authorities 
for instance (Mayer-Schonberger, 2013). 
In response to Snowden’s disclosures, civil rights organisations such as the Centre 
for Democracy and Technology suggested that technology companies would have 
to pressurise the state if they wanted to re-establish trust. 
An important step would be for these companies to exert even 
more pressure; pressure on the intelligence authorities to disclose 
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more information about intelligence related surveillance that they 
are compelled to conduct (Nojeim, 2013). 
Due to his status as an exile, the large technology companies have not made 
substantial comments on Snowden’s actions, although Apple’s Tim Cook has noted 
that Snowden got technology companies to talk more about the issue of privacy 
and surveillance (Cook, 2015). However, since the disclosures, they have been 
extremely vocal in their criticism of state surveillance and have radically changed 
how they implement security and interact with the government and intelligence 
agencies. Google said that they were ‘outraged’ by the revelations and Apple’s Tim 
Cook said that he ‘abhorred’ people’s information being ‘trafficked around’  (Cook, 
2015; Google, 2013). 
Technology companies also made substantial efforts to improve the security of 
their networks and demonstrate that they are not subservient to NSA and law 
enforcement. By December 2013, Google, Microsoft and Yahoo had implemented 
encryption between their data centres to thwart NSA access, by March 2014 Apple, 
Facebook and others were notifying users of secret data requests against them, and 
over the next few years several companies implemented end-to-end encryption on 
their messaging platforms, ensuring that access would be made difficult or even 
possible for the government  (Tech Crunch, 2013; Washington Post, 2014; 
WhatsApp, 2016). The DRC have hailed the change in the stance of technology 
companies and Snowden supporters such as Glen Greenwald claim that they are 
now ‘petrified’ to be seen as NSA collaborators (Greenwald, 2016). 
These companies are now engaged in a genuine commitment to 
demonstrate that they're willing to protect privacy even against 
the U.S. government. That has really altered the relationship 
between the U.S. government and these tech companies, and 
made it much, much harder to spy (Greenwald, 2016). 
Tim Cook, in particular, has been highly critical of state surveillance and won praise 
from Edward Snowden for his stance against the FBI (Snowden, 2015). After the 
Syed Farook case, Harmit Kambo of Privacy International claimed that ‘Tim Cook 
has shown himself to be an important privacy advocate, just as Edward Snowden 
has’, and Alex Webb and Selina Wang of Bloomberg claimed that Cook was ‘picking 
up where Snowden left off’ (Webb & Wang, 2016). Commenting on Cook’s stance, 
Snowden highlighted the fact that Apple’s business model is more conducive to 
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privacy than rivals such as Google and Facebook and suggested that this was good 
for the public. 
He’s obviously got a commercial incentive to differentiate himself 
from competitors like Google. But if he does that, if he directs 
Apple’s business model to be different, to say “we’re not in the 
business of collecting and selling information. We’re in the 
business of creating and selling devices that are superior”, then 
that’s a good thing for privacy. That’s a good thing for customers 
(Snowden, 2015). 
Whilst a cynic could argue that Apple’s stance in support of privacy is motivated by 
a desire to seek commercial advantage, there is no doubt that in Tim Cook Snowden 
has a critical ally who has the power to make a significant difference to digital rights. 
Snowden’s disclosures not only changed the attitudes of technology companies 
towards state surveillance and digital rights, but also caused them to implement 
significant technical changes that made state surveillance much more difficult. In 
doing so, Snowden has begun to achieve his aim of a ‘technical solution’ to the 
problem of state surveillance  (Snowden, 2014). 
Relationship with the legislature 
Snowden’s disclosures were condemned by both coalition parties in government. 
David Cameron said they ‘damaged national security’ and Nick Clegg, a prominent 
campaigner for digital rights, called them ‘damaging’ and of immense interest to 
those who would do us harm’ (Clegg, 2013; Cameron, 2013). Former Defence 
Secretary Liam Fox called Snowden ‘criminally irresponsible’ and suggested the 
disclosures were ‘extraordinarily damaging’, whilst MP Julian Smith suggested that 
the Guardian Newspaper, who had published the disclosures, had broken the law 
and should be prosecuted (The Guardian, 2013; Fox, 2014). During a Home Affairs 
Select Committee hearing on the disclosures, MP Michael Ellis also accused the 
Guardian’s editor of committing a crime by publishing the disclosures, and 
chairman Keith Vaz accused them of lacking patriotism (The Independent, 2013). 
But some MPs, such as David Davis, spoke out in favour of Snowden’s actions. 
Responding to suggestions from a German MP that Snowden should be granted 
asylum in Germany, Davis agreed and argued that whistle-blowers were essential 
to keep the intelligence agencies in line. 
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The only protection for us all in this sort of area is actually whistle-
blowers. It’s the only thing that makes these sorts of organisations 
behave properly. If whistle-blowers can look forward to a life in 
Germany rather than a life in Moscow, I think that would improve 
things for everybody (Davis, 2013). 
In 2015, Davis joined forces with Labour MP Tom Watson to take the government 
to the High Court, in order to overturn powers created by the Data Retention and 
Investigatory Powers Act (DRIPA), which they said had been rushed through 
parliament with little scrutiny (The Guardian, 2015).  But despite some support for 
Snowden’s actions, debate in Parliament was initially limited, causing the 
Guardian’s Editor, Alan Rusbridger, to claim that ‘if Parliament's not going to have 
this discussion and if the courts can only do this in private then I think absolutely it 
falls to the press to stimulate a discussion’ (Rusbridger, 2013). 
However, following the publication of reports by RUSI and David Anderson QC, 
which suggested that oversight of the intelligence services had to be improved, 
Davis suggested that there was growing support in Parliament for such a move.  
There is a new consensus on this emerging among policymakers, 
the surveillance community, experts and politicians, is that judicial 
consent for use of these powers would offer a far higher level of 
oversight, and would be a far stronger protector of people’s 
liberties, than the current system of ministerial authorisation 
(Davis, 2015). 
Davis’ view was reflected in reports by the Home Affairs Committee and ISC, both 
of which criticised the lack of oversight of the intelligence agencies. In 2014, the 
Home Affairs Committee published a report into counter-terrorism policy, which 
suggested that parliamentary oversight of the intelligence services was ‘not fit for 
purpose’ (Home Affairs Committee, 2014, p. 57). Amongst its recommendations 
were calls for the Investigatory Powers Tribunal to produce an annual report on its 
work to build public confidence, an increased role and resources for the 
Investigatory Powers Commissioner and a review of the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act (RIPA). In 2015, the ISC also produced a report that called for greater 
oversight of the intelligence agencies and new surveillance legislation ( Intelligence 
and Security Committee of Parliament, 2015). 
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Snowden’s actions were widely condemned by MPs and there were few who 
supported him openly. His claims that the powers of the intelligence agencies 
should be reduced went largely unheeded and many of the activities that he had 
accused GCHQ of conducting illegally were later incorporated into the IPA, placing 
them on stronger legal foundations. However, Snowden’s call for greater oversight 
of the intelligence agencies received far greater traction amongst MPs, and as a 
result, the IPA provides far greater oversight of the actions of the intelligence 
agencies. These include a new Investigatory Powers Commissioner, tough sanctions 
against those abusing surveillance powers, and the requirement for warrants for 
the most intrusive powers to be approved by both the Secretary of State and a 
senior judge (HM Government, 2017). 
2.3.2.3 Rights Organisations 
There are a variety of groups in the UK who campaign for digital rights, including 
ORG, who are specifically focussed on digital rights and Big Brother Watch (BBW), 
who focus on privacy more generally. These are supported by international groups 
such as the EFF, Access Now, Amnesty International, Liberty and Privacy 
International. 
ORG is the only group specifically focussed on digital rights in the UK and attracts 
support from a range of high profile individuals. Its advisory council includes the 
deputy leader of the Labour party, Tom Watson, the former Liberal Democrat MP 
and now Facebook Policy Director, Richard Allan, Professor of Information Security 
and Privacy at the University of Oxford, Ian Brown, Google privacy lawyer, Trevor 
Callaghan and ‘I.T. Crowd’ creator, Graham Lineham who has even featured the 
group’s poster in the lead characters’ office. 
The ORG operates and contributes to several campaigns promoting digital rights 
and regularly comments on news articles relating to privacy and surveillance. It’s 
comments often feature in newspapers and its executive director, Jim Killock, is 
occasionally interviewed on news shows (Killock, 2013). ORG also runs privacy 
workshops and crypto parties8 and contributed written and oral evidence to the IPB 
consultation (Parliament.uk, 2016). Despite having prominent supporters, the ORG 
does not have a particularly wide reach. Its Twitter account has less than 36,000 
followers and the group claims to have around 3,000 active supporters.  
                                                          
8 Grassroots events organised to demonstrate the benefits of practical cryptography.  
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Organisations such as ORG carry authority but, despite some high-profile backing, 
they do not attract widespread support. 
Relationship with the public 
According to the Edelman Trust Barometer, 40% of the public consider NGO’s to be 
extremely credible or very credible, down 7% on the year before and not that far 
ahead of government representatives on 30% (Edelman, 2017). It’s a surprisingly 
low figure which, combined with the niche appeal of digital rights organisations, 
makes it extremely difficult for them to influence the public directly.  The ORG 
website, for example, has only received more than one thousand visitors a month 
on one occasion, following the passage of the Investigatory Powers Act - it usually 
receives less than 200 visitors per month9. 
Hosting local meetups and supporting crypto parties is an effective method of 
warning followers of the threat of state surveillance, but these events do not appeal 
to the wider public. As Policy Director Javier Ruiz explains, this has led to a debate 
over whether the organisation would be more effective if it targeted policymakers 
rather than the public.  
…we have many discussions around public campaigns, we’ve had 
some disagreements where some people see the need to be more 
of a broad-based campaign where there are other views that we 
are more like an expert group and its more effective to talk to one 
policy maker than a million people on the street (Ruiz, 2016). 
Relationship with technology companies 
In the UK, there is a close relationship between rights organisations and the 
technology industry, and each needs the support of the other to further their 
objectives. Digital rights organisations need technology companies to implement 
better security and privacy enhancing technologies, but technology companies also 
benefit from the endorsement of their privacy credentials from rights 
organisations.  In the UK, the close relationship is demonstrated by the presence of 
representatives from Google, Yahoo and Microsoft on the ORG’s advisory panel 
(Open Rights Group, n.d.). 
One way for rights organisations to influence the technology industry is to raise 
awareness of their digital rights credentials. The EFF publishes an annual report that 
                                                          
9 Using traffic analytics from semrush.com 
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rates the digital rights credentials of over 20 major technology companies, based 
upon whether they tell users about government data requests and how much they 
stand up for user privacy (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2017). The report is 
published on the EFF’s website and is designed to encourage technology companies 
to adapt their digital rights policies. 
But rights organisations also support technology companies when they are acting 
to promote digital rights. In the case of Apple vs FBI, digital rights organisations 
including Access Now, American Civil Liberties Union, the EFF, the Electronic Privacy 
Information Centre, Privacy International and Human Rights Watch all submitted 
‘expert witness’ evidence to support Apple (Electronic Privacy Information Centre, 
2016). In Europe the ORG provided an amicus brief in support of Microsoft after the 
US government sought to gain access to email data stored by Microsoft in Ireland 
(Counsel for Amici Curiae Digital Rights Ireland Limited, Liberty, and the Open Rights 
Group, 2014). 
But there is also concern that the technology industry’s association with digital 
rights is not just hypocritical but is also designed to remove attention from their 
own abuses.  Julian Assange labelled Google a ‘surveillance baron’ when discussing 
how they fund digital rights organisations such as the EFF. 
The EFF is a great group, and they’ve done good things for us, but 
nonetheless it is significantly funded by Google, or people who 
work at Google… I don’t know about EFF specifically, but it’s the 
nature of organizations. They don’t like to bite the hand that feeds 
them (Assange, 2014). 
Facebook and Google have also been accused of using legal judgements against 
them to secretly fund groups such as the EFF in order to gain influence over them 
(Fortune, 2012). Having lost a class action lawsuit due to breaches of user privacy, 
Google was forced to pay damages anonymously to digital rights organisations, 
although they were able to help select which ones.  The Electronic Privacy 
Information Centre (EPIC), which brought the lawsuit, received nothing, whilst 
digital rights organisations who had not challenged them received up to one million 
dollars of funding. 
Relationship with the legislature 
Digital rights organisations such as Access Now, ORG and Big Brother Watch have 
campaigned against surveillance legislation for decades and target the legislature 
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in several different ways. The ORG can exert direct influence through the MPs that 
sit on their advisory panel and they also submit evidence and briefings to MPs to 
influence legislation such as the IPB and the Digital Economy Bill (Parliament.uk, 
2016; Open Rights Group, 2017). The ORG also encourage their supporters to lobby 
politicians on their behalf to encourage them to support digital rights. They host 
training days to show people how to lobby their MP and coordinate the lobbying of 
MPs to ensure that they are targeted in the most efficient manner (Open Rights 
Group, 2010; Open Rights Group, 2017). But whilst rights organisations are 
respected and trusted, their ability to influence substantial numbers of MPs is 
limited. 
2.3.2.4 Technology Industry 
The technology industry occupies a pivotal role in the securitisation of cyberspace, 
acting as a functional actor that facilitates and impedes state surveillance, a 
securitising actor that warns about state surveillance, and a threat actor that 
threatens online privacy. In their roles as securitising actors, companies such as 
Google, Facebook and Apple carry authority as they are considered to understand 
technology and how to secure it. Actors from the technology industry are also 
considered to be modern, forward-looking, cool and in tune with the views of the 
youth, as opposed to politicians who are often perceived as out of touch (Google, 
2017; Tech World, 2016). 
The technology companies also have extremely good reach. Over one billion people 
use the Google search engine and two billion use Facebook (Tech Crunch, 2017; 
Statista, 2013). Company announcements are hotly anticipated and product 
demonstrations by Apple are watched by millions of people around the world 
(Scribble, 2013).  Steve Jobs was perhaps the most famous technology leader and 
attracted a cult following before his death, but Mark Zuckerberg, Bill Gates, Tim 
Cook and Elon Musk are also household names. During the Apple versus FBI conflict, 
Apple’s CEO, Tim Cook, appeared on a variety of media platforms to promote 
Apple’s case and featured on the front page of Time magazine (See Figure 2.3)  (ABC 
News, 2016; Cook, 2016). Other companies, including Microsoft, Twitter, Facebook 
and Google rallied around Apple and filed court motions to support them (Miller, 
2016). The only major actor who appeared to back the FBI was Microsoft co-
founder Bill Gates, who argued that the FBI’s request was about an individual phone 
and would not set a precedent or act as a backdoor (Gates, 2016).  
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The large technology companies have frequently acted together to oppose state 
surveillance. Companies including AOL, Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, 
Twitter and Yahoo, joined together to form the ‘Reform Government Surveillance’ 
campaign and authored a joint open letter to the US Senate, expressing their 
support for a new act to defend Internet freedoms (Reform Government 
Surveillance, 2015). Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Twitter and Yahoo also 
submitted evidence to the IPB consultation arguing that complying with the bill’s 
‘technical capability notices’ would require the installation of backdoors into their 
products which would damage security (Apple & Facebook, 2016). 
The support of the technology companies is vital to the cause of digital rights and 
these companies have huge influence amongst politicians and the public. When 
actors such as Apple’s Tim Cook make claims about the threat of state surveillance, 
these claims receive a wide audience and carry huge authority. According to digital 
rights advocates such as Oana Ciobotea, Apple is the army that is needed to fight 
the war on privacy. 
Apple is almost a religion, and not just in America, but all over the 
world, from Japan to Romania. It has millions of fans who follow it 
with cult-like dedication. So when Apple is attacked, people listen 
and are interested in all the technical details of encryption; nobody 
even thinks to say “I’ve got nothing to hide.” 
Figure 2.3 Tim Cook in Time magazine 
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Even though we’ve seen David trump Goliath several times during 
our history, to win the war on privacy you need an army — Apple 
proved to have exactly that (Ciobotea, 2016). 
Relationship with the public 
Despite the reach and authority of technology companies such as Google and 
Facebook, there is still a degree of suspicion over their privacy credentials (The 
Guardian, 2012). The business model of many technology companies is based on 
advertising which requires the collection of as much user data as possible to target 
adverts more precisely. Google provides free email to customers and, in return, it 
scans emails and targets adverts based upon profiles constructed from individuals’ 
private data. Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg has been accused of hypocrisy over 
his support for Apple, his opposition to state surveillance and his other 
pronouncements on privacy, given accusations surrounding his own platform, 
Facebook  (Derakhshan, 2016; Stewart, 2011; Yoon, 2016). 
The public perception of the hypocrisy of technology companies was evident in the 
response to a message posted to Facebook by their CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, in which 
he announced that he had called President Obama to express his frustration at the 
damage the government was doing to digital rights (Zuckerberg, 2014). Despite 
much support, the top-rated comments largely attacked Facebook for their own 
privacy intrusions (Zuckerberg, 2014). 
And we are supposed to trust all the corporations that Facebook 
sells our data to? Why is the government singled out in this abuse 
of internet privacy?  
Then in 2004, the CIA renamed the world's largest data gathering 
project: THE FACEBOOK 
It's cute when Facebook says they are concerned about your 
privacy 
This is ironic, Mark, given that Facebook and its business model of 
monetising user data (corporate surveillance) is (alongside Google, 
etc.) what enables dragnet government surveillance at global scale 
and at relatively minor cost. 
Just a touch hypocritical, no? 
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Facebook has also been accused of manipulating users’ emotions by experimenting 
with individual newsfeeds to see how they affect user sentiment (The Guardian, 
2014). Following news of the experiment, a small poll in the Guardian indicated that 
84% of people had lost trust in the social network, although the scandal did little to 
damage Facebook’s user base, which is still increasing (The Guardian, 2014).  
Since the Snowden revelations, technology companies have been much more vocal 
in their defence of digital rights and have actively warned about the threat of state 
surveillance. However, whilst they have a large reach and can speak with authority, 
many consider them to be complicit in state surveillance, and their own digital 
rights abuses and suspect that they cynically exploit privacy concerns as a 
marketing tool. 
Relationship with the legislature 
Due to their importance to the economy and their popularity with the public, the 
technology industry is in a very good position to exert influence over the legislature 
and in recent years the influence of companies such as Google has grown 
significantly. The ‘Campaign for Accountability’ reveals the extent of Google’s 
attempts to influence the US government by highlighting the number of Google 
executives that have become Whitehouse officials, the number of meetings 
between Google and Whitehouse officials, and allegations that Google and the 
government co-ordinate policy (Campaign for Accountability, 2016). The ‘Google 
Transparency Project’ highlights a similar revolving door between Google and 
European governments, with over 80 people moving jobs between Google and 
European governments between 2007 and 2017, significantly higher than in other 
sectors (Google Transparency Project, 2017). In the UK, Google’s executive 
chairman, Eric Schmidt, worked for six years as David Cameron’s business advisor, 
Tim Chatwni became director of communications at Google after heading 
communications for David Cameron and Amy Fisher became a special advisor to 
Home Secretary Amber Rudd having previously worked as a press officer for 
Google. Similar associations were made with the other political parties. The EU 
transparency register also demonstrates the extent of Google lobbying and shows 
that in 2016 it spent over five million euros on lobbying the EU, employed 14 
lobbyists and had 157 meetings with the European Commission (EU Transparency 
Register, 2016). 
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The importance of the technology sector to the UK economy gives technology 
companies significant influence over the legislature. After the conservative 
government promised to reintroduce new surveillance legislation following their 
election in May 2015, three technology companies threatened to leave the UK. 
Ind.ie, a self-proclaimed ethical technology company, left the UK and moved to 
Sweden ‘to avoid the possibility of having to add backdoors to our products’, Eris 
Industries (now Monax) said they would leave the UK if the bill was passed as part 
of a ‘mass exodus of tech companies’ and Ghost.org announced its move to Holland 
in opposition to claims that the conservative government was planning to withdraw 
from the Human Rights Act (Ghost.org, 2015; Monax, 2015; Balkan, 2015). Larger 
companies also exerted pressure against surveillance legislation. In leaked emails 
between Hilary Clinton’s campaign and Apple, Apple promised to ‘amplify 
encryption messaging’ by publicly commenting on the Investigatory Powers Bill 
(Jackson, 2015). In their written submission, they then claimed that if government 
proposals were passed, ‘the personal data of millions of law-abiding citizens would 
be less secure’ (Apple, 2015). Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Twitter and Yahoo also 
submitted joint evidence, which took a more conciliatory approach but warned 
about the dangers of undermining public trust (Facebook, 2015). The concerns of 
technology companies were restated by the House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee report on technology issues associated with the 
Investigatory Powers Bill, which claimed that the bill risks ‘undermining our strongly 
performing Tech sector’ (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, 
2016, p. 3).     
But despite significant lobbying, technology companies are still mistrusted by MPs 
and their positions on digital rights are often considered hypocritical. During the 
dispute between Apple and the FBI, the US Justice Department attorney alleged 
that Apple was motivated by a desire to boost its reputation rather than a genuine 
concern for privacy. 
Apple’s current refusal to comply with the Court’s Order, despite 
the technical feasibility of doing so, instead appears to be based on 
its concern for its business model and public brand marketing 
strategy (US Justice Department, 2016). 
This view was supported by a previous court case relating to a similar issue, during 
which Apple’s lawyer highlighted the economic and reputational harm that might 
befall them if they complied with the FBI’s demands. 
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Forcing Apple to extract data in this case, absent clear legal 
authority to do so, could threaten the trust between Apple and its 
customers and substantially tarnish the Apple brand. This 
reputational harm could have a longer term economic impact 
beyond the mere cost of performing the single extraction at issue 
(Dreifach, 2015). 
Others suggested that Apple’s stance was designed to be beneficial to the company 
as it would help promote the security of its products to the whole of the world. 
The current media coverage represents global, massive free 
advertising that the iPhone is very secure, with the headline "Not 
even the FBI can hack an iPhone." Apple will come across as a 
fighter for consumer privacy and iPhone security, consistent with 
its brand (Granados, 2016). 
In a debate in Parliament on the Snowden disclosures, MP Ben Wallace argued that 
despite them arguing the opposite, technology companies themselves are a threat 
to digital rights because they are regulated far less rigorously than the security and 
intelligence agencies.  
The big capitalist companies in America - the Googles, the 
Facebooks - harvest our data without your leave, sell it on to 
intermediaries on and on and on. They make millions, billions of 
pounds, avoid tax - I haven’t yet heard anyone saying how they all 
keep their servers offshore to avoid tax - and that’s the area that 
needs regulating and protection (Wallace, 2013). 
Technology companies have attempted to leverage their importance to the British 
economy, huge financial powers and lobbying capabilities to exert significant 
influence over the legislature. They have had some degree of success, in particularly 
when raising the potential financial costs of surveillance legislation but, despite 
this, they are not trusted by some legislators who still consider their actions to be 
self-interested and hypocritical. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
The securitisation of cyberspace has been achieved by a variety of actors who have 
convinced different audiences that they face an existential threat. Each audience 
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has been exposed to opposing securitisations from the state and DRC, which are 
backed up by authoritative security speakers.  
Edward Snowden has been able to reach a greater public audience than any other 
securitising actor from the DRC, convincing many to take greater precautions 
regarding their own security, purchase products with good security offerings and 
oppose new legislation on state surveillance. He has also influenced the legislature 
to moderate surveillance legislation and, perhaps most importantly, he has 
motivated technology companies to seek to implement ‘technical solutions’ to 
surveillance, which deny the government the ability to access user data. 
Technology companies, such as Apple, have taken up Snowden’s mantel, 
implementing their own anti-surveillance technologies but also lobbying the 
government not to introduce intrusive surveillance powers. In support, academics 
and rights organisations have brought rigour and technical expertise to the cause 
by raising awareness, acting as expert witnesses and submitted evidence to 
government committees. But the DRC’s securitisation of cyberspace is not 
universally accepted, with many considering Snowden a traitor, technology 
companies hypocritical and technical experts as irrelevant or not trustworthy. 
On the other side, the government can reach the widest audience but they are 
often considered technologically backward and are not widely trusted by the public. 
Their relationship with technology companies has deteriorated since the Snowden 
disclosures and their ability to pass legislation such as the IPB is reliant on significant 
amendments and the support of other parties. The security and intelligence 
agencies bring greater credibility, authority and technical expertise to the 
government’s cause but they are limited by their ability to release evidence to 
support their claims and have been damaged by the intelligence failures prior to 
the war in Iraq, allegations of abuse and the Snowden disclosures. 
There is a battle to persuade each audience to support the cause of either the DRC 
or the state. Each side attempts to persuade the public, the legislature and 
technology companies to back their cause and support either national security or 
digital rights. Chapter 3 demonstrates how this can lead to escalating securitising 
rhetoric on either side as each attempts to ‘out-hype’ the other. But, interestingly, 
there are differences in which audience is considered to be most valuable and 
susceptible to each cause. There is disagreement within the DRC about the best 
audience to target to make the most significant impact towards digital rights. The 
ORG is split between trying to influence the public and the legislature, whereas 
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Edward Snowden has stated that he sees technology reform as the key to digital 
rights, rather than legislative reform. For the state, the legislature is the most 
important actor, as expressed by GCHQ’s director Robert Hannigan when he 
claimed that it was not the role of security agencies or technology companies to 
make these types of decisions. 
This introduces a new element to the conflict where, in addition to arguing over 
which cause is most worthy, the DRC and the state argue over which audiences can 
and should be empowered to influence surveillance and digital rights. The state has 
the greatest influence over the legislature and argues that elected representatives 
should make the final decisions, whereas the DRC has the most influence over 
technology experts and technology companies and increasingly argue that they 
should have the last say (Hannigan, 2016; Snowden, 2014). This has led to a 
significant conflict between law enforcement and technology companies. 
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3 THE SECURITISATION OF CYBERSPACE: SPEECH ACTS 
Chapter 2 considers the external characteristics of cyberspace securitisation and 
establishes the key securitising actors and their power relationship with a variety 
of key audiences. This chapter considers the internal characteristics of cyberspace 
securitisation; how these securitising actors use particular language to convince the 
audiences of the existence of an existential threat.  
The first part considers how Nissenbaum’s three grammars of securitisation, 
everyday security practices, technification and hyper-securitisation, are used by 
both the state and the Digital Rights Community (DRC) to construct cyberspace 
threats as extreme and threatening to everyone. The second part then considers 
how the use of heuristic artefacts intensifies this threat construction by linking the 
threat to fears such as darkness, burglary, sickness and war. The final part considers 
how cyberspace securitisations are made more effective by their connections to 
other securitised issues such as terrorism and totalitarianism. 
3.1 GRAMMARS OF SECURITISATION 
The internal category of securitisation captures the characteristics of the speech 
act itself, including the language and its meaning. To meet the criteria of a 
securitising move, the speech act must highlight an imminent and existential threat 
to a referent object and a justification for extraordinary measures to be used to 
counter it. Buzan and Waever explain that whilst securitisation applies to a variety 
of different sectors, it is distinct ‘sub-forms’ or grammars of securitisation that tie 
referent objects, threats and securitising actors together (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 27).  
Hansen and Nissenbaum propose cyberspace as its own sector and define three 
grammars, which they argue are specific to the cyber sector in their relevance, 
although they do also resonate with other sectors. The three grammars are hyper-
securitisation, everyday security practices and technification (Hansen & 
Nissenbaum, 2009). 
Hansen and Nissenbaum demonstrate the efficacy of these grammars of 
securitisation by applying them to cyber attacks on Estonia during its conflict with 
Russia. Several others have used the grammars to help understand certain aspects 
of the securitisation of cyberspace, including Georgieva, who considers Edward 
Snowden as an alternative securitising actor, Yury Kabanov, who compares 
cybersecurity discourses and policies between Russia and the EU, and Tiago Pedro 
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Vales, who applies the concepts to the politics of Brazilian cyberspace (Kabanov, 
2014; Georgieva, 2015; Vales, 2016). 
3.1.1 Hyper-securitisation 
Hansen and Nissenbaum describe hyper-securitisation as the presentation of 
‘large-scale, complex, cascading disaster scenarios’ and Barry Busan considers 
hyper-securitisation to be a ‘tendency to exaggerate threats and to resort to 
excessive countermeasures’ (Busan, 2004, p. 172; Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009, p. 
1157). Whilst Hansen, Nissenbaum and Busan focus specifically on the construction 
of threats as extreme, it is also useful to consider how a referent object’s 
vulnerability to that threat is also constructed.  A good demonstration of this relates 
to George Bush’s construction of global terrorism as a threat to the US.  
On September 11 2001, America felt its vulnerability even to 
threats that gather on the other side of the Earth. We resolved 
then, and we are resolved today, to confront every threat from any 
source that could bring sudden terror and suffering to America 
(Bush, 2002). 
Bush highlights America’s vulnerability to threats from around the world and uses 
this to justify America’s foreign actions. The simultaneous construction of extreme 
threats and extreme vulnerabilities serves to justify extraordinary measures to 
counter this threat.   
3.1.1.1 Extreme Threat 
Hypersecuritisation constructs threats as extreme due to their large scale, their 
cascading nature and their hypothetical and unpredictable outcomes. 
Large Scale 
Both the British state and the DRC routinely refer to cyberspace threats as large 
scale. The DRC makes frequent use of hyperbole, portraying the threat of state 
surveillance as so enormous in scale that it can destroy human rights, democracy 
and the Internet. Examples include comments by Edward Snowden, security expert 
Bruce Schneier, EU Commissioner on human rights Nils Muižnieks, and founder of 
the world-wide-web Tim Berners-Lee. 
I can't in good conscience allow the US government to destroy 
privacy, internet freedom and basic liberties for people around the 
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world with this massive surveillance machine they're secretly 
building (Snowden, 2013). 
It [an encryption ban] wouldn't work, and trying would destroy the 
internet (Schneier, 2015) 
Despite the intentions, secret surveillance to counter terrorism can 
destroy democracy, rather than defend it (Muižnieks, 2013). 
The extension of the state’s surveillance powers would be a 
destruction of human rights (Berners-Lee, 2012). 
Whilst these claims open the DRC to accusations of exaggeration, they also 
construct state surveillance as existentially threatening to democracy, the Internet 
and human rights; claims which are too dangerous to ignore. The state also 
constructs the national security threat as massive in scale and often uses figures 
and statistics to back up this claim: 
Over the last decade the threat to national security and property 
from cyber attacks has increased exponentially (HM Government, 
2010, p. 4). 
Cyber-crime has been estimated to cost as much as $1 trillion per 
year globally (HM Government, 2010, p. 29). 
Government, the private sector and citizens are under sustained 
cyber attack today (HM Government, 2010, p. 29). 
Beijing experienced 12 million cyber attacks per day during the 
2008 games (HM Government, 2010, p. 29). 
However, without context, these claims can be misleading. The spectre of 12 million 
cyber attacks a day against the Beijing Olympics creates the impression of a massive 
threat to the London Olympics four years later, but the National Security Strategy 
(NSS) does not provide any provenance for this information and does not detail the 
methodology for arriving at this figure. Cyber attacks can be large in scale, 
destroying thousands of computers and critical infrastructure, or they can be tiny 
in scale, dealt with easily be security measures such as anti-virus software and 
firewalls. 
But whilst the state constructs the cyberspace threat as large in scale, documents 
such as the UK Cyber Security Strategy (UK CSS) are also designed to promote 
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cyberspace as an opportunity for the UK. The UK CSS’s vision for the next five years 
is a positive one and this positivity is evident throughout the strategy.  
Our vision is for the UK in 2015 to derive huge economic and social 
value from a vibrant, resilient and secure cyberspace, where our 
actions, guided by our core values of liberty, fairness, transparency 
and the rule of law, enhance prosperity, national security and a 
strong society (HM Government, 2011, p. 8). 
This balance is exemplified within Chapter 4, ‘Meeting threats, taking 
opportunities’, which outlines a positive vision of how threats in cyberspace can be 
mitigated, leading to a more secure and prosperous place for the UK to do business. 
This sense of balancing threats and opportunities can be found throughout the 
report. 
The growing role of Cyberspace has also opened up new threats as 
well as new opportunities (HM Government, 2011, p. 15). 
Our reliance on Cyberspace brings new opportunities but also new 
threats (HM Government, 2011, p. 7). 
In addition, the UK CSS also emphasises the importance of dealing with cyber 
threats, whilst not breaching individual’s rights and freedoms. 
We are determined to tackle the threats, but in a way which 
balances security with respect for privacy and fundamental rights 
(HM Government, 2011, p. 5). 
At home we will pursue cybersecurity policies that enhance 
individual and collective security while preserving UK Citizen’s right 
to privacy and other fundamental values and freedoms (HM 
Government, 2011, p. 22). 
Whilst the state constructs the cyber threat as large in scale, this construction is 
tempered by a parallel construction of cyberspace as a space of opportunity and 
government attempts to mitigate the threat as restricted, proportional and 
sensitive to legal and human rights concerns. The DRC is not so restricted in such a 
manner and tends to construct state surveillance as existentially threating to 
human rights and democracy. 
99 
 
Cascading 
The concept of cascading security threats is one familiar to the cybersecurity 
industry due to the nature of cyberspace itself. The concept of the ‘network’ in 
general, and the ‘Internet’ more specifically, is based on the interconnection of 
computing devices. Whilst the precursor to the Internet, the ARPANET, was 
originally envisaged by the US Defence Department to ensure the resilience of US 
defence communications during the Cold War, the dangers of cascading failure 
have now become prominent within cybersecurity research and discourse. This 
reflects warnings of cascading infrastructural failure found within other fields such 
as the resilience discourse (Albert, et al., 2000; Motter & Lai, 2003). The concept of 
cascading failure is based on the premise that the failure of one node in a network 
will lead to traffic being redirected to another node, which will then fail and the 
failure will cascade throughout the system. As Hansen and Nissenbaum explain, 
cyberspace threats are not just limited to networks but can also cascade out into 
the real world. 
The power of hyper-securitisation stems not only from a 
securitisation of the network itself, but from how a damaged 
network would cause societal, financial, military break-down, 
hence bringing in all other referent objects and sectors (Hansen & 
Nissenbaum, 2009, p. 1164). 
This concept entered popular discourse around 1999 with the threat of ‘Y2K’ or the 
‘Millennium Bug’, which highlighted how small computer errors could have 
significant cascading real-world impacts  (BBC News, 2000). Whilst the 
consequences of the bug were not as big as predicted, there were still several cases 
of catastrophic real-world impacts, including a case in Sheffield where 154 pregnant 
women were given incorrect Down’s syndrome test results that led to two 
abortions being carried out (The Guardian, 2001). 
The British government argues that cybersecurity threats are not just about 
computers and networks but can have a significant impact on the real world. 
Interestingly these cybersecurity threats are claimed to emerge from two opposing 
sources; too little cybersecurity and too much cybersecurity. Poor security exposes 
networks to foreign states, terrorists and criminals, whereas too much security 
allows terrorists to plot and communicate online and criminals to evade detection. 
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The ‘Going Dark’ problem represents the issue of too much security. Encryption, it 
is argued, poses a threat to the ability of the state to view private communications, 
which in turn impacts on their ability to investigate and prevent crime and 
terrorism. 
The levels of encryption and protection that we are seeing in the 
devices and methods used to communicate are frustrating the 
efforts of police and intelligence agencies to keep people safe … 
The Internet is becoming dark and ungoverned space where 
images of child abuse are exchanged, murders are planned, and 
terrorist plots are progressed (Hogan-Howe, 2014). 
The construction of cascading security threats is also commonplace within the DRC. 
In the dispute between Apple and the FBI, Apple claimed that the use of the ‘All 
Writs Act’ to access Syed Farook’s phone would lead to cascading impacts to health 
records, financial data and individual privacy. 
The implications of the government’s demands are chilling. If the 
government can use the All Writs Act to make it easier to unlock 
your iPhone, it … could extend this breach of privacy and demand 
that Apple build surveillance software to intercept your messages, 
access your health records or financial data, track your location, or 
even access your phone’s microphone or camera without your 
knowledge (Cook, 2016). 
It would have been difficult for Apple to have argued that the privacy of Syed Farook 
was worth protecting from the FBI, but they instead warned of the cascading 
consequences of granting the FBI access. 
A similar construction of cascading threats was made in relation to UK surveillance 
legislation. Commenting on the passing of the Investigatory Powers Bill, Open 
Rights Group (ORG) Director Jim Killock argued that surveillance legislation in the 
UK and US would have a knock-on effect in other countries (Killock, 2016). 
The passing of the IP Bill will have an impact that goes beyond the 
UK's shores. It is likely that other countries, including authoritarian 
regimes with poor human rights records, will use this law to justify 
their own intrusive surveillance powers (Killock, 2016). 
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This is a common argument within the DRC and makes the case that, even if the UK 
government could protect its citizen’s security by passing laws to allow surveillance, 
other countries could use this example as an excuse to abuse their own citizen’s 
rights. 
Hypothetical and Unpredictable 
As Hansen and Nissenbaum explain, the securitisation of cyberspace is often 
achieved through claims of what could happen if preventative action is not taken 
(Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009). As cyberspace is new and rapidly evolving, past 
precedent is of limited use. The spectre of hypothetical future threats has greater 
impact and can lead to the securitisation of threats that may never materialise or 
were never a realistic possibility. 
The NSS, SDSR and UK CSS make frequent references to the fast-moving 
development of cyberspace and the difficulty in understanding new and emerging 
threats. Both the SDSR and NSS use the term ‘Age of Uncertainty’ in their titles, 
which implies an unpredictable landscape of unknown threats. The NSS refers to ‘a 
world of startling change’, ‘a world that is changing at an astonishing pace’ and ‘an 
age of uncertainty’ with ‘new and unforeseen’ and ‘evolving threats’ (HM 
Government, 2010, pp. 3-5). The UK CSS also claims that ‘predicting and 
understanding how Cyberspace will be used in future is difficult given the rate of 
innovation and change. New vulnerabilities and risks will emerge suddenly’ (HM 
Government, 2011, p. 18). 
Constructing the cyberspace threat landscape as uncertain aids its securitisation by 
drawing on fears of the unknown and boosting the case for defensive measures 
that can deal with any eventuality. The documents also reference hypothetical 
threats that could develop if we take no action now. 
While terrorists can be expected to continue to favour high profile 
physical attacks, the threat that they might also use Cyberspace to 
facilitate or mount attacks against the UK is growing (HM 
Government, 2011, p. 15). 
In times of conflict, vulnerabilities in Cyberspace could be exploited 
by an enemy to reduce our military’s technological advantage, or 
to reach past it to attack our critical infrastructure at home (HM 
Government, 2011, p. 15). 
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But in future, unless we take action, this threat could become even 
worse (HM Government, 2010). 
The DRC does not tend to highlight the pace of change in cyberspace as a threat 
and often see it as an opportunity to outmanoeuvre slow political forces or the 
‘weary giants of flesh and steel’ (Barlow, 1996). However, the DRC does heavily rely 
on the hypothetical. Snowden’s disclosures provided information to the public but 
were primarily focussed on the technical capabilities and technical accesses of NSA 
and GCHQ, rather than how these capabilities were used. The disclosures, for 
example, highlighted backdoors that were used to access servers, wires that were 
tapped and malware that was written, but there was little evidence of how these 
opportunities were exploited by intelligence analysts at GCHQ and the NSA. Whilst 
some see GCHQ’s ability to access the public’s emails as a threat, others only 
consider it to be a problem if they are doing it on a large scale, without a warrant 
and against those who are not suspected of committing a serious crime. Knowledge 
of the capabilities of GCHQ and the NSA, but not their actual activities, facilitates 
the construction of many hypothetical threats about state surveillance and much 
of the reporting following the Snowden disclosures focussed on what GCHQ and 
the NSA could be doing, rather than what they are doing. The following news 
headlines are examples of claims of what the NSA and GCHQ can hypothetically 
achieve. 
Edward Snowden says GCHQ has the power to control your smart 
phone (BBC News, 2015). 
NSA Cracks Encryption Codes, Can Read Email, Banking, Medical 
Records (Off The Grid News, 2013). 
Snooping tools GCHQ could use to hack your phone's microphone, 
camera and keypad (Belfast Telegraph, 2014). 
How the NSA can 'turn on' your phone remotely (Money.com, 
2014). 
Whilst the state uses the fast-developing nature of cyberspace to construct 
hypothetical future threats, the DRC uses the secret nature of state surveillance to 
construct hypothetical current threats. Both constructions help to securitise 
cyberspace by portraying these hypothetical threats as more dangerous than those 
that are currently known to exist.  
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3.1.1.2 Extreme Vulnerability 
Whilst the construction of an issue as extremely threatening will contribute to its 
securitisation, this can be supported by the claim that the referent object in 
question is particularly vulnerable. This can be achieved by highlighting the limited 
defences associated with the referent object and the difficulties in defending it. It 
can also be achieved by constructing vulnerabilities in the referent object as 
extreme and existentially threatening to its survival. 
Limited Defences 
The NSS and UK CSS both focus on explaining the extreme vulnerability of UK 
cyberspace to attack. Whilst specific weaknesses in the nation’s defences are 
mentioned, it is the UK’s dependency on cyberspace which is highlighted as the 
greatest concern. 
Britain today is both more secure and more vulnerable than in most 
of her long history (HM Government, 2010, p. 3). 
Risks emanating from our growing dependence on it [Cyberspace] 
are huge (HM Government, 2010, p. 29).  
As our dependency on it [Cyberspace] increases so do the risks and 
threats we face online (HM Government, 2010, p. 29). 
The scale of our dependence [on Cyberspace] means that our 
prosperity, our key infrastructure our places of work and our 
homes can all be affected (HM Government, 2011, p. 15). 
Whilst increased dependency on cyberspace is constructed as a threat, cyberspace 
is also presented as an opportunity, hence reducing our dependency on it is not 
considered a good way in which to reduce the security threat. Instead, the state 
argues that the country’s increased dependency on cyberspace creates an 
increasing requirement for more state security spending. 
Rather than constructing the public’s increased dependency on cyberspace as a 
threat, the DRC instead sees cyberspace as a tool to liberate activists and oppressed 
citizens by allowing them to operate in an untraceable manner. Whilst state 
surveillance is constructed as a threat to this liberation, increased usage of 
cyberspace itself is not considered a threat.  
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The Binary Nature of Security and Insecurity 
The securitisation of cyberspace is heavily influenced by the concept that anything 
but absolute security must be considered as absolute insecurity. The concept of 
absolute security might work at a technical and mathematical level, but it is more 
realistic to discuss the degree of security that a piece of software or hardware 
provides. The Wi-Fi protocol WEP, for example, is considered to be completely 
insecure because it can be cracked in a matter of seconds but WEP still provides 
protection against the casual eavesdropper and most people do not have the 
technical capability or knowledge to defeat it. Likewise, when digital rights 
campaigners argue that a backdoor is a backdoor for all, they forget that the system 
was probably not completely secure in the first place and that it likely still remains 
secure to all but the most sophisticated of hackers. 
A similar concept applies to state claims that cyberspace is becoming ungovernable 
due to encryption. This claim again presents security as binary, and suggests that 
encrypted communication cannot be accessed by the state. This is misleading, as 
there are several ways to access the content of an encrypted message other than 
by breaking its encryption. Intercepting the message before or after it has been 
encrypted is one such example, and new vulnerabilities are often discovered in 
encryption algorithms that were once considered secure. Conversely, plaintext 
messages are not totally insecure if sent without encryption, as the state must still 
intercept them and know that they are of interest. 
The issues of encryption and backdoors are at the heart of the ‘Going Dark’ and 
‘Compromised Security’ securitisations. For the British state, the ‘Going Dark’ issue 
is a major threat to the ability of the intelligence and security services to govern 
and protect the UK, and several state actors construct the difficulties of the 
government accessing online data to be a severe threat to national security. The 
banning of certain uses of encryption, the creating of backdoors and the weakening 
of encryption algorithms are all claimed to be justified by this existential threat to 
law and order. 
The FBI and its Director, James Comey, claim that the ‘Going Dark’ problem will 
cause law enforcement to miss out on opportunities to catch criminals and stop 
terrorist attacks.  
When changes in technology hinder law enforcement’s ability to 
exercise investigative tools and follow critical leads, we may not be 
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able to root out the child predators hiding in the shadows of the 
Internet, or find and arrest violent criminals who are targeting our 
neighbourhoods (FBI, 2016). 
With Going Dark, those of us in law enforcement and public safety 
have a major fear of missing out—missing out on predators who 
exploit the most vulnerable among us...missing out on violent 
criminals who target our communities...missing out on a terrorist 
cell using social media to recruit, plan, and execute an attack 
(James Comey, 2014). 
In the UK, the government and security agencies also describe this issue as a threat 
to national security although the term ‘ungovernable’ is used more frequently than 
the term ‘Going Dark’.  
We cannot allow parts of the internet - or any communications 
platform - to become dark and ungoverned space where images of 
child abuse are exchanged, murders are planned, and terrorist 
plots are progressed (Hogan-Howe, 2014). 
[Do] we want to allow a means of communication between two 
people which even in extemis with a signed warrant from the home 
secretary personally that we cannot read? ...My answer to that 
question is no, we must not. The first duty of any government is to 
keep our country and our people safe (Cameron, 2015). 
The state’s desire for visibility of the actions of the populace can be compared to 
the power of the guard within Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, who can observe any 
prisoner at any time without them knowing.  Some claim that the state’s 
surveillance machinery as an attempt to create a digital panopticon for the modern 
day (Bruno, 2014). 
The state’s claim that all inaccessible areas of cyberspace are threats to national 
security is mirrored by those who construct any methods to bypass security 
measures as threats to all aspects of cybersecurity. Those who oppose the potential 
circumvention of security measures by the state claim that any such efforts by the 
state will lead to the compromise of everyone’s security. During Apple’s dispute 
with the FBI, Apple CEO, Tim Cook, claimed that the FBI’s request to create a tool 
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to access the iPhone of one of the perpetrators would put all its customers at risk 
of attack. 
The government suggests this tool could only be used once, on one 
phone. But that’s simply not true. Once created, the technique 
could be used over and over again, on any number of devices. In 
the physical world, it would be the equivalent of a master key, 
capable of opening hundreds of millions of locks — from 
restaurants and banks to stores and homes (Cook, 2016). 
In an interview with the Daily Telegraph, Cook made the claim that any backdoor is 
a backdoor for everyone. In other words, if the government creates a means of 
access to some form of hardware or communication then everyone will be able to 
exploit that access. 
Any backdoor is a backdoor for everyone. Opening a backdoor can 
have very dire consequences (Cook, 2015). 
The ORG make a similar claim in response to reports that the government wanted 
to be able to force companies to remove encryption from particular online 
communications if presented with a warrant. Like Cook, the ORG construct the 
issue as a binary choice between security or insecurity for all. 
Either encryption can only be removed by the intended sender and 
recipient, or it is broken and unsafe (Killock, 2016). 
This view is echoed widely within the technology industry and the DRC, including 
the Information Technology Industry Council and the technology company Mozilla. 
Weakening encryption or creating backdoors to encrypted devices 
and data for use by the good guys would actually create 
vulnerabilities to be exploited by the bad guys (Information 
Technology Industry Council, 2015). 
There is just no “safe” backdoor. You are either safe or you are not 
(Dixon-Thayer, 2016). 
The claim that any attempt to circumvent security measures would lead to total 
insecurity has become institutionalised within the cybersecurity community and is 
often repeated in different forms. The term backdoor has also become 
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institutionalised to represent any form of government attempts to make data 
accessible, which is, in turn, recognised as a dangerous threat to security. 
The claims that all security vulnerabilities and all difficult to access areas of 
cyberspace bring about (in different ways) absolute insecurity contribute 
significantly to the securitisation of cyberspace. Anyone concerned about 
government attempts to circumvent security is encouraged to accept the 
securitising claim that all such attempts lead to massive insecurity, whereas those 
who are concerned with the state’s ability to uphold the rule of law are encouraged 
to believe that all inaccessible spaces in cyberspace are a massive threat to law and 
order. 
3.1.2 Everyday Security Practices 
Thierry Balzacq argues that ‘the success of securitisation is highly contingent upon 
the securitising actor’s ability to identify with the audience’s feelings, needs, and 
interests’ and suggests that ‘the speaker has to tune his/her language to the 
audience’s experience’ (Balzacq, 2005, p. 184). Hansen and Nissenbaum ague that 
this is achieved by utilising the second of their grammars of security, everyday 
security practices, which link the securitised threat directly to the audience. 
Personalising the threat makes it directly applicable to the audience and their 
everyday experiences of life. The personalisation of the threat is more likely to elicit 
a desirable response from the audience because to ignore this threat would be to 
act against the individual’s own best interests. Everyday security practices also 
draw the audience into the securitisation by securing the individual’s partnership 
and compliance in countering the threat. Company employees of all levels, for 
example, might play a critical role in defending the company against catastrophic 
cyber attack by being alert to the threat of phishing emails.  
When articulating cyberspace threats, the state makes frequent reference to the 
direct impact that these threats may have on particular groups, including the 
country as a whole, industry and individuals. The introduction to the UK CSS 
outlines the importance of a trusted digital environment for businesses and 
individuals, and then specifically sets out the measures that will be taken ‘if you are 
in business’ or ‘if you are an individual’ (HM Government, 2011, p. 5). 
Whilst national security is often highlighted as the referent object under threat, the 
documents also frequently highlight how threats can affect every aspect of the 
everyday lives of citizens. Threatened areas include ‘our places of work and our 
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homes’, ‘our economic prosperity and our own private lives’ and even ‘children and 
the vulnerable’ (HM Government, 2011, p. 15). The threat will get worse as ‘the 
scope of potential targets will continue to grow’ and incidents will ‘affect larger 
numbers of individuals and organisations’ (HM Government, 2011, pp. 15,16). 
The UK CSS also includes a whole section, titled ‘Affecting individuals and societies’, 
which outlines the numerous ways in which the cyber threat can impact on the 
everyday lives of citizens. Threats are said to now affect ‘society more broadly’ and 
public use of the internet ‘makes for a more attractive target for criminals’ (HM 
Government, 2011, p. 17). 
The UK CSS discusses a range of threats to national security, but also personalises 
these threats by discussing how they can impact the daily lives of individuals. In 
doing so, this aids the securitisation process as threats are presented as threatening 
to individuals and their everyday lives. 
Attacks in Cyberspace can have a potentially devastating real-world 
effect. Government, military, industrial and economic targets, 
including critical services, could feasibly be disrupted by a capable 
adversary (HM Government, 2010, p. 30). 
Cyberspace is already woven in to the fabric of our society. It is 
integral to our economy and our security and access to the 
internet, the largest component of cyberspace, is already viewed 
by many as the ‘fourth utility’, a right rather than a privilege (HM 
Government, 2010, p. 29). 
Whilst the state frequently frames cyberspace as threatening to the everyday lives 
of citizens, it also makes a particular effort to highlight how the state’s actions in 
cyberspace help to protect individuals. 
The levels of encryption and protection that we are seeing in the 
devices and methods used to communicate are frustrating the 
efforts of police and intelligence agencies to keep people safe 
(Hogan-Howe, 2014). 
We need an informed, balanced discussion with communications 
providers to explore what they can do to help us protect the public 
from serious crime and terrorism (Hogan-Howe, 2014). 
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The UK CSS also dedicates a significant amount of text to explaining how businesses 
and individuals are both capable and responsible for countering the cyber threat. 
In its roles and responsibilities section, the strategy has separate entries for the 
state, individuals and business, and outlines the importance of these roles. To 
underline the importance which the state places on individual and private sector 
participation in countering cyberspace threats, the role of these groups is given 
more prominence than that of the government. 
Ordinary people have an important role to play in keeping 
cyberspace as a safe place to do business and live our lives (HM 
Government, 2011, p. 22). 
The private sector has a crucial role to play in the UK’s cyber 
security (HM Government, 2011, p. 23). 
These claims are supported by commitments within the Cyber Security Programme 
(CSP) to dedicate spending to help individuals and businesses to combat the cyber 
threat. Examples of these projects include the Cybersecurity Information Sharing 
Partnership (CISP)10, which was introduced to allow government and industry to 
share information on cyber threats, the Get Safe Online campaign11, which is a 
private/public partnership, that gives advice on avoiding cyber threats and the 
Cyber Essentials12 website, which advises businesses on how to avoid cyber threats. 
Whilst the state does make efforts to relate the cyberspace threat to the average 
citizen, it is also largely focused on the national security threat and the threat to 
the state itself. The elevation of cyber attack to a tier one threat was first made in 
the National Security Strategy, whilst £650 million in funding was first announced 
for cybersecurity in the Strategic Defence and Security Review, and the UK Cyber 
Security Strategy was tag-lined with the phrase ‘Protecting and promoting the UK 
in a digital world’ (HM Government, 2011). Each of these elements highlights the 
focus on national security and the state and, despite an effort to relate the threat 
to the individual, the documents are still presented as being primarily focused on 
national security. 
On the other side of the debate, the DRC focus almost entirely on threats to human 
rights and threats to individual citizens. This is demonstrated by several comments 
                                                          
10 https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/cisp 
11 https://www.getsafeonline.org/about-us/ 
12 https://www.cyberaware.gov.uk/cyberessentials/ 
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made by Edward Snowden, who claims that his sole motivation ‘is to inform the 
public as to that which is done in their name and that which is done against them’ 
(Snowden, 2013). 
Even if you're not doing anything wrong, you are being watched 
and recorded (Snowden, 2013). 
The NSA has built an infrastructure that allows it to intercept 
almost everything. With this capability, the vast majority of human 
communications are automatically ingested without targeting. If I 
wanted to see your emails or your wife's phone, all I have to do is 
use intercepts. I can get your emails, passwords, phone records, 
credit cards (Snowden, 2013). 
In the case of Apple vs FBI, which was played out in the media and which drew huge 
interest, Tim Cook presented the FBI’s request to access an iPhone as a threat to 
individuals and portrayed Apple as a defender of the people. 
The government is asking Apple to hack our own users and 
undermine decades of security advancements that protect our 
customers. Doing so would hurt only the well-meaning and law-
abiding citizens who rely on companies like Apple to protect their 
data (Cook, 2016). 
Apple also positioned themselves as not just on the side of the public but as part of 
the public by referring to threats to ‘our’ personal information and to ‘our’ personal 
safety. 
Compromising the security of our personal information can 
ultimately put our personal safety at risk. That is why encryption 
has become so important to all of us (Cook, 2016). 
In doing so Apple simultaneously constructed the FBI’s request as a threat to all 
individuals, positioned Apple on the side of the people and positioned Apple as one 
of the people. The ORG also focus directly on the threat to individuals, something 
that is evident in their mission statement. 
Open Rights Group exists to preserve and promote your rights in 
the digital age. We are funded by over 3,000 people like 
you. Technological developments have created new threats to our 
human rights. We raise awareness of these threats and challenge 
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them through public campaigns, legal actions, policy interventions 
and tech projects (Open Rights Group, n.d.). 
ORG is also associated with campaigns such as ‘Don’t Spy on Us’ which, by its name, 
simultaneously portrays the individual as threatened but also establishes ORG 
themselves as part of this threatened group. 
Digital rights organisations also employ everyday security practices by highlighting 
the ways in which individuals can take responsibility for combatting cyberspace 
threats. The group is funded by donations from individuals and it encourages 
supporters to donate to ‘help us in this fight’ against UK surveillance laws, to 
volunteer to campaign for the group, to contribute to events, to create literature 
and to fundraise for the group (Open Rights Group, n.d.). They also encourage 
supporters to email their MP to lobby for changes in the law and provide 
instructions on how to contact their MP and what to say (Open Rights Group, n.d.). 
Whilst the state does attempt to relate cyberspace threats to individuals, this effort 
is limited due to a dominant focus on national security and threats to its existence. 
Claims of threats to national security or to the police’s capability to protect the 
public might be viewed as tangential to the public’s concerns rather than directly 
threatening.  As a result, everyday security practices are less relevant to state 
securitisation of cyberspace than they are to the DRC. At the heart of the DRC’s 
construction of cyberspace threats is the threat to the individual and, as a 
grassroots movement, the support and involvement of the public is key.  Relating 
cyberspace threats to the public is, perhaps, an easier task for the DRC than it is for 
the state, due to their closer relationship with the public and greater focus on direct 
threats to individuals rather than threats to the economy or national security.  
3.1.3 Technification 
The last of Hansen and Nissenbaum’s grammars of cybersecurity is technification, 
which is the process by which an issue is constructed as complex and technical, 
requiring expert knowledge to understand and articulate. 
Technifications are, as securitizations, speech acts that ‘‘do 
something’’ rather than merely describe, and they construct an 
issue as reliant upon technical, expert knowledge, but they also 
simultaneously presuppose a politically and normatively neutral 
agenda that technology serves (Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009, p. 
1167). 
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Due to this requirement for expertise, authority to speak on technical issues is 
reserved for technical experts who can claim authority to speak security on an issue 
due to their superior knowledge and understanding of the subject.  
Technification can be applied to a range of issues, but Hansen and Nissenbaum 
highlight three significant aspects of cyberspace that make it a particularly suitable 
space for technical, expert discourse - a strong emphasis on hypothetical threats, a 
rapid pace of change in technology and attack methodology, and a daunting 
knowledge requirement to master the field. 
The strong emphasis on the hypothetical in cyber securitizations 
create a particular space for technical, expert discourse … the 
knowledge required to master the field of computer security is 
daunting and often not available to the broader public, including 
Security Studies scholars. The breathtaking pace at which new 
technologies and hence methods of attacks are introduced further 
adds to the legitimacy granted to experts and the epistemic 
authority which computer and information scientists hold allow 
them the privileged role as those who have the authority to speak 
about the unknown (Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009, p. 1167). 
The hypothetical nature of cyberspace threats, particularly those associated with 
cascading disaster scenarios such as attacks on critical infrastructure, are 
particularly prone to technification, as without past precedent and knowledge of 
technical vulnerabilities, it is difficult for non-experts and the public to assess for 
themselves the risk of a particular threat scenario materialising. The degree of 
knowledge required (or at least perceived to be required) to understand inherently 
technical and fast-moving cyberspace threats adds to the reliance on experts to 
investigate, assess and articulate these threats. 
As well as the ability to understand cyberspace threats, another aspect of 
cybersecurity which lends itself to mediation by experts is that of privileged access 
to information on cyberspace threats. In particular, the state has a monopoly on 
‘classified intelligence’ relating to cyberspace threats, which gives it authority to 
speak on these issues. In addition to technifying cyberspace threats by highlighting 
their complexity, the state can also technify issues by highlighting how they can 
only be understood properly by those with access to classified intelligence. The 
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importance of classified intelligence is highlighted by the government’s refusal to 
reveal how almost half of the cybersecurity budget will be spent. 
Around half of the £650 million funding will go towards enhancing 
the UK’s core capability, based mainly at GCHQ at Cheltenham, to 
detect and counter cyber attacks. The details of this work are 
necessarily classified (HM Government, 2011, p. 27). 
But the state is not the only actor which can claim access to privileged information 
on cyberspace threats. Threat Intelligence had become a significant product 
offering for cybersecurity companies, such as ‘Digital Shadows’, and many 
cybersecurity companies strongly promote their ability to access information on 
cyber threats. With regards to the construction of the State Surveillance Threat, 
access to information also provides authority to speak cybersecurity with 
individuals, such as Edward Snowden gaining authority from his prior work in the 
NSA and Julian Assange gaining authority from his access to huge volumes of 
classified material. 
Whilst the technification of an issue can lead to greater authority for an expert to 
speak security, the process can also lead to a reduction in the ability to scrutinise 
that expertise.  As Schwarz puts it ‘the authority of technocrats in this area is rarely 
questioned because technocrats are treated as extensions of technology’ (Schwarz, 
2016, p. 2). And as Hansen and Nissenbaum explain; 
[technification] constructs the technical as a domain requiring an 
expertise that the public (and most politicians) do not have and 
this, in turn, allows ‘‘experts’’ to become securitizing actors while 
distinguishing themselves from the ‘‘politicking’’ of politicians and 
other ‘‘political’’ actors (Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009, p. 1167). 
Despite an outward appearance of apoliticism, Jef Huysmans argues that ‘in 
technocratic or modern societies expert knowledge is inherently political’ 
(Huysmans, 2006, p. 10). But according to Hansen and Nissenbaum, despite the 
inherently political nature of technical knowledge, the processes of securitisation 
and technification can allow this political nature to hide. 
Cyber Security discourse’s simultaneous securitization and 
technification work to prevent it from being politicized in that it is 
precisely through rational, technical discourse that securitization 
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may ‘‘hide’’ its own political roots (Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009, p. 
1168). 
In doing so, technification can aid in the de-politicisation of issues by ceding the 
authority to discuss them with experts. This can lead to securitisation, as experts 
can claim the sole authority to determine what is or is not a security threat. This is 
not to say that technical expertise is not a useful, or indeed essential, component 
to cybersecurity debates. However, it does highlight that when issues are construed 
as technical, they can become depoliticised and securitised. 
An additional impact of technification, highlighted by Schwarz, is the danger that 
‘framing something in a specific way, like cyberspace as technical, can remove other 
concerns, such as ethical or political, from the discussion’ (Schwarz, 2016, p. 3). 
Framing the use of encryption by terrorists as a technical problem can lead to calls 
for a technical solution, such as weakened encryption, without adequate 
consideration of the wider political and ethical issues. Likewise, framing the issue 
of intrusive state surveillance as a technical problem can lead to the design of 
software which removes the ability of technology firms to comply with legal court 
orders, again without adequate consideration of the wider political and ethical 
issues. 
The contention that an issue has been technified does not necessarily mean that 
this process was deliberate or that this technification is necessarily a bad thing. 
Norman Girvan argues that technification can refer to both the issues (issue 
technification) and the language that is used to explain these issues to decision 
makers, stakeholders and the public (discourse technification) (Girvan, 2010).  Issue 
technification is an intrinsic property of a particular subject, so cannot be avoided, 
but discourse technification is not. As Girvan argues; 
In principle, any technical issue should be susceptible to 
explanation to the general population in language that it can 
understand, for without this the democratic process cannot 
function effectively (Girvan, 2010, p. 109). 
Girvan further argues that discourse technification comes about because of a 
‘political decision to restrict participation in decision-making’ (Girvan, 2010, p. 109). 
Girvan sees discourse technification as a deliberate strategy designed to limit those 
who can be involved in decision making. Whilst there is certainly evidence that 
technification can be used in this manner, including that which is provided by 
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Girvan, it cannot be said that this is always the case. Several reasons can explain 
the presentation of some issues as highly technical, including the inability of the 
speakers to translate technical issues into everyday language, the overestimation 
by a technical expert of the public’s knowledge of a subject, or an ignorance of the 
public’s desire to want to understand and engage with a particular subject. In some 
cases, not only is an issue inherently technical, but so too is the language used to 
discuss it. In these cases, it is a lack of proactive effort to de-technify an issue that 
restricts the public’s interaction with it rather than a deliberate attempt to technify 
the language.   
The issue of the desirability and morality of securitisation will be discussed later in 
this thesis, but it is worth at this point briefly discussing the desirability of 
technification. In the introduction to Risk Society, Scott Lash and Brian Wynne 
discuss the problems associated with technical experts being ‘given pole position 
to define agendas and impose bounding premises a priori on risk discourses’ (Lash 
& Wynne, 1992, p. 4). 
the primary risk, even for the most technically intensive activities 
(indeed perhaps most especially for them), is that of social 
dependency upon institutions and actors who may well be- and 
arguably are increasingly- alien, obscure and inaccessible to most 
people affected by the risks in question (Lash & Wynne, 1992, p. 4). 
Hansen, Nissenbaum, Girvan and Schwarz make a similar case that the risk of 
technification (as with securitisation as a whole) is that it removes an issue from 
the public/political domain and places it into the hands of those who are 
inaccessible and unaccountable to those affected by the issue. The main argument 
against this is that decision making about very technical issues is best left in the 
hands of experts but, as Lash and Wynne explain, this raises the issues of trust and 
credibility. How can we trust that experts are apolitical and acting in our own 
interests and how do we know that they are not acting ideologically or according 
to their own agendas? However, when considering how issues in cyberspace 
become securitised through technification, it is not necessary to understand 
whether that technification was deliberate or desirable, the important element is 
that by presenting issues as technical, they are removed from public debate and 
authority is granted to experts to speak security on these issues. In doing so 
technification aids securitisation as it makes it harder to challenge the experts who 
present issues as security threats. 
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The British state technifies cyberspace threats by simultaneously constructing them 
as complex, hypothetical, rapidly changing and hidden, whilst portraying itself as 
the only actor with both the technical expertise and the access to the requisite 
threat intelligence to manage the defence against these threats. The UK CSS, for 
example, contains a section titled ‘A complex problem’, which highlights the 
difficulties in addressing the problems of cybersecurity (HM Government, 2011, p. 
18). This highlights the rapid pace of change in cyberspace, its complexity, the 
difficulty in predicting threats in this domain and the requirement for classified 
information in order to understand the threat. 
The actual existence of a UK Cyber Security Strategy is a simultaneous form of 
technification and securitisation because the need for such a strategy alone 
constructs cyberspace as a complex problem, a security problem and one which the 
state has the technical authority to address. Table 3.1 provides examples of this 
technification from within the NSS and UK CSS. 
Complex 
The systems that form Cyberspace contain a vast array of 
components sourced from a global diverse range of suppliers. 
Multiple sub-contractors produce, test, package and assemble 
these components (HM Government, 2011, p. 18). 
The complexity of Cyberspace (HM Government, 2011, p. 18). 
Hypothetical 
Predicting and understanding how Cyberspace will be used in 
future is difficult given the rate of innovation and change (HM 
Government, 2011, p. 18). 
New vulnerabilities and risks will emerge suddenly (HM 
Government, 2011, p. 18). 
We are continually facing new and unforeseen threats to our 
security (HM Government, 2010, p. 4). 
Changing 
Rapidly 
The growing adoption of the internet and new uses of digitally 
connected technologies make for a fast moving complex 
environment (HM Government, 2011, p. 18). 
The pace of events can make existing defences look slow and 
inadequate (HM Government, 2011, p. 18). 
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In a world that is changing at an astonishing pace (HM 
Government, 2010, p. 4). 
Hidden 
cyber attacks are difficult to detect (HM Government, 2011, p. 
22). 
The covert nature of the threat means that the public and 
businesses can underestimate the risks (HM Government, 2011, 
p. 18). 
key data and systems on which we now rely can be compromised 
or damaged, in ways that are hard to detect or defend against 
(HM Government, 2011, p. 5). 
Table 3.1: Technification examples 
Having established cyberspace threats as inherently complex, technical and subject 
to expert interpretation, the UK CSS positions the UK state, and GCHQ in particular, 
as the expert agency with the knowledge, technical abilities, expertise and access 
to intelligence that is required to understand, articulate and defend against these 
threats.  By establishing itself as the expert authority, the state claims the authority 
to interpret the threat and determine the correct policy response. Table 3.2 
provides examples of the state positioning itself as the expert within the UK CSS. 
The State as 
Expert 
GCHQ is home to world-class expertise in cyber security (HM 
Government, 2011, p. 33). 
 
GCHQ’s unique expertise (HM Government, 2011, p. 33). 
 
world-class technical skills of GCHQ (HM Government, 2011, 
p. 42). 
 
GCHQ, the Government’s signals intelligence agency, has 
some world-class skills at its disposal (HM Government, 2011, 
p. 18). 
funding will go towards enhancing the UK’s core capability, 
based mainly at GCHQ at Cheltenham, to detect and counter 
cyber attacks (HM Government, 2011, p. 27). 
Continue to build up in GCHQ and MOD our sovereign UK 
capability to detect and defeat high-end threats (HM 
Government, 2011, p. 9). 
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new partnerships between GCHQ and business to capitalise 
on unique Government expertise (HM Government, 2011, p. 
9). 
The intelligence agencies and Ministry of Defence have a 
strong role in improving our understanding of – and reducing 
– the vulnerabilities and threats that the UK faces in 
cyberspace. GCHQ in particular is central to this effort (HM 
Government, 2011, p. 25). 
Table 3.2: The state as expert 
As well as establishing cyberspace threats as technical and the state as the actor 
with the requisite expertise to understand and articulate these threats, the UK CSS 
also justifies state involvement in countering cyberspace threats by framing them 
as issues of national importance. The 2010 UK CSS provides a breakdown of a range 
of different cyber threats and how they impact on a wide range of sectors and 
groupings, including individuals, businesses and the country. Whilst many of these 
threats can be considered to just affect businesses or individuals, they are framed 
as threats to national security. Attacks on individuals are framed as having an 
impact on ‘society’ and attacks on businesses are framed as having an impact on 
the country’s economic security. 
Beyond the impact on individuals, the scale of the use of 
cyberspace means that it can now also affect society more broadly 
(HM Government, 2011, p. 17). 
the threat to revenues and intellectual property is capable of 
causing significant economic damage to the UK (HM Government, 
2011, p. 28). 
Activity in Cyberspace will continue to evolve as a direct national 
security and economic threat as it is refined as a means of 
espionage and crime and continues to grow as a terrorist enabler, 
as well as a military weapon for use by states and possibly others 
(HM Government, 2010, p. 29). 
National security is the responsibility of the state, so by raising cyberspace threats 
to the level of national security the state positions itself as the actor responsible for 
addressing these threats. This mirrors the state’s monopoly on violence 
instantiated through the police and armed forces and its monopoly on the 
legitimate means of movement, which is established through objects such as the 
passport (Torpey, 2000). 
119 
 
But, whilst the state positions itself as the expert authority to understand and 
articulate cyberspace threats, it only presents itself as the legitimate co-ordinator 
of efforts to counter these threats rather than the sole actor with responsibility for 
countering them. The UK CSS suggests that a collation of government, industry and 
the public should have the responsibility for dealing with these threats. The state, 
due to its technical knowledge, institutions and covert intelligence is framed as the 
actor most capable of understanding and articulating the threat, but it is co-
operation between the state, the public and the private sector which must be 
mobilised to defeat it. 
Though the scale of the challenge requires strong national 
leadership, Government cannot act alone. It must recognise the 
limits of its competence in cyberspace. Much of the infrastructure 
we need to protect is owned and operated by the private sector. 
The expertise and innovation required to keep pace with the threat 
will be business-driven (HM Government, 2011, p. 22). 
We need to build a much closer relationship between government, 
the private sector and the public when it comes to national 
security… Business and government will need to work much more 
closely together to strengthen our defence against cyber attack 
(HM Government, 2010, p. 5). 
A whole section of the UK CSS titled ‘Roles and responsibilities’ sets out how 
business, the public and the state are all responsible for meeting the countries 
cybersecurity challenges. 
 Our private sector, key government agencies and academia all 
have world-leading strengths in Cyberspace. We must bring these 
together (HM Government, 2011, p. 18). 
Ordinary people have an important role to play in keeping 
Cyberspace as a safe place to do business and live our lives … 
Everyone, at home and at work, can help identify threats in 
Cyberspace and report them (HM Government, 2011, p. 22). 
The UK CSS establishes the notion that the state should investigate, analyse and 
articulate cybersecurity threats and that industry and individuals should follow the 
government lead in dealing with these threats. This concept is supported by the 
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establishment within the Cyber Security Programme of the Cyber Security 
Information Sharing Partnership (CISP). The CISP is designed as a hub which will 
‘pool government and private threat information and pass that out to nodes in key 
business sectors, helping them identify what needs to be done’ (HM Government, 
2011, p. 28). Other initiatives such as ‘Cyber Essentials’ or the annual conference 
‘Cyber UK’, each of which is run by the government, contributes to the 
establishment of the state as the prime authority on cybersecurity issues. When 
other actors fail to recognise the authority of the state in this area, they are 
sometimes criticised for not being supportive enough. After the death of Lee Rigby, 
the Intelligence and Security Committee accused technology companies of not 
doing enough to combat terrorism. 
Their services not only host the material of violent extremism or 
child exploitation, but are the routes for the facilitation of crime 
and terrorism. However much they may dislike it, they have 
become the command-and-control networks of choice for 
terrorists and criminals (Hannigan, 2014). 
The state constructs cyberspace threats as complex, technical and hidden, and in 
doing so it positions itself as the agent most well suited to addressing this problem. 
One of the consequences of this is an increased authority for the state as the 
technical expert with access to classified information to determine and define 
cyberspace threats. But another consequence of the framing of cyber threats as 
technical is the promotion of technical solutions to these issues, potentially at the 
expense of social, cultural or ethical considerations. Javier Ruiz, Policy Director for 
ORG, explains this issue when discussing the best way to deal with online threats. 
There are real threats around, for example, grooming children on 
social media and online abuse but is the solution a technological 
solution or is the solution a social or behavioural solution? For 
some things you have to look at the solution maybe not being more 
monitoring and algorithms but teaching people how to behave 
properly and sensibly so they don’t meet someone [in public] who 
they met on social media, things like that ... GCHQ view the solution 
as technical because to a hammer every problem looks like a nail 
(Ruiz, 2016). 
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The state’s construction of cyberspace threats as technical, complex and hidden, 
and the construction of the state itself as the only institution with the ability and 
authority to shed light on this dark space, helps to depoliticise and securitise issues 
by framing the state as the only body with authority to understand them. 
The DRC often agree with the state’s claim that cyberspace threats are complex and 
fast moving, and routinely refer to the complexity of human rights in cyberspace 
(Open Rights Group, n.d.; Ruiz, 2016). But the DRC pays particular attention to the 
intersection of technology and human rights and positions itself as the authority to 
define threats in this area.  Open Rights Group, for example, describe themselves 
as existing ‘to preserve and promote your rights in the digital age’ (Open Rights 
Group, n.d.) . 
Technological developments have created new threats to our 
human rights. We raise awareness of these threats and challenge 
them through public campaigns, legal actions, policy interventions 
and tech projects (Open Rights Group, n.d.).  
The DRC exists because we need people to understand how 
technology is shaping our rights, for good and for ill, and who it is 
who is seeking to employ and capture technology for their benefit 
rather than yours (Killock, 2015). 
Whilst the state portrays itself as a defender of human rights, the DRC attempts to 
position themselves as the more legitimate authority on the issue. The state can 
represent itself as the natural authority to speak on cyberspace threats by using its 
position of authority to speak on national security issues, but the DRC attempts to 
undermine this authority by highlighting the state’s lack of understanding of human 
rights and technology. The ORG, for example are dismissive of state expertise and 
argue that ‘powerful people are frightened, and don't understand the sort of 
information-age world we want to live in’ and politicians ‘don’t understand new 
technologies, but comment and pass laws anyway’ (Open Rights Group, 2008; Open 
Rights Group, 2007). As a result, according to DRC campaigners, such as Cory 
Doctorow, policy making is hindered and ‘every tech policy out of Westminster is a 
silly quick-fix that provides a good headline but makes things worse (Doctorow, 
2015).  
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Whilst the state uses its access to classified information to support its authority to 
articulate cyberspace threats, the rapid elevation of Edward Snowden’s profile 
following his NSA disclosures gave the DRC the opportunity to claim their own 
direct access to information on cyberspace threats, particularly those which they 
claim to arise from state surveillance. Whilst former intelligence officials turned 
whistle-blowers, such as William Binney, have previously used their status and 
access to insider information to highlight cyberspace threats, Snowden is in a 
unique position to do so given the momentous nature of his actions and the 
worldwide attention that his disclosures have attracted.  
In an interview with Glenn Greenwald, Snowden presents his views on the threats 
posed by state surveillance as emerging directly from his experience at the NSA. 
The stuff I saw really began to disturb me… I watched NSA tracking 
people's Internet activities as they typed. I became aware of just 
how invasive U.S. surveillance capabilities had become. I realized 
the true breadth of this system. And almost nobody knew it was 
happening (Greenwald, 2014, p. 43). 
Both the state and Snowden claim that their access to privileged information allows 
them to understand cyberspace threats; the state argues that their intelligence 
must remain classified, whereas Snowden argues that the information he had 
access to had to be shared with the public. Despite Snowden placing the 
information he had access to in the public domain and despite some arguing that 
his ‘only apparent qualification is his willingness to steal from his own government’, 
Snowden’s actions have provided him with a huge platform on which to promote 
his views (Pompeo, 2014). At the start of 2017, for example, Snowden had over 2.7 
million Twitter followers; over 50 times that of GCHQ and around 10 times that of 
the NSA. Snowden is viewed by many as an expert on privacy and state surveillance 
but, as a technical expert, he is also able to portray his expertise as non-political. In 
an interview with ‘The Nation’, Snowden described his non-political nature: 
I did what I did because I believe it is the right thing to do, and I will 
continue to do that. However, when it comes to political 
engagement, I’m not a politician, I’m an engineer (Snowden, 2014). 
Whilst Snowden argues that reform of surveillance laws is required, he also 
contests that only technical reform can help achieve his objectives because there is 
not enough public support for political reform. 
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From the very beginning, I said there are two tracks of reform: 
there’s the political and the technical. I don’t believe the political 
will be successful. The issue is too abstract for average people, who 
have too many things going on in their lives. And we do not live in 
a revolutionary time. People are not prepared to contest power 
(Snowden, 2014).  
ORG Policy Director Javier Ruiz, when discussing differing opinions on campaigning 
within the group, expressed a similar dilemma between broad-based political 
campaigning and more technical means towards achieving the group's objectives.  
We have many discussions around public campaigns, we’ve had 
some disagreements where some people see the need to be more 
of a broad-based campaign where there are other views that we 
are more like an expert group because it can be more effective to 
talk to one policy maker than a million people on the street (Ruiz, 
2016). 
Snowden also argues that technical reform will prove more effective, long-lasting 
and universal than political reform because technical standards can spread 
throughout the world, regardless of the politics of individual countries. 
The idea for me now … is to focus on technical reform, because I 
speak the language of technology … What I can do … is to help 
create the new systems that reflect our values.  Of course I want to 
see political reform in the United States. But we could pass the best 
surveillance reforms, the best privacy protections in the history of 
the world, in the United States, and it would have zero impact 
internationally … But if someone creates a reformed technical 
system today—technical standards must be identical around the 
world for them to function together (Snowden, 2014). 
‘The Nation’ questioned whether Snowden’s ambition to create a new technical 
system for the Internet was a political act because it had political ambitions, and 
Snowden agreed that this was the case. 
In case you haven’t noticed, I have a somewhat sneaky way of 
effecting political change. I don’t want to directly confront great 
powers, which we cannot defeat on their terms (Snowden, 2014). 
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By constructing state surveillance as a technical threat and by proposing technical 
solutions, Snowden is attempting to securitise through rational technical discourse. 
Whilst Nissenbaum and Hansen describe this technifying process as preventing 
politicisation, in this case Snowden is attempting to bypass politics and use 
technology to achieve results directly through technological change. To do this he 
constructs state surveillance as a technical threat with a technical solution. 
This construction of surveillance as a technical problem relates directly to the issues 
of backdoors and encryption, which permeate the debate over state surveillance. 
There are three major technical claims made by critics of state surveillance, which 
have been identified from the discourse. These claims present the issues of 
surveillance and privacy in the light of the technical issues of encryption and 
backdoors rather than as political issues.  The claims are usually made by technical 
experts and are presented to the audience as technical facts. The first claim is that 
to perform surveillance the government must either install backdoors, or either 
weaken or destroy privacy (Backdoor/Weakened Security Claim). The second is that 
the existence of backdoors or weakened security will lead to catastrophic security 
and privacy problems, potentially making everyone’s communications vulnerable 
(Catastrophic Vulnerability Claim). The third is that the existence of backdoors or 
weakened security will lead to unrestricted state intrusion into the lives of citizens 
(Unrestricted Surveillance Claim). Taken together the three claims form the basis 
of a rational technocratic argument against state surveillance. 
The following three significant articles and statements from DRC members are used 
to demonstrate these three arguments. The first example is taken from an article 
written by Jim Killock, which featured in the Independent and was written in 
response to Robert Hannigan’s claim that social networks are the command and 
control centres of terrorism (Killock, 2014). The article was significant in that it 
provided a contrary view to Robert Hannigan’s statement, which was extremely 
controversial due to its accusations against social media companies. The second 
was drawn from an interview that Edward Snowden gave to ‘The Nation’. It was 
one of his most wide ranging and comprehensive interviews and came shortly after 
his exile in Russia. The third is from an Open Letter to Customers which Tim Cook 
posted to the Apple website during its famous dispute with the FBI. Snowden 
described Apple’s stance, outlined in the letter, as the ‘key’ to his desired technical 
solution to state surveillance (Snowden, 2014; Cook, 2016). 
Backdoor/Weakened Security Claim 
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They [GCHQ+NSA) will claim that they need to find every criminal 
and terrorist at the press of a button, and to do this, they must 
break encryption, and seize all of our data secretly (Killock, 2014). 
Building a version of iOS that bypasses security in this way would 
undeniably create a backdoor… They have asked us to build a 
backdoor to the iPhone (Cook, 2016). 
They were suggesting, “We have to be able to have lawful access 
to these devices with a warrant”, but that is technically not possible 
on a secure device. The only way that is possible is if you 
compromise the security of the device by leaving a back door 
(Snowden, 2014). 
Catastrophic Vulnerability Claim 
They can weaken our encryption methods, by adding backdoors, so 
they can always decrypt things. The problem with that is it means 
organised crime can find the backdoor, and they can steal our 
credit card details, passwords, and everything else that we want to 
keep safe (Killock, 2014). 
In today’s digital world, the “key” to an encrypted system is a piece 
of information that unlocks the data, and it is only as secure as the 
protections around it. Once the information is known, or a way to 
bypass the code is revealed, the encryption can be defeated by 
anyone with that knowledge (Cook, 2016). 
We’ve known that these back doors are not secure. I talk to 
cryptographers, some of the leading technologists in the world, all 
the time about how we can deal with these issues. It is not possible 
to create a back door that is only accessible, for example, to the FBI 
(Snowden, 2014). 
Unrestricted State Surveillance Claim 
It [breaking encryption] also gives the intelligence services 
unrestricted powers to monitor our communications continuously. 
Perfect surveillance is a kind of omniscience that most people 
would not trust ordinary mortals with (Killock, 2014). 
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The government suggests this tool could only be used once, on one 
phone. But that’s simply not true. Once created, the technique 
could be used over and over again, on any number of devices 
(Cook, 2016). 
What happened was that all of a sudden these massive, behemoth 
companies realized their data centres—sending hundreds of 
millions of people’s communications back and forth every day—
were completely unprotected, electronically naked. GCHQ, the 
British spy agency, was listening in, and the NSA was getting the 
data and everything like that, because they could dodge the 
encryption that was typically used (Snowden, 2014). 
These three claims, taken together, serve to technify, securitise and de-politicise 
state surveillance in cyberspace by constructing the problem as a technical issue, 
solvable through technical means such as stronger and more widely used 
encryption. This type of technical solution to state surveillance is an extreme 
outcome because it restricts state surveillance, even when it is legal and politically 
authorised. It positions the debate over the limits of state surveillance powers 
within a technical rather than a political framework, thereby securitising the issue 
through technification. 
Whilst, as Hansen and Nissenbaum explain, technification can hide the political 
roots of securitisation, in the case of businesses it may also be hiding the economic 
roots. As Snowden explains, big technology companies realised that his revelations 
of NSA surveillance had ‘hurt their business’ and ‘no one trusts their products 
anymore’ (Snowden, 2014). Companies such as Apple make a virtue from their 
claim that their products are more secure and better for privacy than their rivals, 
and actively market the fact that they cannot respond to government search 
warrants (Apple, n.d.). How well companies protect data from government 
requests is measured and scored by organisations such as the Electronic Freedom 
Foundation (EFF), which campaigns for digital rights. Every year they produce a 
report, titled ‘Who Has Your Back’, which ranks technology companies over five 
different categories. Rankings depend on categories such as how well they publicise 
government data requests, how much they oppose backdoors and their policies on 
data retention (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2015). In the most recent report, 
Apple received five stars and displays these proudly on its website. 
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In its latest “Who Has Your Back?” report, once again the EFF 
awarded Apple 5 out of 5 stars “commend[ing] Apple for its strong 
stance regarding user rights, transparency, and privacy” (Apple, 
n.d.). 
Apple’s reputation for creating secure products and for providing customer privacy 
is a significant commercial advantage for their business, so it is clearly in their 
interests to take actions to defend and promote this reputation as and when they 
can. 
Both the state and the DRC construct cyber threats as technical in nature and then 
present themselves as the experts sufficiently equipped to articulate these threats 
and act against them. The state uses its responsibility for national security, its 
access to technical and institutional expertise (particularly at GCHQ) and its access 
to secret intelligence information to present itself as the expert authority to speak 
on issues of cybersecurity. The DRC attempts to undermine the state’s authority by 
criticising their expertise and presenting them as out of touch. It also constructs 
cyberspace as a technical/human rights issue, which only organisations such as ORG 
and technical individuals with previous access to insider information can 
understand. This technification aids securitisation by placing the authority to speak 
on issues of cyberspace threats in the hands of competing experts. This reduces the 
opportunity for real substantive political debate and reframes the debate into one 
of which experts we trust and which we distrust. 
3.2 HEURISTIC ARTEFACTS 
Thierry Balzacq describes how heuristic artefacts13 are used by securitising actors 
‘to create, or effectively resonate with the circumstances that will facilitate the 
mobilization of the audience’ (Balzacq, 2011, p. 36). They help create storylines and 
frames through which issues are viewed and facilitate the communication of a 
threat to an audience by tapping into the audience’s existing fears, prejudices and 
emotions. Cyberspace, perhaps due to its technical and abstract nature, is often 
discussed and understood using heuristic artefacts. The space aspect of cyberspace 
is itself a metaphor, dependant on whether you consider non-physical spaces to be 
‘real’. Biological metaphors such as viruses, worms, infections and cyber-hygiene 
are commonplace, as are military metaphors such as cyber attack, network 
                                                          
13 For example, analogies, metaphors, metonymies, emotions and stereotypes. 
128 
 
defences, perimeters and vulnerabilities, or home security metaphors such as 
backdoors.   
As Adriane Lapointe explains, metaphors may ‘initially provide insight into the 
challenges we face in cyberspace, but too often end up as empty labels or 
catchphrases used by different people to mean different things’ (Lapointe, 2011, p. 
1). Betz and Stevens also acknowledge ‘that metaphors and analogies have utility 
in describing and explaining socio-technical worlds’ but also criticise the application 
of some metaphors, claiming that ‘a martial conceptualization of cyberspace is an 
important determinant of groupthink and reduces scope for collective problem-
solving and creativity’ (Betz & Stevens, 2013, p. 158). In other words, the use of 
military metaphors in cyberspace encourages a particular way of thinking and 
discourages individual and innovative thinking. Artur de Matos Alves also considers 
the potential negative consequences of the ‘battlefield’ metaphor to describe 
cyberspace and concludes that: 
“… by militarizing and securitizing digital networks, they 
compromise established mechanisms of trust, tightening 
surveillance and control at the expense of privacy, anonymity, and 
net neutrality” (Alves, 2015, p. 401).  
To help facilitate the audience’s acceptance of the threat, the securitising actor can 
use several heuristic artefacts, which mediate between the alleged threat and the 
context of that threat to the audience. This may include the deployment of 
analogies, metaphors, metonymies, emotions or stereotypes which frame the 
threat in a particular light. Using negative stereotypes to portray the threat actor 
may resonate with a particular audience; using military or medical analogies may 
serve to elevate the threat, and exploiting the audience’s emotional response to 
certain issues may also help to aid securitization. Creating new storylines or playing 
into existing storylines may also help to frame issues as security threats and 
convince an audience that extraordinary means are required to counter these 
exceptional threats.  
Metaphors and analogies can aid in the securitisation of issues by both escalating 
the rhetoric (i.e. war) and by resonating with the audience’s existing fears, 
emotions and prejudices, thereby generating a greater acceptance of the threat 
(Balzacq, 2011, pp. 9-13).  Both the state and the DRC use analogies and metaphors 
to explain cyberspace. This usage can help to understand and explain different 
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aspects of cyberspace, but it can also escalate issues and link them to threats, fears 
and human emotions. 
3.2.1 Military Metaphors 
Military metaphors are embedded in cybersecurity discourse, and cybersecurity 
practitioners routinely use military language such as network perimeters, cyber 
attacks and network defences. The British state also makes common use of these 
metaphors to articulate cyberspace threats. The 2010 SDSR was the first time in 
which security had been added to what had previously been the Strategic Defence 
Review. As a result, threats in cyberspace were included in the Strategic Defence 
and Security Review and the National Security Strategy, which supported it. This 
conflation of military and security threats helps to establish threats in cyberspace 
on an equal footing to military threats. This is supported using military language, 
which is used to describe these threats. Terms such as ‘hostile’ and ‘weapon’ help 
to support this militarisation, as do direct claims of the threat of ‘military attack’ 
through cyberspace. 
Hostile attacks upon the UK from other states (HM Government, 
2010, p. 47). 
Address deficiencies in the UK’s ability to detect and defend itself 
against cyber attack – whether from terrorists, states, or other 
hostile actors (HM Government, 2010, p. 47). 
Some states continue to attempt to gain advantage over us 
through hostile espionage activity or cyber attack (HM 
Government, 2010, p. 14). 
Government, the private sector and citizens are under sustained 
cyber attack today from both hostile states and criminals (HM 
Government, 2010, p. 29). 
Cyberspace … continues to grow as a terrorist enabler as well as a 
military weapon (HM Government, 2010, p. 29). 
In times of conflict vulnerabilities in cyberspace could be exploited 
by an enemy to reduce our military’s technological advantage (HM 
Government, 2011, p. 15). 
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Some states regard Cyberspace as providing a way to commit 
hostile acts ‘deniably’ (HM Government, 2011, p. 17). 
This use of military language positions cyber attacks in the same framework as 
physical war, a concept which the public can more easily relate to. As war is often 
characterised as a fight for survival, which legitimises all means to achieve this goal, 
this positions cyber attack as existentially threatening to the country and helps to 
legitimise extreme measures to help combat these threats. The DRC also use some 
military language by routinely referring to how human rights are under attack, but 
they do so in a much more limited manner than the state. 
Instead of acknowledging their mistakes, politicians are now 
talking about further chilling our free speech and privacy and 
introducing measures which attack the concept of human rights 
(Open Rights Group, 2015). 
DRIP was the last straw for most Britons, it is a clear attack on our 
privacy (Open Rights Group, 2014). 
Although the DRC use the word ‘attack’ to suggest that rights are being limited or 
reduced, the state uses the word in a much more direct way, which suggests an 
actual military threat.  
3.2.2 Home Security Metaphors 
Whilst the state favours military metaphors to describe cyberspace, which resonate 
with its mandate to protect the nation’s security, the DRC primarily focusses on 
metaphors that relate to an individual’s own personal security. The ‘backdoor’ 
metaphor appears routinely in securitising claims made by actors such as Edward 
Snowden and the Open Rights Group, and is used to imply that technical 
vulnerabilities, particular encryption protocols, certain legal arrangements or even 
the existence of certain software, would allow the state, foreign states and 
criminals to access messages or devices in secret, in a similar manner that a thief 
could access a house through an open back door. 
During Apple’s conflict with the FBI, Tim Cook used the backdoor metaphor to argue 
that the creation of software to allow the FBI gain access to the phone of Syed 
Farook would constitute a backdoor and make it easier for ‘cybercriminals and 
hackers’ to gain access to anyone’s iPhone. But he also introduced the analogy of a 
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‘master key’ to illuminate the argument that the FBI’s request would give them 
unfettered access to all businesses and everyone’s homes.   
 [The FBI] have asked us to build a backdoor to the iPhone … In the 
physical world, it would be the equivalent of a master key, capable 
of opening hundreds of millions of locks — from restaurants and 
banks to stores and homes (Cook, 2016).  
On the surface, the metaphor of the backdoor to describe security vulnerabilities, 
is less concerning than military metaphors, which are inherently threatening. And 
as Leontine Jenner claims, backdoors in the physical world are often seen in a 
positive light when considered an alternative, unofficial point of entry, allowing 
controlled access for goods to be received, waiters to take a smoke break or friends 
to visit (Jenner, 2018). As Jenner points out, the backdoor ‘is meant to be used only 
by people who are somehow legitimised to do so.’ But the backdoor also ‘has 
associations with illicit means, malicious intent and security threats’ and when 
combined with the concept of the master key it can seem particularly threatening 
(Jenner, 2018). The concepts of backdoors and master keys carry powerful agency 
through their association with home security and the implication that their 
existence could make our homes and our most sacred spaces vulnerable. The 
backdoor metaphor conjures the image of the state entering our houses without us 
knowing, and the ‘master key’ analogy enhances this by insinuating that this could 
be achieved by the state at will.  As a result, home security metaphors can act as 
powerful aspects of securitising acts, by tapping into our innate fears of threats to 
our homes, our personal possessions and our loved ones. 
The issue of backdoors has now become so successfully securitised as a threat to 
privacy that there is no need to explain the metaphor for many people to 
understand its meaning. As Buzan et al explain, securitisation can become 
institutionalised if a given type of threat is persistent or recurrent. ‘The need for 
drama in establishing securitisation falls away, because it is implicitly assumed that 
when we talk of this issue we are by definition in the area of urgency’ (Buzan, et al., 
1998, p. 28). This has been achieved with the concept of backdoors as, for some, 
once an action such as the FBI’s attempt to access an iPhone has been framed as 
‘constructing a backdoor’, the action itself becomes securitised and is considered 
an existential threat. As such, the actual nature of the vulnerability, technical access 
or legal request is not considered because it is framed as a backdoor, and backdoors 
have been institutionalised as inherently threatening. 
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3.2.3 Biological Metaphors 
Biological metaphors are common within cybersecurity discourse and as Betz and 
Stevens argue, one ‘might argue that “virus”, in particular, has the power to 
fascinate and instil fear’ (Betz & Stevens, 2013, p. 157). Terms such as virus, 
infection and worm are used to describe malware, and terms such as anti-virus, 
quarantine and cyber-hygiene are used to describe solutions. Whilst these terms 
can resonate with human health concerns, they are usually used more to help 
describe complex concepts than they are to securitise. Of the terms described 
above, only cyber-hygiene and anti-virus are used within the UK CSS (and each of 
them once), and they are used to describe best practice security measures rather 
than to assist in cyber threat construction. 
The DRC also tend to use biological metaphors to help describe technical issues 
rather than to securitise, although as Betz and Stevens point out, whilst ‘the use of 
biological and medical analogies by elites may not be intended necessarily to elicit 
negative emotions in the public imagination … it would not be unwarranted to 
suppose they might be deployed for such a purpose’ (Betz & Stevens, 2013, p. 157). 
One such example is provided in the dispute between Apple and the FBI. During the 
dispute, Tim Cook claimed that helping the FBI to create software to access this 
data would create a backdoor which would be like creating the ‘software equivalent 
of cancer’ (ABC News, 2016). Instead of using the common metaphor of the 
computer virus, Cook created an analogy to cancer, the most feared disease in both 
the UK and the US and a common metaphor for corruption and something that is 
out of place  (Aviva, 2016; Harris Interactive, 2011). In comparing the FBI's request 
to cancer, Cook massively escalated the threat of the FBI’s request and created 
headlines, which framed the dispute in terms of what could be unleashed upon 
society if the FBI’s request was acquiesced to. Whilst other usage of metaphors 
contributes in aggregate to the ongoing securitisation of cyberspace, by using the 
metaphor of cancer, Tim Cook securitised the FBI’s request in an instant. Outside 
of the context of the dispute between Apple and the FBI, the cancer metaphor has 
not been reused. Its potency relates to its shock factor and its extreme escalation 
of the threat.  
3.2.4 Darkness, Shadows and Silence 
Whilst military metaphors are used mainly by the state, and home security 
metaphors are used extensively by the DRC, metaphors of darkness are extensive 
throughout the cybersecurity discourse. Metaphors relating to darkness and silence 
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are common within cybersecurity literature and are used frequently in the 
construction of cyberspace as a threatening place. ‘Dark Net’ is used frequently to 
refer to the part of the Internet, which is made more secure (and potentially less 
accessible by the state) through onion routing technology. The ‘Black Phone’ is 
designed to provide privacy and terrorists are said to be ‘going dark’ by operating 
securely online. 
As demonstrated by Glasgow University’s Mapping Metaphor project, metaphors 
of darkness are strongly connected with the negative concepts of ‘death’, ‘moral 
evil’ ‘emotional suffering’ ‘anger’, ‘destruction’ and ‘fear’. But they are also strongly 
connected to ‘lack of knowledge’, ‘secrecy and concealment’ and ‘disorder’ 
(Glasgow University, n.d.). Darkness relates to danger and a fear of the unknown. 
In the construction of state surveillance as a threat to privacy, metaphors of 
darkness are used to describe the organisations and people who conduct 
surveillance, the methods they use and the lack of oversight over these processes. 
The day after the Guardian announced the Snowden disclosures, Snowden 
described surveillance operatives and the systems they used as shadowy. 
I grew up with the understanding that the world I lived in was one 
where people enjoyed a sort of freedom to communicate with each 
other in privacy, without it being monitored, without it being 
measured or analyzed or sort of judged by these shadowy figures 
or systems, any time they mention anything that travels across 
public lines (Snowden, 2013). 
The ORG also apply the metaphor to describe not just those in the security services, 
but also to anyone in government or private industry who support these activities. 
The space in which state surveillance takes place is also described in terms of 
darkness as ‘the realm of the shadowy world of spies’ (Open Rights Group, n.d., p. 
15). 
After the invasive and over-reaching Communications Data Bill was 
shelved in the UK at the start of May, it's already being re-animated 
by politicians with strong connections to the shadowy world of the 
security services (Open Rights Group, 2013). 
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Whatever the colour of the government, shadowy figures in the 
upper ranks of the civil service will be pushing for measures like this 
and ORG will be ready to oppose them (Open Rights Group, 2009). 
DPI is already used by intelligence agencies to reconstruct traffic 
such as webmail from the data they intercept off high-speed links. 
Reference 1 describes some of the shadowy firms and deals in this 
space (Open Rights Group, 2009). 
GCHQ and the NSA subverted the operations of Swiss company 
Crypto AG, a provider of strong crypto tools that could be bought 
by third party countries. But those operations remained within the 
realm of the shadowy world of spies (Open Rights Group, n.d.). 
As well as characterising the practitioners, systems and supporters of state 
surveillance as dark and shadowy, the ORG also use the metaphor of darkness to 
raise the threat of lack of parliamentary oversight of the intelligence agencies. 
The revelations, made possible by the whistle-blower Edward 
Snowden, over the past few months have shown without doubt 
that Parliament has been kept in the dark about the powers and 
capabilities of GCHQ to conduct mass surveillance (Open Rights 
Group, 2013). 
Academic literature has also perpetuated the use of the darkness metaphor, usually 
relating it to state surveillance. As Deibert puts it, ‘there is a dark side to 
cyberspace-hidden contests and malicious threats that is growing like a disease 
from the inside-out’ (Deibert, 2012, p. 261). Other authors have also used the 
metaphor of darkness to describe the practices of state surveillance in cyberspace, 
including Evgeny Morozov, who argues in his book ‘The Net Delusion: The Dark Side 
of Internet Freedom’ that the cyber-utopian belief that the Internet is liberating is 
wrong and that authoritarian governments are using cyberspace to suppress their 
populations (Morozov, 2012). 
Interestingly, the portrayal of GCHQ and NSA staff as ‘shadowy figures’ is perhaps 
aided by the organisations themselves, who are protective of their staff and do not 
routinely reveal their identities. On the GCHQ website, under the heading of ‘Meet 
our Team’, there is an image of four figures representing four different roles in 
GCHQ (See Figure 3.1). To hide the identity of GCHQ staff members, the figures are 
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shown as silhouettes. A similar methodology is used in the ‘Minority Report’ 
campaign, which is designed to demonstrate the ethnic diversity of GCHQ staff. The 
images used to represent these diverse staff members are cartoonised and partially 
hidden (See Figure 3.2. Whilst the identity of the individuals is hidden, their sex and 
ethnic origin are not. Further hints of ethnic origin are also delivered by the labelling 
of these individuals by their first names, most of which are of non-British origin. 
Whilst the campaign may be effective in highlighting the ethnic diversity of GCHQ 
staff, it simultaneously strips the staff of all identity but their ethnic origin and sex, 
making them appear shadowy and hidden and potentially also suspicious, 
dangerous and threatening. 
Metaphors of darkness are also used to support claims that national security is 
threatened. They are used to describe areas of cyberspace itself and to support the 
claim that the state is restricted in its ability to provide law, order and governance 
in this space. As previously discussed, the FBI routinely use the phrase ‘Going Dark’ 
to explain the impact of encryption and other security measures on their ability to 
investigate and prevent crime. This connects the concept of being left in the dark 
(i.e. lacking information) with the concept of a dark place (i.e. somewhere 
dangerous and fearful). 
If the challenges of real-time interception threaten to leave us in 
the dark, encryption threatens to lead all of us to a very dark place 
(Comey, 2014). 
Figure 3.1: Shadowy employees at GCHQ 
Figure 3.2: Concealed faces within GCHQ’s ‘Minority Report’ campaign. 
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These concepts are also projected by British government and law enforcement 
figures, although the term ‘Going Dark’ is replaced by the concept of cyberspace 
becoming ‘dark and ungoverned’  (Cameron, 2014; Hogan-Howe, 2014). Director of 
MI5, Andrew Parker, has also warned of the increased threat of terrorism relating 
to a reduced ability of the security services to investigate cyberspace activity if 
‘parts of the radar go dark’. He also warns that ‘the dark places from where those 
who wish us harm can plot and plan are increasing’ (Parker, 2015). Darkness in 
cyberspace, it is argued both facilitates the ‘bad guys’ whilst restricting the ability 
of the ‘good guys’ to investigate.   
Into this darkness, the state and surveillance agencies portray themselves as the 
bringers of light. In an announcement on government efforts to tackle child abuse, 
David Cameron claimed that the government ‘are shining a light on the web’s 
darkest corners’ and GCHQ recruitment adverts encourage applicants to join to 
‘illuminate the dark web’ (See Figure 3.3). The use of a raised laptop bringing light 
to a dark space has hints of the biblical creation story, with God bringing light to a 
dark world. The message, it would seem, is that cyberspace is dark and scary but 
with the right tools the state can shine a light and make it safe and secure for 
everyone. 
In parallel with GCHQ’s portrayal of themselves as shadowy, some elements of the 
DRC also represent themselves in this manner. The Anonymous collective, for 
example, uses a logo of a man in a dark suit with a question mark in place of a head, 
and use a Guy Fawkes mask from the film ‘V for Vendetta’ to conceal its supporter’s 
identity (See Figure 3.4). The group styles itself as ‘anonymous’ and secret and 
describes itself as ‘operating in the shadows’ (Anonymous, 2013). 
Both sides of the debate use metaphors of darkness to help describe both the 
threats that are said to exist in cyberspace and the difficulties in combatting these 
threats. This use of darkness portrays cyberspace as unknown, troubling and 
dangerous, and this taps into our innate fear of darkness and the unknown. Jim 
Figure 3.3: GCHQ recruitment advert Figure 3.4: 'Anonymous' imagery 
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Killock describes how he thinks that this fear of the unknown might play into 
GCHQ’s own threat modelling: 
If there’s something [GCHQ) don’t know then there’s a threat they 
don’t know about therefore not knowing is a threat in itself (Killock, 
2016). 
But when talking of his fear of state surveillance in cyberspace, he also indicates 
that it is not knowing that drives his own fear. 
You can never know what the sinister motivations [of GCHQ] might 
be because those motivations exist in the heads of people, not 
necessarily in policy documents (Killock, 2016). 
Efforts are made to alleviate fears of the dark and the unknown in cyberspace, such 
as the Berkman Centre’s report into the illegitimacy of the ‘Going Dark’ metaphor, 
but it would seem that powerful metaphors of darkness, fear and the unknown are 
difficult to counter (Berkman Center, 2016). The state’s claim to be able to 
illuminate the darkness of cyberspace may be particularly effective as it plays into 
an established metaphor in society that evil is represented by darkness and 
shadow, and must be confronted by goodness, which is represented by light 
(Benjamins, 2013).   
It is interesting that whilst both sides of the debate construct cyberspace threats as 
dark and threatening, they also portray themselves as dark, secret and hidden.  For 
GHCQ, alongside other intelligence agencies, this is largely a result of practical 
considerations and the necessity to protect the identity of staff. But there are also 
some positive representations of security agencies, that use darkness metaphors, 
such as the portrayal of spies, as secretive, glamorous and intriguing, and it is 
possible that the security agencies consciously or subconsciously perpetuate these 
images. For the DRC transparency is usually promoted, but groups like Anonymous 
use the metaphor of darkness to convey themselves as hidden, omnipresent, 
uncatchable and therefore powerful. 
As we often mistrust that which is hidden, secret and dark, darkness metaphors are 
used to construct cyberspace as an unknown, dangerous and threatening, place. 
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3.3 CONNECTED SECURITISATIONS 
Whilst issues can be securitised in isolation, this securitisation can be more effective 
if the issue is linked to wider security concerns. For example, the issue of graffiti in 
an area may become more threatening if linked to concerns over crime in general, 
the presence of gangs and ultimately to the possible breakdown of security (Keizer, 
et al., 2008). 
The NSS, SDSR and UK CSS contribute significantly to the securitisation of UK 
cyberspace by directly linking cybersecurity to several other securitisations and 
referent objects. The inclusion and prominence of cyberspace in the NSS and SDSR 
and the publication of a separate UK CSS, help to establish cyberspace as a 
significant threat to national security. By rating cyber attack as a tier one national 
security threat, alongside the already securitised concepts of terrorism, 
environmental catastrophe and war, cyberspace is presented by association as 
equally threatening. Whilst it was the threat of cyber attack (hostile attacks upon 
UK cyber space by other states or large-scale cybercrime) that was assessed to be 
a tier one threat, these documents frequently drop the ‘attack’ suffix and referred 
instead to ‘cyber’ as the concern.    
Our strategy sets clear priorities – counter-terrorism, cyber, 
international military crises and disasters such as floods (HM 
Government, 2010, p. 5). 
This use of cyber as a prefix, which can be placed before everyday threats (e.g. 
cyber-terrorism, cyber-espionage, cyber-war, cyber-bullying), helps to construct 
cyberspace itself as the threat, rather than the forces who wish to exploit it for their 
own gain. Hence, cyberspace itself becomes a threatening place, inextricably 
intertwined with terrorism, crime and warfare. 
Whilst the NSS, SDSR and CSS link cyberspace to several different threats including 
crime, abuse, espionage and war, the most prominent connection is with terrorism: 
Terrorists use cyberspace to organise, communicate and influence 
those vulnerable to radicalisation (HM Government, 2010, p. 30). 
Cyberspace is already used by terrorists to spread propaganda, 
radicalise potential supporters, raise funds, communicate and plan 
(HM Government, 2011, p. 15). 
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The connection between terrorism and cyberspace has been highlighted several 
times by the US and UK governments following high profile terror attacks. The 
Intelligence and Security Committee report into Lee Rigby’s death highlighted how 
a social media platform14 was used to by Michael Adebowale to communicate with 
an extremist linked to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) about his plot to 
kill a British soldier. The implication that Facebook was used to facilitate the attack 
made front page news. 
Facebook hosted Lee Rigby death chat ahead of soldier's murder 
(BBC News, 2014). 
“Facebook has blood on its hands” for failing to raise alarm, says 
Lee Rigby's sister (The Independent, 2014). 
As previously discussed, GCHQ Director Robert Hannigan reinforced this link by 
arguing that social networks were the ‘command and control network of choice for 
terrorists’ (Hannigan, 2014). During the dispute between Apple and the FBI, US 
Senator Tom Cotton claimed that ‘Apple is becoming the company of choice for 
terrorists, drug dealers and sexual predators of all sorts’ (Cotton, 2016). 
The state also connects cyberspace threats with the threat of anarchy and 
lawlessness. Several government actors have claimed that security measures such 
as encryption and the difficulty of accessing online data are leading to a breakdown 
of law and order. 
In a democracy we cannot accept any space - virtual or not - to 
become anarchic where crime can be committed without fear 
(Hogan-Howe, 2014). 
The construction of a connection between terrorism, anarchy and cyberspace 
provides a shortcut to securitisation by hijacking the emotions and fears relating to 
memories of 11 September 2001 in the US and 7 July 2005 in the UK, and applying 
them to cyberspace. A similar practice is also undertaken by those arguing that the 
state is a threat to human rights in cyberspace. This most prominent construction 
has been the association of state surveillance in cyberspace with authoritarianism 
and totalitarianism. The Pen Surveillance Metaphor Mapping Project studied 133 
news articles in the weeks following the Snowden disclosures to investigate the 
metaphors which were used to help explain concepts of surveillance (PEN America, 
                                                          
14 This was not officially named although it was widely reported by the press to be Facebook 
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2014). Whilst metaphors for collecting were most common, metaphors for the 
literary theme were second, and all three of these themes related to Orwell’s 1984 
(Orwell, Big Brother and Dystopian). In addition, authoritarian metaphors were also 
common, including uses of the terms totalitarian, Stasi, Nazi Germany, and police 
state. 
Examples of connections between state surveillance and Nazi Germany include a 
comparison of Hitler’s suspension of mail and telephone privacy with that of the 
NSA, and a comparison of the NSA’s claim to be acting in the interests of its citizens 
with that of the Stasi (Binney, 2016; Greenslade, 2013). The Russian Foreign 
Minister also compared the NSA activities with the oppressive regime of Stalin-era 
Russia (Lavrov, 2013). 
By far the most common association was with George Orwell’s Dystopian Novel 
1984 (See Figures 3.5 and 3.6). In his alternative Christmas message on the UK’s 
Channel 4, Snowden claimed that today’s surveillance was worse than Orwell’s 
vision.  
Great Britain’s George Orwell warned us of the danger of this kind 
of Information. The types of collection in the book, microphones 
and video cameras’ TVs that watch us are nothing compared to 
what we have available today (Snowden, 2013). 
This view was echoed widely within the discourse. In 2015, the UN privacy chief 
also compared NSA and GCHQ surveillance to that in the novel 1984. He claimed 
that British and US surveillance was ‘worse’ than in 1984 as you could not escape 
to the countryside to evade it like the character Winston in the novel. He also 
directly linked the controlling nature of Orwell’s vision with today’s surveillance 
technologies. 
Figure 3.5: Example of 1984 references 
Figure 3.6: Another Example of 1984 
references 
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Orwell foresaw a technology that was controlling. In our case we 
are looking at a technology that is ever-developing, and ever-
developing possibly more sinister capabilities (Cannataci, 2015). 
Digital rights organisations also frequently link surveillance to totalitarianism. In 
November 2016 the Open Rights Group held an event titled ‘Digital Dystopias: 
Orwell’s 1984 and the Internet Age. It was described as 
a session on surveillance and totalitarianism in literature, and how 
the nightmarish world of George Orwell's '1984,' as well as the 
work of other writers, can still be seen as relevant for the digital 
age (Open Rights Group, 2016). 
The digital rights organisation ‘Big Brother Watch’ constructs the connection 
between Orwell and state surveillance by using the Orwellian phrase ‘Big Brother’ 
within their title. As indicated in Figures 3.5 and 3.6, the phrase ‘1984 was not 
supposed to be an instruction manual’ has also become popular in anti-surveillance 
culture. 
The construction and exploitation of a link between state surveillance and 
authoritarianism can also be witnessed in contemporary affairs following the 
election of Donald Trump (who is widely considered to be an authoritarian) as 
President of the US.  The Executive Editor of the ORG, Jim Killock, connected Trump 
to GCHQ by warning that he would now have effective control of the organisation. 
Donald Trump has effective control of GCHQ’s technology and full 
access to their data collection. GCHQ and NSA are joined at the hip 
(Killock, 2016). 
The Guardian also made this connection by reporting on fears of Donald Trump 
‘running’ the global surveillance network. They quote former NSA whistle-blower 
Thomas Drake, who said that surveillance powers were  
ripe for further abuse under an autocratic, power-obsessed 
president. History is just not kind here. Trump leans quite 
autocratic. The temptations to use secret NSA surveillance powers, 
some still not fully revealed, will present themselves to him as 
sirens (The Guardian, 2016). 
The construction of a link between UK/US state surveillance with historical, fictional 
and future (in the case of Donald Trump) totalitarian regimes aids in the 
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securitisation of cyberspace surveillance by tapping into existing institutional fears 
and hatred of these forms of governance. 
A clear parallel can be drawn between the way in which those securitising 
cyberspace use institutionalised threats such as terrorism to bolster their claim, and 
those who securitise state surveillance use institutionalised threats such as 
totalitarianism to boost their claims. In both cases, issues are constructed as 
particularly threatening because they are linked to an already securitised issue. 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
The state constructs the use of cyberspace by terrorists and criminals as an 
existential threat to law and order, which requires huge increases in spending and 
powerful intelligence capabilities to resist. The DRC constructs state surveillance as 
an existential threat to freedom, privacy and democracy, which requires the 
curtailing of state powers, increased enforcement of security measures and 
resistance by technology companies to government data requests. 
Hypersecuritisation, everyday security practices, technification, heuristic artefacts 
and connected securitisations play a major role in each of these securitisations. 
Whilst these competing securitisations have different goals, their methods are very 
similar. The parallels between these competing securitisations are highlighted in 
Table 3.3. 
Concept National Security Threat State Surveillance Threat 
Hypersecuritisation The threat to national 
security is huge, escalating 
and growing in significance. 
Due to encryption, 
outdated legislation and 
blocks by technology 
companies, the state are 
unable to combat this 
threat and this will 
eventually lead to total 
insecurity. 
The State Surveillance 
Threat is huge, escalating 
and growing in significance. 
Due to state secrecy and a 
lack of oversight, the public 
are unable to combat this 
threat and this will 
eventually lead to insecurity 
and a total lack of privacy. 
Technification Cyberspace threats are 
technical and issues of 
Cyberspace threats are 
technical and issues of 
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national security, which 
should be articulated and 
combatted by the state, 
which has access to secret 
threat information and, 
through GCHQ, unrivalled 
technical expertise. 
human rights and should be 
articulated and combatted 
by digital rights 
organisations, which have 
both human rights and 
technological expertise. 
Everyday Security 
Practices 
Cybercriminals affect you, 
your family and your 
workplace. 
State surveillance affects 
you, your family and your 
workplace. 
Heuristic Artefacts Parts of cyberspace are 
dark and dangerous, which 
makes it impossible for law 
enforcement to combat 
crime and protect the 
public 
Surveillance agencies are 
dark and dangerous and 
their secretive nature stops 
them from being scrutinised 
and stopped from harming 
the public 
Connected 
Securitisations 
Cyberspace is threating 
because it facilitates 
terrorism and risks anarchy 
Cyberspace is threatening 
because it facilitates 
totalitarianism 
Table 3.3: Parallels between Cyberspace Securitisations 
Whilst each of these threat constructions may have arisen independently to the 
other, they are now inextricably linked. The openness of cyberspace is considered 
a threat to law and order, which results in increased state activity in cyberspace, 
which is considered a threat and leads to efforts to re-establish its openness, which 
continues the cycle. There is also no clear start or endpoint to this cycle. As is the 
case in the security dilemma, moves by one side lead to the other responding with 
similar measures, producing increased tensions that create conflict, even when no 
side really desires it. This is coupled with the view that any concession or weakness 
cannot be tolerated because the threat is just too great. Any vulnerability is a 
backdoor, and any backdoor is accessible to anyone and therefore threatens us all. 
All enhanced security measures deny the state the access to communications that 
they need and will lead to anarchy, which threatens us all. 
This hypersecuritising rhetoric appeared to hit a peak during the conflict between 
Apple and the FBI. If the FBI won then Apple said that this would be as bad as the 
software equivalent of cancer, and if Apple won then FBI supporters said it would 
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lead to increases in terrorism, drug trafficking, kidnapping and child pornography. 
The state was pitched against the world’s most valuable brand, technical experts 
were pitched against technical experts, terrorism was pitched against 
totalitarianism, and security was pitched against privacy. Examples of these parallel 
constructions can be seen in Table 3.4 (Cook, 2016; Cook, 2015; Cotton, 2016). 
Apple Concept FBI 
The implications of the 
government’s demands are 
chilling. 
Hypersecuritisation Apple is becoming the 
company of choice for 
terrorists, drug dealers, and 
sexual predators of all sorts 
For years, cryptologists and 
national security experts 
have been warning against 
weakening encryption 
Technification  
The government could 
extend this breach of 
privacy and demand that 
Apple build surveillance 
software to intercept your 
messages, access your 
health records or financial 
data, track your location, or 
even access your phone’s 
microphone or camera 
without your knowledge 
Everyday Security 
Practices 
Apple chose to protect a 
dead ISIS terrorist's privacy 
over the security of the 
American people 
The only way to gain access 
to this phone would be to 
write a piece of software 
that we view as the 
software equivalent of 
cancer 
 
They have asked us to build 
a backdoor to the iPhone. 
Heuristic Artefacts The Executive and 
Legislative Branches have 
been working with the 
private sector with the 
hope of resolving the 'Going 
Dark' problem 
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The FBI is proposing an 
unprecedented use of the 
All Writs Act of 1789 to 
justify an expansion of its 
authority. 
 
If the government can use 
the All Writs Act to make it 
easier to unlock your 
iPhone, it would have the 
power to reach into 
anyone’s device to capture 
their data. 
Connection to the 
securitised threat 
of totalitarianism 
The problem of end-to-end 
encryption isn't just a 
terrorism issue. It is also a 
drug-trafficking, 
kidnapping, and child 
pornography issue  
Table 3.4: Parallel threat constructions 
Whilst much of the rhetoric surrounding this case was escalatory, each side did also 
try to counter the other’s securitisation. James Comey claimed that all the FBI 
wanted was access to one phone and Tim Cook argued that Apple had helped the 
FBI in every way they could. 
We simply want the chance, with a search warrant, to try to guess 
the terrorist’s passcode without the phone essentially self-
destructing and without it taking a decade to guess correctly. That’s 
it. We don’t want to break anyone’s encryption or set a master key 
loose on the land (Comey, 2016). 
The FBI asked us for help in the days following the attack, and we 
have worked hard to support the government’s efforts to solve this 
horrible crime. We have no sympathy for terrorists (Cook, 2016). 
But within the context of these competing securitisations and headlines warning of 
software-cancer and terrorism, it is clear that it is far harder to de-securitise an 
issue than it is to securitise it. How this can be achieved will be discussed 
throughout Chapters 5-7. 
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4 THE CYBER SECURITY DILEMMA 
Chapters 2 and 3 discuss how cyberspace has become securitised by members of 
the state and the DRC, who have leveraged their power positions and employed the 
grammars of hypersecuritisation, everyday security practices and technification, to 
convince a range of audiences of threats to national security and digital rights. But 
these parallel threat constructions do not just mirror each other but are also 
generated and fuelled by each other. The DRC resist state surveillance because they 
fear the actions of the state, and the state seeks to increase its surveillance 
capabilities because of resistance to its existing techniques. As each side makes a 
move, the other makes a counter move. This scenario conforms to the international 
relations theory of the security dilemma. 
This chapter will use the framework of the security dilemma to help understand the 
securitisation of cyberspace. Using this framework, the characteristics of the CSD 
will be investigated and the reasons for its intensity will be explored. This chapter 
will first introduce the concept of the security dilemma before considering its 
previous applications to cyberspace. It will then consider how well characteristics 
of the security dilemma match those of traditional security dilemmas, and why the 
CSD is so intense. 
4.1 THE SECURITY DILEMMA 
The security dilemma is a term coined by the American scholar John Herz, who used 
it to describe the predicament of two states who feel they must acquire more and 
more power to defend against the other.  
Groups and individuals … are concerned about their security from 
being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other 
groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, 
they are driven to acquire more and more power to escape the 
impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others 
more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since 
none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing 
units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security 
and power accumulation is on (Herz, 1950, p. 157). 
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Independently, the English philosopher Herbert Butterfield also developed ideas on 
the security dilemma, which he described as the ‘absolute predicament and 
irreducible dilemma’ (Butterfield, 1951, p. 19). Butterfield argues that ‘the greatest 
war in history can be produced without the intervention of any great criminals who 
might be out to do deliberate harm in the world. It could be produced between two 
powers, both of which were desperately anxious to avoid a conflict of any sort’ 
(Butterfield, 1951, pp. 19-20). 
Butterfield describes the security dilemma as a tragedy because it has the power to 
turn positive intentions into devastating consequences. Butterfield claims that the 
ultimate source of the security dilemma is fear, whilst Herz describes it as 
uncertainty and anxiety (Herz, 1950). 
Whether man is ‘by nature’ peaceful and cooperative, or 
aggressive and domineering, is not the question ... It is his 
uncertainty and anxiety as to his neighbors’ intentions that places 
man in this basic [security] dilemma (Herz, 1950, p. 157). 
Robert Jervis argues that this uncertainty and anxiety arises from the anarchical 
structure of international politics. ‘The lack of an international sovereign’, he 
explains, ‘not only permits wars to occur, but also makes it difficult for states that 
are satisfied with the status quo to arrive at goals they recognize as being in their 
common interest’ (Jervis, 1978, p. 167). Anarchy refers to the lack of an authority 
above that of the nation state and, according to Jervis, it is this lack of higher power 
to enforce the law that discourages states from co-operation. Shiping Tang builds 
upon the work of Butterfield, Herz and Jervis, (which he terms the BHJ formulation) 
and introduces three aspects that he considers to be essential to the security 
dilemma: anarchy which leads to fear and uncertainty, a lack of malign intentions 
on either side, and some accumulation of power (Tang, 2009).  
The security dilemma is often used to explain military arms races and, in its most 
extreme form, can lead to accidental wars that were brought about by the logics of 
fear, suspicion and mutual distrust. As with securitization, the existence of an 
‘objectively real’ threat is not a precondition for the existence of a security 
dilemma. Rather, it suffices that each side believes a threat exists. Two countries 
may engage in an arms race because they consider their adversary’s actions to be 
offensive in nature, whilst they consider their own actions to be defensive.  
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4.1.1 Dilemmas and Paradoxes 
According to Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, the security dilemma is really 
comprised of two dilemmas, which together can result in a security paradox, where 
measures taken by an actor to increase its security ultimately leads to greater 
insecurity (Booth & Wheeler, 2008). The first dilemma is the dilemma of 
interpretation; that is, how should one state interpret the actions of another? The 
second is the dilemma of response; how should an actor respond to the actions of 
the other? 
4.1.1.1 Dilemma of Interpretation 
According to Booth and Wheeler, the dilemma of interpretation relates to the 
difficulty that states face in interpreting the intent, motivation and capabilities of 
other states. In conditions of unresolvable uncertainty, a state must decide whether 
the military capabilities of another state are solely defensive or whether they are 
intended for more offensive purposes. The dilemma is driven by the inability of 
states to put themselves into the minds of their counterparts and understand their 
motives and intentions. This difficulty derives from the philosophical problem of 
‘Other Minds’, which addresses the fundamental human inability to know the mind 
of another (Windsor, 1990; Hollis & Smith, 1990). An additional problem is the 
inherent ambiguity of weapons and other technologies. Tanks, aircraft and soldiers 
are largely dual-use in nature, deployable for both offensive and defensive 
purposes. If a state strengthens its army, how can another state tell whether this is 
for defensive or offensive purposes? 
4.1.1.2 Dilemma of Response 
Following the dilemma of interpretation is the dilemma of response; how should a 
state respond to the seemingly hostile actions of another? Should it provide a show 
of force to deter the other from attacking or should it signal its benign intentions in 
an effort to reassure the other side?  A state’s response to the security dilemma is 
of utmost importance to its security. Misjudge hostile activity by another state to 
be benign and defensive and a country risks annihilation; misjudge defensive 
activity as hostile and a state risks a catastrophic conflict. If each side determines 
that the other is hostile then a spiral of insecurity may ensue as each seeks to boost 
their own security whilst simultaneously making the other feel more vulnerable. 
The result is a security paradox, where an increased focus on security actually 
results in greater insecurity (Booth & Wheeler, 2008). 
149 
 
The security dilemma is often invoked to help explain negative outcomes in 
International Relations such as arms races and war, but the existence of a security 
dilemma does not always lead to a negative security spiral. The Cold War is a classic 
security dilemma that resulted in an arms race but ultimately ended short of war 
when each realised the predicament they were in. Insecurity and fear of the other 
drove the US and the Soviet Union towards a spiralling arms race that initially 
resulted in greater insecurity for both, but when Mikhail Gorbachev became the 
leader of the Soviet Union in 1985, he took steps towards ending this harmful spiral. 
He acted to reassure the US of his peaceful intent and made several conciliatory 
moves, which created room for negotiation and resulted in reciprocal moves. The 
disarmament programme following the Good Friday agreement in Northern Ireland 
is another good example, where each side weakened their own strength through 
disarmament but ultimately achieved greater security. In both examples, the worst 
consequences of the security dilemma were avoided, although animosity and 
distrust were not completely diffused. 
The most significant criticism of the security dilemma challenges the idea that 
insecurity is behind international conflict and suggests instead that greed is the 
main source of war. States engage in war to change the status quo, and may either 
seek to gain territory and resources or to eliminate another state, ideology or race. 
Patrick Glynn, for example, argues that the First World War is best explained by 
German greed and desire to expand rather than insecurity, as is claimed by others 
(Glynn, 1992). It is difficult to challenge this idea empirically due to the opacity of 
the causes of war, but for adherents of the security dilemma the existence of 
‘greedy states’ does not negate the security dilemma, it just becomes less 
important. As Glaser explains, the dilemma still applies because even greedy states 
can feel insecure, but ‘the security dilemma is of less significance when the state’s 
adversary is greedy’ (Glaser, 1997, p. 190). 
4.2 BEYOND INTER-STATE CONFLICT 
The conflict between the Digital Rights Community (DRC) and the British state over 
issues of privacy and surveillance would appear to be far removed from the 
traditional applications of the security dilemma in international relations, but the 
concept has proven useful to help understand other sub-state conflicts. In his 
‘Burglar Paradox’ thought experiment, game theorist Thomas Schelling describes 
how a confrontation between himself and an intruder can escalate into a tragic 
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outcome because the security measures taken by each side appear threatening to 
the other (Schelling, 1960). 
If I go downstairs to investigate a noise at night, with a gun in my 
hand, and find myself face to face with a burglar who has a gun in 
his hand, there is a danger of an outcome that neither of us desires. 
Even if he prefers to just leave quietly, and I wish him to, there is 
danger that he may think I want to shoot, and shoot first. Worse, 
there is danger that he may think that I think he wants to shoot. Or 
he may think that I think he thinks I want to shoot. And so on. ‘Self-
Defense’ is ambiguous, when one is only trying to preclude being 
shot in self-defense (Schelling, 1960, p. 207). 
Schelling’s Burglar Paradox was later used by Baliga and Sjöström to demonstrate 
how arms races are inevitable in systems of incomplete knowledge of the 
preferences of the other (Baliga & Sjostrom, 2004). The burglar paradox is derived 
from the same issues as Herz’s Security Paradox; the ambiguity of 
defensive/offensive weapons, the difficulty entering the other man’s counter fear 
and the logic that actions taken to increase self-defence can ultimately leave you 
more vulnerable. Whilst Schelling applies the security dilemma to everyday life, 
several authors have also extended the concept beyond intrastate conflict and into 
the domestic political sphere. 
Barry Posen was the first to apply the security dilemma to internal problems within 
states (Posen, 1993). He argues that the security dilemma can be applied to 
intrastate problems when similar conditions exist to those between states in the 
international system. Ethnic conflict can be fuelled by the security dilemma when 
states no longer function effectively. As communities begin to take responsibility 
for their own security, they can cause anxiety in others, leading to spiralling 
insecurity and conflict. Stuart Kaufman also applies the security dilemma to ethnic 
conflict, arguing that once governments have lost control, ethnic groups can take 
on the attributes of sovereignty. 
Strictly speaking the security dilemma should not apply to 
contending ethnic groups within a state, because they rarely find 
themselves in a situation of complete anarchy. Anarchy can be 
approximated, however, if ethnic groups effectively challenge the 
governments legitimacy and control over its territory. If anarchy 
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reaches the point where the government cannot control its 
territory effectively enough to protect its people, while ethnic-
based organizations can, then the ethnic organizations have 
enough of the attributes of sovereignty to create a security 
dilemma (Kaufman, 1996, p. 151). 
Philip Cerny takes the concept of intrastate security dilemmas a step further by 
introducing the concept of the New Security Dilemma (NSD) to replace the 
Traditional Security Dilemma (TSD) (Cerny, 2000). He argues that the end of the 
Cold War and the emergence of globalization has increased the likelihood of 
challenges to the state from non-state, sub-state and trans-state actors. 
The challenges thrown up in the twenty-first century in the form of 
the New Security Dilemma are likely to significantly reduce the 
effectiveness of traditional state-based and state-systemic 
approaches in the stabilization of international politics. Where it is 
not primarily states that defect15 from interstate balances of 
power, but rather a range of transnational and subnational actors 
and structures, then interstate alliances and other traditional 
means of re-equilibrating the balance will be insufficient to control 
those defections (Cerny, 2000, p. 645). 
Cerny draws on the historical analogy of neo-medievalism, which suggests that the 
traditional model of powerful nation states is gradually being replaced by features 
normally associated with the medieval world. These include competing institutions, 
fragmented loyalties and identities, and the spread of grey zones - areas and social 
contexts where the rule of law does not apply. Cerny argues that the emergence of 
transnational governance from international institutions, policy communities, 
advocacy coalitions and regulatory bodies, has led to insecurity for the state and 
conflict between state and non-state actors. 
 The notion of a vicious circle inherent in the traditional Security 
Dilemma is transposed into the New Security Dilemma, but at an 
entirely different level. To begin with, attempts to address 
insecurities through traditional forms of state power, especially 
hegemony, create further insecurities that provoke backlashes. 
                                                          
15 Cerny uses this term in the game theoretical sense. In game theory players can choose to 
co-operate to gain mutual benefits or defect to pursue individual gain. 
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These backlashes in turn draw both states and nonstate actors 
farther into the quagmires of ethnic and religious conflict, 
warlordism, and tribalism, ineffective or collapsed states, and ever-
increasing calls on military, political, and economic resources. Such 
responses simply provoke further resentment, frustration, and 
hopelessness, and breed endemic low-level conflict. Supposedly 
hegemonic powers are thus sucked into a widening security gap of 
their own making (Cerny, 2005, p. 18). 
Whilst Cerny applies his concept of the NSD to the issue of terrorism, there are also 
some clear parallels with cyberspace. Cerny highlights the Internet as one of the 
factors which helps to undermine traditional identities and his reference to 
neomedieval grey zones, inaccessible to the rule of law, parallels the concept of the 
dark web and areas of cyberspace that are inaccessible to the state (Cerny, 2005, 
p. 19). Digital rights organisations such as the ORG and the EFF are examples of 
Cerny’s advocacy coalitions who undermine traditional state governance and 
provoke conflict with the state.  Cerny also argues that terrorism ‘often actually 
gains sympathy, adherents, and momentum from the attempts of states to repress 
it’ and this can also be seen in cyberspace (Cerny, 2005, p. 19). State efforts to 
protect National security through state surveillance often creates a backlash and 
generate sympathy, adherents and momentum for the cause of digital rights.    
4.3 THE CYBER SECURITY DILEMMA 
Traditional security dilemmas exist between two equivalent actors (states) who 
each fear the other, whereas the CSD exists between the state and the DRC. Whilst 
many within the DRC fear the threat of an authoritarian state, the state does not 
fear the DRC directly; instead, different elements of the state either fear the 
undermining of their own authority and legitimacy or fear action by the DRC that 
could hamper their ability to combat terrorism, organized crime and other threats. 
Unlike with traditional state-based security dilemmas, the sides are not 
predetermined or well defined. Instead of geographical separation, the CSD relies 
on the ideological separation of those who support efforts to improve national 
security and those who support greater digital rights. These are comprised of a 
loose collective of civil rights activists, technologists, industry representatives, 
academics, politicians and members of the public. 
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As with traditional security dilemmas, opinions on surveillance and digital rights 
exist across a spectrum, but these opinions coalesce around two strong ideologies 
that each view the other as threatening. Some privacy-enhancing technologies such 
as end-to-end encryption are considered threatening to national security, whilst 
some national security measures such as surveillance are considered threatening 
to privacy. Whilst each side is focussed on their own security interests, their actions 
appear threatening to the other, which leads to an escalating arms race between 
the state and the DRC. The state uses legislation and technical capabilities to 
maintain and extend its ability to gain access to data, which helps it to protect 
national security, whilst the DRC uses legislation and technical tools such as 
encryption to protect individual privacy. As each measure appears threatening to 
the other, the two sides inadvertently perpetuate a damaging arms race and 
spiralling insecurity.  
4.3.1 Existing Literature 
Several authors apply the security dilemma to cyberspace. Ben Buchanan applies 
the concept to state on state hacking, Nicholas Rueter applies it to cyber warfare 
and Myriam Dunn Cavelty applies it to the conflict between national security and 
individual rights. 
Ben Buchanan considers the offensive/defensive information problem with regards 
to state hacking in cyberspace (Buchanan, 2016). He argues that whilst state 
hacking may appear to be an offensive pursuit, such activity is often driven by 
defensive requirements. As he puts it: ‘two nations, neither of which seeks to harm 
the other, but neither of which trusts the other, will often find it prudent to 
penetrate each other’s systems’ (Buchanan, 2016, p. inside cover). One nation’s 
attempt to secure itself through hacking and learning about the threat from the 
other results in escalating tensions, increased hacking and less security for all. 
When discussing solutions to the CSD, Buchanan criticises what he calls the 
‘mistaken belief that one or two strategic or technological big-ticket innovations 
will dramatically improve a state’s prospects and solve the crisis of the day’ 
(Buchanan, 2016, p. 157).  Instead, he suggests that there is no single answer to the 
CSD, which must be addressed through multipronged efforts that initially establish 
stability, start to build trust and then begin to minimise the risks of 
misinterpretation. These include initial efforts to improve the core baseline 
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defences of each nation, efforts to advance bilateral trust16 and mutual 
contributions to system-wide security17. 
Nicholas Rueter considers a similar CSD between states but focusses on the 
prospect of cyber warfare (Rueter, 2011). He argues that cyberspace is particularly 
prone to the security dilemma because the offense-defence balance leans towards 
offense (i.e. it is easier to attack than to defend in cyberspace) and that offense-
defence differentiation is extremely difficult (i.e. it is extremely hard to determine 
whether a state’s investment in cyber capabilities is designed for offensive or 
defensive purposes). This is compounded by the difficulties in gathering intelligence 
on another state’s capabilities, as these generally exist in the virtual world and 
cannot be physically evaluated in the same way that tank and aircraft numbers can. 
Whilst describing the situation as grim, Rueter suggests three ways in which the 
CSD can be improved. The establishment of international institutions and norms 
could help to facilitate international co-operation in cyberspace and help improve 
trust between states who currently fear each other’s intentions.  Technological 
developments could also help by changing the balance between offence and 
defence, making it costlier to attack than defend and reducing the fear between 
states. And finally, states could better signal their offensive or defensive intentions 
through their doctrine and organisational structures, increased transparency over 
cyber warfare programs and clear delineation between offensive and defensive 
units. 
Myriam Dunn Cavelty notes that despite huge efforts and vast spending on 
cybersecurity, the approach is not working and cyberspace appears to be becoming 
more insecure (Cavelty, 2014). She describes this as a security dilemma between 
the state and the public. Unlike with traditional conceptualisations of the security 
dilemma, which place the blame for the emergence of security problems on the 
inability of two parties to understand the defensive nature of each other’s security 
moves, Dunn Cavelty blames the state for the emergence of the CSD. She cites the 
militarisation of cyberspace by the state, the weakening of security through state-
based malware, state attempts to de-anonymise cyberspace, and the extension of 
                                                          
16 Buchanan references several Cold War initiatives including the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, Strategic Arms Limitation talks and the Intermediate Nuclear 
Forces agreement. 
17 For example, by bilateral nuclear disarmament or in a cybersecurity by a government 
declaring zero-days it discovers. This may cost them good intelligence access in the short 
term but will increase the overall security of the system in the long term. 
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the notion of national security to cyberspace as evidence of the state’s role in 
reducing both individual and national security. Dunn Cavelty argues that national 
security and a form of security that is relevant to the people must not be at 
loggerheads with each other and in cybersecurity, in particular, she claims ‘the two 
can meet’ (Cavelty, 2014, p. 703).  
In addressing the dilemma between national security and individual freedoms, 
Dunn Cavelty’s work is the most applicable to this thesis. However, Dunn Cavelty 
only addresses the CSD from the perspective of individual security and human 
rights, arguing that vulnerability reduction is both the common ground and the 
solution to the CSD. Dunn argues that reducing vulnerabilities in computer systems 
protects digital rights by enhancing individual privacy, but also protects national 
security by reducing the opportunities for hacktivists, criminals and hostile states. 
But Dunn Cavelty fails to address the fears, held by many states, that totally secure 
and encrypted communications in cyberspace would increase the threat of crime 
and terrorism by eliminating the ability of law enforcement to investigate criminal 
and terrorist activity.  
4.3.2 Characteristics of the Cyber Security Dilemma 
Security dilemmas have specific characteristics, which create an environment for 
conflict. Security dilemmas exist in a state of anarchy; they involve actors driven by 
their own security needs; they are fuelled by fear and certainty; they are 
exacerbated by the inability to understand the fears of the other; they relate to a 
scenario where security is not mutually exclusive; they result in actors attempting 
to accumulate power; and they result in spiralling insecurity and negative 
outcomes. The following section considers how well each of these characteristics 
applies to the conflict between the state and the DRC. 
4.3.2.1 A State of Anarchy 
According to Tang, the ultimate source of the security dilemma is the anarchic 
nature of international politics (Tang, 2009). Whilst supranational organisations 
such as the UN or superpowers such as the US can sometimes provide independent 
nations with some guarantees of security, for the most part they must protect 
themselves through the accumulation of power, the establishment of alliances and 
diplomacy. 
The conflict between the British state and the DRC is asymmetric as it pits a nation 
state with legislative authority against a loose collective of individuals and 
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organisations. Because the British state enacts and executes the law in cyberspace, 
it could be considered that this creates a state of order that is not conducive to the 
security dilemma, but the British state’s ability to govern cyberspace is actually 
severely limited. Cyberlibertarians such as John Perry Barlow have long argued that 
cyberspace is apart from physical space and cannot be subject to state control. This 
view is sometimes echoed by state actors such as Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe who has 
argued that cyberspace is becoming anarchic (Barlow, 1996; Hogan-Howe, 2014). 
The ease of information transit in cyberspace, the public availability of encryption 
and the rapid pace of technological change all serve to hinder the state’s control of 
cyberspace.  
Since the start of the Crypto Wars, activists have attempted to bypass state control 
of cyberspace by encouraging the use of encrypted systems such as Tor and PGP. 
In the US, some of the first efforts to control cyberspace through encryption export 
controls were thwarted by activists who printed banned encryption codes on t-
shirts to demonstrate the futility of such policies (Cypherspace.org, n.d.). Following 
the Snowden disclosures, these efforts became more mainstream and technology 
companies began to offer greater access to encryption for their customers. The 
most prominent example comes from Apple, who implemented encryption 
standards within their products that they described as being able to deny 
government access to user data even if presented with a court order (Apple Inc, 
n.d.). Whilst the state could theoretically ban companies from implementing such 
technology, and they could even ban the use of encryption itself, such legislation 
would be difficult to pass, relatively easy to bypass and complicated by the 
international nature of the companies involved. Legislation alone cannot provide 
the British state with full control over the use of cyberspace in the UK. 
Cyberspace is essentially anarchic18, as neither the state nor actors within the DRC 
hold complete control and there is no higher authority who can dictate how 
surveillance is conducted and how encryption is used. This anarchic nature forms 
the basis for the CSD as without a higher authority the state and DRC are driven to 
accumulate power to defend their own security interests. 
                                                          
18 This is not to stay that cyberspace is in a state of chaos or is out of control. A state of 
anarchy, in this sense, refers to a lack of a higher authority, who can impose decisions on 
both the state and the DRC. 
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4.3.2.2 Security Seeking Pre-eminence 
Charles Glaser argues that states can be classed as either ‘Security Seekers’ or 
‘Greedy States’ with respect to their behaviour (Glaser, 1997). Security seekers are 
only motivated by the desire to preserve their own security, although in doing so 
they may inadvertently harm the security of the other. Greedy states are motivated 
to attack others, steal their resources, expand and gain an advantage. The purest 
form of the security dilemma involves two pure security seekers who end up in 
conflict due to fear and ignorance; the motivations of each side are benign but the 
outcome is tragic.  If the actors involved have some limited greedy motivations then 
the security dilemma still applies, as a combination of both aggression and fear can 
lead to an inflated arms race. However, when one actor is motivated primarily by 
greed, improving security in self-defence might act as a deterrent rather than 
fuelling the conflict. As states are comprised of agencies and individuals with 
different motivations, states can simultaneously display both security seeking and 
greedy behaviour, which may limit the degree to which the security dilemma can 
apply.  
It is difficult to definitively ascertain whether particular states are security seekers 
or greedy. Even with hindsight historians disagree over the causes of conflict and 
the motivations of the actors involved. But as Glaser contests, ‘certain actions can 
communicate valuable information because they are not equally likely to be taken 
by a greedy state and a pure security seeker’ (Glaser, 1997, p. 179). Applied to 
cyberspace, it is possible to acquire some idea of the degree to which the actors 
involved are motivated by greed or self-defence. 
The British state has always insisted that its surveillance capability is designed to 
protect the country and its citizens from the threat of terrorism, serious and 
organised crime, and hostile states  (HM Government, 2016). It makes significant 
efforts in policy documents such as the UK Cyber Security Strategy (UK CSS) to 
demonstrate its privacy credentials and makes efforts to demonstrate how it is 
mitigating the potentially intrusive nature of surveillance  (HM Government, 2016).  
If the British State is the equivalent of a greedy state, then it must be motivated to 
deliberately harm digital rights. But if this is the case then it is likely that evidence 
for this would have been uncovered within the hundreds of thousands of 
documents leaked by Edward Snowden. Whilst it can be argued that the disclosures 
revealed significant privacy intrusions by GCHQ, they do not show any evidence 
that GCHQ specifically set out to undermine the public’s digital rights. Whilst this 
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differentiation may not be important for many digital rights advocates, it is a crucial 
distinction within the security dilemma as it demonstrates security-seeking 
behaviour that inadvertently threatens the security of others, as opposed to greedy 
behaviour that deliberately threatens the security of others. It is impossible to 
disprove the claim, made by some conspiracy theorists, that GCHQ is part of a New 
World Order plan to control the populace and there has been some past precedent 
for surveillance capabilities being used for political purposes (The Guardian, 2013). 
However, it is reasonable to draw the conclusion that, on the whole, GCHQ is 
motivated to protect the population against terrorism, crime and hostile states 
rather than to deliberately undermine digital rights (Co, 2014; Campbell & 
Honigsbaum, 1999). 
Members of the DRC frequently state that they do not wish to undermine the ability 
of the state to fight crime and terrorists, but do acknowledge that national security 
sometimes had to be compromised to protect individual rights. Whilst some claim 
that Edward Snowden was working with Russia to compromise American and 
British national security, there is no evidence to suggest that the DRC is motivated 
to damage national security (US House of Representatives, 2016). Some cyber-
libertarians such as John Perry Barlow view the Internet and encryption as an 
opportunity to undermine nation states and bring about a new system of 
governance. It could reasonably be argued that this represents greedy behaviour 
that goes beyond pure security seeking intention, but whilst the actions of the DRC 
may be considered a threat to national security, this threat arises as a by-product 
of actions to protect individual rights and is not what motivates the majority of the 
DRC. 
4.3.2.3 Fear and Uncertainty 
The security dilemma is driven by the actors’ belief that the other side threatens 
their own security. This can be derived from a misreading of the other’s defensive 
actions as offensive, a psychological bias against the other, a tendency to respond 
to the worst-case scenario or a general fear of the unknown. 
Security actors within the British state often claims that encryption and other 
security measures are turning the Internet into a ‘dark and ungoverned space’, 
which is in danger of becoming anarchic, whereas the DRC claims that efforts to 
‘undermine’ encryption and advanced security measures represent a threat to 
digital rights (Muižnieks, 2013; Schneier, 2015; Berners-Lee, 2012; Hogan-Howe, 
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2014). Technical and legislative moves by the state to ensure that the security 
agencies maintain their ability to access online communications are met with 
protest from members of the DRC, who claim that these measures threaten 
democracy and digital rights. Similarly, the introduction of technical or legal 
measures to protect technology users from criminal hacking or state surveillance is 
met by equally loud protest from state representatives, who claims that these 
measures threaten national security and will lead to terrorism and increased 
criminality (Rudd, 2017) (Hogan-Howe, 2014). 
This level of mistrust is fuelled by uncertainty over the actions and motivations of 
the other side. When asked about whether he believed there was something 
sinister about state surveillance, Jim Killock, the Director of the ORG, argued that it 
was the inability to read the state’s intentions that was the real problem.  
 There may be [something sinister] but you can never know what 
the sinister motivations might be because those motivations exist 
in the heads of people, not necessarily in policy documents and 
they are not necessarily articulated … the obscurity is where you 
get the problem, I think (Killock, 2016). 
Killock also discusses the difficulties of determining exactly what the threat of state 
surveillance is, given that intrusion into people’s emails, for example, is much less 
visible than the police entering someone’s property and searching through their 
filing cabinet. 
There’ s a silence. It is a difference, not least because it makes it 
harder for people to understand whether this is a real or ignorable 
threat, is this something we need to pay attention to? The silence 
of this monitoring, the fact that it’s happening without direct 
participation or noticing it, that is what makes it quite hard for 
people to judge (Killock, 2016). 
Whilst the motivations of characters such as Edward Snowden19 and large 
technology companies20 can be challenged, there is little to suggest that a 
significant percentage of the DRC want to threaten national security. Whilst 
                                                          
19 Many view Edward Snowden’s actions to be motivated by revenge, desire for personal 
fame or due to corruption by Russia or China. See House of Representatives report. 
20 Strong privacy credentials are commercially attractive for technology companies so some 
believe that actions by some technology companies to display these credentials may be 
motivated by profit rather than an altruistic desire to protect human rights. 
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members of the DRC may directly fear the actions of state actors such as GCHQ, the 
state does not generally view the DRC to be hostile. Instead, it fears that actions 
taken by the DRC will inadvertently facilitate terrorist and criminal actors. This view 
was articulated by the former director of GCHQ, Robert Hannigan, who accused 
technology companies of being in denial about their role in facilitating terrorism. 
To those of us who have to tackle the depressing end of human 
behaviour on the internet, it can seem that some technology 
companies are in denial about its misuse (Hannigan, 2014). 
The CSD is fuelled by the British state’s fears over the consequences of the DRC’s 
actions and the DRC’s fears over the consequences of state actions. 
4.3.2.4 Failure to appreciate the fears of the other 
Within the security dilemma, each side considers their own actions to be defensive 
in nature and cannot appreciate why others may see them otherwise. Butterfield 
argues that this inability to understand why the other might see them as 
threatening is the driving force of the security dilemma (Butterfield, 1951).  
You yourself may vividly feel the terrible fear that you have of the 
other party, but you cannot enter the other man’s counter fear, or 
even understand why he should be particularly nervous. For you 
yourself know that you mean him no harm, and that you want 
nothing from him save guarantees for your own safety; and it is 
never possible for you to realise or remember properly that since 
he cannot see the inside of your mind, he can never have the same 
assurances of your intentions that you have (Butterfield, 1951, p. 
21). 
In the CSD, the British state considers surveillance to be defensive in nature, 
designed to prevent terrorists and criminals from attacking both the state and the 
population. This is a view that was repeatedly put forward during interviews with 
GCHQ staff such as Matt. 
In terms of the threat to privacy. This is not from us. With GCHQ 
we have a mandate, done through an elected government, under 
law and with safeguards and oversight. Other people are intruding 
without a mandate or safeguards. Criminals don’t have a mandate, 
oversight or safeguards. This is criminals against individuals. It’s a 
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completely different nature of intrusion. The aims are different; 
the purpose is different. We can only use surveillance for national 
security, serious crime and the economic wellbeing of the UK 
(Matt, 2016). 
If you consider that if somewhere in our building there being some 
information on you is a breach of privacy, then companies do the 
same. It’s not the state that gathers the data. We use it for national 
security purposes (Matt, 2016). 
In terms of threats to liberty, privacy and freedom we’re here to 
defend liberty and freedom. The freedom to be safe, the freedom 
delivered through economic wellbeing, keeping the UK safe. 
Globally we have much greater freedoms and privacy then many 
other countries and we are actively promoting this around the 
world (Matt, 2016). 
But there is also frustration that others do not understand this point of view and 
there is exasperation that GCHQ could be viewed as some form of totalitarian force. 
Part of this is a trust issue. A misunderstanding of what we do and 
how. Not understanding we’re real people drawn from the public. 
It’s frustrating to have the ‘mass surveillance’ myth pedalled (Matt, 
2016). 
We don’t like this [the term mass surveillance]. It sounds 1984 and 
it's not true. It suggests a totalitarian regime where every move is 
watched and scrutinised and has possible repercussions. How can 
people actually think we live like this? (Fiona, 2016). 
For GCHQ, the task of persuading others of their benign nature is hampered by 
issues of secrecy, the lack of a human face and the complexity of the technology 
and laws that govern the organisation.  
 We have one arm tied behind our back because we can’t talk about 
specific cases. Identities are also sensitive therefore it is very 
difficult to put a human face on the organization. This is difficult as 
we only have a handful of faces we can show. It’s a problem 
because some of the allegations of ‘mass surveillance’ and extreme 
forms of ‘those people must be evil’ would be an untenable 
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position if you see the actual people who work here. The 
complexity of the work, the laws that cover us and the technology, 
which are all difficult to understand is also a problem (Matt, 2016). 
The legislation that currently exists and proposed new legislation is 
really complex. Even those who track and follow it observe that a 
large proportion of people struggle to understand. So explaining to 
the public is very challenging (Emily, 2016). 
For GCHQ staff this communication problem was compounded by Snowden’s 
disclosures, which they believe presented an inaccurate picture of the organization. 
One of the things that Snowden did was to make the public think 
that we weren’t on their side. That we had somehow slipped into 
1984. It is on us to communicate our value. That we aren’t how we 
are portrayed, that we don’t care about their email and are not 
reading it and we are focused on threats to the UK (Fiona, 2016). 
GCHQ staff also highlight how difficult it is to reverse these perceptions, given their 
inexperience in communicating with the public. 
It’s like turning the Titanic. We’re a Signals Intelligence agency, not 
an experienced crisis management agency. Previously we were 
used to just speaking to the Gloucester Echo and the biggest story 
was that a dead pigeon had been found with a WW2 code attached 
to it and GCHQ couldn’t decrypt it. So the organisation struggled to 
react to Snowden in a way. We were previously secret with no 
public face. When the news broke we didn’t know how bad it would 
be. By the time we realised what had happened and were ready to 
react the horse had already bolted. The reaction was slow and 
coated in fear. We tried to starve the story of oxygen by not 
commenting on it but then when we realised that was not working 
we started to engage but it has taken a long slog to build up 
relationships and get to the situation we are in today, which isn’t 
perfect. But so much damage was done by not commenting. 
Someone else had told our story. The headlines were sensational. 
It was compelling but it was wrong (Fiona, 2016). 
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The DRC also consider their own actions to be defensive, not just of digital rights 
but also of national security. But one of the major allegations that the DRC must 
frequently counter is that their efforts aid terrorists and harm national security 
(Cotton, 2016). Edward Snowden, for example, claims that his actions are designed 
to improve the NSA and Bruce Schneier, amongst many others, argues that strong 
encryption is essential for national security (Snowden, 2013; Schneier, 2016). 
 I am not trying to bring down the NSA, I am working to improve 
the NSA. I am still working for the NSA right now. They are the only 
ones who don't realize it (Snowden, 2013). 
The FBI paints this as a trade-off between security and privacy. It's 
not. It's a trade-off between more security and less security. Our 
national security needs strong encryption (Schneier, 2016). 
But many within the DRC are frustrated by the lack of understanding of their 
position. When asked why GCHQ does not understand the DRC’s point of view, ORG 
Policy Director Javier Ruiz claims that ‘to a hammer every problem looks like a nail’, 
continuing to explain that GCHQ can only think of surveillance as the solution to 
national security problems because this is the nature of the organisation. He also 
claims that public understanding of the issues is limited by the complexity of the 
technology involved (Ruiz, 2016). 
[public understanding is] not good at all. What you get every now 
and then is that people have a gut feeling for something but they 
don’t know how to express that and they don’t really understand 
the technology and then they don’t complain (Ruiz, 2016). 
Both the British state and the DRC believe that their own actions are defensive in 
nature and are motivated by a desire to improve security, freedom and liberty for 
the populace, but each is also frustrated by what they would consider the inability 
of others to understand their position. Whilst some within the government and DRC 
may be better at understanding the fears of the other, each side is largely fixated 
on their own security concerns. As Butterfield puts it ‘neither side sees the nature 
of the predicament that he is in, for each only imagines that the other party is being 
hostile and unreasonable’ (Butterfield, 1951, p. 21). 
164 
 
4.3.2.5 Compatible Security 
The security interests of two different parties can broadly be described as 
compatible or incompatible.  If compatible, then the security interests of each can 
be achieved through either independent efforts or through the establishment of an 
alliance. If security interests are incompatible, then any advancements in the 
security of one party will reduce the security of the other, and as it is impossible for 
both to simultaneously achieve security, conflict is inevitable.  
One of the most significant arguments against the existence of a CSD is the belief 
that national security and digital rights are incompatible security models. National 
security can only be achieved by reducing digital rights and digital rights can only 
be achieved at the expense of national security, so solutions should focus on 
striking a balance between these ‘competing’ notions.  
But the need for balance is challenged by several authors including Mark 
Neocleous, who argues that the notion of balance is a substitute for real argument 
(Neocleous, 2007). Neocleous argues that ‘the myth of a “balance” between 
security and liberty opens the (back-) door to an acceptance of all sorts of 
authoritarian security measures; measures which are then justified on liberal 
grounds’ (Neocleous, 2007, p. 133). By ceding that balance is required, illiberal 
security measures must be accepted in its name. Jeremy Waldron also opposes the 
concept of balance, but suggests that the idea of balance is based on the false 
assumption that security and liberty are in a zero-sum game (Waldron, 2003). 
Waldron’s arguments against a balance include the rejection of consequentialism 
by civil rights activists and the existence of imbalances in security and liberty 
throughout society. Waldron also suggests that actions taken to improve individual 
security (at the expense of liberty), by boosting the state’s powers, might actually 
diminish the security of the individual due to the new threat posed by the state 
itself. This is a common argument made by the DRC, who claim that the powers 
accumulated by organisations, such as GCHQ, to fight terrorism, can equally be 
used against the populace. 
Kenneth Boulding argues that alongside ‘real’ incompatibility we should also be 
considering another type of incompatibility which he describes as illusory. 
The other form of incompatibility might be called ‘illusory’ 
incompatibility, in which there exists a condition of compatibility 
which would satisfy the ‘real’ interests of the two parties but in 
which the dynamics of the situation or illusions of the parties 
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create a situation of … misunderstandings, with increased hostility 
simply as a result of the reactions of the parties to each other, not 
as a result of any basic differences of interests (Boulding, 1959, p. 
130).  
The belief that national security and digital rights are incompatible is a result of 
years of competing securitisations and the polarization of the cybersecurity debate. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, this debate has become entrenched in issues of 
encryption, backdoors and the concept of ‘Going Dark’. It is framed as a choice 
between encryption and digital rights, on the one hand, and backdoors and national 
security on the other. 
A universal application of unbreakable encryption, where the decryption keys are 
held securely and solely by the communicating parties, does appear to be 
incompatible with the state’s desire to be able to access all online communications, 
but encryption and surveillance do not constitute the real security interests of the 
state and the DRC. Encryption does not guarantee digital rights and digital rights do 
not rely on encryption. Likewise, access to all communications does not guarantee 
national security and national security does not rely on access to all 
communications.  As Andrew Keane Woods suggests in his description of 
Encryption Substitutes, there are many ways that the DRC can achieve security 
without the need for encryption, and there are many ways for the state to achieve 
national security without gaining access to encrypted data (Woods, 2016). 
Recently there has been some movement away from the view that national security 
and digital rights must be balanced. Whilst the 2011 UK Cyber Security Strategy 
discusses ‘balancing security with freedom and privacy’, the 2016 National Cyber 
Security Strategy debates ‘reconciling national security with individual rights and 
freedoms’, and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 claims to ’protect both the 
privacy and security of the public’ (HM Government, 2016; HM Government, 2016; 
HM Government, 2011). In 2014, FBI Director James Comey claimed that law 
enforcement worked to provide security that enhances liberty. 
Some have suggested there is a conflict between liberty and 
security. I disagree. At our best, we in law enforcement, national 
security, and public safety are looking for security that enhances 
liberty. The people of the FBI are sworn to protect both security 
and liberty. It isn’t a question of conflict (Comey, 2014).  
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Whereas many in the DRC, such as Bruce Schneier, claim that encryption is essential 
to national security. 
The FBI paints this as a trade-off between security and privacy. It's 
not. It's a trade-off between more security and less security. Our 
national security needs strong encryption (Schneier, 2016). 
Many policies designed to improve national security are considered detrimental to 
digital rights, and many efforts to improve digital rights are considered detrimental 
to national security, but the two are not incompatible because ultimately each side 
wants both national security and digital rights. 
4.3.2.6 Power Accumulation 
Due to uncertainty and fear about the intention of others, states often believe that 
they have no choice but to accumulate power to protect their own security. This 
power accumulation may take the form of military might, economic power, political 
alliances or forms of soft power such as cultural influence. The British state 
attempts to accumulate power in cyberspace through both legislation and the 
development of technical capabilities, particularly at GCHQ. These efforts are 
designed to provide the state with the capability to access any electronic 
communication if deemed necessary to protect national security and to deny ‘safe 
spaces’ for terrorists to communicate online (May, 2015). The Telecommunications 
Act 1984 was the first major piece of legislation providing surveillance powers to 
the British intelligence services. It allowed the collection of bulk phone data and 
authorised the Secretary of State to order telecoms providers to provide secret 
assistance to the state in the interests of National security. 
Following advances in technology, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
(RIPA) provided the state with further powers, including the ability to intercept the 
content of phone and internet communications, the power to demand that an ISP 
provides access to an individual’s communications in secret and the power to 
engage in bulk collection of communications data whilst in transit. Following the re-
emergence of terrorism in the UK and the use of the Internet for serious and 
organised crime, the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 provided further powers to the 
state including the right to access Internet collection records for up to 12 months 
and the creation of Technical Capability Orders, which allow the state to order 
technology companies to adapt their products to facilitate access to information. 
This legislation is designed to both help ensure that the state can combat crime and 
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terrorism, but also to enable it to mitigate new technologies, such as encryption, 
that have reduced the state’s capability to operate in cyberspace. 
The state has also sought to improve its capability to conduct cyberspace 
surveillance through the development of new technical capabilities. The Snowden 
disclosures reveal that in around 2007, GCHQ embarked on a programme dubbed 
‘Mastering the Internet’ (MTI) which was designed to provide the agency with vast 
amounts of intelligence from cyberspace. The programme was designed to 
intercept and exploit as much Internet traffic as possible, and an internal report 
from 2011 indicates that in a single day the agency collected 39 billion separate 
pieces of information (The Guardian, 2013). In recent years GCHQ has also 
developed capabilities to hack into individual computers, rig online polls, intercept 
live webcam footage, read individual emails and intercept web-based phone calls 
(The Guardian, 2014; The Guardian, 2014).  GCHQ has also increased its funding 
and staffing; it received the majority of money from the 2011 Cyber Security 
Programme and, in 2015, the government announced that 1000 extra staff would 
be employed at GCHQ, MI5 and MI6 (The Telegraph, 2015). 
Efforts within the DRC to develop and spread security technologies and influence 
legislation can also be viewed as an attempt to accumulate power to defend their 
own security interests. Technologies such as PGP and Tor are actively promoted by 
members of the DRC, and organisations such as the ORG organize and promote 
events such as ‘Crypto Parties’ which are designed to increase the uptake of good 
encryption (Open Rights Group, n.d.). As discussed in Section 3.3.2, technology 
companies such as Apple and Facebook have also increased their security provision, 
providing to users both end-to-end security for communications and full-disk 
encryption for data at rest (Apple Inc, n.d.). 
Members of the DRC have also been active in restricting the state’s surveillance 
powers through political campaigning and participation in the drafting of 
legislation. During the consultation period for the IPA, a large range of digital rights 
organisations and supporters, including the ORG, EFF, Privacy International, Human 
Rights Watch, Liberty and Amnesty International21 provided written and oral 
evidence to the Investigatory Powers Committee making the case to limit state 
surveillance powers and provide better oversight and accountability mechanisms. 
                                                          
21 See https://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/draft-investigatory-
powers-bill/written-evidence-draft-investigatory-powers-committee.pdf for a full list 
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Provisions such as a new Investigatory Powers Commissioner, the creation of new 
offences for the misuse of Investigatory Powers and the requirement for warrants 
issued by the Secretary of State to be signed off by a senior judge, were all achieved 
in response to campaigns by the DRC  (HM Government, 2016). 
The development of technologies and legal powers by both the state and the DRC 
reflect efforts to accumulate power in the interests of security. The state 
continuously develops new capabilities to defend national security and counter the 
more difficult technological landscape, whilst members of the DRC continuously 
seeks new capabilities to counter increasingly intrusive state surveillance measures 
(Apple, 2017; Electronic Frontier Foundation, n.d.; HM Government, 2017) 
4.3.2.7 Spiralling Insecurity 
When the security dilemma is established it leads to an arms race of competing 
security spending as each side tries to keep up with the other but is ultimately left 
feeling even more insecure. 
 [states are naturally] concerned about their security from being 
attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups 
and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they 
are driven to acquire more and more power to escape the impact 
of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more 
insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none 
can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, 
power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and 
power accumulation is on  (Herz, 1950, p. 157).  
Figure 4.1 demonstrates how this spiralling arms race is evident in the CSD as both 
the state and the DRC react to the other’s security efforts by making additional 
security moves of their own.   
State 
Fear: Cyberspace is enabling criminality and terrorism 
Action: Legislation to enable the intelligence agencies to conduct surveillance and 
the development of a surveillance capability 
 
DRC 
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Fear: The state’s surveillance capability is a threat to digital rights 
Action: The development and promotion of encryption and other security 
technologies to protect digital rights and defend against state surveillance.  
 
State 
Fear: Encryption is threatening the state’s ability to enforce the rule of law and 
counter threats to national security 
Action: Efforts to undermine encryption, efforts to break into encrypted products 
and legislation to help gain access to encrypted communications 
 
DRC 
Fear: ‘Breaking’ Encryption undermines security and digital rights 
Action: Opposition to state efforts to gain access to encrypted communications and 
resistance to court orders by technology companies such as Apple. 
Figure 4.1: The spiralling arms race 
Whilst the diagram indicates a start and end to the conflict, in reality it is a spiral 
with no defined start or end. Whilst any of the actions that are taken could be 
considered positive in isolation, the result of the spiral as a whole is greater 
insecurity. The result of this spiralling arms race between the state and the DRC is 
a greater insecurity for both parties, which is demonstrated by claims from each 
side that their security is under greater threat than ever. Following enactment of 
the IPA in 2016, Jo Glanville, Director of the freedom of expression advocates, 
English PEN, described it as ‘unprecedented’ and more chilling than the Snowden 
revelations, Bella Sankey, the policy Director of Liberty, claimed that ‘the state has 
achieved totalitarian-style surveillance powers’ and Jim Killock, director of ORG, 
said that the act granted the state unprecedented powers ‘more suited to a 
dictatorship than a democracy’ (Don't Spy On Us, 2016). In 2016, new government 
terror watchdog Max Hill claimed that the terror threat was the greatest it had been 
for 40 years, Head of MI5 Andrew Parker said that the cyber threat from hostile 
states was growing and, at the opening to the new NCSC, Chancellor Phil Hammond 
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claimed that ‘the cyber attacks we are seeing are increasing in their frequency, their 
severity, and their sophistication’ (Hammond, 2017; Parker, 2016; Hill, 2017). 
The case of Apple vs the FBI can be used to demonstrate how efforts to improve 
security can paradoxically result in greater insecurity for both sides. From a digital 
rights perspective, security was reduced because not only did the FBI end up with 
the ability to break into all iPhone 5Cs, but the existence of a major vulnerability 
became public knowledge and their appeared to be no guarantee that the 
vulnerability would not be disclosed to others. In a lawsuit filed by the Associated 
Press, USA Today and Vice Media, the claimants argued that dangerous technology 
was now in the hands of this unidentified vendor. 
The FBI’s purchase of the technology – and its subsequent 
verification that it had successfully obtained the data it was seeking 
thanks to that technology – confirmed that a serious undisclosed 
security vulnerability existed (and likely still exists) in one of the 
most popular consumer products in the world. And in order to 
exploit that vulnerability, the FBI contracted with an unidentified 
third-party vendor, effectively sanctioning that party to retain this 
potentially dangerous technology without any public assurance 
about what that vendor represents, whether the vendor has 
adequate security measures, whether the vendor is a proper 
recipient of government funds, or whether it will act only in the 
public interest (Associated Press, USA Today, Vice Media, 2016). 
Apple could have hacked the iPhone in a controlled environment before providing 
the data to the FBI and destroying the software they had created but, by opposing 
this option on security grounds, the FBI acquired a method for accessing iPhones 
which they could use to bypass Apple altogether. 
From the FBI’s perspective, the outcome also damaged security. When speaking at 
the Aspen Security Forum in London, FBI Director James Comey indicated that the 
zero-day had cost the FBI more than his wages for the next seven years, which 
roughly equated to $1.3 million USD (The Guardian, 2016). Spending such large 
amounts each time they have trouble accessing data would not be feasible and 
would reduce the funds available for other counter-terrorism work. By pursuing the 
case, the FBI also angered a coalition of other technology companies including 
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Google and WhatsApp, who all backed Apple’s stance (Financial Times, 2016) and 
are increasingly resistant to attempts by the US state to access user data. 
The CSD has led to spiralling security efforts and spiralling insecurity for both the 
state and the DRC. 
4.3.2.8 Negative Outcomes 
The dynamics of the security dilemma have led to countless wars and ethnic 
conflict, resulting in tragic loss of life as well as standoffs that encourage massive 
military spending and hinder mutually beneficial co-operation. 
When security rivalries emerge from security dilemmas it is natural for each side to 
blame the other as each side ‘knows’ that their own actions are only meant to 
protect their security and ‘each only imagines that the other party is being hostile 
and unreasonable’ (Butterfield, 1951, pp. 19-20). After the Cuban Missile Crisis, for 
example, the US blamed the USSR as they had positioned threatening weapons 
adjacent to the US, but the USSR blamed the US for they were only responding to 
US missiles in Italy and Turkey and the botched CIA operation to overthrow their 
ally in Cuba. Viewed through the lens of the security dilemma, each side was driven 
by their own compatible security interests, but by taking action that threatened the 
other they almost provoked a nuclear war. 
A similar scenario is evident in the case of WannaCry, the malware that caused 
substantial damage to computer networks around the world and crippled some 
parts of the NHS. The DRC blame the CIA for creating the malware that was stolen 
and used within the WannaCry attack, but the CIA and NSA could claim that if the 
DRC hadn’t opposed their efforts to gain access to computer networks then they 
wouldn’t have to resort to malware (The Guardian, 2017). Likewise, the British state 
could accuse social networks of facilitating terrorist attacks such as the murder of 
Lee Rigby, but Facebook and others could argue that they had to limit co-operation 
with law enforcement due to the targeting of technology companies by US and UK 
intelligence agencies. 
Whilst the state and DRC can blame each other for security incidents, it is more 
useful to consider the impact of the CSD as a whole. This includes the increasing 
use of cyberspace by cyber criminals and terrorists, frequent data leaks involving 
the private information of citizens, an increasingly difficult online environment for 
law enforcement, substantial surveillance by domestic and foreign intelligence 
agencies, and the ease of access to illegal material through encrypted services such 
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as Tor. These outcomes demonstrate the tragedy of the Crypto Wars of the 1990s 
and 2010s, which resulted in time and resources being spent on an arms race 
between the state and the DRC, whilst attacks by hackers, cyber criminals, terrorists 
and foreign states were harming both digital rights and national security. 
4.4 INTENSIFYING THE SECURITY DILEMMA 
The previous section demonstrates how the CSD has the characteristics of 
traditional security dilemmas, but it also has particular properties that intensify its 
effects. Within Jervis’s conceptualization of the security dilemma, a state’s 
behaviour can be described as either defensive or offensive; defensive behaviour is 
designed to protect an actor’s own security interests, whilst offensive behaviour is 
designed to disrupt the status quo in favour of the attacker (Jervis, 1978). But it is 
often difficult to determine whether behaviour is defensive or offensive in nature. 
In cyberspace, the defensive or offensive nature of activities such as surveillance 
can be judged by considering the purpose of this activity. From the DRC’s 
perspective, state surveillance can be considered to have either defensive or 
offensive purposes:22 
Defensive Purposes 
• Prevention and investigation of crime. 
• Intelligence gathering against hostile states. 
• Prevention of terrorism. 
• Counter-espionage against foreign intelligence agencies. 
Offensive Purposes 
• Falsifying intelligence to gain public support for war or other such action. 
• Using surveillance to spy on, control or manipulate citizens or the media. 
• Spying on opposition parties to support the party in government. 
• Covering up wrongdoing by the intelligence agencies or the state. 
• Conducting intrusive and unwarranted surveillance against the whole 
population. 
                                                          
22 Individuals within the DRC would likely disagree about whether some of the ‘defensive’ 
purposes are legitimate as they rely on the state defining who is a hostile state or terrorist 
group but the wider point is that most members of the DRC would consider some uses of 
surveillance to be defensive in nature and therefore justified. 
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From the British State’s perspective, security technologies such as encryption can 
also have defensive or offensive purposes. 
Defensive Purposes 
• Protection of individual privacy. 
• Protection of freedom of speech. 
• Protection of journalism. 
• Protection of the identity of vulnerable people such as political dissidents. 
Offensive Purposes 
• Facilitation of criminal acts such as terrorism or the sharing of child abuse 
imagery. 
• Prevention of lawful investigation into criminals and terrorists.  
According to Jervis (1978), the magnitude of the security dilemma depends on two 
main conditions; offence-defence differentiation and offence-defence balance. I.e. 
how easy is it to determine whether capabilities are designed for defensive or 
offensive purposes, and how easy is it to use capabilities offensively rather than 
defensively? 
4.4.1 Defence/Offence Differentiation 
To solve the dilemma of interpretation states must be able to judge whether the 
actions of another are motivated by defensive or offensive intent. Has a military 
build-up been ordered out of fear (perhaps enhanced by poor intelligence) or out 
of a desire to attack? States can make this assessment by considering several 
factors, including the other side’s military doctrine, culture, training programme, 
alliances, arms development, political statements, past behaviour and command 
structure. When offensive and defensive behaviour is difficult to distinguish, the 
security dilemma intensifies but when offensive and defensive behaviour is easy to 
distinguish, the security dilemma diminishes as each side can invest in their own 
defence without threatening the other. 
4.4.1.1 DRC Perspective 
GCHQ is split into an intelligence collection element and a cybersecurity element, 
the NCSC. Whilst the NCSC is evidently designed for defensive purposes (i.e. to 
promote UK cybersecurity and protect the country’s infrastructure), the function of 
the intelligence collection element is more obscure. To determine whether GCHQ’s 
intelligence capabilities are designed for defensive or offensive purposes, members 
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of the DRC may consider their technical capability, their motivation and their past 
behaviour. 
From a purely technical perspective, it is extremely difficult to differentiate whether 
the technologies employed by agencies such as GCHQ are designed for offensive or 
defensive purposes. For example, GCHQ has the capability to intercept the emails 
of criminals and terrorists, but this same technology can also be used against 
political opponents or the public. GCHQ also has the capability to manipulate 
information online, change the outcome of online polls and boost traffic to 
websites or views on YouTube (The Guardian, 2014). These techniques can be used 
to undermine terror networks and reduce their support but, technically, they could 
also be used to manipulate public opinion or cover up wrongdoing. Intuitively, 
GCHQ’s ability to manipulate information appears more threatening to democracy 
and individual rights, compared to their ability to passively collect data. An ORG 
report on GCHQ’s ‘offensive capabilities’ expressed concern about the ‘potentially 
horrific’ implications of these capabilities given the lack of oversight (Open Rights 
Group, n.d.). 
The problem however with GCHQ controlling these offensive 
capabilities is that they are highly secretive and are not subject to 
the same levels of public oversight we would normally expect. 
Parliament would normally examine the ethical, legal and strategic 
questions associated with our offensive weaponry (Open Rights 
Group, n.d.). 
The differentiation problem is exacerbated by vastly differing perceptions of 
GCHQ’s data collection, with GCHQ arguing that ‘bulk collection does not equal bulk 
surveillance’ and the ORG claiming that ‘the bulk collection of communications data 
without targeted suspicion is mass surveillance’ (Hannigan, 2016; Open Rights 
Group, n.d., p. 172). GCHQ often cite an investigation by the Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal which rejects the assertion that they carry out ‘Mass Surveillance’, but the 
DRC claims that considering everyone’s data a threat is still mass surveillance 
(GCHQ, 2014).  
I think for us it is the whole apparatus of collect, analyse, store, 
reanalyse, flag, that is a process of mass surveillance because you 
are treating everyone’s data as potentially indicative of threat. You 
analyse it all to find what might be a threat (Killock, 2016). 
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During his leaving speech, GCHQ Director Iain Lobban claimed that ‘the people who 
work at GCHQ would sooner walk out the door than be involved in anything 
remotely resembling “mass surveillance”’ (Lobban, 2014). And during interviews 
with GCHQ staff, including Emily, Adrian and Fiona, it was evident that this view is 
embedded deep within the organisation.  
I recognise the phrase [mass surveillance], its widely used. If 
individuals think that we are looking at everything then this is 
completely and utterly wrong. The Anderson, RUSI and ISC reports 
all disprove this notion (Emily, 2016). 
It’s not mass surveillance. We have the powers to undertake bulk 
collection. We use bulk collection authorities to investigate and 
prevent crimes. We do not surveil the whole UK to do that. There 
is a difference between how we collect and analyse, rather than an 
analyst looking at every aspect of data in the UK (Adrian, 2016). 
We don’t like this. It sounds 1984 and it's not true. It suggests a 
totalitarian regime where every move is watched and scrutinised 
and has possible repercussions. How can people actually think we 
live like this? We have powers, legal authority and the rules of 
proportionality to look for threats. This needs bulk collection but 
most of the data won’t be touched (Fiona, 2016). 
Some GCHQ staff also argue that it would be impossible to conduct mass 
surveillance given the number of lawyers that would be required to authorise such 
action, the analytical manpower required, and the fierce resistance that GCHQ staff 
would put up themselves if they were asked to conduct such work.  This was evident 
throughout interviews with GCHQ staff. 
It’s a problem because some of the allegations of ‘mass 
surveillance’ and extreme forms of ‘those people must be evil’ 
would be an untenable position if you see the actual people who 
work here. It’s frustrating to have the ‘mass surveillance’ myth 
pedalled. It’s interesting that many people believe the myth of 
mass surveillance but don’t care. They think that if that’s what’s 
necessary then it’s fine. But that’s bad for people here as they 
wouldn’t want to work here if it really was like that. It’s very 
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worrying for GCHQ staff because they care about civil liberties 
(Matt, 2016) 
 I don’t recognise it. You need to look at a lot of data as there’s lots 
out there. Surveillance is very specific in law and warranty on it is 
very rare. Conflating mass with surveillance. It’s impossible due to 
the numbers of lawyers who would need to sign it off. How would 
you go about doing that? The Home Secretary signing off a warrant 
versus everyone? It’s a ridiculous argument (David, 2016).  
For GCHQ, these limitations put technical restraints on the organisation's ability to 
conduct mass surveillance, thus ensuring that their capabilities are used for 
defensive purposes only, but these arguments are rejected by groups such as ORG 
who argue that they don’t ‘detract from the gigantic scale and breadth of the 
agencies’ activities’ (Open Rights Group, n.d., p. 26). 
Whilst technical capabilities may be dual use, the nature and history of institutions 
who wield power can also provide clues as to whether they are designed for 
offensive or defensive purposes. Since the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and 
the 2005 terrorist attacks in London, GCHQ has played an increasing role in 
domestic operations, including the ‘War on Terror’, and has been given a greater 
role in tackling online crime, especially child sex exploitation. Documents released 
by Edward Snowden reveal that, in 2009, GCHQ’s JTRIG unit conducted the 
organisation’s ‘first serious crime effects operation’ against a website that was 
identifying police informants (The Intercept, 2011; Dhami, 2011). JTRIG has also 
conducted work for several domestic agencies, including the Metropolitan Police, 
Border Agency, HMRC and the National Public Order and Intelligence Unit (NPOIU). 
This work has involved the monitoring of domestic extremist groups’, online work 
to ‘deny, deter and dissuade’ criminals and work to ‘deter and disrupt online 
consumerism of stolen data or child porn, including the use of psychological 
methods (The Intercept, 2011; Dhami, 2011). A formal collaboration between the 
new National Crime Agency (NCA) and GCHQ was announced in 2015 with the 
establishment of the Joint Operations Cell (JOC), which is designed to ‘identify and 
stop serious criminals, as well as those involved in child sexual exploitation and 
abuse online’ (National Crime Agency, 2015). 
If GCHQ’s JTRIG uses psychological methods to influence criminals and terrorists in 
the UK then these techniques can also be used for more offensive actions, such as 
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the manipulation of the public. Whilst GCHQ’s increasing role in domestic affairs 
can be considered a more effective use of its unique capabilities, the blurring of its 
domestic and foreign responsibilities makes it harder for outsiders to determine 
whether its capabilities are being used defensively or offensively.  
Another means to judge the offensive or defensive nature of GCHQ’s capabilities is 
to consider how they have been used in the past. Whilst there is no evidence of 
wide-ranging abuse of GCHQ capabilities, there is evidence that they have 
previously engaged in behaviour that could be considered offensive in nature. For 
example, in 2003, an ex-GCHQ staff member leaked documents that suggested the 
UK was planning to use its surveillance capabilities to spy on six countries at the UN 
who were key to passing a second UN resolution on Iraq (The Guardian, 2013). In 
2013, leaked documents from Edward Snowden indicated that GCHQ was engaged 
in several controversial programmes, including the capability to access 1.8 million 
webcams and in 2016, the Investigatory Power Tribunal found that GCHQ’s 
collection and use of Bulk Communications Data was illegal  (The Guardian, 2014)  
(Investigatory Powers Tribunal, 2016). Whilst some may consider these cases to be 
exceptions, others will see them as the tip of the iceberg and evidence of 
widespread abuses of power. 
It is extremely difficult for the DRC to determine whether the state’s vast 
surveillance capabilities are designed for offensive or solely defensive purposes. 
The combination of a huge and previously hidden surveillance programme, 
inadequate oversight, increasing focus on domestic issues and past evidence of 
abuse, leads many within the DRC to conclude that the state is offensively minded 
and uses its surveillance capabilities to cover up wrongdoing, justify unjust wars 
and control the population (Open Rights Group, n.d.; GCHQ Lawyer, 2013; The 
Guardian, 2013). 
4.4.1.2 State Perspective 
To determine whether the capabilities of members of the DRC are designed for 
defensive or offensive purposes, the state can consider their technical capability, 
their motivation and their past behaviour. 
Encryption is critical to the functioning of the Internet but, from a purely technical 
perspective, it is impossible to determine whether technologies such as encryption 
are defensive or offensive in nature. As Moore and Rid explain, individuals now 
have the capability to encrypt their own communications to protect their privacy, 
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but the same technology can be used by criminals and terrorists to support more 
nefarious activities.  
The power of ciphers protects citizens when they read, bank and 
shop online – and the power of ciphers protects foreign spies, 
terrorists and criminals when they pry, plot and steal. Encryption 
bears directly on today’s two top threats, militant extremism and 
computer-network breaches yet it enables prosperity and privacy 
(Moore & Rid, 2016, p. 7). 
This dual use nature of encryption creates a significant problem for both the state 
and the DRC. Studies show that sophisticated encryption technologies such as Tor 
are used primarily for illicit purposes, but they are also widely valued for their 
protection of personal freedoms and individual privacy (Moore & Rid, 2016). Before 
encryption became widespread and was implemented by default on services such 
as WhatsApp, intelligence agencies considered the personal use of encryption to 
be suspicious, but as encryption has become more mainstream the 
defence/offensive balance has blurred. 
Previously, as an analyst, if someone used encryption then this 
would be suspicious behaviour but this is no longer the case (Fiona, 
2016). 
Whilst the state often comments on the benefits of encryption, it is also frequently 
blamed for crime and terrorism, such as in the wake of the Westminster terror 
attacks.  
To be very clear – Government supports strong encryption and has 
no intention of banning end-to-end encryption. But the inability to 
gain access to encrypted data in specific and targeted instances – 
even with a warrant signed by a Secretary of State and a senior 
judge – is right now severely limiting our agencies’ ability to stop 
terrorist attacks and bring criminals to justice (Rudd, 2017). 
The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) Report into the murder of Fusilier 
Lee Rigby indicated that GCHQ’s inability to access the communications of two of 
the perpetrators contributed to the attack not being stopped. The report noted that 
‘encryption is increasingly being used by CSPs to prevent criminality’ but suggested 
that for law enforcement ‘the growing use of increasingly sophisticated encryption 
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is challenging’ (Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, 2014, p. 147). 
Former head of the Metropolitan Police Service, Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, has also 
previously warned that encryption ‘is in danger of making the Internet anarchic’ 
(Hogan-Howe, 2014). 
For the DRC, encryption is often considered to be inherently good, and crypto-
anarchists such as Julian Assange consider cryptography to be a means by which a 
better world can be achieved. Apple CEO, Tim Cook claims that ‘encryption is 
inherently great and we would not be a safe society without it’ (Cook, 2016). 
Borrowing and adapting from Thomas Jefferson, Edward Snowden claimed that 
cryptography is the only way to stop mankind from doing wrong.  
Let us speak no more of faith in man, but bind him down from 
mischief by the chains of cryptography (Greenwald, 2014, p. 24). 
And Julian Assange claims, quite simply, that ‘the universe believes in encryption’ 
(Assange, 2013). 
This dedication to cryptography has been noted by authors such as Rid and Moore, 
who consider that ‘too many activists treat cryptography as if it were a godlike force 
for good’ and describe Julian Assange’s book as a celebration of the ‘cult of crypto’ 
(Moore & Rid, 2016). Indeed, some anti-religious websites such as 
antispirituality.net’ list cryptography as a cult and claim that ‘the fundamental 
belief of cryptography cultists, is the conviction that Cryptography is the only thing 
that matters in the universe’ (Antispirituality.net, n.d.). 
The dual-use nature of encryption makes Jervis’s offence/defence differentiation 
extremely difficult and this consequently fuels the security dilemma. The DRC 
promote encryption for its defensive properties, whilst the state opposes some of 
its uses due to its offensive potential. There is no way to determine whether new 
encryption technologies will be used in ways which are viewed as defensive or 
offensive by the state. This problem is exacerbated by the different views taken 
towards encryption, with the Digital Rights Movement viewing it as solely defensive 
and a guarantor of individual security and privacy, and much of the state 
considering it to be potentially offensive and a threat to their ability to enforce law 
and order.  
The state is unlikely to accuse the DRC of deliberately aiding terrorists and criminals, 
but it does question whether the DRC’s motivations are completely defensive 
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minded. When technology companies challenge attempts by the state to gain 
access to user data, there is often disagreement over their motivations and 
suggestions that they are inadvertently aiding terrorists by pursuing commercially 
lucrative strategies. As discussed in Chapter 3, Apple’s refusal to comply with a 
court order to unlock a terrorist’s iPhone was described as a ‘marketing strategy’ 
by the US Justice Department despite Apple’s insistence that it was taking a stand 
to defend digital rights (US Justice Department, 2016). A genuine concern for digital 
rights could be seen by the state as defensive behaviour, deliberately thwarting 
terrorist investigations to gain a reputational and economic advantage would be 
considered an abuse of power. Likewise, as discussed in Section 2.3, the motivation 
of whistle-blowers is also questioned. Many see Snowden as a serial exaggerator 
and fabricator, motivated by a desire for revenge, an inflated sense of his own self-
importance and potential influence from the Russian intelligence agencies (US 
House of Representatives, 2016). 
For the most part, the DRC is considered to be motivated by a desire to defend 
digital rights, which can become dangerous for the state when this promotes 
behaviour that is considered detrimental to national security. But, in some 
instances, it may be unclear whether more offensive motivations are behind the 
DRC’s actions. 
The DRC’s past behaviour could give some indication of whether their capabilities 
are designed for defensive or offensive purposes. From the state’s perspective, 
Apple’s conflict with the FBI gives an indication that some technology companies 
will take all measures they can to prevent their user data from being accessed by 
the state. Twitter’s decision to block British intelligence agencies from accessing 
some Twitter data, even whilst allowing access to others, can be considered further 
evidence of this hostility (The Telegraph, 2017; Twitter, 2016). 
Large technology companies possess the capability to significantly disrupt the 
state’s ability to investigate and prevent crime and terrorism and there are also 
suggestions that some companies act against state surveillance to boost their 
popularity or absolve themselves from the ethical responsibility of handing over 
decryption keys. There is also concern that whistle-blowers speak out for their own 
selfish or egotistical reasons but, overall former GCHQ Director Robert Hannigan 
sums up the state perspective when he states that he has ‘never doubted the 
shared good intentions of all concerned’ but is ‘puzzled by the caricatures in the 
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current debate’ and believes there is ‘confusion’ over this ‘highly-charged and 
technically complex area’ (Hannigan, 2016). 
4.4.2 Defence/Offence Balance 
Defence/offence balance describes the ease by which territory can be taken by 
force, compared to the ease by which territory can be defended. If territory is easy 
to defend but hard to attack then the security dilemma will diminish because states 
will feel more secure, but if territory is difficult to defend and easy to attack then 
states are likely to feel more insecure and will seek to accumulate power to defend 
their security interests. Jervis uses a simple economic analogy to explain the 
balance. 
Does the state have to spend more or less than one dollar on 
defensive forces to offset each dollar spent by the other side on 
forces that could be used to attack (Jervis, 1978, p. 188). 
Jervis argues that if the offence/defence balance favours offence then war will be 
much more likely. State’s will feel more insecure, so may attack to defend their 
interests; war will be quick and decisive, and therefore profitable; striking first will 
be more advantageous, therefore increasing the probability of crises escalating via 
pre-emptive attacks; and because wars are likely, arms races will be more intense. 
4.4.2.1 DRC Perspective 
The Defence-Offence balance for the DRC relates to how easy it is for the state to 
use its surveillance capabilities offensively (i.e. abuse them), compared to how easy 
it is for the public to defend against these abuses. This depends on the capability of 
the state to conduct intrusive state surveillance, compared to the capability of the 
public to defend against it. It also depends on the degree to which the law facilitates 
or protects against intrusive state surveillance, and the degree to which oversight 
and accountability mechanisms can restrict intrusive state surveillance. 
Capability 
Television, film and the print media often portray state surveillance capabilities as 
omnipotent. In the television shows and films of James Bond, Jason Bourne and 
Jack Bauer, state intelligence agencies can access CCTV anywhere virtually instantly, 
they hack computers at will, have immediate access to targets’ emails and online 
communications, and can tap phone calls on demand. This fantastical view of 
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surveillance is re-enforced by the secret nature of organisations such as GCHQ, 
which makes it difficult for surveillance myths to be dispelled. 
For many members of the DRC, the Snowden disclosures are evidence that the state 
does indeed possess a massive surveillance capability (Open Rights Group, n.d.). 
The PRISM programme, reportedly provided GCHQ and NSA with direct access to 
the online lives of everyone in the UK and US, through backdoor access to the 
systems of the world’s largest internet companies, including Google Facebook, 
Microsoft, Apple, Yahoo and Skype. An investigation by the US Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board debunked this claim, ruling that PRISM was legal and that 
its function was to better manage the data passed to the NSA from internet service 
providers in response to specifically targeted requests against individuals based 
outside of the US. In the UK, an investigation by the Intelligence and Security 
Committee came to a similar conclusion, reporting that only a tiny fraction of 
Internet traffic was ever looked at by GCHQ analysts. 
GCHQ’s bulk interception systems operate on a very small 
percentage of the bearers that make up the internet. We are 
satisfied that they apply levels of filtering and selection such that 
only a certain amount of the material on those bearers is collected. 
Further targeted searches ensure that only those items believed to 
be of the highest intelligence value are ever presented for analysts 
to examine: therefore only a tiny fraction of those collected are 
ever seen by human eyes (Intelligence and Security Committee of 
Parliament, 2015, p. 2). 
There are many means through which it is possible for the public to protect 
themselves against state surveillance, including using end-to-end encryption 
provided by services such as WhatsApp and Apple Messenger, using Virtual Private 
Networks (VPNs), using full disk encryption, and using services such as Tor. 
Mathematically the advantage is also with the defender rather than the attacker 
as, despite the huge resources of GCHQ and the NSA, it is far less data intensive to 
encrypt data than it is to break that encryption. However, the secrecy of intelligence 
agency techniques, the huge range of potential attack vectors, constant reporting 
of new vulnerabilities and hints that services such as Tor have been compromised, 
mean that the public can never be sure of their own security (ArsTechnica, 2017). 
In 1993, Oscar Gandy proposed that modern communication techniques were 
creating a modern panopticon and this concept has since been applied several 
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times to GCHQ and NSA surveillance (Gandy, 1993; Sullivan, 2013). For the DRC, the 
offensive/defensive balance may always seem to be in favour of the state because 
they never actually know if they are being watched.  
Legality 
Prior to the passing of the IPA in January 2017, many within the DRC felt that the 
opaque nature of laws governing investigatory powers had enabled agencies such 
as GCHQ to engage in activities that threaten digital rights. But when these laws 
were rewritten and consolidated within the IPA, there was dismay that the state’s 
powers had been expanded rather than restricted.   Edward Snowden claimed that 
‘the UK has just legalised the most extreme surveillance in the history of western 
democracy’ and ORG director Jim Killock claimed that ’…the Bill will mean the police 
and intelligence agencies have unprecedented powers to surveil our private 
communications and Internet activity, whether or not we are suspected of a crime’ 
(Snowden, 2016; Killock, 2016). 
The state contests these allegations and claims that the IPA prevents the abuse of 
surveillance powers through measures such as tough sanctions against those 
misusing surveillance powers and the requirement for approval by the Secretary of 
State and a senior judge before intrusive powers are used (HM Government, 2016). 
Whilst welcoming some privacy-enhancing aspects of the act, the DRC fear that the 
IPA allows for the offensive use of surveillance powers, including mass surveillance 
and the targeting of those not suspected of a crime. 
Oversight and Accountability 
The DRC has often been critical of the oversight and accountability of UK 
intelligence and security agencies and has argued that legislation has not been 
strong enough to ensure that GCHQ’s activities are legal and proportionate. The 
Intelligence and Security Committee, which oversees their activity, is often 
described as inadequate and ORG director Jim Killock has claimed that their activity 
‘is not an oversight: it is a policy of trust us, we know what we're doing’ (Killock, 
2015). Concern over insufficient oversight was strengthened by evidence from the 
Snowden disclosures, which revealed that in guidelines to the NSA, a GCHQ lawyer 
stated that ‘we have a light oversight regime compared with the US’, which was 
widely reported as GCHQ having boasted about its lack of oversight (GCHQ Lawyer, 
2013). 
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Before the enactment of the IPA, the government acknowledged that surveillance 
powers required greater oversight, but Theresa May claimed that the ‘Bill will 
establish world-leading oversight to govern an investigatory powers regime which 
is more open and transparent than anywhere else in the world’ (May, 2015). The 
government claims that the IPA includes ‘world-leading oversight’, provided by a 
powerful new Investigatory Powers Commissioner who oversees the use of 
surveillance powers, which are subject to strict safeguards (HM Government, 
2016). 
Despite fierce criticism of the act, the ORG has welcomed the improvements it has 
made to surveillance oversight. 
A simplified oversight regime is positive and the Bill states that it 
will have dedicated legal, technical and communications support. 
Even if independent serving judges were responsible for signing 
warrants, an independent commissioner could help with technical 
issues and improve compliance, transparency and accountability 
(Open Rights Group, n.d.) 
Whilst a simplification to the oversight regime is viewed positively, the ORG still 
consider this oversight to be too limited to adequately protect against abuses of 
state surveillance powers. 
4.4.2.2 State Perspective 
The defence-offence balance for the state relates to how easy it is for criminals and 
terrorists to use encryption to protect themselves, compared to how easy it is for 
the state to access their communications. This depends on the capability of the 
state to access online communications, the legal powers that facilitate this and the 
degree to which technology companies co-operate with the state to facilitate 
access to user data. 
Capability 
The police and intelligence agencies claims that security technologies such as 
encryption are becoming so powerful that terrorists and criminals are now better 
able to hide their activities from the authorities; the intelligence agencies are ‘Going 
Dark’ and the Internet is in danger of becoming anarchic (Comey, 2014). 
The levels of encryption and protection that we are seeing in the 
devices and methods used to communicate are frustrating the 
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efforts of police and intelligence agencies to keep people safe. In a 
democracy we cannot accept any space - virtual or not to become 
anarchic where crime can be committed without fear. Yet this is in 
danger of happening (Hogan-Howe, 2014). 
Following the Westminster terror attacks, Home Secretary Amber Rudd also 
complained about the inability of the intelligence agencies to access encrypted 
WhatsApp messages, calling the situation ‘unacceptable’ (Rudd, 2017). She used 
the analogy of steaming open envelopes and listening in to phone calls to re-
enforce her case that the ability of terrorists and criminals to evade monitoring is 
greater than in the past.  
Many within the DRC disagree with this assessment and claims that the state has 
access to more data on citizens and their activities than ever before. The Berkman 
Centre’s report on the ‘Going Dark’ problem suggests that whilst the state might be 
losing access to some vectors of information, others are emerging to take their 
place. 
As data collection volume and methods proliferate, the number of 
human and technical weaknesses within the system will increase 
to the point that it will overwhelmingly likely be a net positive for 
the intelligence community … The label is “going dark” only 
because the security state is losing something that it fleetingly had 
access to, not because it is all of a sudden lacking in vectors for 
useful information (The Berkman Centre, 2016, p. 3 (appendix a)). 
But this view is not shared by state actors such as Theresa May and Amber Rudd, 
who consider the capabilities provided by tools such as WhatsApp to be extremely 
detrimental to the ability of law enforcement to prevent and investigate crime and 
terrorism. 
Legality 
Following the enactment of the IPA, the British state and the DRC tend to agree that 
the intelligence agencies have significant legal authority to use their surveillance 
capabilities. The state views these powers as essential to combat terrorism and 
crime, whereas the DRC views them as threatening. 
The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 will ensure that law 
enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies have the 
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powers they need in a digital age to disrupt terrorist attacks (HM 
Government, 2016). 
Amber Rudd says the Investigatory Powers Act is world-leading 
legislation. She is right, it is one of the most extreme surveillance 
laws ever passed in a democracy… The Bill will mean the police and 
intelligence agencies have unprecedented powers to surveil our 
private communications and Internet activity (Killock, 2016). 
However, following the 2017 terrorist attacks in Manchester and London, the state 
has argued that, despite these powers, technology companies are still thwarting 
the ability of the intelligence agencies to access the data they need. 
Co-operation 
In the past few years, the British state has increasingly complained about efforts to 
resist state surveillance that have been undertaken by some technology companies. 
After the Westminster terrorist attack in March 2017 and reports that the 
perpetrator had communicated using WhatsApp shortly before the attack, Home 
Secretary, Amber Rudd voiced the state’s frustration at being denied access to data 
due to the implementation of encryption and non-co-operation by technology. 
You can’t have a situation where warranted information is needed, 
perhaps to stop attacks like the one last week, and it can’t be 
accessed (Rudd, 2017). 
Amber Rudd suggested that technology companies feel that they are different and 
do not need to comply with the law. 
We do want them [technology companies] to recognise that they 
have a responsibility to engage with government, to engage with 
law enforcement agencies when there is a terrorist situation. We 
would do it all through the carefully thought through legally 
covered arrangements, but they cannot get away with saying we 
are different. They are not (Rudd, 2017). 
Rudd even questioned whose side technology companies are on. 
Where there are ongoing investigations with terrorists – these 
people have families, have children as well, they should be on our 
side (Rudd, 2017). 
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Technology companies deny that they facilitate terrorism, claim that they always 
comply with the law and report that they engage in extensive work to protect their 
users. In a response to Amber Rudd’s comments, Facebook (the owner of 
WhatsApp) released a statement detailing much of the work they do to counter 
terrorism online. 
There’s no place on Facebook for terrorism … When we receive 
reports of potential terrorism posts, we review those reports 
urgently and with scrutiny …. We believe technology, and Facebook 
can be part of the solution (Facebook, 2017). 
Despite the view from technology companies that they make significant efforts to 
combat criminal and terrorist use of their networks and technologies, elements of 
the state still fear that their actions are serving to tip the offence-defence balance 
towards offensive (Rudd, 2017). 
Despite the objections of the DRC and technology companies and new legal powers 
from the IPA, the state still fears that new technologies such as encryption are 
hampering its ability to defend against crime and terrorism. This notion that the 
offence-defence balance is tipping towards offence, serves to fuel the state’s fears 
and serves to heighten the security dilemma. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
The conflict between the DRC and the state is often viewed as binary, caused by 
either overzealous efforts by the state to fight terrorism and crime through 
surveillance, or by a lack of appreciation by the DRC of the scale of the threat to 
national security and the importance of data to the intelligence and security 
agencies. The conflict bears many of the hallmarks of a security dilemma, which has 
been made more intense by the pace of technological and political change. 
Limitations on the state’s ability to govern cyberspace creates a state of anarchy 
between the state and the DRC, where neither can exert full authority and there is 
no mechanism to resolve disputes. Each side is focussed on their own security 
concerns but, fearing the actions of the other, takes measures to defend their own 
interests, creating an insecurity spiral that has resulted in the Crypto Wars. The CSD 
has been intensified by the difficulty in differentiating between defensive and 
offensive capabilities, with the defence/offence balance seemingly tilted towards 
offence. 
188 
 
The framing of the debate as surveillance versus encryption or encryption versus 
insecurity has created the illusion of incompatibility between national security and 
digital rights, but the security interests of the state and DRC are not necessarily in 
opposition to each other. The following chapters will discuss how this dilemma 
might be resolved. 
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5 RESPONDING TO CYBERSPACE SECURITISATION 
Chapters 2 and 3 analysed the relationship between different securitising actors 
and how they use speech acts to securitise cyberspace, and Chapter 4 discussed 
how this securitisation has led to a CSD, which has created spiralling insecurity for 
both sides. 
This chapter considers two further questions which arise from the previous 
chapters, each of which is related to the question of how we should respond to the 
securitisation of cyberspace and the creation of the CSD. Whilst the content of 
Chapter 4 would appear to support the conclusion that the desecuritisation of 
cyberspace is extremely desirable, it is not immediately obvious if this would be 
either ethical or effective. The first part of this chapter considers different 
approaches to the question of whether an issue should be desecuritised or not. 
These approaches are then applied to cyberspace to address the question of 
whether cyberspace should be desecuritised. The second part of this chapter then 
addresses the question of how cyberspace could be desecuritised using existing 
desecuritisation methodology. The chapter concludes by highlighting the 
limitations of desecuritisation and proposing a different approach. This approach is 
then discussed in Chapter 6. 
5.1 APPROACHES TO SECURITISATION 
Whilst the Copenhagen School refer to securitisation as undesirable, Securitisation 
Theory itself does not address the normative implications of securitisation and does 
not provide the tools by which a security analyst can determine whether an act of 
securitisation is desirable, undesirable, harmful or necessary. This weakness has led 
to significant criticism of the usefulness of the concept. McSweeney calls it 
‘sociologically untenable’ and Erikson highlights the problem of ‘adopting a 
securitization perspective and not acknowledging one’s own responsibility for 
widening the security agenda’ (McSweeney, 1996, p. 89; Erikson, 1999, p. 315).  
Michael Williams suggests that this problem has 
led many to ask whether despite its avowedly ‘‘constructivist’’ view 
of security practices, securitization theory is implicitly committed 
to a methodological objectivism that is politically irresponsible and 
lacking in any basis from which to critically evaluate claims of 
threat, enmity, and emergency (Williams, 2003, p. 521). 
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But there are several theoretical frameworks through which a security analyst can 
attempt to assess the positive or negative implications of any act of securitisation. 
Catherine Charrett categorises these responses to the normative dilemma as ‘The 
Copenhagen School’s Response’, ‘The Discursive Ethical Response’ and the 
Consequentialist Response’ (Charrett, 2009). 
5.1.1 Copenhagen Approach 
The Copenhagen School generally consider securitisation to be undesirable and 
insist that security should be viewed as a failure of politics (Busan, et al., 1998). 
Desecuritisation is considered ‘the optimal long-range option’, since it results in 
issues not being framed as ‘threats against which we have countermeasures but 
moves them out of this threat-defence sequence and into the ordinary public 
sphere’ (Waever, 1995, p. 29). However, the Copenhagen School also contend that 
securitisation can have its uses and may be unavoidable in the face of a ‘barbarian 
aggressor’. It can also have ‘tactical attractions … for example, as a way to obtain 
sufficient attention for environmental problems’ and can be desirable if it is the 
only way to raise a depoliticised issue onto the political agenda (Busan, et al., 1998, 
p. 29). 
When considering moves such as “environmental security” or a 
“war on crime,” one has to weigh the always problematic side 
effects of applying a mind-set of security against the possible 
advantages of focus, attention and mobilization. Thus, although in 
the abstract desecuritization is the ideal, in specific situations one 
can choose securitization (Busan, et al., 1998, p. 29) 
 This stance by the Copenhagen School makes uncomfortable reading because the 
contention that some threats are significant enough to be justly securitised is at 
odds with the central contention of Securitisation Theory – that threats are social 
constructions. The Copenhagen School claim that the concept of securitisation 
allows for the ‘problematizing of both actual securitisation and the absence of 
securitisation’ but it does not provide the tools by which to judge whether an issue 
suffers from too much or too little securitisation (Busan, et al., 1998, p. 40). This is 
left open for the security analyst to determine through their own means. 
The CS’s overarching view that securitisation is generally a negative process and 
that desecuritisation is generally preferable is widely reflected within the 
securitisation literature (Georgieva, 2015; Kingsmith, 2013; Lazaridi, et al., 2015; 
Hughes, 2007). The only significant issue where the necessity for securitisation is 
widely debated in academic literature is that of environmental security. Rita Floyd, 
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for example, provides a good overview of arguments for and against the 
securitisation of climate change, addressing arguments that securitisation can raise 
climate change onto the agenda. But she concludes that ‘the securitisation of 
climate change is a double-edged sword’ as it can lead to negative effects on the 
most disadvantaged members of international society (Floyd, 2008, p. 63).  
Whilst some agree with the Copenhagen School that some instances of 
securitisation may be beneficial, others including Claudia Aradau, argue that 
securitisation is, at its heart, a negative concept because it bypasses good political 
processes, delivers unethical outcomes and relies on a Schmittian politics of 
enmity23 (Aradau, 2004; Schmitt, 1932). Aradau argues that securitisation is bad for 
democracy as it creates states of exception and urgency which inhibit the processes 
of normal political debate. ‘The speed required by the exceptional suspends the 
possibilities of judicial review or other modalities of public influence upon 
bureaucratic or executive decisions’ (Aradau, 2004, p. 392). Groups such as the ORG 
reflect Aradau’s concerns about rushed decision making and legislation relating to 
cybersecurity. In 2014, following the introduction of emergency legislation, the 
‘Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill’ completed its passage through 
parliament in one day. Several groups complained about the lack of scrutiny that it 
had received.  
The Government announced legislation this morning forcing 
Internet Service Providers and phone networks to carry out blanket 
retention of your phone calls, your texts, and your Internet 
browsing history … they're pushing this legislation through with 
hardly any debate in Parliament ... Rushing through legislation that 
is so controversial should never be done (Open Rights Group, 
2014).  
The ORG also responded in a similar fashion to news of the progression of the 
Investigatory Powers Bill in 2017 claiming that ‘the Home Office is treating the 
British public with contempt if it thinks it's acceptable to rush a Bill of this 
magnitude through Parliament’ (Killock, 2016). 
Aradau also argues that securitisation creates ‘us/them, ‘friend/enemy’ politics, 
which generates winners and losers based upon the acceptance or not of a 
                                                          
23 Based upon Carl Schmitt’s focus on a friend/enemy dichotomy where an enemy can be 
anyone for whom there is enmity towards. 
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particular act of securitisation. This is demonstrated in the court case between 
Apple and the FBI, where only one side could emerge victorious. 
Other authors have challenged the view that securitisation must always deliver 
negative outcomes. Paul Roe argues that whilst securitisation may lead to the 
expedition of legislation, it does not result in the abandonment of political practices 
altogether. ‘While the legislative process is surely accelerated, a degree of scrutiny 
and oversight nevertheless remains’ (Roe, 2012, p. 260). It can also be argued that 
in specific scenarios, the ability to fast-track emergency legislation is necessary, 
even if that may lead to less scrutiny than is desirable. This point was made by the 
then Home Secretary Theresa May following the passage of the emergency ‘Data 
Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill’, which was passed as an emergency 
stopgap after previous legislation was about to expire. 
If we delay we face the appalling prospect police operations will go 
dark, that trails will go cold, that terrorist plots will go undetected. 
If that happens, innocent lives may be lost (May, 2014). 
In what he calls the securitisation of securitisation Michael Williams engages with 
the negative role that fear plays in driving securitisation, but argues that this force 
can be harnessed to inhibit processes of securitisation instead (Williams, 2011). If 
actors fear making securitising moves or audiences are fearful of securitising moves 
then this fear can prevent an issue from becoming securitised in the first place. 
Williams’ securitisation of securitisation can be seen within the cybersecurity 
discourse. Members of the DRC, for example, attempt to securitise state 
securitisation of terrorism by arguing that surveillance measures are worse than 
terrorism. 
We've been asked to sacrifice our most sacred rights for fear of 
falling victim to [terrorism] (Snowden, 2013). 
State actors make a similar claim about privacy, arguing that the DRC’s 
securitisation of state surveillance is more threatening than state surveillance itself. 
Privacy is important, but … the levels of encryption and protection 
that we are seeing in the devices and methods used to 
communicate are frustrating the efforts of police and intelligence 
agencies to keep people safe (Hogan-Howe, 2014). 
193 
 
The major problem with the Copenhagen School approach is that whilst it provides 
a good case for why securitisation is generally desirable, it also suggests that this 
may not always be the case, without providing the tools to judge when this might 
be. Alternative approaches attempt to address this deficiency. 
5.1.2 Discursive Ethical Approach 
Authors including Michael Williams and Wyn Jones advocate for a ‘Discursive 
Ethical Approach’ to securitisation, which includes a process of legitimisation that 
helps to determine whether securitising claims are true or false. Speech acts should 
be challenged and scrutinised, thereby facilitating the refutation and rejection of 
negative acts of securitisation or the acceptance of acts that are based upon 
truthful and accurate claims. 
Whilst the approach is appealing, it has several limitations, some of which are 
highlighted by Wyn Jones and Williams themselves (Williams, 2003; Jones, 1999). 
The first limitation is that a security analyst cannot ensure that speech acts will be 
scrutinised for validity given the power relations at play within the securitisation 
process. An analyst may refute a securitising claim, but unless they have the 
authority and reach to convince an audience of their case, then they are powerless 
to stop the issue from becoming securitised. The deployment of discursive ethics 
‘does not mean that securitisations will always be forced to enter the realm of 
discursive legitimization’ (Williams, 2003, p. 524). Another problem with the 
discursive ethical approach is the issue of who should make the judgement about 
the validity of the securitising actor's claims, and what tools does an analyst or the 
audience possess to ensure that they can scrutinise the claim free of their own 
internal biases? 
The final limitation is the requirement for an analyst to assess the validity of a 
securitising act by assessing whether the threat is or isn’t real. This clashes with the 
primary claim of the Copenhagen School that threats are constructed rather than 
based on objective reality. If threats are constructed by speech acts, then a security 
analyst has no means within the constructivist approach to enable them to 
determine the validity of these threats. 
5.1.3 Consequentialist Approach 
The Consequentialist approach judges an act of securitisation by its outcome rather 
than its processes. If an act of securitisation is well intended and results in 
appropriate security responses, then it can be considered ethical, otherwise it is 
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unethical. The ethics of securitisation and security are considered to be issue 
dependent rather than black and white. Rita Floyd takes a consequentialist 
approach to the normative dilemma of securitisation by drawing on ‘Just War 
Theory’ to formulate a ‘Just Securitisation Theory’ (Floyd, 2011). Floyd proposes the 
introduction of three criteria, which if met would render an act of securitisation 
morally legitimate; 
1.) There is an objective existential threat; 
2.) The referent object of security is morally legitimate; 
3.) The security response is appropriate to the threat in question. 
To achieve this Floyd extends the scope of Securitisation Theory beyond the 
acceptance or not of a threat, to include the security response to this threat as well. 
She admits that the Copenhagen School would ‘be deeply uncomfortable with all 
parts of the analysis’ because it requires threats to be considered as objectively real 
rather than constructed, but she also argues that her work simply extends the 
Copenhagen School approach into ethics (Floyd, 2011, p. 437). ‘Setting criteria that 
determine the moral rightness of securitisation is akin to the Copenhagen School 
setting criteria that determine both the existence of securitisation and its success’ 
(Floyd, 2011, p. 436). Securitisation Theory applies a formulaic process to help 
determine how threats are constructed and Floyd argues that she simply extends 
this formulaic process to include judgements as to whether the securitisation is 
moral or not. Floyd’s approach is appealing because, by including ethical 
considerations, it broadens the potential usage of Securitisation Theory. It could 
also bring together traditionalists and critical security studies proponents because 
it considers threats to be both objective and constructed.  
Just War theory is subject to substantial criticism, which could equally be applied 
to Just Securitisation Theory, including the criticism that no theory can be 
considered ethical if it ever justifies war/securitisation. The main issue with Just 
Securitisation Theory, however, is deciding who can make the judgement as to the 
ethics of an act of securitisation. Those with the authority and reach to determine 
the justness of an act are likely to be the same actors who have the power and 
authority to securitise an issue in the first place. In addition, by calling for an 
assessment as to whether the ‘security response is appropriate to the threat in 
question’ Floyd undermines the need for Securitisation Theory at all (Floyd, 2011, 
p. 427). If we can simply make an ethical assessment of the appropriateness of 
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security measures then we do not need to question their origins, simply whether 
they are appropriate or not. 
5.2 SHOULD CYBERSPACE BE DESECURITISED? 
Desecuritisation is the process by which an issue is removed from the security 
sphere and is no longer considered to be an urgent threat, requiring exceptional 
measures to counter. For the Copenhagen School, ‘it means not to have issues 
phrased as “threats against which me have countermeasures” but to move them 
out of this threat-defense sequence and into the ordinary public sphere’ (Busan, et 
al., 1998, p. 29). 
But desecuritisation is difficult to achieve once an issue has been accepted as 
threatening and desecuritisation does not guarantee than an issue will become re-
politicised and re-open to public debate. If securitising moves are rejected 
forcefully enough, then issues can become both de-securitised and de-politicised 
(See Figure 5.1). This means that not only are the issues considered non-
threatening, but they are also closed for discussion. Islamic extremism and 
immigration are issues that are often difficult to discuss in a political environment 
because they are either securitised as existentially threatening or de-politicised 
because the responses to them are considered threatening, racist or intolerant.  
Cyberspace scholars are in general agreement that cyberspace securitisation has 
mainly negative consequences. Kingsmith, for example, discusses the negative 
consequences that emerge from moves by states to securitise internet content. 
Considering these securitising moves … the more that filtering 
practices are withheld from public scrutiny and accountability, the 
more tempting it is for framing authorities to employ these tools 
 
Figure 5.1: Securitising and Desecuritising 
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for illegitimate reasons such as the stifling of both opposition and 
civil society networks (Kingsmith, 2013, p. 1). 
Deibert also highlights the negative consequences of the securitisation of 
cyberspace, including the resultant threats to basic freedoms. 
 There has been a growing recognition of serious risks in 
cyberspace. The need to manage these risks has led to a wave of 
securitization efforts that have potentially serious implications for 
basic freedoms (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010, p. 49). 
Whilst arguing that the securitisation of cyberspace is negative and inevitable, 
Deibert also contends that the form of this securitisation can be influenced. ‘The 
securitization of cyberspace may be inevitable, but what form that security takes is 
not’ (Deibert, 2012, p. 274). He suggests that it is better to securitise threats to 
human rights than to securitise threats to national security. Mariya Georgieva takes 
this further, citing the Snowden disclosures as an example of the securitisation of 
digital rights, arguing that Snowden had ‘successfully shifted the focus of the 
securitisation of cyberspace from values such as the survival of the state and 
effective national security to the survival of privacy and personal choice’ 
(Georgieva, 2015, p. 44). Whilst she celebrates this shift she does not explain why 
it is better to securitise privacy rather than national security. Helen Nissenbaum is 
one author who does take a more consequentialist approach to cyberspace 
securitisation, arguing that it might be justified when the threat is as extreme as its 
proponents claim.  
If those who subscribe to a conception of security as cybersecurity 
are right, particularly if the magnitude of threat is as great as those 
on the extremes claim, then an extraordinary response is 
warranted despite its chilling eﬀects (Nissenbaum, 2005, p. 73). 
However, this approach is rare and most literature is either critical of state 
surveillance and the securitisation of cyberspace, or is complimentary of Edward 
Snowden and supportive of the securitisation of individual privacy. Given that a 
narrow majority of the British public support greater efforts to protect national 
security it is surprising that academic literature is weighted so strongly towards 
criticisms of state surveillance and the securitisation of national security (Pew 
Research Centre, 2016). Even when cyberspace securitisation by non-state actors 
is addressed, such as in Georgieva’s work on Snowden as an alternative securitising 
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actor, these forms of securitisation are considered positive because they support 
human rights. In the US and UK, academics have also been politically active in 
opposing state surveillance. In 2014 over one thousand scholars from a wide range 
of disciplines formed the ‘academics against surveillance’ campaign, which 
published an open letter criticising state surveillance (Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, 2014).  
Whilst there is disagreement over whether desecuritisation is always best and what 
types of securitisation should be reversed, there are a variety of means through 
which desecuritisation can be achieved. 
5.3 HOW MIGHT WE DESECURITISE CYBERSPACE? 
Desecuritisation can be achieved through replacement, counter-securitisation, 
silencing, de-escalation or rearticulation of the problem. These can be applied 
separately or in combination with each other. 
5.3.1 Replacement (Competing Securitisation) 
Replacement occurs when one act of securitisation is replaced by another that 
relates to a greater threat, requiring a more urgent and substantial response. One 
example is attempts to replace the securitisation of state surveillance with the 
securitisation of the activities of technology companies. MP Ben Wallace attempted 
to achieve this when he argued that technology companies are a greater privacy 
threat than the state. 
The big capitalist companies in America … harvest our data without 
your leave, sell it on to intermediaries on and on and on. They make 
millions, billions of pounds … and that’s the area that needs 
regulating and protection… I’d rather have the state than the 
private sector all over the world grooming through my internet 
capabilities (Wallace, 2013). 
Others, such as Estonian MP Indrek Tarand, have suggested that state hacking from 
Russia and China24 is a greater threat than state surveillance by the UK and US. 
For me, US spying cannot be a bigger problem than Chinese or 
Russian spying. And, here in the Parliament, unfortunately, we 
                                                          
24 For example, hacks on the DNC and New York Times 
198 
 
always speak about the US but tend to forget that other big powers 
are doing the same (Tarand, 2014). 
Replacement does not necessarily aim to debunk the original threat construction, 
but this threat becomes replaced in the audience’s minds by an even more 
significant one. 
5.3.2 Counter-Securitisation 
An issue is counter-securitised when the consequences of securitisation are 
deemed more threatening than the original threat. Counterterrorism measures, for 
example, are often argued to be a greater threat to freedom and liberty than 
terrorism itself (Ogilvie, 2016). 
Counter securitisation is prevalent in cybersecurity discourse because measures to 
promote digital rights and national security are often considered to be threatening 
to the other side. Individuals such as Edward Snowden argue that the securitisation 
of terrorism has led to state surveillance, which is more dangerous than the 
terrorist threat itself. 
It may be that by watching everywhere we go, by watching 
everything we do, by analyzing every word we say, by waiting and 
passing judgment over every association we make and every 
person we love, that we could uncover a terrorist plot, or we could 
discover more criminals. But is that the kind of society we want to 
live in? (Snowden, 2014). 
Conversely, state actors argue that the securitisation of state surveillance has led 
to an increased roll-out of encryption and other enhanced security measures, which 
are now the greater threat. 
Privacy is important, but in my view the security of 
communications methods and devices is growing beyond what any 
genuine domestic user could reasonably require. The levels of 
encryption and protection that we are seeing in the devices and 
methods used to communicate are frustrating the efforts of police 
and intelligence agencies to keep people safe (Hogan-Howe, 2014). 
Counter-securitisation does not address the issues of securitisation but merely 
focusses attention in a different direction. 
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5.3.3 Silencing 
Silencing occurs when an issue is not only de-securitised but is also eliminated from 
political discourse. This can occur when the issue at hand is considered so toxic that 
it is no longer open for public debate, the securitising actor is widely discredited or 
the securitising move is somehow suppressed. 
Examples of toxic issues include the concepts of backdoors, key escrow and 
weakened encryption, which are considered by many members of the DRC and 
much of the technology community to be inherently threatening and closed to 
debate (Schneier, 2015; Abelson, et al., 2015). 
Individuals or institutions can be silenced by undermining their qualifications to 
speak security, undermining their trustworthiness and motivations, and denying 
them a platform from which to speak. This may involve dehumanising the 
securitising actor, portraying them as evil or ignorant, or making it difficult for 
others to associate with their cause. The use of the term ‘snoopers’ charter’ to refer 
to the Investigatory Powers Bill implies that the beneficiaries of the bill are 
motivated by a desire to pry into other people’s business. It discredits them and 
therefore seeks to silence their arguments. A similar concept applies to Edward 
Snowden, who was widely labelled as a traitor when he disclosed material from the 
NSA and GCHQ. The official US House of Representatives report into Snowden’s 
disclosures described Snowden as ‘a serial exaggerator and fabricator’ saying that 
he had demonstrated a ‘pattern of intentional lying’ throughout his career and 
following the disclosures (US House of Representatives, 2016, p. iii). 
Attempts can also be made to silence an issue by denying it attention. GCHQ 
describe how they attempted to silence the Snowden revelations by starving them 
of oxygen. 
The organisation struggled to react to Snowden in a way. We were 
previously secret with no public face. When the news broke we 
didn’t know how bad it would be. By the time we realised what had 
happened and were ready to react the horse had already bolted. 
The reaction was slow and coated in fear. We tried to starve the 
story of oxygen by not commenting on it (Fiona, 2016). 
But silencing does not always work. Having initially attempted to silence the issue 
by not commenting, GCHQ eventually realised that they had instead only silenced 
themselves. 
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…but then when we realised that was not working we started to 
engage but it has taken a long slog to build up relationships and get 
to the situation we are in today, which isn’t perfect. But so much 
damage was done by not commenting. Someone else had told our 
story. The headlines were sensational. It was compelling but it was 
wrong (Fiona, 2016). 
Attempts to silence issues can be high risk because, whilst speakers can be silenced 
and concepts can be removed from public debate, this can result in ideas becoming 
repressed and emerging later in more extreme forms. 
5.3.4 De-escalation 
De-escalation involves the securitising actor or other influential force reducing the 
claimed likelihood, imminency or impact of a threat so that it can be dealt with 
through ordinary means. There have been several attempts to de-escalate 
cyberspace threats relating to both surveillance and national security. The Berkman 
centre report on the ‘Going Dark’ threat attempts to de-escalate the issue by 
highlighting the vast volumes of information that law enforcement have access to 
(The Berkman Centre, 2016). During the conflict between Apple and the FBI, Tim 
Cook also made a similar effort to de-escalate the ‘Going Dark’ threat. 
We shouldn’t all be fixated just on what’s not available. We should 
take a step back and look at the total that’s available. Because 
there’s a mountain of information about us (Cook, 2016). 
Edward Snowden has also attempted to de-escalate the ‘Going Dark’ threat by 
referencing a case where the FBI had gained access to a Dark Web drug dealer’s 
encrypted laptop by following him and seizing the laptop when it was logged on 
(Snowden, 2016). He argued that normal policing could be used to counter 
encryption, therefore the ‘Going Dark’ problem is not as significant as claimed. 
The state has also attempted to de-escalate the threat that it poses to digital rights. 
The National Cyber Security Strategy, for example, contains a whole section titled 
‘balancing security with freedom and privacy’, which explains how the state will 
preserve ‘UK citizens’ rights to privacy and other fundamental values and freedoms’ 
(HM Government, 2011, p. 22). Whilst making speeches warning of cyberspace 
threats, state representatives also frequently claim that they protect digital rights 
rather than threaten them. In speeches about cyber threats, Sir Bernard Hogan-
Howe agreed that ‘privacy is important’, former Head of GCHQ, Robert Hannigan, 
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claimed that ‘we have a good story to tell about privacy’, and former Head of MI5, 
Jonathan Evans claimed that ‘any suggestion that the [Investigatory Powers Acts] 
powers will be used to ‘snoop’ on the innocent activities of ordinary people is 
absurd’  (Hogan-Howe, 2014; Hannigan, 2014; Evans, 2016). 
Whilst de-escalation is often a useful tool, it can be difficult to achieve because it is 
far easier to talk a threat into existence than to talk it out of existence. 
5.3.5 Re-articulation 
Re-articulation occurs when a securitised issue is recast in entirely new terms. An 
issue may still be accepted as real but is no longer viewed in security terms. Re-
articulation is arguably the most difficult form of de-securitisation to achieve, since 
it involves a fundamental shift in how people conceptualise security, but it can have 
profound effects, as demonstrated by the peace process in Northern Ireland. 
During the troubles, Sinn Fein was considered the political arm of the IRA and 
constructed as a threat to the integrity of the UK, but since the signing of the Good 
Friday agreement in 1998, their increased role in Northern Irish politics has been 
rearticulated as a positive sign of a developing peace. Whilst many still consider 
Sinn Fein to represent terrorism, many others who originally considered them a 
threat now see them as part of the solution. 
Re-articulation of threats to national security and digital rights would see the DRC 
consider GCHQ as an ally in their efforts to protect digital rights, and the state 
consider the DRC as essential to the provision of good cybersecurity. 
5.4 THE LIMITATIONS OF DESECURITISATION 
One of the main reasons that cyberspace is difficult to desecuritise is that 
securitisation is now well established, constantly re-enforced, and the audiences 
which accept these securitisations have become entrenched in their views. As the 
preceding chapters have demonstrated, securitisation has been achieved through 
hyper securitising rhetoric that portrays surveillance and national security threats 
as existentially threatening, and this rhetoric is strengthened with linkages to fears 
of authoritarianism, totalitarianism, anarchy and terrorism. 
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Audience acceptance of threats is also influenced by political ideology, with those 
fearful of the state placing much greater trust in the securitisations of whistle-
blowers25 such as Edward Snowden and those more fearful of external threats, such 
as terrorism, placing far greater trust in the securitisations of the state. In addition, 
cyberspace securitisations are constantly re-enforced by daily events, with 
instances of terrorism or cyber breaches re-enforcing the national security threat, 
and daily reports on the state’s surveillance powers re-enforcing the state 
surveillance threat. 
It is also far easier to securitise an issue than it is to desecuritise it. Once an audience 
has accepted the existence of an existential threat, it is difficult to convince them 
that this threat does not exist, or is far less dangerous than first thought. This is 
most evident in reactions to terrorism and the war on terror, although can be 
applied equally to cyberspace. In 2010, 25% of the British population believed that 
the threat of terrorism had grown in the past five years compared to 17% who 
believed it had shrunk. By 2016, the percentage of people believing that the threat 
had grown was 74% compared to only 1% who believed it had shrunk (YouGov, 
2016) (see Figure 5.3). Supporters of all political parties believed that the terror 
threat had increased, but this belief was stronger on the right of British politics 
(Conservative -84%, UKIP – 83%, Labour – 71%, LibDem – 74%). In the US, when 
                                                          
25 For his supporters, Snowden is a whistle-blower, but for his detractors he is a criminal 
who has illegally disclosed millions of classified documents. 
Figure 5.2: American views on terrorist threat 
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asked how they would rate the chances of themselves or a member of their family 
or a good friend being killed or wounded in a terrorist attack, 12% of people 
responded with ‘Very high’ or ‘Fairly High’. This belief appears at odds with the fact 
that the US had not suffered a mass casualty terrorist attack since 2001. 
There have been several attempts to explain the discrepancy between the fear of 
terrorism and the actual risk of being affected by it (Nellis, 2009; Altheide, 2016; 
Braithwaite, 2013). These demonstrate how the visceral images of terrorist attacks 
such as 9/11, the constant re-enforcing of the threat, hatred of ‘the other’ and the 
uncertain nature of the threat, combine to create an emotional response to 
terrorism. Studies have also demonstrated that it is not necessary to have been 
present at a terrorist attack or to have been directly affected by one, to experience 
significant symptoms of anxiety and stress in otherwise healthy citizens (Collins, et 
al., 2001). 
This emotional response to the threat of terrorism renders logical arguments 
against it less effective and psychological studies have repeatedly demonstrated 
that logical arguments are rarely effective against existing views. An experiment in 
Stanford, for example, demonstrated that when students were provided with 
fictitious information, they still based their opinions on this information even when 
it was revealed that the data was false (Ross & Mark Lepper, 1975). A related study 
at Stanford a few years later revealed that not just opinions, but people’s beliefs 
and values, which had been formed based upon false information, were not 
changed even when the information that lead them to form these beliefs was 
shown to be false (Anderson, et al., 1980). According to another study ‘corrections 
actually increase misperceptions among the group in question’ (Nyhan & Reifler, 
2010, p. 303). The authors call this the backfire effect and suggested that if people 
Figure 5.3: British view on terrorist threat 
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counter-argue unwelcome information they may end up entrenching views that are 
more extreme than those originally held. 
Fear and anxiety play a significant role in risk perception.. And for those in fear, 
encountering those who deny the existence of the threat can lead to greater 
anxiety since the burden of facing that threat is considered greater when others do 
not accept its existence. Common advice to help people reassure those with 
anxieties is that fears should not be invalidated, but should be accepted as real to 
those who hold them. When confirmation bias (which explains how people 
selectively interpret new information to support their existing beliefs) is also 
considered, it becomes clear that challenging attitudes to cyberspace threats is not 
as simple as presenting the case for the other side. Once an issue has become 
securitised, it is extremely difficult to convince the audience that their acceptance 
of the threat is wrong. This difficulty was demonstrated following the enactment of 
the IPA. Some at GCHQ thought that the act would ‘defeat claims of mass 
surveillance’ but this notion was dispelled after its passing when the ORG described 
it as ‘one of the most extreme surveillance laws ever passed in a democracy’  (David, 
2016) (Killock, 2016). 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
The consequentialist approach appears to be the most applicable to the 
securitisation of cyberspace but it is still extremely problematic. Determining 
whether state surveillance has an overall negative or positive impact on the world 
cannot be achieved objectively and individuals and academics will continue to hold 
different views based upon their own ethics, values and subjective experience of 
the world. But whilst it is extremely difficult to reliably determine the ethics of 
particular acts of securitisation, it might be possible to apply the consequentialist 
approach collectively to the two competing securitisations that lie at the heart of 
the CSD. When considering the case of Apple versus the FBI, it is not necessary to 
make a judgement about the validity of each side’s securitising claims in order to 
judge whether the dispute as a whole was undesirable. Viewed as a whole, it is clear 
that competing securitisations caused both Apple and the FBI to take hardline 
positions, which lead to conflict, enmity and an outcome that was in neither side’s 
interests. 
Instead of attempting to address acts of securitisation, it might be more effective 
to address the root cause of these acts - the genuine fear of cyberspace threats, 
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which exists on each side of the debate, the fear that the actions of the other side 
are making things worse, and the animosity and distrust that this creates. These 
issues are at the heart of the CSD and thus, to desecuritise cyberspace, the CSD 
must be overcome. The following chapter uses examples from the dispute between 
the state and the DRC to help understand the failure of past approaches and then 
proposes some general principles that can be used to overcome the CSD. 
  
206 
 
6 OVERCOMING THE CYBER SECURITY DILEMMA 
Chapter 5 concluded that, rather than addressing and contesting particular acts of 
cyberspace securitisation, it would be more useful to address the root causes of the 
security dilemma, which include the genuine fear of cyberspace threats that exist 
on each side of the debate, the fear that the actions of the other side are making 
things worse, and the animosity and distrust that this creates. This chapter 
considers current and historic attempts to overcome the CSD and discusses why 
these have not been successful. From these conclusions, it then establishes several 
guiding principles that could be used to help overcome the CSD in the future.   
6.1 HISTORY REPEATING ITSELF 
Despite the passage of time and the rapid development of technology, the 
arguments on both sides of the Crypto Wars and the CSD have not changed very 
much in the past few decades. This is demonstrated by considering the similarities 
in the FBI's statements on encryption made by Louis Freeh in 1997 and James 
Comey in 2014 (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2014). 
We believe that unless a balanced approach to encryption is 
adopted… the ability of law enforcement to investigate and 
sometimes prevent the most serious crimes and terrorism will be 
severely impaired. Our national security will also be jeopardized 
(Freeh, 1997). 
Those charged with protecting our people aren’t always able to 
access the evidence we need to prosecute crime and prevent 
terrorism even with lawful authority…. And if the challenges of 
real-time interception threaten to leave us in the dark, encryption 
threatens to lead all of us to a very dark place (Comey, 2014). 
The arguments from members of the DRC have also remained very similar. In 1997 
eleven prominent cryptography experts, including Whitfield Diffie, Bruce Schneier, 
Ron Rivest and Ross Anderson, collaborated on a paper on the unworkability of key 
escrow, which was designed to provide support to the arguments of the DRC 
(Abelson, et al., 1997).  In 2015 the same authors, along with a few additions, wrote 
a very similar paper on the danger of government-imposed mandates on access to 
encrypted data (Abelson, et al., 2015). Once again, the paper was designed to 
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support the DRC in the face of renewed government calls for access to encrypted 
data. 
The Open Technology Institute (OTI) asks whether we are ‘doomed to repeat 
history’ and fail to learn from the mistakes of the first Crypto Wars, arguing that 
much of the debate is a repeat of what has gone on before (Kehl, et al., 2015, p. 
21). 
They [the government] have revived many of the arguments they 
made about encryption in the 1990s, seeming to have forgotten 
the lessons of the past. In response, encryption proponents have 
countered with many of the same arguments that they made in the 
1990s (Kehl, et al., 2015, p. 21). 
The OTI conclude that the arguments have been settled, the case for digital rights 
has emerged victorious, and governments should just accept that they have lost. 
But this is a simplistic argument, which fails to appreciate the reason why the 
Crypto Wars have re-emerged26. For the state, the issue was never resolved 
because their security concerns were never addressed. The fear that encryption is 
harming law enforcement and making areas of cyberspace ungovernable still exists 
and, due to the exponential growth in online communication, this fear is only 
becoming more pronounced (Comey, 2014). Whilst the DRC frequently point to the 
success of encryption as evidence that they were right all along, the state can point 
to evidence that unbreakable encryption has led to an outbreak of illicit behaviour 
in cyberspace (Hogan-Howe, 2014). Ungovernable marketplaces on the Dark Web 
that deal in drugs, weapons and child pornography, encrypted communications 
between terrorists that are inaccessible to law enforcement, and the use of online 
anonymity to spread extreme ideology are evidence for the state that unrestricted 
use of encryption is damaging their ability to maintain law and order (Rudd, 2017; 
Moore & Rid, 2016; Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, 2014). The 
issue is far from resolved. 
6.2 ATTEMPTS TO OVERCOME THE SECURITY DILEMMA 
Over the last forty years, there have been many attempts to resolve the CSD and 
end the Crypto Wars. Each side has attempted to ‘win’ the Crypto Wars but, on 
each occasion, the dispute has re-emerged after the ‘losing’ side has refused to 
                                                          
26 Or never went away 
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accept the new reality (Foundation for Information Policy Research, 2005). There 
have also been attempts to solve the CSD in a more collaborative manner by finding 
solutions acceptable to both sides. Technical solutions like David Chaum’s 
Privategrity have sought to provide strong encryption for the ‘good guys’ but 
prevent this from being used for ‘evil’. ‘Peace talks’ between the state and the DRC 
have also been attempted with varying degrees of success.  But a resolution of the 
Crypto Wars is proving elusive and a spiralling cycle of action, counter-action and 
fear has resulted in greater insecurity for all. This section considers both unilateral 
and collaborative approaches to the CSD, and how successful they have been. 
6.3 Unilateral Attempts to ‘Win’ the Crypto Wars 
Both state actors and members of the DRC have attempted to use a range of 
techniques to overcome the CSD by either winning or gaining the advantage in the 
Crypto Wars. The state has developed hacking techniques, targeted encryption 
directly and attempted to use legislation to ensure that it has access to the 
intelligence it needs to provide security, whilst the DRC has sought to develop and 
promote a wide range of security and encryption techniques to ensure that 
individual privacy and security is protected.  In each of these examples, each side 
has attempted to address their own security issues, with little or no consideration 
of the impact that this would have on the other side. 
6.3.1 State Attempts to win the Crypto Wars 
Whilst the British and American establishments have always acknowledged and 
promoted the virtues of encryption, they have also always maintained that 
ubiquitous unbreakable encryption poses a significant threat to national security 
(Comey, 2014). For the state, the perfect solution to the problem of encryption is 
for the public to use encryption that is unbreakable to anyone but themselves. This 
has been the focus of much of the intelligence agencies efforts on encryption and 
has taken several forms, including undermining encryption, hacking, and using 
legislation to force companies to facilitate state attempts to access user data. 
This approach is reflected in an NSA document leaked by Edward Snowden which 
provides details of a project to influence the design of commercial products to make 
them accessible to interrogation by the NSA and GCHQ. 
 ‘These design changes make the systems in question exploitable 
through SIGINT collection with foreknowledge of the modification. 
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To the consumer and other adversaries, however, the system’s 
security remains intact’ (New York Times, 2013).  
On paper, this approach would appear to be effective for GCHQ and the NSA but, 
as the examples demonstrate, it often creates a backlash that makes the job of the 
intelligence agencies even more difficult. 
Undermining encryption 
Due to the strength of modern encryption algorithms, GCHQ and the NSA have had 
to seek different means to access data when they have been unable to crack the 
encryption that is used. The Snowden disclosures revealed that the BULLRUN and 
EDGEHILL programmes at the NSA and GCHQ respectively, deployed several tactics 
to bypass encryption, including stealing encryption keys, hacking into systems or 
persuading vendors to install backdoors (The Guardian, 2013). However, of all the 
techniques that GCHQ and the NSA have utilised, it is the undermining of 
encryption itself that has most angered the DRC and has created a significant 
backlash and breakdown of trust. Evidence for the deliberate undermining of 
encryption was provided in an NSA budget request leaked by Edward Snowden that 
detailed how the NSA ‘actively engages the US and foreign IT industries to covertly 
influence and/or overtly leverage their commercial products designs’ in order to 
enable ‘expanded network operation and intelligence exploitation’, whilst leaving 
systems security intact (New York Times, 2013). Methods of achieving this include 
attempts to ‘insert vulnerabilities into commercial encryption systems, IT systems, 
networks, and endpoint communications devices used by targets’ and attempts to 
‘influence policies, standards and specification for commercial public key 
technologies’ (New York Times, 2013). 
Whilst British and American intelligence agencies feel that their ability to access 
encrypted communications helps to protect national security, the DRC feel strongly 
that this approach has done more harm than good. This was expressed by several 
academics, who jointly published an Open Letter reflecting their concerns following 
the Snowden disclosures (Paterson, et al., 2013).    
The first set of publications based on Edward Snowden’s files were 
concerned with surveillance of internet communication happening 
more indiscriminately and on a much larger scale than previously 
thought. The more recent publications, presenting the systematic 
210 
 
undermining of cryptographic solutions and standards, are the 
cause of much more substantial worry (Paterson, et al., 2013). 
Other commentators, such as security researcher Bruce Schneier, were concerned 
that the actions of GCHQ and the NSA undermined trust and threatened the fabric 
of the Internet itself. 
Cryptography forms the basis for trust online. By deliberately 
undermining online security in a short-sighted effort to eavesdrop, 
the NSA is undermining the very fabric of the internet (Schneier, 
2013). 
Technology firms also expressed concern at the revelations. Microsoft said it had 
‘significant concerns’ about the activities of GCHQ and the NSA, and Yahoo said it 
feared ‘substantial potential for abuse’ (The Guardian, 2013). As a result, 
technology companies accelerated and enhanced their own use of encryption and 
began to view the intelligence agencies as more of an adversary. Eric Groose, Vice 
President for security engineering at Google, described the situation as an ‘arms 
race’ between Google and the intelligence agencies (Washington Post, 2013). 
Google significantly accelerated their program to encrypt traffic between data 
centres, and Apple introduced end-to-end encryption by default on the iPhone 
(Washington Post, 2013).  
The then US Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper,  acknowledged the 
problem, claiming that ‘as a result of the Snowden revelations, the onset of 
commercial encryption has accelerated by seven years’ (Clapper, 2016). Whilst 
many would claim that an acceleration of cybersecurity is a good thing, Clapper 
explained that ‘from our standpoint, it’s not … it’s not a good thing’ (Clapper, 2016). 
The disclosures have had ‘a profound effect on our ability to collect, particularly 
against terrorists’ (Clapper, 2016). Whilst Clapper blamed Snowden for the 
accelerated provision of commercial encryption, the NSA themselves could also be 
blamed for their overzealous approach to breaking encryption. GCHQ and the NSA’s 
efforts to protect national security by undermining encryption also undermined 
trust, triggering a counter-response within the DRC, which has subsequently made 
intelligence collection efforts more difficult. 
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Hacking 
One of the ways by which GCHQ and the NSA seek to mitigate the ‘Going Dark’ 
problem is to use their technological capabilities and expertise to gain access to 
information through Computer Network Exploitation (CNE), or ‘hacking’ in standard 
parlance. The capability was first disclosed within the Snowden disclosures, but was 
confirmed for the first time by GCHQ during a case brought against them at the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal (Bowcott, 2015). In 2013, 20% of GCHQ’s intelligence 
reports contained information derived from hacking. In 2016, Foreign Secretary 
Philip Hammond said that ‘the ability to exploit computer networks plays a crucial 
part in our ability to protect the British public’ (Hammond, 2016). 
Hacking is a three-stage process that involves identifying a vulnerability in a piece 
of software or hardware, writing an exploit to be used against that vulnerability, 
and deploying that exploit against the target. Whilst targeted hacking might be 
deemed more acceptable to the DRC than mass surveillance, many argue that state 
hacking undermines security because of the requirement of states to hoard 
vulnerabilities. Digital Rights activists such as Bruce Schneier argue that, rather than 
protecting national security, ‘hoarding zero-day vulnerabilities is a bad idea. It 
means that we're all less secure’ (Schneier, 2016). Evidence to support this case 
comes from the WannaCry attacks of 2017, which exploited a vulnerability 
discovered by the NSA and utilised elements of NSA software that were leaked onto 
the Internet. 
The EternalBlue exploit was believed to have been developed by the NSA and used 
for around five years to gain access to computers using the Microsoft Windows 
operating system. The exploit was extremely powerful, and according to NSA 
employees, it was like ‘fishing with dynamite’ and produced an intelligence haul 
that was ‘unreal’ (Washington Post, 2017). The NSA considered the option of 
reporting the vulnerability used in the exploit to Microsoft so they could fix the 
problem, but decided that the intelligence it produced was too valuable. However, 
in early 2017, EternalBlue was stolen by the Shadow Brokers hacking group and, in 
April 2017, they released the code to the public. In May 2017, the WannaCry 
malware, which utilised the EternalBlue code, infected hundreds of thousands of 
computers around the world, encrypting files and demanding a ransom. The 
malware had a significant impact on the UK’s National Health Service, resulting in 
hospitals and doctors’ surgeries shutting down services and turning away patients 
(BBC News, 2017). Microsoft themselves placed the blame for the attack on the 
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NSA and echoed the sentiments of many within the DRC, who had long argued that 
stockpiling vulnerabilities was bad for security. 
This attack provides yet another example of why the stockpiling of 
vulnerabilities by governments is such a problem. This is an 
emerging pattern in 2017. We have seen vulnerabilities stored by 
the CIA show up on WikiLeaks, and now this vulnerability stolen 
from the NSA has affected customers around the world (Microsoft, 
2017).  
Microsoft also pledged to work towards forcing governments to ‘report 
vulnerabilities to vendors, rather than stockpile, sell or exploit them’, an effort that, 
if successful, would remove the NSA’s capability to use undeclared (i.e. Zero-Day) 
exploits to hack computers (Microsoft, 2017). 
Hacking may sometimes be required by the state, but when revealed (as inevitably 
it sometimes will be), it causes considerable discomfort to the companies on whose 
products the vulnerabilities were found. The case of EternalBlue shows how this 
can lead to a backlash by technology companies who may then choose to reduce 
co-operation with the state to save face and to prevent future attacks. 
Legislation 
Another way in which the state has attempted to reduce the threat of the ‘Going 
Dark’ problem is to introduce legislation that forces companies to facilitate the 
state’s attempts to gain access to communications data. The IPA includes several 
clauses that mandate companies to assist the state, including the requirement for 
ISPs to retain web browsing history for 12 months, provide facilities and services to 
law enforcement, and to remove electronic protection from communication data 
(HM Government, 2016, pp. 206-208). 
According to the British government, the IPA ‘will ensure that law enforcement and 
the security and intelligence agencies have the powers they need in a digital age to 
disrupt terrorist attacks’, but these powers are considered by members of the DRC 
to be intrusive (HM Government, 2016). Others, such as Rid and Moore, suggest 
that legislation against encryption will ultimately backfire: 
Any attempt to systematically undermine end-to-end encryption – 
through legislation requiring service providers to retain the option 
of removing encryption for any given user – will likely strengthen 
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more secure implementations by creating more demand for them, 
and thus help criminals and militants (Moore & Rid, 2016, p. 31). 
The argument that companies will resist demands by the state to provide access to 
user data is evidenced by the actions of Apple, who have designed their iOS 
operating system so that they cannot provide user data even if issued with a 
government warrant (Apple, n.d.). As Jane Harman writes in ‘Foreign Affairs’, since 
the Snowden disclosures there has also been a significant change in attitudes in 
Silicon Valley, with companies less willing to co-operate with law enforcement as 
they do not want to appear complicit in mass surveillance (Harman, 2015). 
U.S. technology firms are taking increasingly dramatic steps to 
protect their customers' data. One can doubt the sincerity of the 
technology community's outrage over the NSA'S surveillance 
practices - doubt, for example, that the Facebook co-founder Mark 
Zuckerberg, whose company reportedly stores petabytes' worth of 
data about its billion-plus active monthly users, was shocked at the 
thought of mass data collection. But Silicon Valley's reaction has 
bite, and the outcome has been an encryption drag race that has 
top government officials panicking… Rather than fight surveillance 
policies in court, where the government has an overwhelming 
edge, companies such as Apple, Facebook, and Google have 
responded in cyberspace. To satisfy a global customer base with 
strict privacy expectations, they've developed technical capabilities 
to put customer data under lock and key (Harman, 2015). 
Attempts to gain access to data by forcing technology companies to provide it have 
proven counterproductive, as they have caused the technology companies to 
develop technologies to make sure they cannot comply with these requests. 
6.3.2 DRC Attempts to win the Crypto Wars 
Members of the DRC tend to view encryption and other security measures as 
inherently positive in nature, whilst state surveillance is considered to be intrusive 
and unaccountable and is thought to cause more harm than good (Dixon-Thayer, 
2016; Cult of Mac, 2016). Much of the focus of the DRC has therefore been on 
denying the state the capability to access encrypted communications through 
technologies such as end-to-end encryption, full disk encryption and onion routing 
networks such as Tor. This approach reflects the view expressed by Security 
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Researcher Bruce Schneier that ‘either we build encryption systems that keep 
everyone secure, or we build them to leave everybody vulnerable’ (Schneier, 2016). 
In other words, there is no middle ground and encryption must be applied to its 
fullest to protect everyone’s security. 
On paper, this approach by the DRC appears to be well grounded because the more 
that encryption is improved and applied, the more secure the Internet becomes. 
But this does not take into consideration the security concerns of the state, which 
considers some applications of encryption to be detrimental to national security.  
Full Disk Encryption 
Full Disk Encryption (FDE) can be applied to PCs, Laptops, smartphones or other 
devices and is used to makes the data stored on these devices inaccessible without 
the decryption key. FDE was introduced as an option in the Honeycomb edition of 
the Android operating system but is turned on by default in later versions.  For 
Apple smartphones, FDE was introduced in version 8.0 of iOS and is now turned on 
by default (Apple, 2017). FDE can involve a variety of different key management 
protocols, with the key either stored externally, internally or in a specially protected 
area on the device that protects it from brute-force attacks27. FDE is widely 
promoted by the DRC as a method to combat state surveillance, including the EFF 
who describe it as ‘Surveillance Self-Defense’ (Electronic Frontier Foundation, n.d.). 
However, certain implementations of FDE are considered threatening to law 
enforcement agencies as they deny them access to information to investigate crime 
and terrorism. 
The dispute between Apple and the FBI resulted from the fact that Syed Farook’s 
phone had been protected with FDE and the FBI was unable to brute force the 
decryption key. Apple’s implementation of FDE and refusal to co-operate with the 
FBI, led the FBI to purchase knowledge of a vulnerability in the iPhone from an 
unnamed black-market vendor (Aspen Institute, 2016). As Section 4.4.2 
demonstrates, this provided the FBI with unrestricted access to all iPhone 5C’s, 
notified the public of a major flaw in the iPhone software and left an exploit for the 
flaw in the hands of an unknown black-market vendor. Apple blame the FBI for 
these negative consequences. However, an argument could be made for holding 
                                                          
27 Brute force attacks are attacks that test every single possible key until the correct one is 
found 
215 
 
Apple responsible, since if they had cooperated with the FBI then these negative 
outcomes would not have occurred. 
President Obama has also argued that a focus on strong encryption will backfire 
because, in the wake of a terrorist attack, public opinion will shift and poorly 
written legislation will be rushed through (Obama, 2016).   
If your argument is strong encryption no matter what, and we can 
and should in fact create black boxes, that I think does not strike 
the kind of balance we have lived with for 200, 300 years. And it's 
fetishizing our phones above every other value. That can't be the 
right answer. What will happen is, if everybody goes to their 
respective corners, and the tech community says ‘either we have 
strong perfect encryption or else it's Big Brother and an Orwellian 
world', what you'll find is that after something really bad happens, 
the politics of this will swing and it will become sloppy and rushed 
and it will go through Congress in ways that are dangerous and not 
thought through (Obama, 2016).   
Whether it is through rushed legislation, hacking or backdoors, if there is no 
ordered way for the state to access specific information in the light of terror attacks 
then it is likely to attempt to access this information in ways that are more 
dangerous for both privacy and security. 
End-to-End Encryption 
End-to-end encryption (E2EE) is a method of encryption which restricts access to 
messages to just the sender and the receiver, unlike in other protocols where a 
third party such as a service provider may also hold the key. Keys can either be 
established beforehand using secure means or they can be negotiated dynamically 
using techniques such as Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange. The DRC advocate the 
widespread uptake of E2EE and argue that it is more secure because it ‘reduces the 
number of parties who might be able to interfere or break encryption’ (EFF, n.d.). 
But, as David Cameron argues, the common use of a system of communication that 
cannot be accessed by the state, even in extremis, can be considered a threat to 
national security. 
[do]we want to allow a means of communication between two 
people which even in extemis with a signed warrant from the home 
secretary personally that we cannot read? ...My answer to that 
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question is no, we must not. The first duty of any government is to 
keep our country and our people safe (Cameron, 2015). 
After the Westminster terror attacks in March 2017, Home Secretary Amber Rudd 
made similar comments, claiming that WhatsApp was giving terrorists a ‘place to 
hide’ and that it was ‘completely unacceptable’ that terrorists were able to 
communicate in secret without law enforcement being able to read their 
communications (Rudd, 2017). 
In response to the dispute over end-to-end encryption, the government has acted 
to defend their security interests. Section 255 of the IPA details the function of 
Technical Capability Notices (TCN) that provide the government with the power to 
oblige an operator to remove ‘electronic protection applied by or on behalf of that 
operator to any communications or data’ (HM Government, 2016, p. 208). How the 
clause will be used is unclear. It could be used to mandate companies to remove 
encryption when they hold the key, it could be used to oblige companies to secretly 
remove E2EE encryption from future messages sent by individuals, or, it could be 
used to force companies to hack their own customers. The implementation of 
encryption on widely used platforms, which are inaccessible by the state, will 
inevitably lead the state to seek technical or legal methods for undoing this 
protection. This could ultimately leave some systems less secure than if they 
implemented encryption in a way that allowed the state access. 
Tor and the Dark Net 
The Onion Router (Tor) uses encryption to provide online anonymity for Internet 
users. When using the Tor Browser, an individual’s web traffic is encrypted and 
bounced around several Tor relays throughout the world so that it is difficult to link 
a Tor user with the websites they visit. Tor also allows websites to operate 
anonymously so that the owners and operators of these sites cannot be traced. The 
Tor Project and the DRC argue that Tor provides individuals and organisations with 
greater security and privacy, whilst avoiding censorship and protecting civil 
liberties, and the more users that use the service the more secure it is because 
individuals are hidden within the mass of the userbase (The TOR Project, n.d.). 
But the state has frequently expressed the view that technologies such as Tor are 
turning the Internet into a ‘dark and ungoverned’ space that is frustrating police 
operations and threatening to turn the Internet ‘anarchic’ (Hogan-Howe, 2014). 
Academic studies reveal the huge amount of illegal activity that is conducted on Tor 
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(Moore & Rid, 2016). Thus, from the state’s perspective, the more people that use 
Tor the more effort they must make to bypass its security features. In recent years 
US and UK law enforcement agencies have run several high-profile operations to 
shut down dark web marketplaces, de-anonymise drug dealers and child exploiters 
and prevent the sale of arms. In 2015, GCHQ and the National Crime Agency (NCA) 
created a joint unit to focus on tackling child abuse on ‘the dark web28’ (NCA, 2015). 
‘GCHQ is using its world-leading capabilities to help the NCA reach into the dark 
web and bring to justice those who misuse it to harm children’ (NCA, 2015). 
Rid and Moore argue that ‘Tor hidden services29 present a formidable political risk 
to cryptography itself’ (Moore & Rid, 2016, pp. 28-29). They argue that ‘the 
widespread and highly visible abuse of unidentified Tor hidden services provides an 
easy target for any critic of encryption’ (Moore & Rid, 2016, p. 29). Tor is becoming 
a victim of its own success because its high level of security attracts criminals and 
undermines the arguments for encryption. This is exacerbated by the refusal of the 
DRC to countenance any restrictions in Tor’s functionality, such as the removal of 
hidden services, which provide the basis for most of the criminality on the network 
and have limited legitimate uses. 
6.3.3 The Problem with Unilateral Approaches 
Unilateral attempts to ‘win’ the Crypto Wars or gain a permanent advantage over 
the other side have always failed because of their failure to address the fears and 
uncertainty of the other. If the state does not achieve an acceptable level of access 
to online communications then it will continue its efforts to defeat, remove, 
undermine, circumvent or outlaw certain types of encryption until it achieves this. 
This was evident after the so-called end of the ‘Crypto Wars’ when GCHQ did not 
accept defeat and secretly continued to utilise all means available to it to access 
online communications. 
Likewise, if members of the DRC do not believe they have achieved acceptable 
limits on state surveillance and acceptable levels of protection for communications, 
then they too will continue their efforts to thwart state attempts to access online 
communications. This is demonstrated by the DRC’s redoubling of its efforts to 
                                                          
28 The Dark Web or Dark Web is often used synonymously with Tor although they are not 
the same thing 
29 Hidden services on Tor are website’s or other services that have their physical location 
and ownership details hidden so that no-one can identify running the service. Darknet 
markets use hidden services to enable them to sell drugs, weapons or other illicit goods 
without detection. 
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secure cyberspace and prevent state surveillance following the Snowden 
disclosures.  
There may be periods of apparent calm within the Crypto Wars, but allegations that 
a terrorist attack was planned using encrypted communications or a cyber attack 
exploited a vulnerability hoarded by GCHQ, will reawaken all the same arguments. 
Perfect security is impossible and the government is unlikely to ever obtain 
unrestricted access to data.  It is highly unlikely that either side can ‘win’ the Crypto 
Wars unilaterally as it would appear that the other would never stop fighting. Only 
a collaborative approach would seem likely to be able to ease an ongoing conflict 
that is damaging both national security and digital rights. 
6.4 A Collaborative Approach 
Whilst the Crypto Wars have been categorised by competing securitisations, 
extreme rhetoric and uncompromising attitudes towards surveillance, there have 
been some attempts at a more collaborative approach. These have included 
technical solutions that attempt to help differentiate between good and bad uses 
of encryption, peace talks designed to build trust and develop common security 
goals, and attempts to re-articulate and reframe the issue away from zero-sum 
scenarios and towards common security interests. 
6.4.1 Technical Solutions 
Several technical solutions to the CSD have been attempted, including the Clipper 
Chip and key escrow, which theoretically provide the state with access to data 
whilst ensuring it remains secure from attackers. But these attempts failed because 
they were opposed by members of the DRC, who were suspicious of government-
imposed solutions and feared that the techniques would weaken encryption and 
lead to a reduction in security (Blaze, 1994). If the CSD is to be resolved then a 
technical element will be required, but this must satisfy both sides that it meets 
their security needs. 
One potential approach was proposed by David Chaum, who has been described as 
the father of online anonymity following his 1981 paper on untraceable email, 
which put in place much of the theory for anonymous communications (Chaum, 
1981). At the Real World Crypto conference at Stanford in 2015, Chaum announced 
that he and his colleagues had designed a solution that he claimed ‘breaks the 
Crypto Wars’ (Chaum, 2016). Speaking on the issue of online anonymity, Chaum 
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took an unusual step for a privacy advocate and acknowledged that systems that 
focussed solely on privacy would not ultimately be effective in the real world. 
You have to perfect the traceability of the evil people and the 
untraceability of the honest people. That’s how you break the 
apparent trade-off, this standoff called the encryption wars 
(Chaum, 2016). 
Chaum argued that his system would provide law enforcement with the access they 
required without affecting anyone else’s privacy. 
 If you want a way to solve this apparent logjam, here it is. We don’t 
have to give up on privacy. We don’t have to allow terrorists and 
drug dealers to use it. We can have a civil society electronically 
without the possibility of covert mass surveillance (Chaum, 2016). 
Chaum’s ‘PrivaTegrity’ system involves an encryption technology, which he calls 
cMix, that passes messages around numerous servers (nine in his example), which 
each perform a different cryptographic function on the message (Chaum, et al., 
2016). The interesting feature of Chaum’s solution comes from the fact that, whilst 
none of the servers can access the original message, if all nine act together then 
the message can be decrypted.  Chaum argues that the system provides greater 
security than competing services such as Tor, but also contains the unique feature 
that messages can be decrypted and deanonymized if all nine servers work together 
to do so. Chaum suggests that the servers could be spread around nine countries 
and, only when the administrators of all nine servers agree, could a message be 
decrypted and de-anonymised. This would be reserved for ‘serious abuse, 
something that leads to death and real harm to people, or major economic 
malfeasance’ (Chaum, 2016). Chaum also notes that the number of servers could 
be more or less than nine and a limit could be placed on the number of decryptions 
possible within a timeframe. 
Whilst Chaum’s particular system may or may not prove workable, his concept is 
an interesting solution to the CSD. It is a technical solution proposed by a privacy 
activist that could provide the state with access to data, without otherwise 
compromising security. Chaum’s suggestion of nine servers in nine countries could 
be adapted in a variety of different ways; for example, four servers could be used 
with one being controlled by a state agency such as GCHQ, another by a technology 
company such as Facebook, another by an independent privacy commissioner, and 
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a final one by the judiciary. Only when all four agree that there is a proportionate, 
reasonable and legal case to decrypt a message could this task be performed. Such 
a solution could solve the state’s fear of ‘Going Dark’, and could provide the DRC 
with the reassurance that surveillance was only possible in a targeted and legal 
manner.  
Despite the apparent potential of such a system, Chaum’s ideas were heavily 
criticised immediately after their announcement. Chaum had made the fatal 
mistake of describing the system as ‘like a backdoor with nine different padlocks on 
it’ (Chaum, 2016). As previously discussed, the term backdoor has been 
institutionalised within the DRC as inherently bad, and the reference immediately 
invokes negative reactions and hostility from the DRC. Backdoors are considered 
unacceptable security vulnerabilities and are associated with underhand actions by 
intelligence agencies and hackers. As Wired put it in an article on Chaum’s new 
method; 
The mere mention of a "backdoor"—no matter how many 
padlocks, checks, and balances restrict it—is enough to send 
shivers down the spines of most of the crypto community (Wired, 
2016). 
Following Chaum’s announcement, the DRC heavily criticised the idea, with much 
of that criticism focussed on the ‘backdoor’ aspect of the software. A senior 
technologist at Amnesty International, Claudio Guarnieri, said that backdoors 
should never be discussed. Others such as ‘activist technology researcher’ 
Christopher Soghoian, argued that doing so was just playing into the hands of the 
FBI. 
Even discussing of a crypto backdoor "solution", despite of how 
"secure" it might be, is a dangerous step back to a critical debate 
(Guarnieri, 2016). 
Security experts: Backdoors weaken security. They're a bad idea. 
Chaum: I've built a new system with a backdoor. FBI: See? It is 
possible (Soghoian, 2016). 
 …this is little more than a huge political gift to the FBI, who can go 
back to their stupid claims that if technologists just work 
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harder they can come up with a "solution" to the false problem of 
"going dark” (Anon., 2016). 
The word ‘backdoor’ did not feature in Chaum’s paper on PrivaTegrity but he did 
use the term in a widely quoted interview with Wired magazine. This was 
something that Chaum later admitted was a major mistake. 
I agreed to allow the term 'backdoor' to be used in the article to 
refer to access in general, not as a deliberate weakening of a 
system. This probably was my big mistake … It's B.S. There 
unconditionally is no hidden weakening within PrivaTegrity. My 
whole career has been about reducing the likelihood of these 
backdoors and all about creating structures that aren't subject to 
clandestine manipulation (Chaum, 2016). 
Chaum has a very strong digital rights background and created PrivaTegrity, after 
learning from the Snowden disclosures about a dangerous relationship between 
the NSA and technology companies. He considers his system to have much stronger 
privacy and security qualities than the current ‘front door’ security concerns of well-
established technology companies.    
Current social media systems all have a front door through which 
those who operate them, possibly under the influence of 
government, can do whatever they want, including inserting a man 
in the middle—even if clients think they're doing end-to-end 
encryption (Chaum, 2016). 
But his use of the ‘backdoor’ metaphor discredited his work and turned him 
overnight from a hero to an enemy of the DRC. 
Holy crap, has Chaum turned evil in his old age? (Andrea, 2016). 
I'm heartbroken to see that Chaum is proposing key escrow for 
everyone on the planet: What happened to David Chaum? 
(Appelbaum, 2016). 
Don't you think the intelligence agencies tried to $$$ convince $$$ 
the least ethical of the guys working with cryptography till they 
found one that was up for sale? (Ninja, 2016). 
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 Bought or extorted, David Chaum is now with the enemy (Dawson, 
2016). 
Chaum claimed that protecting digital rights could be better achieved by a system 
that satisfied the requirements of the state, since this would stop them from 
pursuing the type of tactics revealed by Edward Snowden. This appreciation of the 
other side and its impact, shows that Chaum was sensitive to the nature of the CSD 
and understood that unilateral approaches to solving it could not be successful. But 
despite his privacy credentials, Chaum’s efforts to engage with the logic of the 
state’s arguments on encryption were enough to see him discredited and 
lambasted by the DRC. 
The reactions to Chaum’s proposals echo those towards historical figures who have 
attempted to reconcile with an adversary but have been ostracised by their own 
side. Anwar Sadat, the president of Egypt attempted to solve the conflict between 
Israel and Arab nations by engaging with Israel’s security fears. In 1977, he publicly 
recognised the right of Israel to exist. in 1978, he agreed to the Camp David Accords. 
In 1979, he signed the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty with Israeli Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin (Booth & Wheeler, 2008). These reconciliation efforts seemed to 
have broken a historical deadlock but Sadat’s actions were viewed as treacherous 
by many on his own side. Ultimately, in 1981, he was assassinated by ideological 
fundamentalists within the Egyptian Army. 
Sadat was assassinated for seeking to improve Egypt’s security by engaging with 
and responding to Israeli fears, and a similar (figurative) fate awaited Chaum after 
he attempted to engage with the fears of the state. Chaum reached out to the other 
side but, by using the term backdoor, he lost the support of his own. Chaum’s 
approach was unsuccessful because it focussed on a purely technical solution to 
the CSD and overlooked the trust building that is necessary for security co-
operation. The failure of Chaum’s approach mirrors failures of security co-
operation in the international arena, such as the Northern Ireland peace talks in the 
1970s and 1980s, which failed due to a lack of trust building (Ruane & Todd, 1996). 
Many of the key actors in the CSD are technically minded, including academic 
cryptographers, coders, crypto-libertarians and GCHQ employees, so the focus on 
technical solutions is understandable. For many digital rights advocates, the 
solution to state surveillance is to develop better encryption technologies, ‘encrypt 
as much communications as you can’ and spread the message of encryption as 
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widely as possible (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2013).  For cyberlibertarians 
technology is the ultimate solution to oppressive government, and the technologies 
of cyberspace render government control impossible (Barlow, 1996). However, 
after many years of trying and failing to solve their issues with technology, some 
within the DRC have begun to realise that technology alone might not be the 
solution. The prominent security researcher, cryptographer and privacy 
campaigner Bruce Schneier wrote a book on this topic, in which he dismantled the 
arguments in his previous book that cryptography was the solution to everything 
(Schneier, 2004; Schneier, 1995). On his website, he explained how his thinking had 
changed (Schneier, 2000). 
Seven years ago I wrote another book: Applied Cryptography. In it 
I described a mathematical utopia: algorithms that would keep 
your deepest secrets safe for millennia, protocols that could 
perform the most fantastical electronic interactions-unregulated 
gambling, undetectable authentication, anonymous cash-safely 
and securely. In my vision cryptography was the great 
technological equalizer; anyone with a cheap (and getting cheaper 
every year) computer could have the same security as the largest 
government. In the second edition of the same book, written two 
years later, I went so far as to write: "It is insufficient to protect 
ourselves with laws; we need to protect ourselves with 
mathematics." 
It's just not true. Cryptography can't do any of that. It's not that 
cryptography has gotten weaker since 1994, or that the things I 
described in that book are no longer true; it's that cryptography 
doesn't exist in a vacuum. Mathematics is perfect; reality is 
subjective. Mathematics is defined; computers are ornery. 
Mathematics is logical; people are erratic, capricious, and barely 
comprehensible. 
The error of Applied Cryptography is that I didn't talk at all about 
the context. I talked about cryptography as if it were The AnswerTM. 
I was pretty naïve (Schneier, 2000). 
Schneier was not responding specifically to the CSD, but his recognition that 
cryptography does not exist in a vacuum is directly relevant. Technological solutions 
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to the CSD cannot prove effective if they are not coupled with efforts to build trust 
and common identity between the conflicting parties. As Schneier went on to 
conclude, ‘if you think technology can solve your security problems, then you don't 
understand the problems and you don't understand the technology’ (Schneier, 
2000). 
6.4.2 Peace Talks 
The Crypto Wars have created distrust, enmity, suspicion, a tendency towards 
extreme positions and an unwillingness to compromise. Although technical 
solutions are essential, they cannot solve the CSD alone. Peace talks are the first 
steps towards establishing peace between nations as they help to build trust, dispel 
myths and establish common interests and ideologies. There have been several 
attempts to hold peace talks between key actors within the CSD, which have had 
varying degrees of success. 
James Comey’s Adult Conversation 
The difficulty in establishing an initial dialogue is demonstrated by the response to 
FBI director James Comey’s attempts to engage in discussion with technology 
companies over the CSD. Speaking at the 2016 Symantec Government Symposium, 
Comey acknowledged the difficult issue of encryption but said that the problem 
was ‘less technological and more ideological‘ (Comey, 2016). He announced that 
the FBI planned to ‘collect information this year so that next year [after the 
Presidential elections] we can have an adult conversation in this country’ (Comey, 
2016). His comments were greeted with hostility from members of the DRC who 
were angry at the condescending tone. The Register wrote an article attacking the 
comments, which was tag-lined ‘how about f**k off – is that adult enough?’ (The 
Register, 2016). Techdirt was similarly scathing of Comey’s attempts at negotiation 
and their response shows how difficult it is to establish a dialogue when there is so 
much distrust and hostility between the two parties (Tech Dirt, 2016). 
This is not just insulting, but counterproductive. Plenty of experts 
have been trying their damnedest to have an "adult conversation" 
with Comey, explaining to him why he's wrong about the risks of 
"going dark," while others have -- in fairly great detail -- 
explained the serious dangers behind Comey's approach.  Comey's 
response to these efforts so far has been the equivalent of sticking 
his fingers in his ears and screaming "nah, nah, nah -- can't hear 
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you!" while repeating his "nerd harder" mantra (Tech Dirt, 2016).  
 
An "adult conversation" has to be one where someone in Comey's 
position is able to admit that maybe, just maybe, he's wrong. It's 
not one where he gets to keep demanding a new conversation until 
people tell him that night is day. Because that's just silly. This new 
claim about an "adult conversation" is also stupidly 
counterproductive. All it's going to do is make the actual 
experts here -- like the authors of that MIT paper on the dangers of 
backdoor -- dig in and have absolutely no interest in dealing with 
Comey. How could you when he so flippantly brushes off all the 
work they've done already? (Tech Dirt, 2016). 
The response to Comey’s words demonstrates the difficulty in even establishing a 
dialogue when enmity is strong and historical grievances are still raw. Comey’s 
‘adult conversation’ never happened because he was sacked by Donald Trump for 
unrelated reasons, but it is difficult to see how he could have achieved any degree 
of success given his reputation within the DRC. 
Hilary Clinton’s Manhattan Project 
In the run-up to the 2016 US Presidential elections, Hillary Clinton laid out her 
digital policy saying that she rejected the false choice between privacy and security 
and wanted to work with technology companies to protect them both (Clinton, 
2016). During a debate, she announced that she wanted to launch a Manhattan-
like project to bring the government and tech community together and solve the 
CSD (Clinton, 2015). 
I would hope that, given the extraordinary capacities that the tech 
community has and the legitimate needs and questions from law 
enforcement, that there could be a Manhattan-like project, 
something that would bring the government and the tech 
communities together to see they're not adversaries, they've got 
to be partners…  I just think there's got to be a way, and I would 
hope that our tech companies would work with government to 
figure that out (Clinton, 2015). 
The similarities between Clinton’s policies and Apple’s position were noted by 
several news outlets. Kif Leswing, for Business Insider, claimed that Clinton and 
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Apple were in lockstep and noted how ‘remarkable’ it is that ‘Clinton’s position 
mirror’s Apple’s public statements (Leswing, 2016). Daniel Dilger, writing for Apple 
Insider, claimed that her policies ‘read as if they were ghost written by [Tim] Cook 
for Apple's ideal America’ (Dilger, 2016). Apple themselves appreciated Clinton’s 
policies and, in leaked emails between Apple’s Vice President, Lisa Jackson, and the 
chairman of Clinton’s presidential campaign, John Podesta, Jackson thanked Clinton 
‘for the principled and nuanced stance the Secretary took last night on encryption 
and the tech sector’ (Jackson, 2015). Further emails revealed the close relationship 
between Clinton and Apple after Podesta said that he was ‘looking forward to 
working [with Apple] to elect the first woman President of the United States’ and 
Jackson replied that she would do whatever she could to help before later 
promising to play a more public role in Clinton’s campaign (Jackson, 2015; Podesta, 
2016). In August 2016 Jackson and Tim Cook jointly held a fundraiser to support 
Clinton’s presidential bid. 
Despite Clinton’s conciliatory tone and close alignment with Apple, her comments 
were still rejected by many within the DRC, who suggested that she was attempting 
to create a backdoor into encryption or even to break it (Laguna, 2015). Edward 
Snowden claimed that Clinton had ‘just terrified everyone with an internet 
connection’ and Marc Andreessen of Netscape mocked her comments as 
unrealistic facetiously claiming that ‘also we can create magical ponies who burp 
ice cream while we're at it’ (Snowden, 2015; Andreessen, 2015). 
The reaction to Clinton’s statements shows how difficult it is to even begin to 
debate the issue of encryption and surveillance because trust between the 
government and DRC is so low. The mere suggestion that government could work 
with technology companies to assist law enforcement is viewed by some of the DRC 
as an attempt to install a backdoor.  
Wilton Park and Ditchley Park Events 
Peace talks are often held in secret because it allows actors to express views that 
might not be publicly unacceptable, and meet the other side without accusations 
that they are dealing with the ‘enemy’. In the UK there have been several attempts 
to establish peace talks between the state and members of the DRC, including an 
event at Wilton Park on 6-7 October 2014, titled ‘Privacy and security in the digital 
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age: UK perspective30. The event was sponsored and run by GCHQ but run on 
neutral ground, and brought together MPs, industry, academics, think tanks and 
civil liberties organisations.  
The event was held in secret, so the outcomes were unclear, but it did lead to a 
follow-up event at Ditchley Park between 14-16 May 2015. This was more openly 
publicised; a list of attendees was released and a report on the findings was made 
available on the Ditchley Foundation website31.  The conference operated under 
Chatham House rules, meaning that participants could use the information they 
received but could not attribute comments to attendees.  These rules were 
established at Chatham House in 1927 to facilitate free discussion, but are now 
used worldwide to help individuals speak freely and express views that do not 
necessarily reflect those of the institution they serve. 
The Ditchley Park event brought together high-level leadership from the 
intelligence and security agencies, the government, technology companies, and the 
digital rights movement, including current and former directors of GCHQ, a 
member of the intelligence and security committee, an investigative journalist, 
security and privacy representatives from Google and Apple, and the former head 
of the Secret Intelligence Service (aka MI6), Sir John McLeod Scarlett. The stated 
aim of the conference was to consider ‘how the twin needs of security and privacy 
can be met in modern democracies, and the principles which should underpin the 
bargain between the State and the citizen in this area’ (Ditchley Park, 2015). 
 
The official report on the event indicates that participants made substantial 
progress. It was agreed that intelligence agencies should be more transparent and 
should push the boundaries of what could be revealed to show convincing evidence 
of what surveillance is for. It was also agreed that terms such as ‘national security’ 
should be defined more precisely. 
Investigative journalist and digital rights campaigner Duncan Campbell was the first 
to reveal the existence of GCHQ in 1976, and he has since spoken and written 
extensively about surveillance issues. After attending the Ditchley event, he wrote 
a blog about the experience in which he expressed his surprise at the fact that at 
the event ‘no-one argued against calls for greater openness’ arguing that this was 
                                                          
30 https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/event/privacy-and-security-in-the-digital-age-uk-
perspective-wp1352/ 
31 http://www.ditchley.co.uk/conferences/past-programme/2010-2019/2015/intelligence 
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‘a first; coming 40 years after a time when it was a crime in Britain even to mention 
the existence of GCHQ’ (Campbell, 2015; Campbell, 2015). Campbell also expressed 
surprise at ‘some unexpected and surprising comments from senior intelligence 
voices, including that "cold winds of transparency" had arrived and were here to 
stay‘ (Campbell, 2015). He highlighted other comments from security sources that 
surprised him, including opinions that ‘Snowden's actions were an inevitable and 
perhaps necessary counterbalance to admitted excesses of intelligence collection 
after 9/11’ and that ‘we [intelligence agencies] should have seen it coming in the 
first place, and so put more information in the public domain first’ (Campbell, 
2015). 
Campbell claimed that ‘away from the foetid heat of political posturing and populist 
headlines’, the participants could speak more openly, suggesting that ‘you don't get 
nuanced thoughts like that on Fox News or in Britain's Daily Mail’ (Campbell, 2015). 
He also commented on the lack of ‘rhetoric’ and polarised debate over the 
villainous or heroic nature of Edward Snowden, adding that the conference 
conclusions would focus on developing future principles rather than focussing on 
allegations of harm (Campbell, 2015). 
Campbell’s surprise at some of the comments by intelligence officials demonstrates 
the ‘other minds’ problem of the CSD, and the Butterfieldian difficulty in putting 
yourself in the other person’s counter fear. It is interesting that, despite years of 
campaigning on surveillance issues, Campbell only heard the real views of 
surveillance practitioners once a safe environment had been created that 
promoted honest and open discussion. The Ditchley event demonstrates how 
carefully managed peace talks can potentially help to break down 
misunderstandings and mistrust. Campbell finished his blog with the phrase ‘we are 
not in Kansas anymore’, suggesting that he believed the conference to have moved 
the debate into unchartered waters (Campbell, 2015). 
The official report into the conference also took an upbeat tone, claiming that there 
was optimism that ‘satisfactory arrangements could be found between the 
agencies and the companies, despite recent arguments following the Snowden 
revelations’ (Holmes, 2015). But some reporting on the event demonstrated why it 
could be so difficult for the government to engage in such discussions. In a highly 
misleading article, titled ‘Snowden leak: governments' hostile reaction fuelled 
public's distrust of spies’, the Guardian newspaper, who did not attend, claimed 
that the conference had concluded that ‘the hostile reaction of the British and US 
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governments to the Snowden disclosures of mass surveillance only served to 
heighten public suspicion of the work of the intelligence agencies’ (Travis, 2015). In 
fact, the official summary of the event concluded that it was the government’s 
policy to release as little information as possible, but the allegation that this policy 
had increased suspicion, and hostility was never mentioned by anyone in 
attendance (Holmes, 2015). 
Such reporting highlights why frank and open discussion is so difficult and, whilst 
there is an irony in the notion that discussions about greater transparency are best 
held in secret, the Ditchley event appears to show the benefits of such an initiative. 
Whilst the secretive nature of the event precludes a thorough analysis, the 
positivity of representatives from the state and DRC indicates that the event was a 
success and appears to have helped to build bridges between the government, 
technology companies and privacy advocates. Whilst it did not lead to tangible new 
policies, it did demonstrate that, in the right environment, with the right people, 
old enmities can be overcome and progress on the CSD can be made. 
Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism 
Another initiative to encourage dialogue is the Global Internet Forum to Counter 
Terrorism (GIFCT) which was established in June 2017 to help technology 
companies coordinate their efforts to make ‘consumer services hostile to terrorists 
and violent extremists’ (Facebook, 2017). It includes representatives from 
Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube, and has a ‘mission is to substantially 
disrupt terrorists’ ability to use the internet in furthering their causes, while also 
respecting human rights’ by collaborating with civil society and government (Global 
Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, 2017). 
We believe that the best approach to tackling online terrorism is to 
collaborate with each other and with others outside the private 
sector, including civil society and government (Global Internet 
Forum to Counter Terrorism, 2017). 
The forum held its first workshop on 1st Aug 2017 and included representatives 
from more than two dozen technology companies and NGOs, as well as a range of 
state representatives, including the British Home Secretary, Amber Rudd. 
Statements from the forum demonstrated an acute awareness of the government’s 
concerns over the use of technology by terrorists and stated a clear determination 
to deal with the problem. 
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Comments made by Amber Rudd before the first forum, where she appeared to 
threaten technology companies and imply that ‘real people’ did not need 
encryption (see Section 6.3.3), meant that the forum did not get off to a good start. 
These remarks struck at the heart of sensitivities over encryption and set a tone of 
confrontation rather than collaboration. They also make it more difficult for 
technology companies to collaborate with the government without being accused 
of succumbing to government demands to undermine encryption. However, the 
GIFCT still has the potential to help create a much better relationship between the 
government and technology companies by focussing on common interests, such as 
the removal of terrorist content from social networks.  
Reframing the debate 
One of the major difficulties associated with the CSD is the way it is framed by 
different actors. It is framed as good versus evil, security versus privacy, security 
versus insecurity or the people versus the government, but these framings are 
simplistic representations of an issue that is extremely complex. 
Frames are useful as cognitive shortcuts that help make sense of complex 
information but, when using frames, we discount potentially important information 
and filter our perceptions through a lens. According to Shmueli, Elliott and 
Kaufman, the divergence of frames between two different parties plays a significant 
role in conflict (Shmueli, et al., 2006).    
Disputants differ not only in interests, beliefs, and values but also 
in how they perceive the situation at the conscious and 
preconscious levels. These differences engender divergent 
interpretations of events, paint parties into negative characters, 
yield mutually incompatible issues, and focus attention on specific 
outcomes that impede exploration of alternatives (Shmueli, et al., 
2006, p. 209). 
This framing applies to public reaction to the CSD, as Jim Killock of ORG explains. 
A lot of the public reaction is based upon the way they see the 
framing of these things so with surveillance either you can see it as 
a vital security measure and you’re operating in the frame of 
terrorist threats and the threat to national security …if you are 
operating on the level of intrusion into people’s personal privacy 
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and the legitimacy of doing that without genuine suspicion then 
you get a different reaction from people (Killock, 2016). 
As this framing becomes embedded within the thinking of the state and the DRC, it 
can make it far more difficult to achieve compromise as each side thinks that they 
are right and should not compromise (Shmueli, et al., 2006). 
As conflicts become intractable, frame differences often 
exacerbate communication difficulties, polarize parties, and 
escalate strife. In turn, polarization is reflected in the parties’ 
frames, feeding stakeholders’ sense that they are in the right and 
should not compromise. Divergent frames are self-reinforcing 
because they filter parties’ subsequent information intake and 
color interpretation (Shmueli, et al., 2006, p. 209). 
In the CSD, encryption is framed as a universal good so, for the DRC, any policy that 
might compromise any implementation of it to any degree should be defeated, 
whereas, for the state, access to information is deemed essential to national 
security so any technologies that prevent this must be opposed or circumvented. 
However, according to Shmueli et al, interventions to reframe an issue can help to 
improve its tractability. De-escalatory processes that seek to reduce escalatory 
cycles, perspective-taking processes that seek to help disputants understand the 
views of the other, and identification of commonalities that seek to find common 
ground, can all help to reframe seemingly intractable conflicts. 
Whilst reframing is difficult, there have been some attempts to reframe the CSD 
and help break the current cycle of insecurity. 
Encryption Substitutes 
The issue of encryption sits at the heart of the CSD because it is framed very 
differently by the state and DRC. Members of the DRC tends to believe that any 
tampering with any implementation of encryption represents a backdoor that 
makes everyone insecure, whilst the government frequently highlights how 
particular implementations of encryption can threaten national security (Hogan-
Howe, 2014; Cook, 2016). The problem seems intractable, but Andrew Kean Woods 
of the Hoover Institute has sought to reframe the debate away from encryption and 
focus instead on what each side really wants.  
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Law enforcement officials are, in general, agnostic about the 
method through which they obtain evidence—what matters is 
obtaining it. Privacy-seekers are similarly agnostic about how they 
secure their privacy—what matters is having it. This means that 
policymakers have a wide set of options—not only about whether 
to allow law enforcement to access personal data, but also how to 
do so. This wide set of options is not reflected in the debate over 
encryption, which is typically framed in all-or nothing terms. 
Widening the scope of the policy discussion to include related 
issues—what I will call “encryption substitutes”—may increase the 
chances of compromise and may generate better policy (Woods, 
2016, p. 1). 
To reframe the issue away from encryption, Woods suggests a range of ‘Encryption 
Substitutes’ that could provide security to both law enforcement and the DRC. For 
law enforcement, he argues that equipment interference, metadata and 
unencrypted market-driven data can all provide the information that law 
enforcement needs without breaking encryption. For the DRC, Woods suggests that 
judicial substitutes such as blocking statutes, and technological substitutes such as 
anonymization tools, can be used to provide privacy without the use of encryption. 
Wood’s proposals are not so much useful for their practical insights but more for 
their attempt to reframe the debate away from the tricky issue of encryption. 
Cryptopolitik 
Daniel Moore and Thomas Rid also attempt to address the contentious issue of 
encryption, calling for a less idealistic approach to the issue, which they call 
Cryptopolitik (Moore & Rid, 2016).  
Encryption is too important to be left to true believers. The future 
design of crypto systems should be informed by hard-nosed 
political and technical considerations. A principled, yet realistic, 
assessment of encryption and technology more broadly is needed, 
informed by empirical facts, by actual user behaviour and by 
shrewd statecraft – not by cypherpunk cults, an ideology of 
technical purity and dreams of artificial utopias. Pragmatism in 
political decision-making has long been known as realpolitik. Too 
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often, technology policy has been the exception. It is high time for 
cryptopolitik (Moore & Rid, 2016, p. 30). 
Whilst acknowledging the complexity of the problem, Moore and Rid suggest 
examples of compromises that could be made by each side.  Attempts to 
‘systematically undermine end-to-end encryption’ should be a ‘political no-go area’ 
as they would backfire but, equally, crypto-utopias such as Tor should restrict their 
offerings to rid the services of their most illicit uses and protect the reputation of 
encryption (Moore & Rid, 2016, p. 31). Rid and Moore suggest that instead of 
focussing on technical issues or utopian dreams, we should first focus on deciding 
what we want as a society before then designing software to achieve it. They 
suggest that attention should be focussed away from banning or promoting better 
encryption, and challenge software engineers to consider whether they can design 
platforms that improve anonymity, authentication and availability, but do not 
incentivise illiberal and illegal behaviour. 
Rid and Moore attempt to reframe encryption as a tool of policy-making rather than 
a master of it and, in doing so, they hope to remove the heat from the encryption 
debate and move towards a more pragmatic approach to the CSD. The challenge is 
to convince two sides who are deeply wedded to their views on encryption that 
they can improve their own security if they change their focus.  
Other Attempts to Reframe 
Other authors have also suggested that this debate around privacy and security 
needs reframing. Paul Ohm suggests that both ‘parties have spent most of the 
debate fighting their battles in the trenches, butting heads over picayune specific 
details in statutory text that rarely, by themselves, impact safety or privacy’ (Ohm, 
2004, p. 1599). He suggests reframing the debate one level up. ‘Can we develop 
sound procedures or prophylactic measures to ensure privacy and security, even if 
we cannot agree today on the specific substantive form that our Internet 
surveillance laws should take?’ (Ohm, 2004, p. 1599). Sergei Boeke also notes that 
whilst ‘the debate on government surveillance programs is frequently 
characterised by the apparently absolute dichotomy of security versus privacy … 
basic concepts such as privacy and surveillance elude precise definition’ (Boeke, 
2017, p. 307). By breaking down issues into domestic/foreign, 
upstream/downstream, targeted/bulk, metadata/content, Boeke claims that a 
better understanding about the nuanced nature of surveillance can be reached, 
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which would inform a better debate. Quin DuPont criticises the domination of the 
debate by ‘cyberlibertarians on one side and law and order proponents on the 
other’ and suggests that the solution is to reject the extremes on either side 
(DuPont, 2015). 
 there's a desperate need to reframe the debate around encryption 
– and that starts with rejecting advocacy for pervasive and 
ubiquitous cryptography as well as the overreaching state 
demands for wholesale surveillance. Instead, solutions should 
leverage strong democratic controls and collective decision-
making (DuPont, 2015). 
6.3 CAN SECURITY DILEMMAS BE OVERCOME? 
The examples highlight the difficulties faced by those attempting to resolve the 
CSD. Unilateral attempts to improve security for one side often fail because they 
exacerbate the security concerns of the other, provoking a reaction that leads to 
grater insecurity for both. And more collaborative approaches have also proven 
difficult as a lack of trust, historic enmity and an inability to appreciate the concerns 
of the other act as impediments to co-operation. 
Authors such as John Mearsheimer would take this as evidence for the fatalistic 
view that security dilemmas can never be overcome. Mearsheimer argues that 
because national security matters are a question of state survival, uncertainty over 
the intentions of another state must lead to the assumption that they are a threat 
and should be deterred militarily. Within his theory of offensive realism, 
Mearsheimer suggests that the nature of the anarchic international system is 
responsible for aggressive state behaviour in international politics (Mearsheimer, 
2001; Toft, 2005). His concept of offensive realism is based on the assumptions that 
states can never be certain of the intentions of other states, they value their 
survival as their primary goal, and they behave as rational actors. Whilst the 
fatalistic approach simply extends the security dilemma to its logical conclusion, it 
is based upon the assumption that states will always feel insecure if they do not 
possess complete knowledge of the intentions of the other, and that this insecurity 
will always lead to conflict.  
Others suggest that the security dilemma is not absolute and can be mitigated in a 
variety of ways. One method is to address the offence-defence balance problem by 
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implementing pacts such as arms control agreements that make it easier to defend 
than attack.  Another is to address the offence/defence differentiation problem by 
using methods such as mutual weapons inspections to ease doubts over the other’s 
military power (Jervis, 1978). These strategies address what Charles Glaser 
describes as the general condition of uncertainty that exists at the heart of the 
security dilemma. States that are better informed of each other’s intentions are 
more likely to realise the defensive nature of the other’s activities (Glaser, 1997). 
As ORG Director, Jim Killock explains, public debate might be one way in which the 
CSD can be mitigated. 
You can never know what the sinister motivations [of the state] 
might be because those motivations exist in the heads of people, 
not necessarily in policy documents. But public debates clear the 
air of those suspicions to a greater or lesser extent and flushes out 
those concerns that are not legitimate and allows them to be 
properly contested, whereas if you don’t do that you either 
produce a suspicion of those nefarious motivations or you indeed 
allow them to flourish because they are not being properly 
challenged (Killock, 2016). 
Whilst this mitigation approach may help to avert the most tragic consequences of 
the security dilemma, the structural problems of uncertainty and fear are only 
lessened rather than resolved. Transcendence is an alternative, constructivist 
approach, more aligned with securitisation theory itself and closely aligned to the 
de-securitising concept of re-articulation. It attempts to solve the issue of fear and 
uncertainty by completely reframing the problem. 
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett apply Karl Deutsch’s concept of security 
communities to the security dilemma to change the game from one of competing 
security concerns to one of mutual security interests. Deutsch describes the 
existence of pluralistic security communities, where states become integrated to 
the point that they gain a sense of community, which in turn creates the assurance 
that they will settle their differences short of war (Deutsch, 1957). Adler and 
Barnett argue that whilst individual states cannot escape the security dilemma 
alone, together they can transcend it by eliminating the fear on which it is based. 
Security communities do not need to be designed from the top down but emerge 
once states recognise that seeking co-operation on security or economic issues can 
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have mutual benefit (Adler & Barnett, 2009). This interaction can open space for 
the establishment of norms and states can start to look at issues collectively rather 
than in isolation. States then begin to view each other as security partners as fear 
and uncertainty subside. Alliances such as NATO, concepts such as the West, and 
political unions such as the UK and the EU can be considered security communities, 
which have transcended fear and uncertainty32. These communities are particularly 
effective in the face of a common enemy, such as the Warsaw Pact to NATO, but 
this is not essential to their success. The spectre of war and mutual annihilation, 
and the development of a mutual sense of identity, can help to facilitate the 
creation of security communities without the need for an external threat. 
6.4 HOW TO SOLVE THE CYBER SECURITY DILEMMA 
If transcendence can be achieved then security competition will be turned into 
security co-operation, but this first requires the creation of an environment of 
mutual understanding, trust and co-operation. Whilst this may be difficult to 
achieve after years of enmity, the following guiding principles can help to shape an 
environment within which the CSD can be overcome; 
• Shared values and Identities; 
• Future Certainty; 
• Positive Signalling and Symbolism; 
• Ideological Flexibility; 
• Security Dilemma Sensibility; 
• Good Interpersonal Relationships; 
• Trust; 
• Transparency. 
These guiding principles will be discussed in the following section; 
6.4.1 Shared Values and Identities 
Rational Egoism is the believe that actors will always take actions that seek to 
maximise their own self-interest. It often forms the basis for negotiations, but as 
Booth and Wheeler explain, ‘co-operation cannot survive, and indeed flourish, if it 
is based on no more than rational egoism’ (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, p. 131). Jervis 
                                                          
32 Whilst many consider the UK’s vote to leave the European Union in 2016 to be borne from 
fear and uncertainty, EU countries are still largely considered to be security allies with each 
other and the UK. 
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expands on this idea explaining that for co-operation to last, shared values and 
identification with the other must also be a priority. 
In part because of the tendency for people to be self-righteous and 
to see their own acts as cooperative and those of others as hostile, 
temptations and fears may produce mutually undesired outcomes 
as long as narrow self-interest is dominant. At a minimum, the 
feeling that one is morally obligated to reciprocate cooperation—
and that others live under the same code—permits a wider range 
and scope for mutually beneficial exchanges. In fact, the actors may 
gain most when they do not regard the interaction as one of self-
interested exchange at all. Even if this extreme is not approached 
(and it is not likely to be in international politics), without the 
power of at least some shared values, without some identification 
with the other, without norms that carry moral force, cooperation 
may be difficult to sustain (Jervis, 1988, p. 348). 
The Investigatory Powers Act (IPA) can be viewed as having been based upon a 
rational egoist approach, rather than one of shared values and identifies. The 
Investigatory Powers Commission considered 830 pages (once transcribed) of oral 
evidence and 1532 pages of written evidence, which were submitted by lawyers, 
academics, intelligence officials, digital rights organisations, technical experts and 
industry bodies (HM Government, 2016; HM Government, 2016). It was also 
supported by three reviews into investigatory powers provided by the Royal United 
Services Institute, David Anderson QC and the Intelligence and Security Committee 
(ISC) (Anderson, 2015; Intelligence and Security Committee, 2013; Royal United 
Services Institute, 2015).  A draft bill was published in November 2015 and, after 
scrutiny by the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, the 
Intelligence and Security Committee, the Joint Committee of both Houses of 
Parliament and the aforementioned organisations, the final bill was submitted to 
parliament a year later in November 2016. 
The government claims that the final act took into consideration the concerns and 
requests of all contributors and in response delivered a ‘much clearer’ bill with 
‘clearer and stronger privacy safeguards’ and ‘additional protection for journalists’ 
(HM Government, 2017). Technically the bill appears to have satisfied the 
requirements of all sides; it provides the intelligence agencies with more powers 
than they previously had, it makes these powers clearer, and it creates far greater 
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privacy controls and oversight and accountability mechanisms. Yet as a solution to 
the CSD, it cannot be considered a success because fear and uncertainty on each 
side are undiminished. As previously highlighted, ORG director Jim Killock called the 
act ‘one of the most extreme surveillance laws ever passed in a democracy’ and a 
petition to repeal the Act received 212,000 signatures (Killock, 2016; Killock, 2017).  
Only a few months after the IPA was enacted, the Home Secretary Amber Rudd and 
the DRC were once again in conflict in the wake of reports that the Westminster 
terrorist Khalid Masood had used the encrypted messaging platform WhatsApp to 
communicate just before the attack. 
This consultative and rational egoist approach to the IPA succeeded in 
incorporating the requirements of a large range of actors, but did nothing to 
identify and develop shared values and identities. As a result, the state and the DRC 
do not identify with each other or consider their security interests to be mutually 
compatible, and this has resulted in a continuing state of conflict. 
6.4.2 Future Certainty 
Even if fear and uncertainty can be overcome in the present, this may not be 
enough to resolve the security dilemma. Whilst a state may be considered a current 
ally, fears over the stability of the alliance, the potential for a change of government 
or a future break-down in trust means that the status quo cannot be relied upon to 
last forever. Whilst defenders of state surveillance argue that the people and 
agencies who practice it are benign and ethical, others fear that the very existence 
of surveillance technology is a threat because at a future date a less benign force 
may use it to subjugate the population. In 2015, the ORG raised concerns about 
data sharing between US and UK intelligence agencies, fearing that this could pose 
a significant risk if this relationship broke down. 
We are increasingly dependent on the US for the NSA’s technology 
and data. This could mean it is difficult to separate our own 
strategic interests from those of the US… If there were a crisis in 
the relationship between the UK and the US, what risks would our 
shared intelligence arrangements pose? (Open Rights Group, 
2015). 
In his first interview after exiling himself to Hong Kong, Edward Snowden made a 
similar point, warning of a potential future where a new leader exploits the NSA’s 
surveillance machinery to support a tyrannical regime. 
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Eventually, there will be a time when policies will change, because 
the only thing that restricts the activities of the surveillance state 
is policy… a new leader will be elected, they'll flip the switch, say 
that because of the crisis, because of the dangers that we face in 
the world--some new and unpredicted threat-- we need more 
authority, we need more power. And there will be nothing the 
people can do at that point to oppose it and it will be turnkey 
tyranny (Snowden, 2013).  
Three years later, Snowden’s warnings were revisited after it emerged that Donald 
Trump could be elected President of the US. This fear was exacerbated when Trump 
responded to allegations of Russian hacking by saying ‘I wish I had that power, man 
that would be power’ (Trump, 2016). When Trump was elected on 8th November 
2016, Nick Merrill, the executive of the Calyx Institute and an advocate for 
encryption, suggested that trust in Obama had led to complacency over 
surveillance powers.  
There have been some people who were complacent about things 
like drone killing of US civilians and mass surveillance under 
Obama, because they trusted him. That wilful neglect on their part 
is about to come back and possibly bite all of us in the ass (Merrill, 
2016). 
Ben Wizner of the American Civil Liberties Union and lawyer for Edward Snowden, 
also suggested that trust in the executive had been misplaced. 
The danger of the aggregation of executive power we have seen 
over the last decade is that we might have an executive who is not 
worthy of that trust. This has been a trend in the US but there has 
been a weakening of constitutional oversight during the growth of 
the national security state (Wizner, 2016). 
Former NSA whistle-blower Thomas Drake also warned that Trump would abuse 
the surveillance powers he had available to him. 
The electronic infrastructure is fully in place – and ex post facto 
legalised by Congress and executive orders – and ripe for further 
abuse under an autocratic, power-obsessed president. History is 
just not kind here. Trump leans quite autocratic. The temptations 
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to use secret NSA surveillance powers, some still not fully revealed, 
will present themselves to him as sirens (Drake, 2016). 
In the UK, Trump’s election was also used as evidence by the DRC that their fears 
were well-founded. ORG director, Jim Killock, tweeted shortly after his election that 
‘Donald Trump has effective control of GCHQ’s technology and full access to their 
data collection’ (Killock, 2016). 
Given that the agencies’ operations are nearly indistinguishable, it 
makes it incredibly hard for the UK to resist using our resources for 
risky endeavours or even human rights abuses … Trump’s election 
ought to remove the complacency MPs have been suffering from 
(Killock, 2016). 
For members of the DRC to trust state intelligence agencies, they are likely to 
require legislation and bureaucratic structures that guarantee future 
administrations will not exploit them for malicious purposes. 
State actors are also concerned about the future and in particular the prospect of 
a ‘dark’ future where the intelligence agencies can no longer access information 
online (Hogan-Howe, 2014). The rapid growth of cyberspace has also posed 
challenges for legislation, which the state fears can become obsolete shortly after 
being passed. The state has attempted to combat this problem in the IPB by future-
proofing its language and using generic terminology such as ‘Internet Connection 
Records’, ‘Technical Capability Notices’ and ‘Electronic Protection’, which Theresa 
May admitted were intentionally vague (May, 2016). The former head of MI5, Lord 
Evans, explained that ‘In the rapidly changing world of communications, the new 
Act gives as much ‘future proofing’ against technological change as we are likely to 
achieve’, but this future proofing is inevitably threatening to the DRC (Evans, 2016). 
Whilst the government has consistently denied that they wish to ban encryption, 
references in the IPA to ‘removing electronic protection’ have led many in the DRC 
to fear that that is exactly what they wish to achieve. 
To overcome the security dilemma, some resolution to both the current and future 
fears and uncertainties of both the state and the DRC must be achieved.  
6.4.3 Positive Signalling 
Weapons such as guns and knives carry ambiguous symbolism since they can be 
used to hunt and prepare food, as well as to attack others. Similarly, nuclear non-
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proliferation treaties are difficult to enforce because it is difficult to determine 
whether nuclear facilities are designed for civilian or military applications. But this 
ambiguity can be countered through better use of signalling to convey an actor’s 
intentions. Signing up to arms control agreements, demonstrating adherence to a 
defensive doctrine or withdrawing offensive weapons, may help to signal to 
another party that an actor’s intent is defensive in nature. Defensive signalling can 
cause an increase in overall security if it encourages the other side to do the same. 
An example occurred during nuclear tensions between India and Pakistan, when 
each side agreed to a state of non-deployed non-weaponization, where nuclear 
warheads were stored away from their delivery vehicles. This signalled to the other 
that the weapons existed for defensive and not offensive purposes (Ganguly & 
Hagerty, 2006). 
Within the CSD, the state’s intentions towards encryption provide a good example 
of ambiguous symbolism that serves to exacerbate the conflict. The DRC’s 
sensitivity towards any suggestion that encryption might be ‘banned’ or ‘weakened’ 
has previously been discussed, but the government’s actions often inflame these 
concerns, as demonstrated by Home Secretary Amber Rudd’s attempt to explain 
the government’s position on encryption (Rudd, 2017). 
To be very clear – Government supports strong encryption and has 
no intention of banning end-to-end encryption. But the inability to 
gain access to encrypted data in specific and targeted instances – 
even with a warrant signed by a Secretary of State and a senior 
judge – is right now severely limiting our agencies’ ability to stop 
terrorist attacks and bring criminals to justice. I know some will 
argue that it’s impossible to have both – that if a system is end-to-
end encrypted then it’s impossible ever to access the 
communication. That might be true in theory. But the reality is 
different... 
… Real people often prefer ease of use and a multitude of features 
to perfect, unbreakable security. So this is not about asking the 
companies to break encryption or create so called “back doors”. 
Who uses WhatsApp because it is end-to-end encrypted, rather 
than because it is an incredibly user-friendly and cheap way of 
staying in touch with friends and family? Companies are constantly 
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making trade-offs between security and “usability”, and it is here 
where our experts believe opportunities may lie (Rudd, 2017). 
Rudd claimed that she was being very clear, but her statement was extremely 
ambiguous. She suggested that the reality of end-to-end encryption was different 
to the theory, but she was not clear how that was the case. She hinted that an 
opportunity lay in the trade-off between security and usability, but did not say what 
that opportunity was. Rudd’s comments were interpreted in many ways, including 
that she wanted to ‘ban encryption’, that she thought that ‘ordinary people don’t 
care about security’, that she wanted technology companies to assist the police 
with hacking, and that she wanted companies to push out compromised apps with 
end-to-end encryption disabled (Open Rights Group, 2017). Jim Killock of the ORG 
said she had caused ‘immense confusion’ and Renate Samson of Big Brother watch 
claimed her comments were ‘at best naïve, at worst dangerous’ (Samson, 2017; 
Killock, 2017). 
Ambiguous signalling such as this leads to the worst-case scenario assumption that 
the government wants to ban encryption. Clearer signalling will be an essential part 
of any moves to solve the CSD. 
6.4.4 Ideological Flexibility 
Ideological fundamentalism occurs when policymakers bring biases to an 
encounter and assign an enemy status to others based on their political identity 
and what they are, rather than how they behave. Ralph White describes this as the 
‘diabolical enemy image’ and suggests that it is the major cause of war (White, 
1984). 
An exaggerated, literally diabolical image of another country—a 
country that is actually composed of human beings not so very 
different from the citizens of one’s own country—is in my 
judgment the very taproot of war in the present-day world (White, 
1984, p. 121). 
Examples of ideological fundamentalism include the US’ hostility towards Iranian 
and North Korean nuclear capabilities whilst it remains ambivalent towards Israeli 
and Indian capabilities, and the designation of the US as the ‘Great Satan’ by Iran. 
In these examples, the designation of the other as evil creates a lens through which 
their actions are viewed. For co-operation to improve, ideological fundamentalism 
such as this must be resisted.  
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security dilemma sensitivity can be significantly enhanced, and 
hence the prospects for co-operation improve, if leaders avoid 
ideological fundamentalism, characterised as it is in practice by 
stereotyping, crusading and black boxing (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, 
p. 165). 
A clear example of Ideological fundamentalism within the CSD is the ‘diabolical 
image’ of state surveillance practitioners that is constructed by many within the 
DRC. Chapter 2 discusses how the DRC uses dark and shadowy Orwellian language 
to construct the state as a threat, and common phrases such as ‘Snoopers’ Charter’ 
serve to denigrate legislation such as the IPA. The ORG describe how they use this 
language to resonate more with the public and gain support.  
…it’s an attempt to reclaim the language … which I think is often 
important when you have things like this a lot of the public reaction 
is based upon the way they see the framing of these things. 
Communications campaigning is about your language prevailing 
over theirs essentially; the question is, is your language and your 
explanation for certain phenomena, do they resonate more or less 
with the public? Do they believe your story more or less? And the 
language you use to explain those stories is a vital part of that 
(Killock, 2016). 
Constructing the state as a diabolical enemy may be a useful way to gain support 
for the cause of digital rights, but once the state has been constructed in this 
manner it becomes far more difficult to understand their real fears and uncertainty 
and move towards cooperation. 
As well as people, technology itself can be viewed in an ideologically fundamentalist 
manner. The DRCs consideration of all state attempts to gain access to data as 
backdoors, the institutionalisation of backdoors as inherently threatening, and 
opposition to anything that might be viewed as ‘weakening encryption’ are all 
examples that have been previously discussed (Cook, 2016; Schneier, 2016). The 
state’s view that there cannot be any ‘safe spaces’ for terrorists online, or any form 
of communication ‘that we cannot read’ can also be viewed in a similar manner 
(Cameron, 2015; May, 2017). 
The more each side entrenches into these seemingly incompatible ideologies, the 
more difficult it becomes to establish common ground and work towards mutually 
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acceptable solutions. To overcome the security dilemma, ideological 
fundamentalism must be replaced by ideological flexibility, which allows issues to 
be considered on their own merits, rather than through the lens of an established 
ideology. 
There is also something to say about the notion, often expressed by each side, that 
technology can be the solution. This is something that Egbert Schuurman calls 
technicism, ‘a fundamental attitude which seeks to control reality, to resolve all 
problems with the use of scientific-technological methods and tools’ (Schuurman, 
1997, p. 1). But, as Schuurman explains, ‘science and technology must not play a 
messianic role’ (Schuurman, 1997, p. 2). Whilst technical innovations may play their 
part in overcoming the CSD, they cannot be relied upon alone, and each side must 
realise the limitations on technology to solve all their problems. 
6.4.5 Security Dilemma Sensibility 
Booth and Wheeler use the term ‘security dilemma sensibility’ to describe the 
ability of an individual to understand the point of view of the other (Booth & 
Wheeler, 2008, p. 7). 
Security dilemma sensibility is an actor’s intention and capacity to 
perceive the motives behind, and to show responsiveness towards, 
the potential complexity of the military intentions of others. In 
particular, it refers to the ability to understand the role that fear 
might play in their attitudes and behaviour, including, crucially, the 
role that one’s own actions may play in provoking that fear (Booth 
& Wheeler, 2008, p. 7). 
The ability to appreciate the other’s point of view is essential to overcoming the 
security dilemma and has been the foundation of several historic peace initiatives. 
In 1977, Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat surprised many when he explained to an 
Egyptian magazine why Israeli’s lived in fear for their existence. 
They lived in ghettos fearing majority populations everywhere. 
They were exposed to many massacres and persecutions … Life 
itself is their problem. They are not threatened by a lack of food or 
housing. But they are threatened in merely maintaining an 
existence. That is why they have been truly terrified of the slogan 
“we will bury you in the sea” (Mangold, 1990, p. 63). 
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Following Sadat’s words, Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David Accords and later 
the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. Sadat’s ability to appreciate the fears of the other 
contrasts with others who are unable to understand how others might perceive 
them. When writing about Pakistan’s nuclear standoff with India, President 
Musharraf wrote in his memoirs that ‘India’s intentions were offensive and 
aggressive, ours were defensive’ (Musharraf, 2006). He failed to see the fear that 
drove India’s actions and this proved an impediment to lasting peace. 
Lack of security dilemma sensibility leaves each side frustrated with their inability 
to explain to the other why they feel threatened. For many within the DRC, this is 
best encapsulated by the phrase ‘if you have nothing to hide you have nothing to 
fear’, which has been used by defenders of surveillance to reassure those 
concerned with the practice that if they are innocent then they have nothing to 
worry about. It was initially successfully used by John Major in defence of a 
programme to vastly increase the installation of CCTV cameras around the country, 
and resulted in CCTV being widely viewed as a friendly eye in the sky rather than an 
Orwellian intrusion (Rosen, 2005). The phrase was also used by the Foreign 
Secretary William Hague in the immediate aftermath of the Snowden disclosures, 
and then repeated by Conservative MP Richard Graham when addressing the 
House of Commons on the draft Investigatory Powers Bill (The Independent, 2015). 
As Daniel Solove points out in his book, ‘Nothing to Hide’, the phrase resonates well 
with many members of the public who argue that as they have nothing to hide they 
are quite happy for the government to conduct surveillance, but for the DRC it is 
often associated with authoritarianism and is frequently linked to both Nazi 
Propagandist Joseph Goebbels and George Orwell’s 1984 (Solove, 2011). Negative 
reactions to the phrase are powerful and there are dozens of academic papers and 
online articles claiming to debunk it (Solove, 2011; American Civil Liberties Union, 
2013; Crossman, 2008; Freiwald, 2014). The ORG provides a thorough summary of 
arguments against the notion, including quotes from digital rights campaigners 
such as Edward Snowden, Bruce Schneier and Glenn Greenwald.  
The premise [is] that privacy is about hiding a wrong. It's not. 
Privacy is an inherent human right, and a requirement for 
maintaining the human condition with dignity and respect 
(Coustick-Deal, 2015).   
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For the state, the phrase may seem intuitive for they ‘know’ that they mean the 
public no harm, but the use of the phrase demonstrates a lack of sensitivity to the 
fears of the DRC and exacerbates the CSD. 
The difficulty the state faces in understanding the fears of the DRC is encapsulated 
by GCHQ analysts, who respond to allegations that they are conducting mass 
surveillance with the question ‘how can people actually think we live like this?’ 
(Fiona, 2016). From their perspective, intelligence professionals ‘know’ that they 
are acting in the public good, have no interest in reducing individual rights and 
‘know’ that they make considerable efforts to protect these rights. 
A similar issue from the state’s perspective relates to the so-called ‘Going Dark’ 
problem of surveillance. For state intelligence agencies, a major concern is that 
encryption and other security technologies are impeding investigations and, if not 
countered, the trend will lead to the breakdown of law and order. But many within 
the DRC describe this as a myth and reports such as ‘Don’t Panic’, which was written 
by several security and digital rights experts, claim to show how the future will 
provide more surveillance opportunities rather than less (Berkman Center, 2016). 
But, such claims show lack of sensitivity to the fears of the state, which is concerned 
over the inaccessibility of any particular form of communication rather than the 
overall volume of data available. This fear is repeated frequently by the state but 
ignored by the DRC. The following quotes are examined in Chapter 2 but it is worth 
revisiting them here to examine the language carefully. Cameron, Hogan-Howe and 
Rudd do not claim that the overall volume of information available to law 
enforcement is reducing but instead focus on their fear that particular areas of 
cyberspace are becoming inaccessible to the state. 
Do we want to allow a means of communication between two 
people, which even in extemis, with a signed warrant from the 
home secretary … that we cannot read? ...My answer to that 
question is no, we must not (Cameron, 2015). 
We cannot allow parts of the internet - or any communications 
platform - to become [a] dark and ungoverned space (Hogan-
Howe, 2014). 
We need to make sure that organisations like WhatsApp … don’t 
provide a secret place for terrorists to communicate with each 
other (Rudd, 2017). 
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The lack of security dilemma sensibility on both sides of the conflict serves to 
exacerbate the CSD and impede efforts towards a resolution. 
6.4.6 Good Interpersonal Relationships 
The success of co-operation is dependent on the personalities of those involved and 
the relationships between them, and this depends on the willingness and ability of 
leaders to rise above their preconceptions and engage with the other’s counter 
fear. The relationship between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev is a good 
example of a personal relationship between leaders that helped to overcome the 
security dilemma by establishing friendship and trust but, as King Hussein of Jordan 
explains, for peace to fully take hold it is the people who must learn to understand 
and trust each other.  
It is the tearing down of barriers between people. It is the coming 
together, coming to know one another. It is the children of martyrs 
on both sides embracing … it is people getting together and doing 
business. Real peace is not between governments but between 
individuals who discover that they have the same worries, the 
same concerns, that they have suffered in the same way, and that 
there is something they can both put into creating a relationship 
that would benefit all of them (Shlaim, 2007, p. 544). 
Interviews with GCHQ staff revealed a common lament that if only people could get 
to know them they would realise that they’re well-intentioned, but the secrecy that 
surrounds surveillance practitioners makes this difficult to achieve. When the 
opportunity has arisen, it has been difficult to get GCHQ staff to engage with the 
DRC because they do not want to be ‘in the firing line’ (Fiona, 2016). To overcome 
the CSD both sides must be willing to reach out, engage with the other and establish 
good interpersonal relationships. Chapter 7 explores this idea further in the context 
of Hunted and the exposure that former state intelligence actors experience whilst 
participating in the show. 
6.4.7 Trust 
Booth and Wheeler consider trust to exist on a spectrum between functional co-
operation and interpersonal bonding (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, p. 229). Functional 
cooperation describes our trust in a chef not to poison our food, despite us not 
having met them, because we judge that this is not in their interests. At the other 
end of the spectrum, interpersonal bonding is the trust an individual has in the 
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people they know. Trust is a strategy for dealing with uncertainty, which can lead 
to what social psychologists term the ‘trust dilemma’, where wrongful mistrust can 
lead to missed opportunities, but misplaced trust can lead to the risk of being taken 
advantage of (Kramer, 2001). The ‘trust dilemma’ lies at the heart of the security 
dilemma’s dilemma of interpretation, as it is only through trust that a positive 
interpretation of the other’s activities can be made. 
6.4.7.1 Trust Attributes 
To escape this dilemma, we must begin to trust others whilst convincing them to 
trust us. Booth and Wheeler propose four linked pairs of attributes of trust that 
they argue are central to its existence. 
Leap in the dark/uncertainty 
All relationships begin in a condition of uncertainty and to develop trust, one party 
must take a ‘leap in the dark’, trusting the actions of another when the 
consequences are uncertain. This is a high-risk high-reward strategy that could lead 
to devastating consequences if the trust is misplaced, but could equally help to 
break the insecurity spiral if reciprocated by the other. 
Empathy / Bonding 
Empathy, according to Lauren Wispe, is the ‘self conscious effort to share and 
accurately comprehend the presumed consciousness of another person, including 
his thoughts, feelings and perceptions as well as their causes’ (Wispe, 1968, p. 441). 
Empathy allows an actor to understand the fears of their adversary, which helps to 
establish trust and facilitates cooperation. Karin Fierke argues that processes that 
build mutual empathy can create environments in which each side can 
‘acknowledge how the acts of the other have been conditioned by their own 
experience of suffering’, and ‘analytic empathy’ can help each side acknowledge 
how they have contributed to this suffering (Fierke, 2005, p. 148). As former UN 
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold put it: 
You can only hope to find a lasting solution to a conflict if you have 
learned to see the other objectively, but, at the same time, to 
experience his difficulties subjectively (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, p. 
237). 
To achieve this, individuals must ‘hold in suspension two interpretations of the 
same facts, the other fellow’s and one’s own’ (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, p. 237). 
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Bonding can follow from empathy and can lead to longstanding and robust 
relationships once a personal or political relationship has developed and a new 
collective identity has been formed. 
To reach such a state between members of the DRC and the British state will require 
a slow establishment of relationships, a mutual expression of fears and concerns, 
an acknowledgement by the state of how the concept of surveillance threatens the 
DRC and an acknowledge by the DRC of how their actions affect the state’s ability 
to investigate and prevent threats. This also requires the establishment of personal 
relationships, which can be achieved by shared events such as those held at Wilton 
Park and Ditchley Park. 
Dependence/ Vulnerability 
As Hoffman explains ‘trust refers to an actor’s willingness to place something 
valued under another actor’s control’ so to trust is to risk betrayal. (Hoffman, 2002, 
p. 394). To trust, actors must accept their vulnerability to betrayal if the trust placed 
in the other is misplaced. To move towards resolving the security dilemma each 
actor must accept that they are vulnerable to harm from another, but trust that this 
power will not be abused. 
Currently, Edward Snowden and many within the DRC do not take the view that 
they should place their data and their privacy under the control (or even reach) of 
governments and intelligence agencies. As Snowden puts it, we should ‘speak no 
more of faith in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of 
cryptography’ (2014, p. 24). In other words, we should place out trust in 
cryptography and not the state. But after around half a century of the Crypto Wars 
and half a decade since Snowden’s disclosures, the DRC have been proven 
incapable of using cryptography to completely prevent state surveillance. As 
members of the DRC readily admit, regulation, hacking, subversion, court orders, 
backdoors and other means have allowed the state to continue surveillance 
practices regardless of advancements in technology. The state may be restricted 
but it is by no means shackled. Despite what some would like to believe there is no 
technological silver bullet to help win the Crypto Wars for either the state or the 
DRC. Applying the work of Booth, Wheeler and Hoffman to the problem indicates 
that for the DRC to really feel safe, they must accept that they are vulnerable to 
harm from the state, but trust that this power will not be abused. The plea to ‘trust 
us’ is frequently rejected out of hand by the DRC but if the state can start to 
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demonstrate its trustworthiness by being more accountable, transparent and 
accessible then perhaps, over time, the DRC will become more willing to accept a 
certain level of vulnerability. 
Integrity/reliability 
If actors behave with integrity and act in a reliable and predictable fashion, then 
feelings of mistrust and uncertainty can be overcome. If interactions between 
states are peaceful then ‘states can internalise positive images of one another, and 
come to expect friendly behaviour in the future. They can learn to trust one 
another’ (Shore, 1998, p. 334). 
Impediments to trust 
Misperceptions about the other, which are often driven by bias and prejudice, can 
make it difficult to establish trust between two parties. Both psychological and 
bureaucratic biases can impede trust and fuel the security dilemma. Attribution 
theory states that humans are motivated to assign causes to the actions and 
behaviours of both themselves and others, which can be subject to psychological 
biases (Kassin, et al., 2015). One example is the Actor/Observer difference, which 
posits that people attribute their own behaviour to situational factors whilst 
attributing others behaviour to dispositional factors. For example, a leader might 
consider their own military forces to be necessary due to a variety of internal and 
external pressures, whilst simultaneously interpreting another’s as evidence of 
hostile intent. Likewise, the DRC consider their own desire for privacy/secrecy to be 
necessary for their own security, due to hacking and an intrusive state, whilst 
simultaneously interpreting the state’s desire for secrecy as evidence of malintent. 
Mirroring this, the state considers its own desire for secrecy to be necessary for 
national security, due to terrorism, organised crime and hostile states, whilst 
simultaneously believing that only those with something to hide, should require 
privacy from the state. 
Whilst individuals are susceptible to psychological bias, bureaucratic bias from 
within states can also reduce trust and fuel the security dilemma. Militaries are 
inclined to exaggerate an adversary’s capabilities for a variety of reasons, including 
a desire for conflict, hostility and a safety-first approach to risk assessments. Glaser 
also suggests that powerful interest groups who could benefit from military 
competition or expansion might exaggerate an adversary’s capabilities or motives 
to advance their own interests. States are also inclined to create and re-enforce 
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myths about their own unthreatening nature, while in turn fantasising about the 
threat of others (Evera, 1998). 
Attempts to overcome the CSD will only be successful if built upon a foundation of 
trust but, after years of mutual suspicion, developing such trust is a long and 
difficult process. 
6.4.8 Transparency 
Stephen Van Evera describes secrecy as a ‘hydra-headed cause of war’ as it can 
result in actors under or overestimating each other, allows for surprise attack, 
raises the risk of preventative war, narrows the circle of experts consulted on policy, 
and prevents arms control agreements by making them harder to verify (Evera, 
1998, p. 11). Michael Colaresi argues that whilst transparency can resolve these 
issues, secrecy is essential for national security and this results in a ‘Secrecy 
Dilemma’ (Colaresi, 2014). 
How can the public be confident that foreign policy programs 
advocated by the executive will enhance security if that same 
leader has the power to selectively reveal and hide relevant 
information? The capacity to keep secrets is useful for security, but 
it can also be used for non-security ends. The same classification 
and counterintelligence powers that can hide security 
vulnerabilities and reduce threats to the public can also cover up 
executive incompetence and corruption or undercut legitimate 
domestic political opposition (Colaresi, 2014, p. 1). 
Whilst the issue of secrecy appears intractable, Colaresi suggests that ‘transparency 
cost deflation’ and oversight bodies can be used to mitigate the problem. National 
secrets tend to lose their value over time as capabilities become obsolete, sources 
no longer need protecting and enemies become allies. The details of the allied 
capability to decipher German Enigma codes is an obvious example of a national 
secret that was of huge value at the time, but no longer has a transparency cost 
associated with it. Therefore, the delayed release of secret information can provide 
some degree of accountability and oversight without significant transparency costs.  
Oversight institutions exist outside of the executive and have the powers to 
investigate abuses of state power whilst simultaneously protecting sensitive 
information. If they are considered to be more trustworthy than the institutions 
they are overseeing, then this can help to reassure the public by ensuring that 
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wrongdoing is exposed and wrongdoers are punished. Strong and trustworthy 
oversight institutions are essential to uncovering wrongdoing, but they can also 
benefit national security by bolstering public support in times of crisis. 
Retrospective oversight institutions should lead to greater public 
support during international crises. Because there is a greater 
probability of abuse being revealed, ex post, with stronger 
oversight institutions, citizens have less reason to distrust that 
crisis actions are not in the public interest (Colaresi, 2014, p. 11). 
As discussed, trust plays a huge role in the CSD. Mistrust in the state leads the DRC 
to consider its capabilities to be threatening and, when the state discusses issues 
such as encryption, this distrust leads the DRC to assume that the state wants to 
ban it. For the state, there may be bureaucratic biases that cause it to have 
exaggerated fear of threats such as ‘Going Dark’. 
Much of this trust is fuelled by the secrecy that surrounds the intelligence agencies. 
Edward Snowden claimed that ‘transparency’ was the goal of his disclosures and 
that he handed over NSA and GCHQ files to journalists because he trusted them 
rather than the government to determine what should remain secret and what 
should remain concealed (Snowden, 2013). Whilst GCHQ maintains that the secrecy 
surrounding surveillance is designed to protect national security, a leaked internal 
memo from a court briefing appeared to suggest that GCHQ wished to also use 
secrecy to avoid public debate and legal challenges (Guardian, 2013). 
Our main concern is that references to agency practices (i.e. the 
scale of interception and deletion) could lead to a damaging public 
debate which might lead to legal challenges against the current 
regime (Guardian, 2013). 
The state has attempted to address this issue within the IPA, which grants 
significant new authority to oversight organisations, including the new 
‘Investigatory Powers Commissioner’, who is charged with ensuring that the 
intelligence agencies act within the law. Since its inception in September 2017, The 
Office of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner (IPCO) has taken steps to build 
trust with the public by demonstrating its independence from the intelligence 
agencies. One example is a pinned Tweet on its Twitter feed which reads: ‘Watching 
the watchers … Since September 2017’. This applies phraseology normally 
associated with the DRC, such as in Spy Blog’s tagline ‘Watching Them, Watching 
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Us’, and helps to portray the IPCO as independent of the intelligence agencies, not 
subservient to them like the old Intelligence and Security Committee were often 
accused of being (Blog, n.d.; Investigatory Powers Commissioner's Office, 2017). 
Whilst the potential for the IPCO to help build trust is encouraging, less progress 
has been made on direct disclosure of information relating to GCHQ’s activities.  
The government’s policy on releasing state information has evolved over time from 
the 50-year rule set in 1958 to the 30-year rule set in 1967, and current efforts to 
reduce the period to 20 years, but exceptions can still be made for national security-
related documents. Without better disclosure, the DRC will tend to assume the 
worst of the intelligence services, who are themselves impeded from defending 
their own activities. After the Snowden disclosures, GCHQ was left frustrated 
because, in their own words, ‘someone else had told our story … but it was wrong’ 
(Fiona, 2016). They also commented that they had ‘one arm tied behind our back 
because we can’t talk about specific cases’ (Matt, 2016). Whilst transparency can 
harm national security, so too can secrecy if this results in reduced trust in the 
intelligence services and a consequent reduction in formal and moral support for 
their activities. Allowing GCHQ to discuss intelligence matters and release 
intelligence material to the public in a way that does not compromise national 
security could have a significant impact on the trust relationship between the state 
and the public. 
The use of transparency to de-escalate tensions was demonstrated in the BRIXMIS 
and SOXMIS exchange programmes, which were enacted during the Cold War. An 
agreement between the UK and the Soviet Union permitted military units from 
each country to operate in the other’s zone of influence in Germany, allowing them 
to gather intelligence on the other side. The missions reassured each side that the 
other was not planning an imminent invasion and helped to de-escalate tensions. 
The Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty (SALT II) is another example from 
the Cold War. As part of the treaty, the US and the Soviet Union banned the use of 
encryption during certain types of weapons testing so that the other side could 
gather intelligence on the function and capability of the weapon  (Bureau of Arms 
Control, Verification and Compliance, 1979). Banning encryption provided 
transparency and reassured each side about the other’s capability, thus helping to 
de-escalate tensions. 
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6.5 CONCLUSION 
The Cyber Security Dilemma has endured for over forty years, yet seems no closer 
to resolution than it did in the early days of encryption export bans and mandatory 
hardware backdoors. The exponential growth of cyberspace and its importance to 
society has raised the issue from a niche dispute, presided over by academic experts 
and government intelligence agencies, to one that impacts on the lives of billions 
of people across the globe. Whilst concern over surveillance appeared to ebb in the 
2000’s following terror attacks in New York and London, the issue returned to the 
public agenda with a vengeance in 2013, following the Snowden disclosures. The 
importance of the debate has grown dramatically but the issues have not changed 
significantly. 
Competing securitisations, amplified by the media, have intensified the issue, which 
has become framed as binary, absolute and unresolvable. The key actors have 
become demonised, the language has become loaded with emotion, and each side 
has become firmly anchored to their own framing of the problem, making 
compromise and co-operation difficult. The difficulties in addressing issues of 
surveillance and encryption parallel those found in any global conflict and include 
long-standing enmity, lack of understanding, mistrust, insecurity, ambiguous 
symbolism, broken relationships, ideological fundamentalism and secrecy. As such, 
our experience of international relations might help point a way out of the CSD. By 
addressing trust, secrecy and the relationships between securitising actors, it might 
be possible to find creative ways to overcome the dilemma.  
Each side has attempted to win the Crypto Wars or gain the upper hand but, 
paradoxically, unilateral efforts to boost security have often resulted in greater 
insecurity. Technical solutions have been proposed but enmity, mistrust and 
entrenched positions have hampered their progress. 
Attempts to establish a dialogue have generally been unsuccessful due to the actors 
involved or the nature of the approach, but there has been some cause for 
optimism. The Ditchley Park event demonstrates that, away from the media and 
public spotlight, trust can be improved - a vital component of long-lasting peace. 
And there is a small but growing body of academics and other thinkers who are 
attempting to break the deadlock.  
Solutions to the CSD need to operate on several levels. They need to resolve the 
enmity and distrust at the heart of the dilemma, they need to reframe the debate 
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away from entrenched issues of encryption and backdoors towards a more 
pragmatic and less ideological approach, and they need to provide technical 
solutions that resolve the fears of both the state and the DRC. There are still huge 
impediments to security co-operation, but by adapting the principles that have 
been used to improve security between nations there is the potential to establish 
an environment of collaboration and mutual security interest between the state 
and the DRC. This may ultimately reduce fear and deliver greater security for all. 
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7 HUNTED CASE STUDY 
Chapters 1-5 describe how the DRC and the British state have securitised 
cyberspace, using technification, hypersecuritisation and everyday security 
practices. As each side has constructed the actions of the other as threatening, a 
CSD has emerged. Each side fears the actions of the other and takes their own 
action to counter this threat. This in turn appears threatening to the other, resulting 
in a spiral of insecurity and fear.  
Chapter 6 explores current efforts to overcome the CSD and why they have so far 
been unsuccessful. It then draws on security dilemma theories to examine several 
principles that can be used to help overcome the problem. This chapter considers 
three of these principles in more detail, using the reality television show, Hunted. 
Using interviews, ethnographic research and episodes of the show, this chapter 
explores the issues of security dilemma sensibility, good interpersonal relationships 
and transparency, and how they can be utilised to help overcome the CSD. These 
principles have been selected because they form the foundations for overcoming 
security dilemmas and are particularly difficult to address within the context of the 
conflict between digital rights and national security.  
7.1 HUNTED 
The Channel 4 television show Hunted provides an opportunity to further observe 
state intelligence actors in an environment mirroring that of a British intelligence 
agency and to observe public reaction to their activities. Within this reality crime 
show, members of the public (fugitives) attempt to avoid a team of state 
intelligence actors (hunters) for 28 days. The hunters are split between an 
intelligence headquarters (Hunted HQ) and operations on the ground and they 
utilise surveillance techniques to try to discover and apprehend the fugitives. The 
show is broadcast over six, one-hour episodes, which focus equally on the fugitives’ 
attempts to escape and the hunters’ attempts to catch them. Hunted is unique in 
its portrayal of state intelligence actors at work and supplements the information 
gathered through discourse analysis and interviews used throughout this thesis. 
The show is comprised of fugitives, hunters, production and TV Command, each of 
which plays a specific role. 
• Fugitives: Around 10 members of the public are selected by the production 
team to act as fugitives and spend up to 28 days on the run. They are 
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accompanied by a camera crew who are charged with recording the activities 
of the fugitives whilst remaining neutral to the hunt. 
• Hunters: Around 30 members of the public are recruited by the production 
team to act as hunters. Most of these have had prior experience in policing, the 
military or the intelligence community, although some were recruited after 
completing an MA in Intelligence and Security33. Cyber expertise is provided by 
a team from NCC Group. The hunters are charged with finding and capturing 
fugitives within 28 days, using the same powers that the police and intelligence 
agencies would utilise in real life. They are split between around 12 ground 
hunters, who interrogate the fugitive’s friends and family and follow up leads, 
and around 18 HQ hunters, who work in Hunted HQ and develop intelligence 
to find the fugitives. Hunted HQ is comprised of leadership, an analyst team, an 
information management team, a cyber team and an open source intelligence 
team. The hunters always wear microphones and camera crews record 
everything they do. 
• TV Command: TV Command is led by former Detective Chief Superintendent, 
Kevin O’Leary. It coordinates the show, ensuring that the powers of the state 
are replicated accurately and that information which could compromise 
national security is not exposed. 
• Production: The production team from Shine TV is responsible for recruiting 
the participants, producing and editing the show. They also liaise with the 
participants and attempt to address any concerns they have. 
Due to my prior experience working for the police and the Royal Air Force, I was 
able to take part in Hunted as the lead intelligence analyst within Hunted HQ.  
To a limited extent, Hunted acts as a proxy for observation of a real intelligence 
headquarters and provides some useful insight into the environment, practices and 
pressures experienced by state intelligence actors. This insight has been used 
throughout this thesis to help inform on the perspective and opinions of the state 
and the intelligence agencies. But despite significant efforts to replicate a real-
world operation, Hunted cannot replace observation of a real-world intelligence 
HQ. However, Hunted does offers something more unique and insightful. The 
presence of television cameras and the broadcasting of the show on national 
television creates an additional layer of complexity which provides an opportunity 
                                                          
33 These individuals took on more junior roles but were fully involved in the whole of the 
show. 
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to explore several issues that would usually be extremely difficult to study. These 
help inform our understanding of 3 of the guiding principles, set out in Chapter 6, 
which can be used to help overcome the cyber security dilemma; security dilemma 
sensibility, transparency and good interpersonal relationships.  
The permanent presence of television cameras and microphones on the Hunters 
resulted in state intelligence actors experiencing surveillance for themselves. This 
resulted in them entering ‘the other man’s counter fear’ and provided an insight 
into the difficult issue of security dilemma sensibility (Butterfield, 1951, p. 21). The 
presence of television cameras and microphones also allowed state intelligence 
actors to experience operating in a far more transparent environment than they 
were used to. This helped them to challenge their own perceptions around what 
this is like and how transparency should be approached within intelligence work. 
And finally, the broadcasting of the show to a large nationwide audience and the 
presence of non-state intelligence actors within Hunted HQ exposed the everyday 
actions and behaviours of state intelligence actors to members of the public. This 
provided an insight into how perceptions of state intelligence actors and their work 
may be influenced by their (lack of) exposure. This helps reaffirm the importance 
of interpersonal relationships to overcoming the cyber security dilemma. 
There is substantial existing research into reality crime shows, such as Hunted, 
including John Sears’ evaluation of the impact of reality crime show, ‘Crimewatch’ 
and Cavender and Fishman’s consideration of the impact of US crime shows ‘Cops’ 
and ‘America’s Most Wanted’. Annette Hill also considers how reality crime 
television shows such as Hunted demonstrate the entertainment appeal of mixing 
facts and entertainment, which helps to connect crime entertainment with the real 
world (Fishman & Cavender, 1998; Sears, 1995; Hill, 2017). But the ethnographic 
study of Hunted within this work is focussed on the experiences of the show’s 
participants and the audience’s reaction to them, rather than the construction of 
the show itself. Such a study is unique in relation to the public understanding of the 
securitisation of cyberspace and the security dilemma. 
7.2 AN EXPLORATION OF THREE PRINCIPLES 
The establishment of security dilemma sensibility, transparency and good 
interpersonal relationships are critical to overcoming the CSD, but the nature of the 
dispute between national security and digital rights makes addressing these issues 
particularly difficult. Transparency is difficult to achieve given the importance of 
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secrecy to national security and privacy to digital rights. Good interpersonal 
relationships are hard to establish, given the secrecy of state intelligence actors, 
and security dilemma sensibility is difficult when the two sides are distanced from 
each other and do not have access to the same information. Using examples from 
Hunted, the following sections will explore these issues further and draw lessons to 
help inform the wider question of how to overcome the CSD. 
7.2.1 Security Dilemma Sensibility 
Chapter 6 explains the importance of security dilemma sensibility to overcoming 
the CSD. Developing security dilemma sensibility requires a willingness to engage 
with and understand the motivations and actions of the other, but may only be fully 
achieved by living the experiences of the other, feeling their fears and seeing the 
situation from their entirely different perspective.  As former UN Secretary-General 
Dag Hammarskjold put it: 
You can only hope to find a lasting solution to a conflict if you have 
learned to see the other objectively, but, at the same time, to 
experience his difficulties subjectively (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, p. 
237). 
To achieve this, individuals must ‘hold in suspension two interpretations of the 
same facts, the other fellow’s and one’s own’ (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, p. 237). 
For state actors to achieve security dilemma sensibility, they must not only 
understand why the DRC fears surveillance but experience that fear for themselves 
and learn why surveillance is considered threatening. They must be able to move 
beyond the mantra of ‘if you have nothing to hide you have nothing to fear’ and 
begin to understand why good and law-abiding people still fear surveillance. David 
Lyon amongst others, explains this fear by arguing that surveillance leads to social 
sorting, which can lead to cumulative social disadvantage when the same people 
are subject to increased suspicion and scrutiny due to innocent activities such as 
attending a Mosque (Lyon, 2014). But as demonstrated in Section 4.4.2.4, state 
intelligence actors believe that their actions are defensive in nature and find it 
difficult to imagine why others would fear them.  
Whilst state intelligence actors are subject to the same levels of surveillance as 
members of the public,34 they do not fear this surveillance because they know the 
                                                          
34 Actually, greater levels if security vetting is considered. 
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people, agencies and practices involved. It is difficult for them to see surveillance 
from the perspective of individual citizens. But during the filming of Hunted, a range 
of current and former state intelligence actors were placed in an environment 
where they were constantly watched and recorded by TV cameras and 
microphones. This simulated a level of surveillance and, whilst the hunters 
participated voluntarily and had no reason to distrust the show’s producers, it still 
allowed them to experience what it is like to not know when you are being watched 
and not know how this information will be used. The show’s hunters have 
experience in the police, military and intelligence agencies and are accustomed to 
using surveillance techniques to gather intelligence on criminals and terrorists. But, 
during Hunted, the ever-presence of television cameras and audio recording 
equipment served to emulate the experience of those within the DRC who feel that 
they are always being watched and monitored by the government. Everything the 
hunters did was recorded and monitored, and even visits to the bathroom could be 
accidently captured if they forgot to turn microphones off. They had little control 
over what was collected and how it was used. 
This experience resulted in significant anxiety for the hunters. One of the major 
concerns was over their lack of control over data held about them. They were being 
filmed and recorded at all times, but the vast majority of this footage would never 
be seen by the public and the producers had the power to use this footage however 
they wished, potentially portraying the hunters in misleading and unflattering 
ways. There was no evidence to suggest that the producers would do this but the 
lack of control caused significant anxiety. The issue was raised by the hunters on 
several occasions, but the producers’ appeals to ‘trust us’ and their promises not to 
use footage out of context did not appear to convince the hunters. The issue was a 
frequent topic of discussion on set, during lunch, and after filming, and was only 
quelled when the producers hosted a pre-screening of the first episode. Only once 
the trustworthiness of the producers had been proven were anxieties reduced, 
although some concerns persisted until the show was broadcast. 
The experiences of the hunters parallel those who are told by the government and 
GCHQ to ‘trust us’, about how they use data collected on British citizens. 
Responding to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which ruled that state 
surveillance complied with the Human Rights Act, Rachel Logan, legal advisor for 
Amnesty International explained that ‘trust us’ was not enough. 
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The government’s entire defence has amounted to “trust us” and 
now the tribunal has said the same … “trust us” isn’t enough 
(Logan, 2014). 
Some of the hunters also experienced anxiety over the level of intrusion into their 
own individual privacy, which was demonstrated by an incident on set. During a 
quiet period, one of the producers appeared, accompanied by three other 
members of production. She took them around to each section and introduced 
them as some of the show’s transcribers. Despite the show’s procedures being 
explained in training, some of the hunters were surprised when the reality that 
individual members of production were listening to everything they said became 
clear. ‘[You listen to us] even when the cameras are not on us?’ asked one of the 
analysts, ‘yes, all the time’, replied one of the transcribers. ‘What about when we’re 
off set making tea?’ asked the analyst, ‘yes’, said the transcriber. ‘So you heard us 
talking about…’ said the analyst, referring to a conversation that occurred in HQ 
when, off camera, the hunters were talking about relationships. ‘Yes’ said the 
transcriber with a smile and a laugh. ‘We try not to listen to conversations that 
aren’t about the hunt but it’s hard because we don’t know what you’re going to say 
next’. The analyst went quiet. 
Despite being aware of the cameras, the filming and the microphones and despite 
having agreed to the conditions of the show, the reality of another human, 
unknown to them, monitoring everything they said, had only just dawned. After the 
incident, conversations were notably tamer and the hunters even took measures 
to defend their own privacy. As the head of the Cyber Team, Paul Vlissidis explains; 
You don’t feel you have any real opportunity… any downtime when 
you can perhaps have a laugh and a joke about what’s going on and 
so that increases tensions and frustrations. That said, there were a 
couple of occasions where we felt we needed to have a 
conversation and we turned our microphones off and went 
somewhere else to do it (Vlissidis, 2016). 
A flick of the head to the set exit or a written note hidden from cameras was used 
to indicate a desire to talk in private and, after a quiet space outside the set was 
found, microphones were turned off.  
The hunters were affectively under ‘sousveillance’, a term coined by Steve Mann to 
describe inverse surveillance, or the practice of surveilling the surveiller to 
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moderate their behaviour (Mann, et al., 2002; Mann, 1998). They reacted to this 
form of surveillance by engaging in resistance. Resistance to surveillance can take 
the form of counterveillance techniques, which include blocking all opportunities 
for surveillance by, for example, going off grid or through ‘univeillance’, which 
involves the continuation of normal communicative activities whilst blocking the 
surveiller, though, for example, the use of end-to-end encryption (Bakir, 2015). The 
hunters used counterveillance techniques by limiting their conversations, but then 
moved to univeillance by switching off microphones and shifting conversations to 
a different area. Whilst the hunters were not trying to hide illicit conversations and 
the show’s producers were simply acting within the well explained requirements of 
the show, the experience did demonstrate to the hunters the potential negative 
impact of being on the other side of surveillance. 
The scenario reflects the experiences of the those who fear state surveillance and 
act to evade it. A variety of polls reveal that internet users in major democracies 
self-censor their online conversations out of fear of state surveillance (Pew 
Research Centre, 2014; PEN America, 2015).  Whilst the sheer volume of 
information, the technological and financial challenges, issue of proportionality, the 
limited resources, the ethics of state intelligence actors and the law, all preclude 
the pervasive monitoring of the entire population, there are many who believe that 
they are personally being monitored by the state, in the same way that the hunters 
were personally monitored by the show’s transcribers. Through film, television and 
literature, the public have always had some general awareness of the capability of 
the intelligence agencies, but the Snowden disclosures turned that abstract notion 
into something more personal to many people. When Snowden revealed GCHQ’s 
capability to hack into webcams, this capability was presented by the media as 
something personal to individuals, through headlines such as ‘GCHQ has been 
checking you out through your webcam’ (TechDirt, 2014). Even articles defending 
surveillance tended to personalise this practice, including the argument made by 
the Telegraph that ‘Yes, Big Brother is watching you. But for good reason’ 
(Telegraph, 2013). The sense that the Internet was being turned into a giant 
panopticon designed to control individual behaviour intensified after Snowden with 
both GCHQ and the NSA being accused of working towards this goal (Sullivan, 2013; 
Mitrou, et al., 2014). 
Many feel that state surveillance is personally targeting them, and this leads 
individuals to take measures to protect themselves in a similar manner to the 
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hunters. The anti-surveillance campaign ‘Don’t spy on us’, for example, is backed 
by around a dozen UK rights organisations and specifically highlights how 
surveillance impacts on the individual. Other examples include Facebook’s policy to 
notify users if they think their account has been targeted by a nation state, and the 
large range of web pages that have been set up to help individuals determine if they 
have personally been targeted by GCHQ. 
Addressing the lack of security dilemma sensibility on each side of the dispute is, 
perhaps, the most significant challenge of the CSD. This is exacerbated by the 
secrecy of state surveillance and the distance between state intelligence actors and 
the DRC. But the experiences of the hunters demonstrate that whilst It is difficult 
to develop a better understanding of the fears of the other, it is not impossible. 
Although the experiences of the hunters are hard to replicate on a large scale, other 
measures to broaden the perspective of state intelligence actors and encourage 
them to appreciate different viewpoints, are possible. 
7.2.2 Good Interpersonal Relationships 
Chapter 6 demonstrates the importance of good interpersonal relationships in 
overcoming security dilemmas. If actors on each side can develop good 
relationships then this can form the basis for developing security dilemma 
sensibility, trust, and shared values and identities.  But state intelligence actors are, 
by their nature, hidden from the public and this means that their image is still very 
much shaped by the news and entertainment media. Fictional characters, such as 
James Bond, characterise the state intelligence actor as ‘an action hero of 
extraordinary abilities’, whilst John Le Carre invokes a world of skulduggery and 
deceit (Funnell & Dodds, 2017, p. 220; Winder, 2006). 
In Beyond Bond, Wesley Britton charts the development of espionage fiction, 
highlighting how various modern ‘spy traits’ have become established over time 
(Britton, 2005). These traits include patriotism (‘39 Steps’ – John Buchan), 
fearlessness and bravery (‘The Spy – James Cooper), mystery and intrigue 
(French/Spanish dramas) and a maverick and shadowy nature (‘Sherlock Holmes’ – 
Sir Arthur Conan-Doyle). Espionage itself has been characterised as a ‘Great Game’ 
(Rudyard Kipling), futuristic, (Tom Clancy) glamorous (Ian Fleming) and 
adventurous (Sauerberg). These characterisations of state intelligence actors are 
also utilised and re-enforced by politics. State intelligence actors are often lauded 
for their heroism and patriotism by the ruling classes (May, 2017; Hammond, 2015). 
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Whereas their detractors, such as civil rights groups, often portray them as 
shadowy and untrustworthy (Snowden, 2013; Open Rights Group, 2013; Open 
Rights Group, 2009) 
But despite these public constructions, most state intelligence actors are hidden 
from the public, so public imaginations of state intelligence actors can be extremely 
misleading. Peter Taylor of the BBC was given access to officers from MI5 and MI6 
for a documentary called ‘Modern Spies’ (Taylor, 2012). He concluded that ‘those 
who actually carry out these covert and potentially dangerous operations could not 
be further removed from their imaginary counterparts’  (Taylor, 2012). MI6 Officer, 
Anna also highlights the discrepancies between the media portrayal and the actual 
reality of being an intelligence professional.  
If James Bond actually worked in MI6 today, he'd spend a large 
amount of time behind a desk doing paperwork and making sure 
everything was properly cleared and authorised. He certainly 
wouldn't be the lone wolf of the films (Taylor, 2012). 
Some state intelligence actors also explain how working for the intelligence 
agencies has changed their own preconceptions of these organisations. MI5 Officer 
Shami explained how she was almost put off applying because she thought that 
‘you had to be upper class, academically bright and white male’ to work at MI5 
(Taylor, 2012). Similarly, MI5 Officer, Emma said she ‘thought it would be largely 
male, and women would usually be a PA or Miss Moneypenny from James Bond’ 
(Taylor, 2012).  
Whilst the intelligence agencies have long survived under the cover of the Official 
Secrets Act, in recent years they have recognised the need to open up and improve 
their public image. As part of this process they have been particularly keen to 
highlight the existing diversity within the intelligence community in order to attract 
an even more diverse array of talent. GCHQ, for example, engaged in a very public 
act of support for ‘National Coming Out Day’ by lighting their headquarters in the 
colours of the PRIDE flag. They also attempted to draw a parallel between coming 
out as gay and GCHQ coming out as an organisation. 
In many ways GCHQ has come out as an organisation, and more 
than once. Not only from under a veil of secrecy back in 1983 when 
our function and existence was avowed in Parliament, but also 
more recently  (Stewart, 2016).  
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Other initiatives include the CyberFirst Girls competition, which is designed to 
promote cyber careers to women, and participation in the Asian Network 
documentary ‘Minority Report’, which is designed to attract more Black, Asian and 
Minority Ethnic recruits and was discussed in Chapter 3  (GCHQ, 2016; GCHQ, 2017). 
The relationship between state intelligence actors and the public can be affected 
by several factors, including the perceived entitativity of state intelligence agencies, 
mechanistic dehumanisation of state intelligence actors and a lack of familiarity 
with state intelligence actors. Entitativity is the degree to which an organisation or 
institution is viewed as a real entity rather than a collection of individuals. Castano 
et al demonstrate that the perception of the other is significantly affected by the 
degree of entitativity; the greater the entitativity the more threatening an 
institution can appear (Castano, et al., 2003). If an organisation such as an 
intelligence agency is imagined as a single body, then it can appear more 
threatening than if it is regarded as a collection of individual intelligence actors, 
who may act to moderate each other’s behaviour. Dehumanisation can take the 
form of animalistic dehumanisation, where the individual is considered to be sub-
human and mechanistic de-humanisation, where the individual is portrayed as cold, 
unfeeling and lacking in human nature (Haslam, 2006). Mechanistic 
dehumanisation is the most applicable to state intelligence actors, who are often 
portrayed as faceless figures or are represented using mechanistic imagery, such as 
CCTV cameras. Whilst familiarity is said to breed contempt, sociologist Niklas 
Luhmann argues that ‘trust has to be achieved within a familiar world’ (Luhmann, 
2000, p. 94). Whilst familiarity is a precursor to trust it is difficult to achieve in the 
intelligence world where state intelligence actors are distant and separated from 
the public.  
Intelligence agency entitativity, mechanistic dehumanisation of intelligence actors 
and lack of familiarity with state intelligence actors all serve to make it difficult to 
establish relationships between the state and the public. But by exposing state 
intelligence actors to both the public and others working on the show, Hunted 
provides a good insight into the importance of interpersonal relationships within 
the CSD. Given the lack of public visibility of state intelligence actors, Hunted 
represents a unique opportunity for state intelligence actors to be observed by the 
public, whilst carrying out their professional duties. Whilst Hunted takes place in 
the simulated environment of a television show, it is presented as an actual security 
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operation and allows the Hunters to be observed conducting analysis, making 
decisions and taking actions. 
The first series of Hunted was pitched as an attempt to ‘dramatically explore the 
scale of Britain’s surveillance state’s all-seeing gaze’ (Channel 4, 2015). It was 
advertised through a series of interesting and innovative methods, which largely 
focussed on the scale of state surveillance and the difficulties faced by those 
attempting to avoid it.  Adverts at train stations highlighted the volume of CCTV 
cameras monitoring passengers, adverts on cash machines instructed customers to 
cut up their credit cards, and oyster card holders informed recipients that these 
could be used by the state to track them (OMD Blog, 2016). 
 
This advertising was supported by a social media campaign based on the Twitter 
handle @Hunted_HQ, which was designed to represent a sinister and shadowy 
Figure 7.1: Hunted advertising 
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fictional character who worked for the hunters and was run by Aaron Eccles, the 
show’s social media manager.  
[we constructed] a fictional Hunter that worked in Hunter HQ, that 
was slightly sinister, and we’d have this twitter account and we’d 
see people who talked about the show on Twitter and we’d kind of 
almost goad them a little bit, that kind of thing … oh you think you 
can hide …  at the beginning of the series Hunted HQ came across 
as … it was sort of the state in a slightly shady way (Eccles, 2016).  
The nature of the advertising campaign and the use of the @Hunted_HQ character 
helped to establish the fugitives as underdogs, set against the all-powerful state.  
The Twitter account portrayed the state as a faceless, sinister figure, indulging in its 
access to the private lives of its citizens; a portrayal that was also reflected in the 
advertising. The audience’s initial reaction was to support the fugitives, but the 
Hunted social media team believed that this attitude began to shift as the show 
progressed. 
I think the view of the hunters and fugitives really changed as the 
show went on. It started with a huge amount of support for the 
fugitives, everyone was just thinking it’s a regular person up against 
the state, up against this kind of powerful state and as an underdog 
can you actually get away from them so there was a lot of support 
for the fugitives … I think people began to shift, they started to see 
the hunters become characters in their own right … they stopped 
being a faceless force and started being real people … and so when 
there were a few episodes when the fugitives were caught and the 
hunters were quite pleased, the public would be happy with that 
(Eccles, 2016).  
Eccles’ observations demonstrate the impact of entitativity on the perception of 
state intelligence actors who became more popular when viewed as ‘characters in 
their own right’ rather than just part of the ‘powerful state’. Feeling the hunter’s 
emotions also helped to develop familiarity and to rehumanise the hunters as real 
people.  
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Whilst it is difficult to accurately quantify support for the fugitives and the hunters, 
there is some evidence that support for the hunters increased as the show 
progressed. The hashtags #TeamHunter and #TeamFugitive became established on 
Twitter to demonstrate support for each team and, although the hashtags were 
used by relatively few commentators, there was a noticeable increase in the use of 
#TeamHunter as the series progressed (See Figure 6.2). 
This shift was a surprise to the show’s producers, who had been expecting the 
fugitives to continue to enjoy most of the public’s support. 
I don’t think we expected to see this shift in support towards the 
hunters … the marketing campaign and the social campaign were 
all linked to this faceless force but you got to know them [the 
hunters] a bit better, I didn’t expect that to happen in the way that 
it did, I think you saw their real emotions and having a laugh at 
times as well. They became a bit less scary (Eccles, 2016). 
It also appeared to be the case that support for the hunters varied across social 
media channels.  Peter Bleksley, the Chief hunter and the most active hunter on 
social media, attributed this difference to how much the hunters interacted with 
the audience on each channel. 
On twitter I found that support for the hunters was the prevalent 
view, people seemed to want to connect with the hunters on 
twitter, converse with them, they wanted fugitives caught … I 
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Figure 7.2: Hashtag usage during Hunted series 1 
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found that the Facebook people were overwhelmingly in support 
of the fugitives. And they all wanted them to evade capture and 
thwart us. By using Twitter, we weren’t remote people who were 
just on the telly, we were real people communicating, offering 
views, entering into conversations, really personalising that 
relationship (Bleksley, 2016).  
Whilst the show changed the minds of some of the audience, the affect was even 
more intense for some of the show’s participants. Whilst most of the hunters were 
former security and state intelligence actors, some had not previously worked for 
the state and this provided the opportunity to study their reactions working with 
state intelligence actors. One of the most striking reactions from the inexperienced 
hunters was their surprise at how ‘normal’ the experienced hunters were. Aisha 
Ishaq was studying for a Masters in Intelligence Studies when she took part in 
Hunted as an Intelligence Officer, but had no previous practical experience within 
the intelligence community. The show significantly altered her impressions of 
intelligence work and those who carry it out. Aisha explained that her impressions 
of intelligence and security practitioners before the show were negative; she did 
not think that they paid enough attention to ethics and they did not understand 
wider issues beyond their role.  
[before Hunted] I had a very strong perception of people in the 
military and in the police, who thought single-mindedly, very 
strategically … By strategic I mean achieving the goals, in the long 
run protecting citizens but being focussed on getting the work done 
and forward with the investigation… So the ethical side really gets 
chucked out the window (Ishaq, 2016). 
But working with the hunters on Hunted gave Aisha a different perspective. 
[Hunted] gave me a different insight. In meeting Ben and Louisa 
who are from the military, they’re just like normal people. You 
forget that these people are just like normal. But because I was in 
that academic environment, not knowing them outside of the 
classroom I was also getting only one side. Knowing Ben and Peter 
and Louisa and everyone else who had these backgrounds, they’re 
just normal people. I was surprised that, yes, they are aware of 
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different perspectives, they’re just normal people you’d meet on a 
day to day basis (Ishaq, 2016). 
Aisha’s surprise at the normality of the state intelligence actors she worked with on 
Hunted demonstrates the disconnect between the public’s perceptions of state 
intelligence actors and the day-to-day reality. Her reaction differed to Paul, who 
had also never worked for the state but had been previously been exposed to the 
intelligence profession through his work. 
I do actually have a high degree of trust in them [intelligence 
agencies] partly because I’ve been personally exposed to some of 
the individuals who work for those organisations because they’re 
colleagues of mine and I’ve had direct dealings with some of those 
organisations throughout my career. I know that they do take a lot 
of care and trouble and concern around these things. My personal 
knowledge humanises them and makes you naturally much more 
trusting of them.  I might feel a bit differently about it, if I had no 
personal knowledge of them, they would be this big brother like 
faceless identity and it would be very difficult to trust something 
like that because you don’t know what their motives are, you’ve 
never been exposed to them in any human sense so your natural 
response is to be suspicious and to be wary. It’s very much about 
your personal experience (Vlissidis, 2016). 
Paul and Aisha’s experiences reiterate the importance of people and personalities 
within the CSD. When seen as faceless, the intelligence community appear sinister, 
but when they become visible, this attitude can change.  
Hunted revealed the human side of state intelligence actors, including their 
motivations, emotions and everyday human behaviour and this re-humanisation 
changed attitudes towards them. It is likely that that the secretive nature of the 
intelligence agencies is contributing to their de-humanisation, which in turns 
reduces the public’s trust in their work. Whilst this secretive nature has previously 
added glamour and intrigue to the profession, in an era of distrust in state 
institutions this secrecy is now more damaging. Reversing this may be difficult for 
the intelligence agencies, who justifiably need to protect the identities of staff but 
if they are to improve trust then they must find a way to present the human side of 
intelligence work. 
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7.2.3 Transparency 
Chapter 6 demonstrates the importance of transparency in overcoming the CSD. 
Whilst secrecy creates mistrust and suspicion, transparency can build trust and help 
provide future certainty. But the necessity of secrecy for national security creates 
a Secrecy Dilemma. Secrecy is required for national security but transparency is 
required for public trust. 
Often, the British state’s resistance to oversight of the intelligence agencies is 
considered evidence that they are behaving in a malicious manner. In calls for 
greater oversight of the intelligence agencies, the DRC sometimes reverse a trope 
used to defend surveillance, claiming that ‘if the government has nothing to hide, 
then there’s nothing to fear’ (Casey, 2017). But fear of oversight can also be 
considered a natural upshot of the culture of secrecy, which is instilled within state 
intelligence actors from the moment they apply for a job and is re-enforced 
throughout their careers. Applicants to the intelligence services are informed that 
they can only discuss their application with close family and, if they are successful, 
they must maintain discretion for life. Every document they produce, computer 
system they use, building they enter, room they work in, and communications 
system they use, is assigned a classification which restricts its access. Employees 
are trained in the principle of need-to-know, so they can only discuss operations or 
capabilities with colleagues who have been specifically cleared to access that 
information.  
As Charney and Irvin explain, this culture of secrecy makes it difficult to study the 
intelligence community, due to legal and national security restrictions and the 
limited availability of state intelligence actors for research (Charney & Irvin, 2014). 
But there are some sources of information that can help to illuminate how this 
culture of secrecy impacts on state intelligence actors. Laurence Miller’s 
psychological guide to undercover policing, for example, describes the inability to 
discuss operations as a major stress factor for under-cover police officers (Miller, 
2008). 
The most commonly reported symptoms included anxiety, 
heightened suspiciousness, loneliness, feelings of isolation, and 
relationship problems. Many officers were distressed at not being 
able to talk to anyone about the assignment (Miller, 2008, p. 11). 
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The impact of this culture of secrecy can also be studied using direct evidence from 
state intelligence actors themselves, which demonstrate the difficulty of operating 
in this type of environment.  
The hardest part is maintaining the web of lies you have weaved.  It 
is a massive undertaking if you decide to live a robust social life like 
I did. I suppose if you take the hermitic path it would be a lot easier 
(Laux, 2016) 
Fewer than 10 people in the world know what I do, and they 
include close girlfriends and my ex-boyfriend. My parents couldn’t 
tell their friends when I got the job, they couldn’t tell anyone “look 
at what my daughter has achieved” since. That is hard on them 
(Anonymous, n.d.). 
The job of a spy can be very lonely. You can never discuss details of 
operations or what's happening with particular agents ... When you 
start off as a young recruit, you think, “Fine, that suits me.” But it 
is emotionally crushing for officers in the secret services and you 
can never really share that guilt with anybody. You always carry 
that around with you. That does grind people down over time 
(Ferguson, 2014). 
Long-term existence in a culture of secrecy can also generate paranoia within state 
intelligence actors, instil a fear of the spotlight, and lead to difficulties forming 
trusting relationships. 
When people ask what you do, you’re trained to think what is it 
that this person is actually looking to learn? Do you want to know 
that I read top secret documents in the morning? (Anonymous, 
n.d.). 
The unease with which state intelligence actors view intrusions into their world was 
demonstrated when the BBC was granted exclusive access to GCHQ in 2010. 
Reflecting on his experience, Mark Savage from the BBC explains how the presence 
of the BBC affected GCHQ staff (Savage, 2010). 
Their job is to listen in on others, record their conversations and 
pick up their e-mails. It is said, by the government, to provide 
"essential intelligence in the battle against terrorism and 
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[contribute] to the prevention of serious crime". But for the first 
time in its history we were turning the microphones on them 
(Savage, 2010). 
Prior to the BBC’s visit, signs were placed throughout the building to warn staff of 
their presence and an announcement over the public-address system called for 
internal blinds to be closed when the BBC passed by. BBC staff were made to wear 
red badges, denoting their lack of security clearance, and were escorted around the 
building by minders. Whilst some staff were willing to talk to the BBC, Savage 
recounts that others ‘weren’t entirely happy with our presence … People gave us a 
wide berth. It felt like I had a communicable disease.’ 
Greater oversight of intelligence agencies is often the subject of lobbying by the 
DRC and there have been many technical discussions about how to produce greater 
scrutiny whilst limiting the impact on national security and the safety of state 
intelligence actors. The Investigatory Powers Act (IPA), for example, attempted to 
address the issue by creating a new Investigatory Powers Commission (IPC), which 
is designed to independently scrutinise the work of the intelligence agencies 
without compromising national security. However, whilst technical arguments for 
greater oversight might be convincing, for new policies to be effective, state 
intelligence actors themselves need to understand and accept the need for these 
policies. They also need to be reassured that they will not undermine the protection 
of national security and their own safety. The first step to achieving this is to 
understand how such efforts might be received by state intelligence actors, who 
are accustomed to a culture of secrecy and who might be naturally opposed to 
actions that reduce the protections traditionally provided by secrecy. 
In Hunted, the culture of secrecy and fear of oversight was evident, although some 
of the hunters became more supportive of the idea of greater scrutiny because of 
the experience. Despite the appeal of taking part in an exciting show like Hunted, 
several of the hunters expressed significant reservations about participating and 
several prospects turned down the chance to take part due to concerns over the 
exposure they would receive. Several of those who did take part were also 
apprehensive about making the switch from the secretive world of intelligence to 
the very public world of television. Hunted transformed the watchmen into the 
watched through the permanent presence of television crews, which recorded 
every statement, action and decision that was taken by the hunters. For many who 
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took part, including Ben and Paul, stepping out from the shadows was extremely 
unnerving. 
When I was in [a government intelligence job] I saw this as a 
massive no-no. I was part of an operations centre over the Olympic 
period and I was very fully aware that in the future it would be all 
linked up with CCTV and we would wear microphones and 
everything would be recorded, the thought process, the decisions 
made, the logs, it’s written down, it’s on the computers, it’s 
recorded visually and verbally and I really did not want to go down 
that route (Owen, 2016). 
When I first started it I felt very, very uncomfortable as for my 
whole life I’ve been trying to avoid cameras, I’d normally run a mile 
so it took me a while to get used to it, to realise I’m not in that 
world anymore, its fine (Owen, 2016). 
Particularly in the early days of filming, we all felt quite self-
conscious that we were being scrutinised essentially by being on 
the show. What we were saying was being scrutinised, the level of 
your professionalism is being scrutinised (Vlissidis, 2016). 
One of the major reservations expressed by the hunters was the fear that the show 
would expose surveillance capabilities to criminals and terrorists. One of TV 
Command’s responsibilities was to protect these capabilities by ensuring that only 
those within the public domain could be used throughout the show.  Despite TV 
Command holding final responsibility for protecting these capabilities, many of the 
hunters were still wary about compromising national security, despite most having 
left active service. 
Prior to the start of filming, three days were set aside to enable the hunters to 
familiarise themselves with equipment, establish working practices and learn about 
how the show would operate. There were also discussions between the hunters 
and TV Command about what intelligence techniques might be used to track down 
the fugitives, how these could be facilitated and how they might be presented to 
the audience. Despite the show only utilising techniques within the public domain, 
there was substantial unease within the hunters that they could inadvertently 
reveal information that might damage national security. Whilst the show’s 
producers took significant measures to protect against this, observation of the 
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hunters revealed this tension to be evident throughout the show and after it was 
broadcast.  
The hunters also felt personal responsibility for the intelligence they collected on 
the fugitives. Whilst they were motivated to acquire as much information as they 
could about the fugitives and their associates, it became apparent that they also 
became personally responsible for the protection of this information. As head of 
the Cyber Team, Paul had direct access to the most intrusive data from the fugitive’s 
phones and computers, and despite the fugitives giving permission for this intrusion 
into their lives, he began to feel personally protective of the information his Section 
discovered. 
I was concerned that although people had given all this permission 
… there might be things that came out as a result of the programme 
that when they saw it in the edit they’d be absolutely horrified 
because … suddenly their lives would be a matter of public record 
and that did concern us, and we did agonise over that…. you feel 
responsible for the information you’ve just acquired I felt like I was 
a bit of a custodian (Vlissidis, 2016). 
Emma Channel’s i2 charts showed 5 calls to one telephone number. 
That was the most number of calls she made in that time period 
and that telephone number turned out to be a medical centre. I 
deliberately did not ask for us to monitor that telephone number 
because I felt that the potential collateral damage to that was too 
intrusive to too many people and we’re talking about people’s 
medical histories. Even though that might have been the key to 
unlock the mystery of where she was I deliberately said we’re not 
applying for that one (Bleksley, 2016). 
The examples demonstrate some of the human factors that promote a reluctance 
to accept oversight and scrutiny within the intelligence agencies. However, the 
experiences of the hunters also demonstrate that this reluctance can be overcome. 
Despite initial wariness of the TV cameras, Hunted was a transformative experience 
which led some of the hunters, such as Chief Peter, and Deputy Chief Ben, to change 
their existing attitudes towards oversight and scrutiny.  
Having done the Hunted experience, having sat there in an Ops 
room with these massive great big cameras and obvious 
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microphones and that not having an effect greatly on my work then 
… it was fine, it’s a good thing and it’s accountability isn’t it and I 
think that better decisions will be made in the long run.  if people 
have been trained properly and they’re applying the correct 
processes to their work then they’re going to make the right 
decisions whether its recorded or not and I think that would give 
the public more assurance and hopefully give them less paranoia, I 
think they should publicise that more, I think they should say look 
these are all recorded, we’re not sitting here smoking cigars, 
drinking whiskey saying ah we should shoot the guy anyway, it’s all 
recorded and I think they should let the public know that, I really 
do (Owen, 2016). 
Both Peter and Ben suggested that after the experience they would both me more 
accepting of scrutiny and even advocate for a change in practices. 
 I think that if I talked to them now I would say it’s [greater scrutiny] 
a really good idea and they [his former colleagues] would say it’s a 
really bad idea. I’ve changed my view (Owen, 2016). 
What it did do [the presence of TV cameras] is it kind of just 
cranked up the tension a little bit because your every word and 
deed and action was on camera but, you know, it’s quite a good 
thing because it’s almost a check and balance being in place there 
and I found it, looking back, a good thing because at the end of the 
day we were all subject to scrutiny on the show by the program 
makers, by our colleagues and ultimately by the television 
audience … and there were massive levels of scrutiny throughout 
the entire process and I think that law enforcement could, if they 
wanted to listen to us, learn something from that because scrutiny 
is a good thing. This was something that grew out of my experience 
on the show. That level of scrutiny. It was good (Bleksley, 2016). 
State intelligence actors are trained to keep secrets, hide their identities and only 
share information with those who need to know, and this culture of secrecy can 
lead to a natural suspicion of scrutiny and transparency. This resistance to ‘opening 
up’ can be interpreted by outsiders as evidence that the agencies have something 
to hide, but may largely be driven by an instilled distrust of scrutiny. Whilst it is easy 
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to criticise the lack of transparency associated with the work of intelligence 
agencies, achieving change will require more than new legislation, such as the 
increased powers of scrutiny that were included in the new Investigatory Powers 
Act. Those working in this industry are naturally resistant to oversight because they 
are trained to work in secret and this resistance can impede efforts to deliver 
greater scrutiny of their work. But the examples from Hunted demonstrate that 
when state intelligence actors become accustomed to oversight, they may begin to 
change their attitudes towards it, acknowledge its benefits and even embrace it. 
7.3 CONCLUSION 
Chapter 6 considers a variety of efforts to overcome the CSD and why they have 
failed. It then introduces several key principles that can be used to help overcome 
this difficult issue. This chapter has explored three of these principles in more 
detail, through the lens of the television show Hunted. This has revealed both the 
depth of the challenges faced in overcoming the CSD and the potential areas where 
improvement can be achieved. Achieving security dilemma sensibility is difficult 
because of the distance between the state and the DRC and differing access to 
information, but by acknowledging this gap and taking steps to bridge it, both the 
state and the DRC can improve their own prospects by beginning to learn about, 
experience and feel the genuine fears of the other. Good interpersonal 
relationships are difficult to achieve between the DRC and the state because state 
intelligence actors will always be somewhat distanced from the public, but there 
are clear indications that opening up can help to rehumanise the intelligence 
agencies and the practices of surveillance. This can help lay the groundwork for the 
establishment of greater understanding and trust. 
The secrecy of the intelligence agencies and the resultant lack of transparency is 
perhaps the most difficult element of the CSD to overcome because there appears 
to be an intractable conflict between the need for secrecy and need for 
transparency. But the two do not exist in a zero-sum game. As Chapter 6 discusses, 
moves towards transparency do not necessarily come at the cost of national 
security. And as this chapter demonstrates moves towards transparency may also 
need to begin by combatting the fear of transparency that some state intelligence 
actors may hold.  
Simply demanding more transparency or legislating to guarantee transparency is 
not enough to solve the problem. Instead it is necessary to understand the culture 
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of secrecy at the heart of the intelligence community, how this creates resistance 
to transparency and how this can be overcome. Assigning malicious intent to this 
resistance may be understandable, but it is unhelpful and fails to appreciate the 
perspective of state intelligence actors who dedicate their lives to the protection of 
their countries. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter 2 of this thesis introduced the actors involved in the securitisation of 
cyberspace and the establishment of the CSD and Chapter 3 examined how 
cyberspace has been securitised using language and metaphor. The consequences 
of this securitisation were explored in Chapter 4, which considered how competing 
securitisations have created a CSD between the state and the DRC. Chapter 5 
discussed how to address the securitisation of cyberspace and Chapter 6 
considered how to resolve the CSD. Chapter 7 then used the television show, 
Hunted, to focus on particular aspects of the CSD. 
This chapter summarises the thesis and introduces a range of principles that can be 
applied in future attempts to solve the CSD. It then discusses potential work to 
complement and develop the work within this thesis. 
8.1 SUMMARY 
The following is a summary of the chapters within this thesis, their conclusions, and 
how they meet the research questions. 
Q1: How do the British state and the DRC construct cyberspace threats? 
Chapter 2 identifies several key actors involved in the securitisation of cyberspace, 
including the government, intelligence agencies, whistle-blowers, technical 
experts, academia, rights organisations and the technology industry. The chapter 
demonstrates how the securitisation of cyberspace is not achieved by a single actor 
but is achieved through the collective securitising acts of a range of different actors. 
Whistle-blowers such as Snowden achieve incredible reach and gain massive 
exposure, whilst academic experts bring credibility, and rights organisations 
provide the foundation for the digital rights campaign. On the state side, the 
government has huge reach but is widely untrusted, whilst the security and 
intelligence agencies provide credibility and expertise to the cause. The different 
actors also have different relationships with different audiences, which influences 
their ability to convince them of the existence of cyberspace threats. The DRC and 
technology companies, for example, are often united in opposition to state 
surveillance but have a more fractious relationship with regards to potential privacy 
abuses by the technology industry. The state has the best ability to influence the 
legislature and create new surveillance legislation, but if the DRC convince the 
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technology industry to oppose this legislation then they can design their technology 
to resist state attempts to access data. 
Chapter 3 considers how this range of actors use language and metaphors to 
securitise cyberspace. It demonstrates how both the state and the DRC use 
hypersecuritisation and everyday security practices to construct cyberspace threats 
as extreme and directly applicable to the audience. It also shows how they both 
also use technification to construct the issues as technical, positioning themselves 
as the expert authority to speak and act on the issues. Each side also use military, 
home security, biological and darkness metaphors to help enhance the threats and 
generate emotional responses in the audience. This process is taken further by 
connecting cyberspace securitisations with other securitised issues, such as 
terrorism and totalitarianism. 
Q2: How have competing threat constructions led to conflict between the DRC and 
the British state? 
Chapter 4 builds on Chapters 2 and 3 and considers how competing securitisations 
by the state and the DRC have created a CSD. The CSD describes how both the state 
and the DRC fear the consequences of each other’s actions but are unable to see 
that they are driven by fear. In response, each side takes countermeasures which 
provoke additional fear in the other and create a spiral of escalating rhetoric and 
decreasing security for all. Chapter 4 considers some of the characteristics of the 
CSD, including the pre-eminence of security-seeking behaviour and the likelihood 
that the state’s desire for national security and the DRC’s desire for digital rights 
are not incompatible. The chapter discusses means through which the CSD is 
intensified, including the difficulty in differentiating between defensive and 
offensive behaviour by the state and the DRC. For example, whilst GCHQ may have 
developed the ability to hack webcams to target terrorists, the same technology 
can also be used to target the public. The chapter also considers how the CSD is 
intensified by the perception that the defence/offence balance is weighted towards 
offence. 
Q3: What strategies can be applied to help resolve this conflict? 
Chapter 5 addresses the normative dilemma of how the security researcher should 
respond to the securitisation of cyberspace and the resultant CSD. It first considers 
different approaches to desecuritisation, including the Copenhagen Approach, the 
Discursive Ethical Approach and the Consequentialist Approach, but highlights 
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difficulties with each. The Copenhagen Approach suggests that desecuritisation is 
generally desirable, but not always, and provides no tools to help decide which is 
the case. The Discursive Ethical Approach addresses this problem by suggesting that 
acts of securitisation should be judged based upon whether their claims are true or 
not. Whilst appealing, this approach is also difficult, given the range of different 
opinions highlighted in Chapters 3 and 4 and the difficulty of deciding whether 
securitising claims are true. The Consequentialist Approach resolves this issue by 
focussing on the consequences of securitisation, rather than its processes, but this 
approach is difficult to apply to the CSD. For example, judging whether surveillance 
is proportional to the threat is extremely difficult. The chapter also considers 
methods of desecuritisation, including replacement, counter-securitisation, 
silencing, de-escalation and re-articulation, highlighting problems with each. The 
chapter concludes that desecuritisation alone is not the best approach to the CSD 
because of the way it is created through competing securitisations. Instead, a 
different approach is required. 
Chapter 6 reviews the history of the ‘Crypto Wars’ and the CSD and assesses why 
attempts to resolve these have not been successful. It considers unilateral attempts 
to ‘win’ the ‘Crypto Wars’ through the DRC’s use of encryption and the state’s use 
of surveillance, but concludes that such attempts cannot be successful as they only 
address the fears of one side. The chapter also considers attempts at more 
collaborative approaches. Technical solutions, such as David Chaum’s Privategrity 
had promise, but failed because they did not combine the technical aspect with a 
parallel effort to build trust and reduce enmity. Some attempts at peace talks have 
been more successful, although, due to historic enmity and mistrust, they have also 
proven of limited utility. Some attempts at reframing the debate are also promising 
but have not achieved widespread support.  The chapter then discusses how to 
solve the CSD by utilising the experiences and literature related to resolutions of 
traditional security dilemmas. 
Chapter 7 considers several factors that affect the ability of the Security Dilemma 
to be solved and applies these to the CSD, illustrating several of these with 
examples from the television show, Hunted. It considers issues such as trust, 
secrecy, and ideological fundamentalism and concludes that the CSD can be 
overcome if these issues are all addressed.  
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8.2 KEY RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
Within the literature review several research gaps were identified, which this thesis 
sought to address. These include the lack of work on the securitisation of British 
cyberspace, the failure to address securitisation conducted by non-state actors 
such as the DRC, the lack of substantial work into the emergence of a security 
dilemma between the British state and the DRC, and a lack of detailed analysis of 
the actions and motivations of British state intelligence actors. This work had 
contributed towards a greater understanding of each of these areas. 
8.2.1 Securitisation of cyberspace in the UK 
Whilst there have been several studies into the securitisation of cyberspace, none 
have focused specifically on the UK, despite its prominent intelligence agencies and 
surveillance capabilities, its relation to the Snowden disclosures, and its world-
leading investigatory powers legislation. This thesis contributes towards this 
research area by focussing specifically on the securitisation of British cyberspace. 
International events, such as the dispute between Apple and the FBI are addressed, 
due to their relevance to the UK, but primarily this thesis focuses on statements 
and official reports produced by the British government, interviews with staff at 
GCHQ and the ORG and observation of the British reality crime drama, Hunted. In 
doing so, this work exposes the mechanisms of cyberspace securitisation in the UK 
and sheds new light onto the dispute between the DRC and the British state. 
8.2.2 Securitisation by non-state actors 
There is a range of literature that considers the securitisation of cyberspace by 
states, but only Mariya Georgieva’s work considers the influence of non-state, 
actors such as Edward Snowden. But to fully appreciate the dispute between the 
DRC and the state it is necessary to study the actions and intentions of not just the 
state but the DRC as well. This thesis considers the way in which the DRC securitises 
cyberspace in direct comparison to how the state securitises cyberspace. In doing 
so it helps to address this significant research gap and potentially opens an 
innovative new approach to studying conflict between state and non-state actors.  
8.2.3 The Cyber Security Dilemma 
The security dilemma is a useful tool to help understand the emergence of conflict 
and how to prevent it, but research into this framework has only infrequently been 
applied to cyberspace and only once, to the dispute between the British state and 
the DRC, in a short paper by Myriam Dunne Cavelty (Cavelty, 2014). But 
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understanding the interplay between the motivations and actions of the two sides 
is critical to understanding the conflict and how it can be overcome. This thesis 
addresses the parallels between the actions of the DRC and the British state, and 
how these can lead to a spiral of insecurity. This substantial application of the 
security dilemma to the dispute between the British state and the DRC contributes 
to a better understanding of the conflict and potentially opens new policy 
approaches which move beyond simple critiques of government policy towards 
ideas of community, mutual interest and common purpose.  
8.2.4 Study of state intelligence actors 
Whilst there is a substantial volume of research into government policy on 
surveillance and cyberspace, there is far less on the culture of intelligence agencies 
and the perspective of intelligence actors. This is likely driven by the secrecy of 
intelligence agencies and the necessity of ‘insider status’ to gain access to 
intelligence actors. But to understand what drives government policy decisions in 
this area it is necessary to understand the culture of those involved in decision 
making and the factors that influence them. By interviewing GCHQ staff and 
observing and interviewing former state intelligence actors on Channel 4’s Hunted 
this thesis goes some way towards addressing this limitation. This study exposed 
both the opinions of intelligence actors and their reactions to new and novel 
situations. Whilst an ethnographic study of GCHQ could have added even more 
value, this work still helps to expose this under researched area and helps to show 
how the experiences of state intelligence actors influences the dispute between the 
British state and the DRC. 
8.3 SOME KEY PRINCIPLES 
There is no single solution to the CSD and, as with any conflict, it will take time to 
overcome the enmity and distrust that has built up between a range of different 
actors. However, there are several principles that can help each side move away 
from conflict. 
8.3.1 Accept that no-one can win the Crypto Wars 
One of the most damaging elements of the surveillance and digital rights discourse 
is the framing of the issue as one of security vs privacy, national security vs digital 
rights or liberty vs totalitarianism. These framings and the use of the term, ‘Crypto 
Wars’, helps to construct a zero-sum game, which can only be won by one side. 
Some of the actions of both the state and the DRC play into this narrative, as each 
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has previously attempted to ‘win’ the Crypto Wars through technological, legal and 
discursive means. But as one side takes the advantage the other becomes more 
fearful and determined to counter the threat. There can be no lasting victory for 
national security or digital rights if the deliverance of one comes at the expense of 
the other. For progress to be made, each side must realise that co-operation is the 
only way to achieve their goals. 
8.3.2 Understand and acknowledge the fears of the other 
As Section 4.4 explains, the primary driver of the CSD is the inability of each side to 
understand the fears of the other. Intelligence agencies such as GCHQ find it 
difficult to understand why they are feared, whilst the DRC find it difficult to 
understand why enhanced digital rights might be problematic for GCHQ. 
When the state articulates its fears that cyberspace will become anarchic because 
of encryption or the DRC articulates its fear that surveillance is leading to 
totalitarianism, the other side often tries to debunk and discredit these claims. 
Instead they should try to understand, acknowledge and address these fears in 
order to prevent a more harmful response. 
8.3.3 Build trust 
As Section 6.3 demonstrates, the establishment of trust and the development of 
interpersonal relationships will provide the foundation for any solutions to the CSD. 
Trust can be achieved on a range of different levels. Oversight agencies might 
provide functional trust in the intelligence agencies’ ethics and lawfulness; 
meetings and conferences between the technology industry, state and DRC might 
help to establish interpersonal bonding; and the ‘coming out’ of intelligence 
agencies might help to rehumanise intelligence practitioners, enabling them to 
form a more trusting relationship with the public. Once trust is established, it will 
become easier to transcend the CSD and to establish common interests and goals. 
Threat constructions can then be rearticulated towards common enemies, such as 
criminals, terrorists and hostile states. 
As well as learning to trust the other, each side must also learn to trust those on 
their own side who seek to reach out and engage with a different perspective. The 
example of David Chaum and Privategrity, discussed in Section 7.4, shows that this 
can be a difficult issue to address, but as Section 6.3.7 demonstrates, sometimes it 
takes a ‘leap in the dark’ to overcome issues of mistrust and enmity. 
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8.3.4 Reject absolutes 
Section 3.2 introduces one of the most damaging elements of the securitisation of 
cyberspace; the construction of cyber issues as extreme, absolute and indivisible. 
Framing backdoors as inherently dangerous and encryption as inherently 
threatening, results in an environment where compromise becomes impossible. To 
facilitate a return to rational debate, it is in the interests of both sides to reject the 
most extreme securitising rhetoric from their own side and to focus on engaging 
with the other. In that way, issues can be discussed on a case by case basis, allowing 
for a more nuanced approach and a greater array of potential solutions. 
8.3.5 Focus on the important issues 
As Woods’ report on encryption substitutes demonstrates (see Section 7.4), the 
British state and the DRC may be missing an opportunity to achieve their objectives 
by obsessing over the wrong issues  (Woods, 2016). Woods demonstrates that 
whilst the DRC focus on encryption to deliver digital rights and the state focusses 
on accessing encrypted information to protect national security, both goals might 
be achievable through alternative means. The conflict over digital rights and 
national security is often distilled into a debate about encryption, but this renders 
the issue unsolvable as encryption is considered to be either secure or not. A more 
fruitful approach would be to start with the aims of the state and the DRC and work 
collectively to see how well they can be delivered. 
8.3.6 Raise the quality of the debate 
The quality of the debate around issues of encryption and surveillance is often poor 
and fails to generate increased understanding of the complex issues involved. 
Section 3.2 demonstrates how the debate is hyper-securitised, preventing issues 
from being discussed on anything more than a superficial level. Issues are also 
technified, with technology experts claiming the unique authority to interpret the 
ethics of new technology and the state claiming the unique authority to speak on 
issues of national security and intelligence. 
The relationship between national security and digital rights is directly relevant to 
everyone but the issues are often inaccessible to the public. The IPA was keenly 
followed by the intelligence, security and human rights communities, but it was 
enacted with what the Guardian described as ‘barely a whimper’ and a distinct lack 
of interest from the public (The Guardian, 2016). It is in the interests of each side 
to raise the quality of the debate and attract a greater range of opinions and 
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expertise. Bringing outside perspectives, less tainted by enmity and less entrenched 
in ideology, will help to introduce new ideas and side-line the ideologically driven 
extremists on each side. As Moore and Rid exalt, when discussing encryption, the 
issue is ‘too important to be left to true believers’ (Moore & Rid, 2016, p. 30). 
8.4 CONTRIBUTIONS TO RESEARCH DESIGN AND PRACTICE 
To obtain a deep understanding of the causes of the conflict between digital rights 
and national security, the result of that conflict, and the influence and perspectives 
of the key actors, it was necessary to utilise a combination of deep analysis of 
publicly accessible discourse, interviews with key actors, and ethnographic 
research. These different methodologies were combined to produce an 
understanding of not just the outcomes of the conflict, but the causes and the 
reasons why it is so difficult to resolve. Whilst ethnographic studies are an 
established research technique the approach used within this thesis was extremely 
novel. Instead of observing state intelligence actors in their usual environment, 
they were observed in an environment that was both familiar and unusual. By 
participating in Hunted they performed the role of surveillance officers whilst 
simultaneously being monitored and observed. As the security dilemma revolves 
around the difficulty of seeing the perspective of the other side, this environment 
provided a unique opportunity to study the same set of people experiencing 
surveillance from both ends of the CCTV camera. This human experiment provided 
unique insight into how fears of surveillance emerge and how they are mitigated.  
To answer the research questions, it was also necessary to draw on research and 
utilise frameworks from a wide range of disciplines. These include intelligence 
studies, security studies, psychology, geopolitics and international relations, in 
additional to information security which provides the project with technical rigour. 
By utilising a wide empirical and theoretical base this mixed methods and 
interdisciplinary approach opens a new perspective on the conflict between the 
British state and the DRC and exposes novel approaches to addressing it. This type 
of approach can potentially be used more widely to address similar complex issues. 
8.5 FURTHER WORK 
To take the ideas presented in this thesis further, the following issues could be 
addressed. 
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8.5.1 International Cyber Security Dilemmas 
This thesis establishes the formulation of the CSD in the UK, but different countries 
have taken different approaches and been influenced by different factors. It would 
be useful to compare the CSD in the UK with other countries. Does the CSD exist 
everywhere, how is it different and what impact has this had on national security 
and digital rights? What can the UK learn from experiences elsewhere and to what 
extent can these be replicated? 
8.5.2 The role of technology companies in the Cyber Security Dilemma 
Chapter 2 addresses some of the influence of technology companies on the CSD but 
this work could be taken further to address the following questions. What is the 
impact of the profit motive for technology companies such as Facebook and 
Google? How do the different strategies of companies such as Google (selling 
information) and Apple (selling hardware) affect their approach to and influence on 
the CSD? What role do technology companies have in exacerbating the CSD and 
how might they help resolve it? 
8.5.3 Practical approaches to the Cyber Security Dilemma 
This thesis establishes several broad principles which can help towards addressing 
the securitisation of cyberspace and the CSD, but further work is required to 
establish the technologies that will eventually be required to address the issues 
involved. Can technologies be created to both deliver national security and digital 
rights, and ease the fears of those who fear that each of these is under threat? 
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9 GLOSSARY 
CSD ...................................................... Cyber Security Dilemma 
DRC ...................................................... Digital Rights Community 
GCHQ ................................................... Government Communications Headquarters 
IPA ....................................................... Investigatory Powers Act 
JIC ........................................................ Joint Intelligence Committee 
NCSC .................................................... National Cyber Security Centre 
NSA ...................................................... National Security Agency 
NSD ...................................................... New Security Dilemma 
NSS ...................................................... National Security Strategy 
ORG ..................................................... Open Rights Group 
SDSR .................................................... Strategic Defence and Security Review 
TSD ...................................................... Traditional Security Dilemma 
UK CSS ................................................. United Kingdom Cyber Security Strategy 
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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
GCHQ 
David  - Cyber Policy Adviser 
Adrian  - Head of Cyber Crime 
Matt  - Head of Communications and Campaign Planning 
Emily  - Head of News 
Fiona  - Public Communications and Campaign Planning 
 
Open Rights Group 
Jim Killock - Director 
Javier Ruiz - Policy Director 
 
Hunted 
Peter Bleksley - Chief Hunter 
Ben Owen - Deputy Chief 
Aisha Ishaq - Intelligence Officer 
Paul Vlissidis - Head of Cyber 
Aaron Eccles - Production 
  
290 
 
10 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, 2015. Privacy and Security: A 
modern and transparent legal framework, s.l.: House of Commons. 
ABC News, 2016. Apple CEO Tim Cook Sits Down With David Muir (Extended 
Interview). [Online]  
Available at: http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/video/exclusive-apple-ceo-tim-cook-
sits-david-muir-37174976 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
ABC News, 2016. Apple CEO Tim Cook Stands Firm Against the FBI. [Online]  
Available at: http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/video/apple-ceo-tim-cook-stands-firm-
fbi-37123364 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
ABC News, 2016. Apple CEO Tim Cook Stands Firm Against the FBI. [Online]  
Available at: http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/video/apple-ceo-tim-cook-stands-firm-
fbi-37123364 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Abelson, H. et al., 1997. The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third 
Party-Encryption. World Wide Web Journal, 2(3), pp. 241-257. 
Abelson, H. et al., 2015. Keys Under Doormats: mandating insecurity by requiring 
government access to all data and communications, s.l.: Computer Science and 
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory - MIT. 
Access Now, 2016. Third Annual Heroes & Villains of Human Rights and 
Communications Surveillance. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.accessnow.org/third-annual-heroes-villains-human-
rights-communications-surveillance/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Adler, E. & Barnett, M., 2009. Security Communities in theoretical perspective. In: 
E. Adler, ed. Security Communities. s.l.:Cambridge University Press, pp. 3-28. 
Adrian, 2016. Adrian Interview [Interview] (1 April 2016). 
Albert, R., Jeong, H. & Barabasi, A.-L., 2000. Error and attack tolerance of complex 
networks. Nature, 40(6), pp. 378-382. 
Altheide, D. L., 2016. Terrorism and the Politics of Fear. Cultural Studies ↔ Critical 
Methodologies, 6(4), pp. 415-439. 
Alves, A. d. M., 2015. Between the “Battlefield” Metaphor and Promises of 
Generativity: Contrasting Discourses on Cyberconflict. Canadian Journal of 
Communications, 40(3), pp. 389-406. 
American Civil Liberties Union, 2013. You May Have 'Nothing to Hide' But You Still 
Have Something to Fear. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.aclu.org/blog/you-may-have-nothing-hide-you-still-
have-something-fear 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
291 
 
Amnesty International, 2013. UN response to surveillance must strike balance 
between privacy and security. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/10/un-response-
surveillance-must-strike-balance-between-privacy-and-security/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Anderson, C., Lepper, M. & Ross, L., 1980. Perseverance of social theories: The role 
of explanation in the persistence of discredited information.. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 39(6), pp. 1037-1049. 
Anderson, D., 2015. A Question of Trust - Report of the Investigatory Powers Review, 
s.l.: Crown. 
Anderson, T. & Kanuka, H., 2003. E-research Methods, Strategies and Issues. 
s.l.:Allyn and Bacon. 
Andrea, 2016. Twitter. [Online]  
Available at: https://twitter.com/puellavulnerata/status/684719616568999936 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Andreessen, M., 2015. Edward Snowden: Clinton's Call for a 'Manhattan-Like 
Project' Is Terrifying. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/edward-snowden-
clintons-call-for-a-manhattan-like-project-is-terrifying-20151220 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Anon., 2016. Pioneer In Internet Anonymity Hands FBI A Huge Gift In Building 
Dangerous Backdoored Encryption System. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.TechDirt.com/articles/20160106/09090233253/pioneer-internet-
anonymity-hands-fbi-huge-gift-building-dangerous-backdoored-encryption-
system.shtml 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Anon., 2016. Social media giants 'failing' on extremism - MPs. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-37180159 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Anon., n.d. Surveillance Self-Defense - End-to-end encryption. [Online]  
Available at: https://ssd.eff.org/en/glossary/end-end-encryption 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Anonymous, 2013. Anonymous Operation Last Resort. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WaPni5O2YyI 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Anonymous, n.d. Someone to watch over you. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.stylist.co.uk/people/someone-to-watch-over-you 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Antispirituality.net, n.d. The Cult of Cryptography. [Online]  
Available at: http://antispirituality.net/cryptography 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
292 
 
Appelbaum, J., 2016. Twitter. [Online]  
Available at: https://twitter.com/ioerror/status/684763375260270592 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Apple Inc, 2016. A Message to Our Customers. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/ 
Apple Inc, n.d. Apple Privacy Policy. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.apple.com/uk/privacy/government-information-
requests/ 
[Accessed 17 2 2016]. 
Apple, 2015. Written Evidence - Draft Investigatory Powers Committee. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/draft-
investigatory-powers-bill/written-evidence-draft-investigatory-powers-
committee.pdf 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Apple, 2017. iOS Security. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Apple & Facebook, G. M. T. Y., 2016. Written evidence submitted by Apple Inc, 
Facebook Inc, Google Inc, Microsoft Corp, Twitter Inc and Yahoo Inc (IPB 21). 
[Online]  
Available at: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmpublic/investigatorypowers/
Memo/IPB21.htm 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Apple, n.d. Apple Privacy Policy. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.apple.com/uk/privacy/government-information-
requests/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Apple, n.d. Apple Privacy Policy. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.apple.com/uk/privacy/government-information-
requests/ 
[Accessed 17 2 2016]. 
Apple, n.d. Government Data Requests. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.apple.com/uk/privacy/government-information-
requests/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Aradau, C., 2004. Security and the democratic scene: desecuritization and 
emancipation. Journal of International Relations and Development, 7(4), pp. 388-
413. 
ArsTechnica, 2017. To keep Tor hack source code secret, DOJ dismisses child porn 
case. [Online]  
Available at: https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/03/doj-drops-case-
against-child-porn-suspect-rather-than-disclose-fbi-hack/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
293 
 
Aspen Institute, 2016. From Apple to ISIL: FBI Director on How Technology is 
Changing Security. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/from-apple-to-isil-fbi-
director-on-how-technology-is-changing-security/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Assange, J., 2013. Cyhperpunks: Freedom and the future of the Internet. s.l.:OR 
Books. 
Assange, J., 2014. Wikileaks meets Surveillance Valley: An interview with Julian 
Assange. [Online]  
Available at: https://pando.com/2014/10/12/wikileaks-meets-surveillance-valley-
an-interview-with-julian-assange/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Associated Press, USA Today, Vice Media, 2016. Case No.16-cv-1850, s.l.: United 
States District Court for the Distrit of Columbia. 
Aviva, 2016. UK: Cancer most feared disease in Britain - but more than 8 million 
British adults take no action to reduce their risk. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.aviva.com/newsroom/news-releases/2016/01/uk-
cancer-most-feared-disease-in-britain-but-more-than-8-million-british-adults-
take-no-action-to-reduce-their-risk-17581/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Bakir, V., 2015. “Veillant Panoptic Assemblage”: Mutual Watching and Resistance 
to Mass Surveillance after Snowden. Media and Communication, 3(3), pp. 12-25. 
Baliga, S. & Sjostrom, T., 2004. Arms Races and Negotiations. Review of Economic 
Studies, Volume 71, pp. 351-369. 
Balkan, A., 2015. So Long, and Thanks for All the Fish. [Online]  
Available at: https://ar.al/notes/so-long-and-thanks-for-all-the-fish/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Balzacq, T., 2005. The Three Face of Securitization. European Journal of 
International Relations, 11(2), pp. 171-201. 
Balzacq, T., 2005. The Three Faces of Securitisation: Political Agency, Audience and 
Context. European Jounral of International Relations, 11(2), pp. 171-201. 
Balzacq, T., 2011. Securitisaion Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and 
Dissolve. s.l.:Routledge. 
Balzacq, T., 2011. Securitisation Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and 
Dissolve. Oxon: Routledge. 
Barlow, J. P., 1996. A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Barnes, S., 2006. A privacy paradox: Social networking in the United States. First 
Monday, 11(9), pp. Volume 11, Number 9. 
Barry Buzan, O. W. J. d. W., 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
294 
 
Bartlett, J., 2015. The Dark Net. London: Random House. 
Bartlett, J., 2015. The online surveillance debate is really about whether you trust 
governments or not. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-
security/11979682/The-online-surveillance-debate-is-really-about-whether-you-
trust-governments-or-not.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Bartlett, J., 2015. Twitter. [Online]  
Available at: https://twitter.com/JamieJBartlett/status/663984482735796224 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
BBC News, 2000. Y2K: Overhyped and oversold?. [Online]  
Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/talking_point/586938.stm 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
BBC News, 2003. Ex-GCHQ officer 'preventing war'. [Online]  
Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3243266.stm 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
BBC News, 2006. UK general warns of Afghan threat. [Online]  
Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4779321.stm 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
BBC News, 2014. Facebook emotion experiment sparks criticism. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-28051930 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
BBC News, 2014. Facebook hosted Lee Rigby death chat ahead of soldier's murder. 
[Online]  
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-30199131 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
BBC News, 2015. Edward Snowden interview: 'Smartphones can be taken over'. 
[Online]  
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34444233 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
BBC News, 2017. NHS cyber attack: Everything you need to know about 'biggest 
ransomware' offensive in history. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/13/nhs-cyber-attack-
everything-need-know-biggest-ransomware-offensive/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Belfast Telegraph, 2014. Snooping tools GCHQ could use to hack your phone's 
microphone, camera and keypad. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/technology/snooping-tools-gchq-
could-use-to-hack-your-phones-microphone-camera-and-keypad-nosey-smurf-
gumfish-and-foggybottom-30272505.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Benjamins, J., 2013. The Good is Light and Bad is Dark Metaphor in Feature Films. 
Metaphor and the Social World, 3(2), pp. 160-179. 
295 
 
Berkman Center, 2016. Don't Panic. Making Progress on the 'Going Dark' Debate, 
s.l.: February. 
Bernal, P., 2014. Open letter from UK legal academic experts re DRIP. [Online]  
Available at: https://paulbernal.wordpress.com/2014/07/15/open-letter-from-uk-
legal-academic-experts-re-drip/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Berners-Lee, T., 2012. Tim Berners-Lee urges government to stop the snooping bill. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/apr/17/tim-
berners-lee-monitoring-internet 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Berners-Lee, T., 2012. Tim Berners-Lee urges government to stop the snooping bill. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/apr/17/tim-
berners-lee-monitoring-internet 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Berners-Lee, T., 2012. Tim Berners-Lee urges government to stop the snooping bill. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/apr/17/tim-
berners-lee-monitoring-internet 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Betz, D. J. & Stevens, T., 2013. Analogical reasoning and cyber security. Security 
Dialogue, 44(2), pp. 147-164. 
Bigo, D. et al., 2014. After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of Surveillance. 
International Political Sociology, 8(2), pp. 121-144. 
Binney, W., 2016. William Binney: NSA Surveillance Takes a Page From Nazi 
Germany. [Online]  
Available at: https://sputniknews.com/us/201605311040567328-loud-clear-
binney-nsa/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Birnhack, M. D. & Elkin-Koren, N., 2003. The Invisible Handshake: The Reemergence 
of the State in the Digital Environment. Virginia Journal of Law and Technology, 
Volume 6, pp. 1-57. 
Blakeley, R. & Raphael, S., 2016. British torture in the 'war on terror'. European 
journal of International Relations, 23(2), pp. 243-266. 
Blaze, M., 1994. Protocol Failure in the Escrowed Encryption Standard. Virginia, 
ACM Conference on Computer Communications Security. 
Bleksley, P., 2016. Peter Interview [Interview] (4 April 2016). 
Blog, S., n.d. Home. [Online]  
Available at: http://spyblog.org.uk/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
296 
 
Boeke, S., 2017. Reframing 'Mass Surveillance'. In: M. Conway, et al. eds. Terrorists 
Use of the Internet. s.l.:IOS Press Books, pp. 307-318. 
Booth, K. & Wheeler, N. J., 2008. The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust 
in International Politics. s.l.:Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bossong, R., 2008. The EU's Mature Counterterrorism policy - A Critical History and 
Functional Assessment, s.l.: LSE. 
Boswell, C., 2007. The Securitisation of Migration: A Risky Strategy for European 
States, s.l.: Danish Institue For International Studies. 
Botero, G., 2017. The Reason of State. s.l.:Cambridge University Press. 
Boulding, K., 1959. National Images and International Systems. The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 3(2), pp. 120-131. 
Bowcott, O., 2015. GCHQ accused of 'persistent' illegal hacking at security tribunal. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/dec/01/gchq-accused-
of-persistent-illegal-hacking-at-security-tribunal 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Bowcott, O., 2015. GCHQ accused of 'persistent' illegal hacking at security tribunal. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/dec/01/gchq-accused-
of-persistent-illegal-hacking-at-security-tribunal 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Braithwaite, A., 2013. The logic of public-fear in terrorism and counter-terrorism. 
Journal o fpolice and criminal psychology, 28(2), pp. 95-101. 
Branum, J. & Charteris-Black, J., 2015. The Edward Snowden affair: A corpus study 
of the British press. Discourse and Communication, 9(2), pp. 1-22. 
Britton, W. A., 2005. Beyond Bond: Spies in Fiction and Film. s.l.:Praeger Publishers. 
Bruno, Z., 2014. The PRISM Program Panopticon: Foucault’s Insights in the Era of 
Snowden, s.l.: s.n. 
Bruno, Z., 2014. The PRISM Program Panopticon: Foucault’s Insights in the Era of 
Snowden, s.l.: Occidental College. 
Buchanan, B., 2016. The Cybersecurity Dilemma: Hacking, Trust and Fear Between 
Nations. London: C. Hurst and Co. 
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, 1979. Treaty Between The 
United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II), s.l.: Bureau of Arms Control, 
Verification and Compliance. 
Busan, B., 2004. American Exceptionalism, Unipolarity and September 11: 
Understanding the Behaviour of the Sole Superpower, Montreal: ISA Conference. 
Busan, B., Waever, O. & Wilde, J. d., 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. 
s.l.:Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc. 
297 
 
Bush, G., 2002. Full text of Bush speech on Iraq. [Online]  
Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2309049.stm 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Butterfield, H., 1951. History and Human Relations. 3 ed. s.l.:Collins. 
Butterfield, H., 1951. History and Human Relations. s.l.:Macmillan. 
Buzan, B., Waever, O. & Wilde, J. d., 1998. Security: A New Framework For Analysis. 
s.l.:Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Cable, J., 2015. An overview of public opinion polls since the Edward Snowden 
revelations in June 2013, Cardiff: Cardiff University. 
Cameron, D., 2010. Olympic Park to offer high-tech business development.. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-announces-
east-london-tech-city-to-rival-silicon-valley 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Cameron, D., 2013. David Cameron: Guardian Snowden leaks 'damaged national 
security'. [Online]  
Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10383089/David-Cameron-
Guardian-Snowden-leaks-damaged-national-security.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Cameron, D., 2014. UK PM Cameron says Internet must not 'be an ungoverned 
space'. [Online]  
Available at: 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/11/14/uk_pm_cameron_says_internet_must
_not_be_an_ungoverned_space/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Cameron, D., 2015. David Cameron Wants To Ban Encryption. [Online]  
Available at: http://uk.businessinsider.com/david-cameron-encryption-apple-pgp-
2015-1?r=US 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Cameron, D., 2015. Facebook and Twitter have ‘social responsibility’ to help fight 
terrorism, says David Cameron. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/16/cameron-
interrupt-terrorists-cybersecurity-cyberattack-threat 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Campaign for Accountability, 2016. Ethics Letter. [Online]  
Available at: http://campaignforaccountability.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/WH-Ethics-Letter-10-4-16.pdf 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Campbell, D., 2015. Spooks admit it in private: Snowden has made them rethink 
their methods. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/02/spooks-
snowden-transparency-mi6-gchq-cia 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
298 
 
Campbell, D., 2015. Talking to GCHQ (interception not required) .... [Online]  
Available at: http://www.duncancampbell.org/content/talking-gchq-interception-
not-required 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Campbell, D. & Goodwin, B., 2016. MPs’ private emails are routinely accessed by 
GCHQ. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.computerweekly.com/news/450297574/MPs-private-
emails-are-routinely-accessed-by-GCHQ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Campbell, D. & Honigsbaum, M., 1999. Britain and US spy on world. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/1999/may/23/duncancampbell.markhonigsbau
m 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Cannataci, J., 2015. Digital surveillance 'worse than Orwell', says new UN privacy 
chief. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/24/we-need-
geneva-convention-for-the-internet-says-new-un-privacy-chief 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Casey, T., 2017. Public Interest Defence: If the government has nothing to hide then 
there's nothing to fear. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.pcaw.org.uk/latest/blog/public-interest-defence-if-the-
government-has-nothing-to-hide-then-theres-nothing-to-fear 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Castano, E., Sacchi, S. & Gries, P. H., 2003. he Perception of the Other in 
International Relations: Evidence for the Polarizing Effect of Entitativity. Political 
Psychology, 24(3), pp. 449-468. 
Caster, C. N., 2016. Edward Snowden, Hero or Traitor? An Analysis of News Media 
Framing, California: the Faculty of the Communication Studies Department, 
California Polytechnic State University. 
Cavelty, M. D., 2007. Cyber-Terror – Looming Threat or Phantom Menace? The 
Framing of the US Cyber-Threat Debate. Journal of Information Technology & 
Politics, 4(1), pp. 19-36. 
Cavelty, M. D., 2013. From Cyber Bombs to Political Fallout: Threat Representations 
with an Impact in the Cyber-Security Discourse. International Studies Review, 15(1), 
pp. 105-122. 
Cavelty, M. D., 2014. Breaking the Cyber-Security Dilemma: Aligning Security Needs 
and Removing Vulnerabilities. Science and Engineering Ethics, 20(3), pp. 701-715. 
Cavelty, M. D., 2014. Breaking the Cyber-Security Dilemma: Aligning Security Needs 
and Removing Vulnerabilities. Science and Engineering Ethics, 20(3), pp. 701-715. 
Cavelty, M. D., 2014. Breaking the Cyber-Security Dilemma: Aligning Security Needs 
and Removing Vulnerabilities. Science and Engineering Ethics, 20(3), pp. 701-715. 
299 
 
Cerny, P., 2000. The New Security Dilemma: divisibility, defection and disorder in 
the global era. Review of International Studies, 26(4), pp. 623-646. 
Cerny, P., 2005. Terrorism and the New Security Dilemma. Naval War College 
Review, 58(1), pp. 11-33. 
Cesari, J., 2009. The Securitisation of Islam in Europe, s.l.: Centre for European Policy 
Studies. 
Chakrabarti, S., 2015. Let me be clear – Edward Snowden is a hero. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/14/edward-
snowden-hero-government-scare-tactics 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Channel 4, 2015. Channel 4 alerts Londoners to surveillance power of the state. 
[Online]  
Available at: http://www.channel4.com/info/press/news/channel-4-alerts-
londoners-to-surveillance-power-of-the-state 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Charney, D. L. & Irvin, J. A., 2014. A Guide to the Psychology of Espionage, s.l.: 
Association of Former Intelligence Officers. 
Charrett, C., 2009. A Critical Application of Securitization Theory: Overcoming the 
Normative Dilemma of Writing Security, s.l.: Institut Català Internacional per la Pau. 
Chaum, D., 1981. Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and Digital 
Pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 2(24), pp. 84-88. 
Chaum, D., 2016. The Father of Online Anonymity has a plan to end the Crypto Wars. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.wired.com/2016/01/david-chaum-father-of-online-
anonymity-plan-to-end-the-crypto-wars/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Chaum, D., 2016. What Everybody Misunderstands About Privacy Pioneer David 
Chaum’s Controversial Crypto Plan. [Online]  
Available at: http://fortune.com/2016/01/14/encryption-wars-crypto-david-
chaum/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Chaum, D. et al., 2016. cMix: Anonymization by High-Performance Scalable Mixing. 
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive. 
Chilcott, J., 2016. The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, s.l.: The Iraq Inquiry. 
Ciobotea, O., 2016. Why the Apple-FBI battle made people realize the importance 
of privacy faster than Snowden. [Online]  
Available at: https://venturebeat.com/2016/04/29/why-the-apple-fbi-battle-
made-people-realize-the-importance-of-privacy-faster-than-snowden/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Citizen Lab, 2018. About the Ciitzen Lab. [Online]  
Available at: https://citizenlab.ca/about/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
300 
 
Citizen Lab, n.d. About the Citizen Lab. [Online]  
Available at: https://citizenlab.org/about/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
City AM, 2016. Britain wants to woo US tech entrepreneurs to expand their 
businesses in London and the UK with SXSW campaign launch by mayor's office and 
UKTI. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.cityam.com/236392/britain-wants-to-woo-us-tech-
entrepreneurs-to-expand-their-businesses-in-london-and-the-uk-with-sxsw-
campaign-launch-by-mayors-office-and-ukti 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
City AM, 2017. UK woos foreign tech investors to boost post-Brexit digital economy. 
[Online]  
Available at: http://www.cityam.com/272167/uk-woos-foreign-tech-investors-
boost-post-brexit-digital 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Clapper, J., 2016. SPY CHIEF COMPLAINS THAT EDWARD SNOWDEN SPED UP 
SPREAD OF ENCRYPTION BY 7 YEARS. [Online]  
Available at: https://theintercept.com/2016/04/25/spy-chief-complains-that-
edward-snowden-sped-up-spread-of-encryption-by-7-years/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Clarke, R. A., 2010. Cyber War: The next threat to National Security and what to do 
about it. s.l.:Harper Collins. 
Clarke, R. A., 2012. Cyber War: The next threat to National Security and what to do 
about it. s.l.:Harper Collins. 
Clegg, N., 2012. Draft Communications Data Bill cannot proceed - Nick Clegg. 
[Online]  
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-20668953 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Clegg, N., 2013. Edward Snowden leaks damaging, says Nick Clegg. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-24476047 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Clegg, N., 2014. Security and privacy in the internet age. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/security-and-privacy-in-
the-internet-age 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Clement, M., n.d. Television, Ethnographic Research and Reality. [Online]  
Available at: https://mc560.wordpress.com/2015/08/24/ethnographic-research-
and-reality-television/ 
[Accessed 11 February 2018]. 
Clinton, H., 2015. Democratic debate transcript: Clinton, Sanders, O'Malley in New 
Hampshire. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/democratic-debate-transcript-
clinton-sanders-omalley-in-new-hampshire/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
301 
 
Clinton, H., 2016. Hillary Clinton’s Initiative on Technology & Innovation. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20161205091208/https://www.hillaryclinton.com/b
riefing/factsheets/2016/06/27/hillary-clintons-initiative-on-technology-
innovation/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Colaresi, M. P., 2014. Democracy Declassified: The Secrecy Dilemma in National 
Security. s.l.:Oxford University Press. 
Collins, L. et al., 2001. A National Survey of Stress Reactions after the September 
11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks. The New England Journal of Medicine, 345(20), pp. 
1507-1512. 
Comey, J., 2014. Going Dark Are technology, privacy andpublic safety on a collision 
course?. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-dark-are-technology-
privacy-and-public-safety-on-a-collision-course 
[Accessed 17 February 2016]. 
Comey, J., 2014. Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a 
Collision Course?. [Online]  
Available at: Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision 
Course? 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Comey, J., 2014. Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a 
Collision Course?. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-dark-are-technology-
privacy-and-public-safety-on-a-collision-course 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Comey, J., 2016. FBI Director Comments on San Bernardino Matter. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-director-
comments-on-san-bernardino-matter 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Comey, J., 2016. FBI director looks to 2017 for 'adult' encryption debate. [Online]  
Available at: http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/293786-comey-targets-2017-
for-less-emotional-adult-conversation-on-encryption 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Cook, T., 2015. Apple boss: We have a human right to privacy. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/apple/11441265/Terrorists-
should-be-eliminated-says-Apples-Tim-Cook.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Cook, T., 2015. Apple's Tim Cook declares the end of the PC. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/01/21/apples-tim-
cook-declares-the-end-of-the-pc-and-hints-at-new-medi/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Cook, T., 2015. Tim Cook talks Edward Snowden, Apple Car and more in new 
interview. [Online]  
302 
 
Available at: http://bgr.com/2015/03/02/tim-cook-interview-snowden/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Cook, T., 2016. Apple CEO Time Cook on his fight with the FBI and why he won't back 
down. [Online]  
Available at: http://time.com/magazine/us/4262476/march-28th-2016-vol-187-
no-11-u-s/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Cook, T., 2016. Customer Letter. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Cook, T., 2016. Here's the Full Transcript of TIME’s Interview With Apple CEO Tim 
Cook. [Online]  
Available at: http://time.com/4261796/tim-cook-transcript/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Cook, T., 2016. Tim Cook talks encryption in Utah. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1yKcS2C24sM 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Co, R., 2014. The New World Order: The Evil Exposed!. s.l.:Rafal Col Publishing. 
Cotton, T., 2016. Cotton Statement on Apple's Refusal to Obey a Judge's Order to 
Assist the FBI in a Terrorism Investigation. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.cotton.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=319 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Cotton, T., 2016. Cotton Statement on Apple's Refusal to Obey a Judge's Order to 
Assist the FBI in a Terrorism Investigation. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.cotton.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=319 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Counsel for Amici Curiae Digital Rights Ireland Limited, Liberty, and the Open Rights 
Group, 2014. Brief of Amici Curiae Digital Rights Ireland limited, Liberty and the 
Open Rights Group in support of appelant Microsoft Corporation. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.scribd.com/document/250254939/Amicus-Brief-Digital-
Rights-Ireland-Liberty-and-ORG-in-Microsoft-v-USA 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Coustick-Deal, R., 2015. Responding to "Nothing to hide, Nothing to fear". [Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2015/responding-to-nothing-
to-hide-nothing-to-fear 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Crossman, G., 2008. Nothing to hide, nothing to fear?. International Review of Law, 
Computers and Technology, 22(1-2), pp. 115-118. 
Cryptome, 2000. Microsoft offer to resolve "questions about NSA_key", then put up 
a brick wall.. [Online]  
Available at: https://cryptome.org/nsakey-ms-dc.htm 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
303 
 
Cult of Mac, 2016. AT&T CEO thinks Apple should give up on protecting encryption. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.cultofmac.com/408298/att-ceo-thinks-apple-should-
give-up-on-protecting-encryption/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Cypherspace.org, n.d. export-a-crypto-system sig. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/rsa/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Dalek, J., Senft, A., Crete-Nishihata, M. & Deibert, R., 2013. O Pakistan We Stand on 
Guard for Three: An Analysis of Canada-based Netsweeper’s Role in Pakistan’s 
Censorship Regime, s.l.: Citizen Lab. 
David, 2016. David Interview [Interview] (15 April 2016). 
Davis, D., 2013. David Davis expresses strong support for the role played by Edward 
Snowden. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.daviddavismp.com/davis-davis-expresses-strong-
support-for-the-role-played-by-edward-snowden/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Davis, D., 2015. Surveillance and civil liberties: Interview with David Davis MP. 
[Online]  
Available at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2015/11/05/surveillance-
and-civil-liberties-interview-with-david-davis-mp/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Dawson, L. S., 2016. Twitter. [Online]  
Available at: https://twitter.com/linton_s_dawson/status/684803496072314881 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Deibert, R., 2008. Global Civil Society and the Securitisation of the Internet, s.l.: MIT 
Press. 
Deibert, R., 2012. The Growing Dark Side of Cyberspace. Penn State Journal of Law 
and International Affairs, 1(2), p. 260. 
Deibert, R., 2012. The Growing Dark Side of Cyberspace. Penn State Journal of Law 
and International Affairs, 1(2), p. 260. 
Deibert, R., 2012. The Growing Dark Side of Cyberspace. Penn State Journal of Law 
and International Affairs, 1(2), p. 260. 
Deibert, R. & Crete-Nishihata, M., 2012. Global Governance and the Spread of 
Cyberspace Controls. Global Governance, 18(3), pp. 339-361. 
Deibert, R. & Rohozinski, R., 2008. Good for Liberty, Bad for Security? Global Civil 
Society and the Securitization of the Internet. In: Access Denied: The Practice and 
Policy of Global Internet Filtering. s.l.:MIT Press, pp. 123-149. 
Deibert, R. & Rohozinski, R., 2010. Liberation vs. Control: The Future of Cyberspace. 
Journal of Democracy, 21(4), pp. 43-57. 
Deligiaouri, A. & Popovic, M., 2010. Reality TV and Reality of TV: How much Reality 
is There in Reality TV shows?. In: S. V. Bauwel & N. Carpenter, eds. Trans-Reality 
304 
 
Television: The Transgression of Reality, Genre, Politics and Audience. s.l.:Lexington 
Books, pp. 65-86. 
DeNardis, L., 2010. The Emerging Field of Internet Governance. s.l.:Yale Information 
Society Project; Yale Law School. 
DeNardis, L. & Hackl, A., October 2015. Internet governance by social media 
platforms. Telecommunications Policy, 39(9), pp. 761-770. 
Derakhshan, H., 2016. Mark Zuckerberg is a hypocrite - Facebook has destroyed the 
open web. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/mark-zuckerberg-hypocrite-facebook-has-
destroyed-open-web-1559298 
[Accessed 18 February 2018]. 
Deutsch, K. W., 1957. Political Community and the North American Area. 
s.l.:Princetno University Press. 
Dhami, M., 2011. Behavioural Science Support for JTRIG’s (Joint Threat Research 
and Intelligence Group’s) Effects and Online HUMINT Operations, s.l.: GCHQ Report 
disclosed by Edward Snowden. 
Diffie, W., 1993. The Impact of a Secret Cryptographic Standard on Encryption, 
Privacy, Law Enforcement and Technology. [Online]  
Available at: https://epic.org/crypto/clipper/diffie_testimony.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Diffie, W. & Hellman, M. E., 1976. New Directions in Cryptography. IEEE 
Transactions On Information Theory, 22(6), pp. 644-654. 
Dilger, D., 2016. Hillary Clinton's tech platform backs Apple positions on encryption, 
privacy, innovation, patents, education. [Online]  
Available at: http://appleinsider.com/articles/16/06/29/hillary-clintons-tech-
platform-backs-apple-inc-positions-on-encryption-privacy-innovation 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Ditchley Park, 2015. Intelligence, security and privacy. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.ditchley.co.uk/conferences/past-programme/2010-
2019/2015/intelligence 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Dixon-Thayer, D., 2016. Mozilla Exec: There’s No Such Thing as a Safe Backdoor. 
[Online]  
Available at: http://time.com/4263121/apple-fbi-backdoor/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Dixon-Thayer, D., 2016. Mozilla Exec: There’s No Such Thing as a Safe Backdoor. 
[Online]  
Available at: http://time.com/4263121/apple-fbi-backdoor/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Doctorow, C., 2015. Every issue is a digital issue. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2015/every-issue-is-a-digital-
issue 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
305 
 
Dodge, M. & Kitchen, R., 2001. Mapping Cyberspace. s.l.:Routledge. 
Donovan, K. M. & IV, C. F. K., 2015. The Role Of Entertainment Media In Perceptions 
Of Police Use Of Force. Criminal Justice and Behaviour, 42(12), pp. 1261-1281. 
Don't Spy On Us, 2016. Parliament passes most extreme surveillance law in UK 
history. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.dontspyonus.org.uk/blog/2016/11/17/parliament-
passes-most-extreme-surveillance-law-in-uk-history/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Drake, T., 2016. Privacy experts fear Donald Trump running global surveillance 
network. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/11/trump-
surveillance-network-nsa-privacy 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Dreifach, K., 2015. Apple INC's Reponse to Court's October 9, 2015 Memorandum 
and Order. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.scribd.com/document/286689775/Apple-Brief-
10192015 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
DuPont, Q., 2015. Opinion: It's time to rethink polarizing encryption debate. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-
Voices/2015/1202/Opinion-It-s-time-to-rethink-polarizing-encryption-debate 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Eccles, A., 2016. Hunted Interview [Interview] 2016. 
Edelman, 2017. Edelman Trust Barometer, s.l.: Edelman. 
Edelman, 2017. Edelman Trust Barometer, s.l.: Edelman. 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2013. Ten Steps You Can Take Right Now Against 
Internet Surveillance. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/10/ten-steps-against-
surveillance 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2014. Academics and Researchers Against Mass 
Surveillance. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/academics-and-researchers-
against-mass-surveillance 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2014. Academics and Researchers Against Mass 
Surveillance. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/academics-and-researchers-
against-mass-surveillance 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2014. The 90s and Now: FBI and its Inability to Cope 
with Encryption. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/10/90s-and-now-fbi-and-its-
306 
 
inability-cope-encryption 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2015. Who Has Your Back - Protecting your data 
from Government Requests. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.eff.org/who-has-your-back-government-data-requests-
2015 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2017. Who Has Your Back, s.l.: Electronic Frontier 
Foundation. 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, n.d. Counter-Surveillance Success Stories. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.eff.org/csss 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, n.d. Full disk encrption. [Online]  
Available at: https://ssd.eff.org/en/glossary/full-disk-encryption 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, n.d. Full disk encrption. [Online]  
Available at: https://ssd.eff.org/en/glossary/full-disk-encryption 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Electronic Privacy Information Centre, 1994. Crypto Experts Letter. [Online]  
Available at: https://epic.org/crypto/clipper/crypto_experts_letter_1_94.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Electronic Privacy Information Centre, 2016. Apple v. FBI. [Online]  
Available at: https://epic.org/amicus/crypto/apple/#legal 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Emily, 2016. Emily Interview [Interview] (1 April 2016). 
Erikson, J., 1999. Observers or Advocates?: On the Political Role of Security 
Analysts. Cooperation and Conflict, 34(3), pp. 311-333. 
EU Transparency Register, 2016. Google. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://lobbyfacts.eu/representative/1d40cdaf822941888d1e6121858bb617/goo
gle 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Evans, J., 2016. The 'Snooper's Charter' hysteria is absurd – The IPB sets a new 
standard for the world. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/09/snoopers-charter-
hysteria-absurd-ipb-sets-new-standard-world/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Evera, S. V., 1998. Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War. International Security, 
22(4), pp. 5-43. 
Evera, S. V., 1998. Why States Beleive Foolish Ideas: Non-Self Evaluation by 
Government and Society, Washington DC: Paper presented at the annual meeting 
of the American Political Science Association. 
307 
 
Facebook, 2017. Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube Announce Formation of 
the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism. [Online]  
Available at: https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/06/global-internet-forum-to-
counter-terrorism/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Facebook, 2017. Hard Questions: How We Counter Terrorism. [Online]  
Available at: https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/06/how-we-counter-
terrorism/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Facebook, G. M. T. Y., 2015. Written Evidence - Investigatory Powers Committee. 
[Online]  
Available at: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/draft-
investigatory-powers-bill/written-evidence-draft-investigatory-powers-
committee.pdf 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Farwell, J. P. & Rohozinski, R., 2011. Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War. Survival, 
53(1), pp. 23-40. 
Farwell, J. P. & Rohozinski, R., 2012. The New Reality of Cyber War. Survival, 54(4), 
pp. 107-120. 
Fast Company, 2012. NYPD, Microsoft Launch All-Seeing “Domain Awareness 
System” With Real-Time CCTV, License Plate Monitoring [Updated]. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.fastcompany.com/3000272/nypd-microsoft-launch-all-
seeing-domain-awareness-system-real-time-cctv-license-plate-monito 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Fast Company, 2013. Silicon Valley And The Intelligence Agencies. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.fastcompany.com/3012725/silicon-valley-and-the-
intelligence-agencies 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Fast, S., 2015. Facebook | Panopticon: an analysis of Facebook and its parallels to 
the Foucaultian Panopticon, s.l.: The University of Tennessee. 
Fast, S. A., 2015. Facebook | Panopticon: an analysis of Facebook and its parallels 
to the Foucaultian Panopticon, s.l.: University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. 
FBI, 2016. Going Dark. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.fbi.gov/services/operational-technology/going-dark 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Ferguson, H., 2014. Undercover in MI6: what's it like to work as a spy?. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/careers/careers-blog/spy-career-
secret-service 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Fierke, K. M., 2005. Diplomatic Interventions: Conflict and change in a Globalising 
World. s.l.:Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
Financial Times, 2016. Google and WhatsApp back Apple in FBI encryption fight. 
[Online]  
308 
 
Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/74a91e24-d5dd-11e5-8887-
98e7feb46f27 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Fiona, 2016. GCHQ Interview [Interview] (15 April 2016). 
Fishman, M. & Cavender, G., 1998. Television Reality Crime Programs: Context and 
History. In: M. Fishman & G. Cavender, eds. Entertaining Crime. s.l.:Walter de 
Gruyter, pp. 3-18. 
Fitzgerald, M., Hough, M., Joseph, I. & Qureshi, T., 2002. Policing for London. 1 ed. 
s.l.:Willan. 
Floyd, R., 2008. The Environmental Security Debate and its Significance for Climate 
Change. Italian Journal of International Affairs, 43(3), pp. 51-65. 
Floyd, R., 2011. Can securitisation theory be used in normative analysis? Towards a 
just securitisaion theory. Security Dialogue, 42(4-5), pp. 427-439. 
Foreign Policy, 2013. Is Edward Snowden the New Che Guevara?. [Online]  
Available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/19/is-edward-snowden-the-new-
che-guevara/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Fortune, 2012. Google and Facebook’s new tactic in the tech wars. [Online]  
Available at: http://fortune.com/2012/07/30/google-and-facebooks-new-tactic-in-
the-tech-wars/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Foucault, M., 1971. The Order of Discourse, s.l.: Gallimard. 
Foucault, M., 1975. Discipline and Punish. s.l.:Pantheon Books. 
Foucault, M., 2002. The Subject of Power - Essential Works of Foucault - 1954-1984. 
London: Penguin. 
Foundation for Information Policy Research, 2005. The Crypto Wars Are Over!. 
[Online]  
Available at: http://www.fipr.org/press/050525crypto.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Fox, L., 2014. Snowden leaks 'criminally irresponsible', MP Liam Fox says. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-27053116 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Freeh, L. J., 1997. The Impact of Encryption on Public Safety. [Online]  
Available at: https://cryptome.org/jya/fbi090397.htm 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Freiwald, S., 2014. Nothing to Fear or Nowhere to Hide: Competing Visions of the 
NSA's 215 Program, s.l.: Colorado Law Technology Journal. 
Funnell, L. & Dodds, K., 2017. Geographies, Genders and Geopolitics of James Bond. 
2 ed. s.l.:Palgrave Macmillan. 
Gandy, O., 1993. The Panoptic Sort: Political Economy of Personal Information. 
s.l.:Westview Press Inc. 
309 
 
Ganguly, S. & Hagerty, D. T., 2006. Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the 
Shadow of Nuclear Weapons. s.l.:University of Washington Press. 
Gates, B., 2016. Bill Gates backs FBI in battle with Apple over San Bernardino killer's 
phone. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/23/bill-gates-
fbi-apple-san-bernardino-killer-phone 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
GCHQ Lawyer, 2013. GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret access to world's 
communications. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-
world-communications-nsa 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
GCHQ, 2014. Investigatory Powers Tribunal rejects assertions of mass surveillance. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.gchq.gov.uk/news-article/investigatory-powers-
tribunal-rejects-assertions-mass-surveillance 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
GCHQ, 2016. GCHQ Minority Report. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.gchq.gov.uk/gchq-minority-report 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
GCHQ, 2016. GCHQ Minority Report. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.gchq.gov.uk/gchq-minority-report 
GCHQ, 2017. National challenge will develop schoolgirls' cyber security skills. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.gchq.gov.uk/press-release/national-challenge-will-
develop-schoolgirls-cyber-security-skills 
Georgieva, M., 2015. Contesting the State Securitisation of Cyberspace: The Impact 
of Alternative Securitizing Actors, s.l.: Central European University. 
Georgieva, M., 2015. Contesting the State Securitisation of Cyberspace: The Impact 
of Alternative Securitizing Actors, s.l.: s.n. 
Georgieva, M., 2015. Contesting the State Securitisation of Cyberspace: The Impact 
of Alternative Securitizing Actors, s.l.: Central European University. 
Ghost.org, 2015. Ghost Moves to DigitalOcean Global Infrastructure. [Online]  
Available at: https://blog.ghost.org/digitalocean/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Gibson, W., 1984. Neuromancer. Paperback Edition 1985 ed. s.l.:Victor Gollancz. 
Girvan, N., 2010. Technification, Sweetification and Treatyfication. Interventions, 
12(1), pp. 100-111. 
Glaser, C., 1997. The Security Dilemma Revisited. World Politics, 50(1), pp. 171-201. 
Glaser, C., 1997. The Security Dilemma Revisited. World Politics, 50(1), pp. 171-201. 
310 
 
Glasgow University, n.d. Metaphor Map of English. [Online]  
Available at: http://mappingmetaphor.arts.gla.ac.uk/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, 2017. Global Internet Forum to 
Counter Terrorism to Hold First Meeting in San Francisco. [Online]  
Available at: https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/07/global-internet-forum-to-
counter-terrorism-to-hold-first-meeting-in-san-francisco/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Glynn, P., 1992. Closing Pandoras Box: Arms Races,Arms Control and the History of 
the Cold War. New York: Basic Books. 
Google Transparency Project, 2017. Investigating Google's European Revolving 
Door. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.googletransparencyproject.org/articles/investigating-
googles-european-revolving-door 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Google, 2013. Snowden leaks: Google 'outraged' at alleged NSA hacking. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-24751821 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Google, 2017. It's Lit - a guide to what teens think is cool, s.l.: Google. 
Gorr, D. & Schünemann, W., 2013. Creating a secure cyberspace – Securitization in 
Internet governance dis-courses and dispositives in Germany and Russia. 
International Review of Information Ethics, 20(1), pp. 37-51. 
Granados, N., 2016. Apple Can, Should, And Will Help FBI Unlock Shooter's iPhone. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/nelsongranados/2016/02/20/apple-
can-should-and-will-help-fbi-unlock-shooters-iphone/#325f7e9331c4 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Greenslade, R., 2013. How Hitler suspended the right to mail and telephone privacy. 
[Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2013/dec/04/surveillance-
adolf-hitler 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Greenwald, G., 2014. No Place to Hide. s.l.:Penguin Random House UK. 
Greenwald, G., 2016. The Snowden effect: Privacy is good for business. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.cnet.com/au/news/the-snowden-effect-privacy-is-
good-for-business-nsa-data-collection/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Grieve, D. & Laing, E., 2009. Rise of the Surveillance State. [Online]  
Available at: https://conservativehome.blogs.com/files/surveillance-state.pdf 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Guardian, 2013. Leaked memos reveal GCHQ efforts to keep mass surveillance 
secret. [Online]  
311 
 
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/leaked-
memos-gchq-mass-surveillance-secret-snowden 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Guarnieri, C., 2016. Twitter. [Online]  
Available at: https://twitter.com/botherder/status/684819562760634369 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Guitton, C., 2013. Cyber insecurity as a national threat: overreaction from 
Germany,. European Security, 22(1), pp. 21-35. 
Haiven, M. & Stoneman, S., 2004. Wal-Mart: The Panopticon of Time, s.l.: Institue 
of Globalization and the Human Condition. 
Hammond, P., 2015. For Philip Hammond, Britain's spies are unsung heroes of 
national security. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/mar/10/philip-
hammond-britain-spies-unsung-heroes-national-security 
Hammond, P., 2016. Fifth of GCHQ intelligence comes from hacking. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/12154733/Fifth-
of-GCHQ-intelligence-comes-from-hacking.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Hammond, P., 2017. Chancellor's speech at the National Cyber Security Centre 
opening. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chancellors-speech-at-
the-national-cyber-security-centre-opening 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Hannigan, R., 2014. The web is a terrorist’s command-and-control network of 
choice. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/c89b6c58-6342-11e4-8a63-
00144feabdc0 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Hannigan, R., 2014. The web is a terrorist’s command-and-control network of 
choice. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/c89b6c58-6342-11e4-8a63-
00144feabdc0 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Hannigan, R., 2014. The web is a terrorist’s command-and-control network of 
choice. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/c89b6c58-6342-11e4-8a63-
00144feabdc0 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Hannigan, R., 2016. Front doors and strong locks: encryption, privacy and 
intelligence gathering in the digital era. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.gchq.gov.uk/speech/front-doors-and-strong-locks-
encryption-privacy-and-intelligence-gathering-digital-era 
[Accessed 20 October 2017]. 
312 
 
Hansen, L. & Nissenbaum, H., 2009. Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the 
Copenhagen School. International Studies Quarterly, 53(1), pp. 1155-1175. 
Hansen, L. & Nissenbaum, H., 2009. Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the 
Copenhagen School. International Studies Quarterly, 53(1), pp. 1155-1175. 
Hare, N. P. & Collinson, P., 2012. Organisational culture and intelligence analysis: A 
perspective frmo senior managers in the Defence Intelligence Assessments Staff. 
Public Policy Administration, 28(2), pp. 214-229. 
Harman, J., 2015. Disrupting the Intelligence Community. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-03-
01/disrupting-intelligence-community 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Harris Interactive, 2011. What America Thinks, s.l.: Metlife Foundation. 
Haslam, N., 2006. Dehumanisation:An Integrative Review. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 10(3), pp. 252-264. 
Hass, R., 2010. The Role of Media in Conflict and their Influence on Securitisation. 
Italian Journal of International Affairs, 44(2009), pp. 77-91. 
Head, S., 2014. Mindless: Why Smarter Machines Are Making Dumber Humans. 
s.l.:Basic Books. 
Hearn, M., 2013. Google Plus. [Online]  
Available at: https://plus.google.com/+MikeHearn/posts/LW1DXJ2BK8k 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Herz, J., 1950. Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 
2(2), pp. 157-180. 
Herz, J., 1950. Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 
pp. 157-80. 
Herz, J., 1950. Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 
2(2), pp. 157-180. 
Hill, A., 2005. Reality TV. 1 ed. s.l.:Routledge. 
Hill, A., 2017. Reality TV Crime Programs. [Online]  
Available at: 
http://criminology.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264079.001.00
01/acrefore-9780190264079-e-177 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Hill, M., 2017. Terror chief Max Hill warns risk of attacks in Britain is highest since 
dark days of IRA. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/25/terror-chief-max-hill-
warns-risk-attacks-britain-highest-since/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Hjalmarsson, O., 2013. The Securitization of Cyberspace: How the Web Was Won, 
s.l.: Lund University. 
HM Government, 1994. Intelligence Services Act 1994, s.l.: HM Government. 
313 
 
HM Government, 2010. A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National 
Security Strategy , s.l.: HM Government. 
HM Government, 2010. Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic 
Defence and Security Review, s.l.: HM Government. 
HM Government, 2011. The UK Cyber Security Strategy, s.l.: HM Government. 
HM Government, 2011. The UK Cyber Security Strategy, s.l.: HM Government. 
HM Government, 2011. UK Cyber Security Strategy, s.l.: HM Government. 
HM Government, 2011. UK National Cyber Security Strategy, s.l.: H M Government. 
HM Government, 2016. Google, Facebook and Twitter: countering extremism on 
social media. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-
z/commons-select/home-affairs-committee/news-parliament-2015/160129-
countering-extremism-evidence/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
HM Government, 2016. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s.l.: HM Government. 
HM Government, 2016. Investigatory Powers Bill receives Royal Assent. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/investigatory-powers-bill-
receives-royal-assent 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
HM Government, 2016. Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill - 
Oral Evidence, s.l.: Joint Investigatory Powers Committee. 
HM Government, 2016. Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill - 
Written Evidence, s.l.: Joint Investigatory Powers Committee. 
HM Government, 2016. National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021, s.l.: Crown. 
HM Government, 2017. Investigatory Powers Act, London: HM Government. 
Hobbes, T., 2016. Leviathan. s.l.:Penguin Classics. 
Hoffman, A. M., 2002. A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations. 
European Journal of International Relations, 8(3), pp. 375-401. 
Hogan-Howe, B., 2014. Internet is becoming a 'dark and ungoverned space', says 
Met chief. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-
order/11214596/Internet-is-becoming-a-dark-and-ungoverned-space-says-Met-
chief.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Hogan-Howe, B., 2014. Internet is becoming a 'dark and ungoverned space', says 
Met chief. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-
order/11214596/Internet-is-becoming-a-dark-and-ungoverned-space-says-Met-
chief.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
314 
 
Hogan-Howe, B., 2014. Internet is becoming a 'dark and ungoverned space', says 
Met chief. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-
order/11214596/Internet-is-becoming-a-dark-and-ungoverned-space-says-Met-
chief.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Hollis, M. & Smith, S., 1990. Explaining and Understanding International Relations. 
s.l.:Clarendon Press. 
Holmes, S. J., 2015. Intelligence, security and privacy: A note by the Director. 
[Online]  
Available at: http://www.ditchley.co.uk/conferences/past-programme/2010-
2019/2015/intelligence 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Home Affairs Committee, 2014. Seventeenth Report of Session 2013–14: Counter 
Terrorism, s.l.: House of Commons. 
House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, 2016. Investigatory 
Powers Bill: technology issues, London: House of Commons. 
Huffington Post, 2015. Jeremy Corbyn And Senior Shadow Cabinet Told By 
Intelligence Chiefs Of Scale Of ISIL Threat To Britain And British Citizens. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/11/25/jeremy-corbyn-and-
senior-_n_8651014.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Hughes, B., 2007. Securitizing Iraq: The Bush Administration's Social Construction 
of Security. Global Change, Peace and Security, 19(2), pp. 83-102. 
Huhne, C., 2013. Prism and Tempora: the cabinet was told nothing of the 
surveillance state's excesses. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/06/prism-
tempora-cabinet-surveillance-state 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Huppert, J., 2013. After the NSA leaks, we've got to talk about rebalancing security 
and privacy. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/30/nsa-
britain-balance-security-privacy 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Huysmans, J., 2006. The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU. 
1 ed. s.l.:Routledge. 
Huysmans, J., 2006. The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU. 
1 ed. s.l.:Routledge. 
Ilves, T. H., 2014. Rebooting Trust? Freedom vs Security in Cyberspace. s.l.:Munich 
Cyber Security Conference. 
Independent, T., 2017. Facebook, Twitter and Google bosses to be grilled by 
Parliament over spread of 'fake news'. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/facebook-
315 
 
twitter-google-bosses-parliament-spread-fake-news-conspiracy-us-election-
a7527956.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Information Technology Industry Council, 2015. Apple, Google and Microsoft: 
weakening encryption lets the bad guys in. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/nov/23/apple-
google-microsoft-weakening-encryption-back-doors 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
InfoSecurity Group, 2014. Global Academics Unite Behind Anti-surveillance 
Declaration. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/global-academics-
unite-behind-anti-surveillance/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, 2014. Report on the intelligence 
relating to the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby, s.l.: Intelligence and Security Committee 
of Parliament. 
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, 2014. Report on the intelligence 
relating to the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby, s.l.: ISC. 
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, 2014. Report on the intelligence 
relating to the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby, s.l.: ISC. 
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, 2015. Privacy and Security: A 
modern and transparent legal framework, s.l.: Crown. 
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, 2016. Report on the draft 
Investigatory Powers Bill, s.l.: Crown. 
Intelligence and Security Committee, 2009. Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? 
Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, s.l.: HM 
Government. 
Intelligence and Security Committee, 2013. Privacy and Security: A modern and 
transparent legal framework, s.l.: Crown. 
Internet Live Stats, 2015. Internet Users. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Investigatory Powers Commissioner's Office, 2017. Watching the watchers... Since 
September 2017. [Online]  
Available at: https://twitter.com/IPCOffice/status/903489539062194176 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal, 2016. UKIPTrib 15_110-CH, s.l.: HM Government. 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal, 2016. UKIPTrib 15_110-CH, s.l.: October. 
IPSOS Mori, 2016. Veracity Index 2016, s.l.: IPSOS MORI. 
Iraq Survey Group, 2004. Duelfer Report on Chemical Weapons in Iraq, s.l.: Iraq 
Survey Group. 
316 
 
Ishaq, A., 2016. Aisha Interview [Interview] (29 June 2016). 
Jackson, L., 2015. Last Night. [Online]  
Available at: https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/emailid/30593 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Jackson, L., 2015. Re: Last night. [Online]  
Available at: https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/emailid/40214 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Jackson, L., 2015. Subject: Last night. [Online]  
Available at: https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/emailid/30593 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
James Comey, 2014. Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a 
Collision Course?. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-dark-are-technology-
privacy-and-public-safety-on-a-collision-course 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Jenner, L., 2018. Backdoor: How a metaphor turns into a weapon. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.hiig.de/en/blog/backdoor-how-a-metaphor-turns-into-
a-weapon/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Jensen, D. & Draffan, G., 2004. Welcome to the Machine: Science, Surveillance, and 
the Culture of Control. s.l.:Chelsea Green Publishing. 
Jervis, R., 1978. Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), pp. 
167-214. 
Jervis, R., 1978. Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), pp. 
167-214. 
Jervis, R., 1978. Cooperation under the Security Dilemna, s.l.: World Politics. 
Jervis, R., 1988. Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation. World Politics, 40(3), pp. 
317-349. 
Johnston, R., 2005. Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community: An 
Ethnographic Study, s.l.: Center for Study of Intelligence,Central Intelligence 
Agency. 
Jones, J., 2013. Edward Snowden: 21st-century revolutionary icon?. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2013/aug/20/edward-snowden-
21st-century-revolutionary-icon 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Jones, J., 2015. http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-
analysis/2015/11/20/comment-david-cameron-should-remember-our-national-
security. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2015/11/20/comment-
david-cameron-should-remember-our-national-security 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
317 
 
Jones, R. W., 1999. Security, Strategy and Critical Theory. s.l.:Lynne Rienner 
Publishers. 
Kabanov, Y., 2014. Information (Cyber-) Security Discourses and Policies in the 
European Union and Russia: A Comparative Analysis, s.l.: Centre for German and 
European Studies. 
Kabanov, Y., 2014. Information (Cyber-) Security Discourses and Policies in the 
European Union and Russia: A Comparative Analysis, Moscow: Higher School of 
Economics. 
Kaminski, R. T., 2010. Escaping the cyber state of nature: Cyber Deterrence and 
international institutions. Tallinn, Estonia, s.n. 
Kaplan, F., 2017. The Leaky Myths of Snowden. [Online]  
Available at: 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2016/09/what_sn
owden_gets_wrong_about_its_hero.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Kassin, S. et al., 2015. Social Psychology. s.l.:Cengage Learning. 
Kaufman, S., 1996. An International Theory of Inter-ethnic War. Review of 
International Studies, 22(2), pp. 149-171. 
Kehl, D., WIlson, A. & Bankston, K., 2015. Doomed to Repeat History? Lessons from 
the Crypto Wars of the 1990s, s.l.: New America. 
Keizer, K., Lindenberg, S. & Steg, L., 2008. The spreading of disorder. Science, 
Volume 322, pp. 1681-1685. 
Keller, R., 2006. Analysing Discourse. An Approach From the Sociology of 
Knowledge. Historical Social Research, 31(2), pp. 223-242. 
Killock, J., 2013. Europeans 'shocked and angry' by 'unaccountable' American 
surveillance. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tf_9zbdu47w 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Killock, J., 2014. The courts should decide how much privacy we're entitled to - not 
GCHQ. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/the-courts-should-
decide-how-much-privacy-were-entitled-to-not-gchq-9838882.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Killock, J., 2015. Minimal oversight of GCHQ hacking is 'a major scandal'. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.wired.co.uk/article/gchq-hacking 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Killock, J., 2015. Why are digital rights important?. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2015/why-are-digital-rights-
important 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
318 
 
Killock, J., 2016. [Online]  
Available at: https://twitter.com/jimkillock/status/796333214163992576 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Killock, J., 2016. Does the government want to break encryption or not?. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2016/does-the-government-
want-to-break-encryption-or-not 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Killock, J., 2016. Investigatory Powers Act is UK's most extreme surveillance law. 
[Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.openrightsgroup.org/press/releases/2016/investigatory-powers-act-
most-extreme-surveillance-law 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Killock, J., 2016. Investigatory Powers Act is UK's most extreme surveillance law. 
[Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.openrightsgroup.org/press/releases/2016/investigatory-powers-act-
most-extreme-surveillance-law 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Killock, J., 2016. Investigatory Powers Act is UK's most extreme surveillance law. 
[Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.openrightsgroup.org/press/releases/2016/investigatory-powers-act-
most-extreme-surveillance-law 
Killock, J., 2016. Jim Interview [Interview] (4 February 2016). 
Killock, J., 2016. Privacy experts fear Donald Trump running global surveillance 
network. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/11/trump-
surveillance-network-nsa-privacy 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Killock, J., 2016. Stop Rushing the Investigatory Powers Bill through Parliament. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/press/releases/2016/stop-
rushing-ipbill 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Killock, J., 2016. The Investigatory Powers Bill's impact will reach beyond the UK. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/press/releases/2016/ipb-will-
reach-beyond-the-uk 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Killock, J., 2016. Twitter. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://twitter.com/search?q=%22Donald%20Trump%20has%20effective%20cont
rol%20of%20GCHQ%E2%80%99s%20technology%20and%20full%20access%20to
319 
 
%20their%20data%20collection%22&src=typd 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Killock, J., 2017. Repeal the new Surveillance laws (Investigatory Powers Act). 
[Online]  
Available at: https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/173199 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Killock, J., 2017. UK's flip-flops on encryption don't help anyone. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.cnet.com/uk/news/british-government-amber-rudd-
flip-flops-on-encryption/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Kingsmith, A. T., 2013. Virtual Roadblocks: The Securitisation of the Information 
Superhighway. Conversations in Global Politics and Public Policy, 2(1), pp. 1-14. 
Kingsmith, A. T., 2013. Virtual Roadblocks: The Securitisation of the Information 
Superhighway. Bridges: Conversations in Politics and Public Policy, 2(1). 
Kramer, R. M., 2001. Trust Rules for Trust Dilemmas: How Decision Makers Think 
and Act in the Shadow of Doubt. In: Trust in Cyber-societies. Berlin, Heidelberg: 
Springer. 
Kremer, J., 2014. Policing cybercrime or militarizing cybersecurity? Security 
mindsets and the regulation of threats from cyberspace. Information and 
Communications Technology Law, 23(3), pp. 220-237. 
Kurbalija, J., 2016. An Introduction to Internet Governance. 7 ed. Geneva: Diplo 
Foundation. 
Kurbalija, J., 2016. An Introduction to Internet Governance: 7th edition. s.l.:Diplo 
Foundation. 
Laguna, R., 2015. Could Hillary Clinton’s Encryption ‘Manhattan Project’ Work?. 
[Online]  
Available at: http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/could-hillary-clinton-s-
encryption-manhattan-project-work-n484086 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Lanchester, J., 2013. The Snowden files: why the British public should be worried. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/03/edward-
snowden-files-john-lanchester 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Lapointe, A., 2011. When good metaphors go bad: The Metaphoric "Branding" of 
Cyberspace, s.l.: Centre for Strategic and International Studies. 
Lash, S. & Wynne, B., 1992. Introduction. In: Risk Society. s.l.:SAge, p. 4. 
Laux, D., 2016. Q&A with Doug Laux, Former CIA Case Officer and Author of Left of 
Boom. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.criminalelement.com/blogs/2016/04/qaa-with-doug-
laux-former-cia-case-officer-and-author-of-left-of-boom 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
320 
 
Lavrov, G., 2013. NSA methods reminiscent of those used in USSR under Stalin – 
Lavrov. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.rt.com/news/lavrov-nsa-private-life-427/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Lazaridi, G. & K. W., 2015. The Securitisation of Migration in the EU. 1 ed. 
s.l.:Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lemke, T., 2001. The birth of bio-politics: Michael Foucault’s lectures at the College 
de France on neo-liberal governmentality. s.l.:Economy and Society. 
Lessig, L., 1999. Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace. s.l.:Basic Books. 
Leswing, K., 2016. Hillary Clinton and Apple are in lockstep on one critical issue. 
[Online]  
Available at: http://uk.businessinsider.com/hillary-clinton-language-about-
encryption-echoes-apple-2016-6?r=US&IR=T 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Lobban, I., 2014. Sir Iain Lobban's valedictory speech - as delivered. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.gchq.gov.uk/speech/sir-iain-lobbans-valedictory-
speech-delivered 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Locke, J., 1689. Two Treatises of Government. s.l.:Awnsham Churchill. 
Locke, J., 2009. Second Treatise on Civil Government. s.l.:World Library Classics. 
Logan, R., 2014. Uk Court Decision on Government Mass Surveillance: 'Trust Us' Isn't 
Enough. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2014/12/uk-court-
decision-government-mass-surveillance-trust-us-isnt-enough/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Lucas, E., 2014. The Snowden Operation. 1 ed. s.l.:Amazon. 
Luhmann, N., 2000. Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives. In: D. 
Gambetta, ed. Trust Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, pp. 94-107. 
Lyon, D., 2014. CCTV Cambridge. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.cctvcambridge.org/SnoopingAfterSnowden 
[Accessed 11 February 2018]. 
Lyon, D., 2014. Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, consequences, 
critique. Big Data and Society, 1(2), pp. 1-13. 
Lyon, D., 2015. Surveillance After Snowden. s.l.:Wiley. 
Mangold, P., 1990. National Security in International Relations. s.l.:Routledge. 
Mann, S., 1998. "Reflectionism" and "Diffusionism": New Tactics for Deconstructing 
the Video Surveillance Superhighway. Leonardo, 31(2), pp. 93-102. 
Mann, S., Nolan, J. & Wellman, B., 2002. Sousveillance: Inventing and Using 
Wearable Computing Devices for Data Collection in Surveillance Environments. 
Surveillance and Society, 1(3), pp. 331-355. 
321 
 
Martin, C., 2015. GCHG: We don't have the manpower to spy on you. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/02/gchq-we-dont-have-the-
manpower-to-spy-on-you.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Matt, 2016. Matt Interview [Interview] (1 April 2016). 
Mayer-Schonberger, V., 2013. Yahoo, Google, Facebook and more face fight to 
salvage reputations over NSA leaks. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jun/10/apple-
google-giants-nsa-revelations 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
May, T., 2014. Commons passes emergency data laws despite criticism. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-28305309 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
May, T., 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/home-secretary-introduces-
draft-investigatory-powers-bill. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/home-secretary-introduces-
draft-investigatory-powers-bill 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
May, T., 2015. Theresa May to revive her 'snooper's charter' now Lib Dem brakes 
are off. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/09/theresa-may-
revive-snoopers-charter-lib-dem-brakes-off-privacy-election 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
May, T., 2015. Theresa May: we must deny terrorists safe spaces to communicate. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jan/14/theresa-may-no-
safe-spaces-terrorists-communicate 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
May, T., 2016. Home Secretary leaves plenty unanswered after IP Bill debate. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.engadget.com/2016/01/15/theresa-may-ip-bill/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
May, T., 2017. May: Security services 'true heroes'. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-31677040 
May, T., 2017. PM statement following London terror attack: 4 June 2017. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-following-
london-terror-attack-4-june-2017 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
May, T., 2017. Theresa May warns tech companies: ‘no safe space’ for extremists. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/0ae646c6-4911-11e7-a3f4-
c742b9791d43 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
322 
 
McDonald, M., 2008. Securitisation and the Construction of Security. European 
Journal of International Relations, 14(4), pp. 563-587. 
McLoud, K., 2015. Treasonous Patriot: A Comparative Content Analysis of the 
Media’s Portrayals of Daniel Ellsberg and Edward Snowden, s.l.: University of 
Arkansas. 
McSweeney, B., 1996. Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School. 
Review of International Studies, 22(1), pp. 81-93. 
Mearsheimer, J., 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. s.l.:W. W. Norton & 
Company. 
Mehta, M. D. & Darier, E., 1998. Virtual Control and Disciplining on the Internet: 
Electronic Governmentality in the New Wired World. The Information Society, 
14(2), pp. 107-116. 
Merrill, N., 2016. Privacy experts fear Donald Trump running global surveillance 
network. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/11/trump-
surveillance-network-nsa-privacy 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Microsoft, 2013. Protecting customer data from government snooping. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20131205100213/http://blogs.technet.com/b/fireh
ose/archive/2013/12/04/protecting-customer-data-from-government-
snooping.aspx 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Microsoft, 2017. The need for urgent collective action to keep people safe online: 
Lessons from last week’s cyberattack. [Online]  
Available at: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/05/14/need-urgent-
collective-action-keep-people-safe-online-lessons-last-weeks-
cyberattack/#sm.0001b0gm51altf04xc91fxhoj5s14 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Miller, C., 2016. Google, Twitter, Facebook, & Microsoft to file court motions 
officially supporting Apple in FBI fight. [Online]  
Available at: https://9to5mac.com/2016/02/25/google-facebook-apple-fbi-fight/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Miller, L., 2008. Undercover Policing:. Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, 
21(2), pp. 1-24. 
Mitrou, L., Kandias, M., Stavrou, V. & Gritzalis, D., 2014. Social Media Profiling: A 
Panopticon or Omnioption tool?. Barcelona, Surveillance and Society conference. 
Mitrou, L., Kandias, M., Stavrou, V. & Gritzalis, D., 2014. Social Media Profiling: A 
Panoptison or Omniopticon tool?. Barcelona, Surveillance and Society Conference. 
Monax, 2015. Eris Industries Statement on the Reintroduction of the UK 
Investigatory Powers Bill. [Online]  
Available at: https://monax.io/2015/05/29/ei-comms-data-
323 
 
bill/?redirect_from_eris=true 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Money.com, 2014. Money.com. [Online]  
Available at: http://money.cnn.com/2014/06/06/technology/security/nsa-turn-
on-phone/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Moore, D. & Rid, T., 2016. Cryptopolitik and the Darknet. Survival: Global Politics 
and Strategy, 58(1), pp. 7-38. 
Moore, D. & Rid, T., 2016. Cryptopolitik and the Darknet. Survival, 58(1), pp. 7-38. 
Moore, D. & Rid, T., 2016. Cryptopolitik and the Darknet. Survival, 58(1), pp. 7-38. 
Moore, D. & Rid, T., 2016. Cryptopolitik and the Darknet. 58(1). 
Moretti, A., 2015. Whistleblower or Traitor: Edward Snowden, Daniel Ellsberg and 
the Power of Media Celebrity. Global Media Journal, Issue 1. 
Morozov, E., 2012. The Net Delusion: How Not to Liberate The World. s.l.:Penguin. 
Motter, A. & Lai, Y. C., 2003. Cascade-based attacks on complex networks. Physical 
Review. 
Mueller, M. L., 2010. Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet 
Governance. s.l.:MIT Press. 
Muižnieks, N., 2013. Human rights at risk when secret surveillance spreads. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/human-rights-at-risk-
when-secret-surveillance-sprea-1 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Muižnieks, N., 2013. Human rights at risk when secret surveillance spreads. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/human-rights-at-risk-
when-secret-surveillance-sprea-1 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Muižnieks, N., 2013. Human rights at risk when secret surveillance spreads. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/human-rights-at-risk-
when-secret-surveillance-sprea-1 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Musharraf, P., 2006. In the Line of Fir:A memoir. s.l.:Simon & Schuster Ltd. 
National Crime Agency, 2015. GCHQ and NCA join forces to ensure no hiding place 
online for criminals. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/736-gchq-and-nca-
join-forces-to-ensure-no-hiding-place-online-for-criminals 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
NCA, 2015. GCHQ and NCA join forces to ensure no hiding place online for criminals. 
[Online]  
Available at: http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/736-gchq-and-nca-
join-forces-to-ensure-no-hiding-place-online-for-criminals 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
324 
 
Nellis, A. M., 2009. Fear of terrorism. In: Terrorism in America. s.l.:Jones & Bartlett 
Publishers, p. Chapter 6. 
Neocleous, M., 2006. Imagining the State. s.l.:Open University Press. 
Neocleous, M., 2007. Security, Liberty and the Myth of Balance: Towards a Critique 
of Security Politics. Contemporary Political Theory, 6(2), pp. 131-149. 
New York Times, 2013. Secret Documents Reveal N.S.A. Campaign Against 
Encryption. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-
reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Ninja, 2016. TechDirt. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.TechDirt.com/articles/20160106/09090233253/pioneer-internet-
anonymity-hands-fbi-huge-gift-building-dangerous-backdoored-encryption-
system.shtml 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Nissenbaum, H., 2005. Where Computer Security meets national Security. Ethics 
and Information Technology, 7(1), pp. 61-73. 
Nissenbaum, H., 2005. Where Computer Security meets National Security. Ethics 
and Information Technology, 7(1), pp. 61-73. 
Nissenbaum, H., 2009. Privacy in Context - Technology, Policy and the Integrity of 
Social Life. s.l.:Stanford University Press. 
Nojeim, G., 2013. Yahoo, Google, Facebook and more face fight to salvage 
reputations over NSA leaks. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jun/10/apple-
google-giants-nsa-revelations 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Nolan, B. R., 2013. Information sharing and collaboration inteh Untied States 
Intelligence Community: An ethnographic study of the NAtional Counter-Terrorism 
Centre, s.l.: Princeton University. 
Nyhan, B. & Reifler, J., 2010. When corrections fail: The persistence of political 
misperceptions. Political Behaviour, 32(2), pp. 303-330. 
Obama, B., 2016. Obama tells tech community to solve encryption problem now or 
pay later. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/11/11207480/obama-sxsw-
2016-fbi-apple-encryption 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Off The Grid News, 2013. NSA Cracks Encryption Codes, Can Read Email, Banking, 
Medical Records. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.offthegridnews.com/privacy/nsa-cracks-encryption-
codes-can-read-email-banking-medical-records/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
325 
 
Ogilvie, S., 2016. The dangers of counter-productive counter-terror strategy: a stark 
warning from Chilcot. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/news/blog/dangers-
counter-productive-counter-terror-strategy-stark-warning-chilcot 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Ohm, P. K., 2004. Parallel-Effect Statutues adn E-mail "Warrants": Reframing the 
Internet Surveillance Debate. The George Washington Law Review, 72(6), pp. 1599-
1617. 
OMD Blog, 2016. Channel 4- Hunted. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.omdemeablog.com/news/channel-4-hunted/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, 2007. About the Open Rights Group. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/ourwork/annual-reports/review-
of-activities/about-the-open-rights-group 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, 2008. Chair's Forword. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/ourwork/annual-reports/review-
of-activities-2008/chairs-foreword 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, 2009. Annual Report 2009. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.openrightsgroup.org/assets/files/pdfs/Annual_Report_2009.pdf 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, 2009. Annual Report 2009. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.openrightsgroup.org/assets/files/pdfs/Annual_Report_2009.pdf 
Open Rights Group, 2009. Interceptopm Modernisation or 'Protecting the Public'. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/ourwork/reports/interception-
modernisation-or-protecting-the-public 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, 2010. How to talk to your MP: training days. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2010/how-to-talk-to-your-
mp-training-days 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, 2013. 'CDB: The Zombie Bill That Just Won't Die' and 'Reforming 
OSI'. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.meetup.com/ORG-Manchester/events/121186352/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, 2013. 'CDB: The Zombie Bill That Just Won't Die' and 'Reforming 
OSI'. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.meetup.com/ORG-Manchester/events/121186352/ 
326 
 
Open Rights Group, 2013. Mass Surveillance Oversight Debate. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/ourwork/reports/mass-
surveillance-oversight-debate 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, 2014. Dear Theresa, see you in court. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2014/dear-theresa-see-you-
in-court 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, 2014. No Emergency! Stop the Data Retention Stitch Up!. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/campaigns/no-emergency-stop-
the-data-retention-stitch-up 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, 2015. 2015 report about the Snowden leaks, s.l.: Open Rights 
Group. 
Open Rights Group, 2015. 2015 report about the Snowden leaks, s.l.: Open Rights 
Group. 
Open Rights Group, 2015. We don't protect our civil liberties by attacking them.. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2015/join-today-and-vote-
for-digital-rights 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, 2016. Digital Dystopias: Orwell's 1984 and the Internet Age. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.meetup.com/ORG-London/events/234732775/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, 2017. Digital Economy Bill: Briefing. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/ourwork/reports/digital-economy-
bill-briefing 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, 2017. ORG policy update/2017-w40. [Online]  
Available at: https://wiki.openrightsgroup.org/wiki/ORG_policy_update/2017-w40 
[Accessed 11 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, 2017. Please adopt your MP and visit them to explain why 
disconnection is wrong!. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/campaigns/disconnection/adopt-
your-mp 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, 2017. Sorry Amber Rudd, real people do value their security. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2017/sorry-amber-rudd-real-
people-do-value-their-security 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
327 
 
Open Rights Group, n.d. About Page. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/ourwork/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, n.d. Advisory Council. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/people/advisory 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, n.d. CRYPTOPARTIES. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/events/cryptoparties 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, n.d. GCHQ and Mass Surveillance. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/ourwork/reports/gchq-and-mass-
surveillance 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, n.d. Invasive collection: active signals. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/assets/files/pdfs/reports/gchq/02-
Part_One_Chapter_Two-Invasive_Collections.pdf 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, n.d. Invasive collection: active signals development. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/assets/files/pdfs/reports/gchq/02-
Part_One_Chapter_Two-Invasive_Collections.pdf 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, n.d. Investigatory Powers Bill - Guide for ORD Supporters. 
[Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.openrightsgroup.org/assets/files/campaign_resources/investigatory
_powers_bill/Briefing%20Doc%20150316%20WEB.pdf 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, n.d. Investigatory Powers Bill: Email Your MP. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/campaigns/investigatory-powers-
bill-email-your-mp/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, n.d. Orphan Works Hearing EU Commission. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/ourwork/speeches/orphan-works-
hearing-eu-commission 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Open Rights Group, n.d. You can also join ORG to defend your digital rights. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/updates/check-your-inbox-now/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Owen, B., 2016. Ben Interview [Interview] (30 March 2016). 
Parker, A., 2015. Director General speaks on terrorism, technology and oversight - 
See more at: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/director-general-speaks-on-terrorism-
technology-and-oversight#sthash.TwZAtTsj.dpuf. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/director-general-speaks-on-terrorism-
328 
 
technology-and-oversight 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Parker, A., 2016. MI5 head: ‘increasingly aggressive’ Russia a growing threat to UK. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/oct/31/andrew-
parker-increasingly-aggressive-russia-a-growing-threat-to-uk-says-mi5-head 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Parliament.uk, 2016. Bill documents — Investigatory Powers Act 2016. [Online]  
Available at: https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2015-
16/investigatorypowers/documents.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Pateron, K. et al., 2013. Open Letter From UK Security Researchers. [Online]  
Available at: http://bristolcrypto.blogspot.co.uk/2013/09/open-letter-from-uk-
security-researchers.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Paterson, K., Bellare, M. & Rogaway, P., 2015. Security of Symmetric Encryption 
against Mass Surveillance. s.l., International Cryptology Conference. 
Paterson, K. et al., 2013. Open Letter From UK Security Researchers. [Online]  
Available at: http://bristolcrypto.blogspot.co.uk/2013/09/open-letter-from-uk-
security-researchers.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
PEN America, 2014. PEN Surveillance Metaphor Mapping Project. [Online]  
Available at: https://pen.org/infographic/pen-surveillance-metaphor-mapping-
project 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
PEN America, 2015. Global Chilling: The Impact of Mass Surveillance on 
International Writers, s.l.: PEN America. 
Pew Research Centre, 2014. Social Media and the 'Spiral of Silence'. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/08/26/social-media-and-the-
spiral-of-silence/ 
[Accessed 11 February 2018]. 
Pew Research Centre, 2015. Americans' Privacy Strategies Post-Snowden, s.l.: Pew 
Research Centre. 
Pew Research Centre, 2016. 15 Years After 9/11, a Sharp Partisan Divide on Ability 
of Terrorists to Strike U.S.. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.people-press.org/2016/09/07/15-years-after-911-a-
sharp-partisan-divide-on-ability-of-terrorists-to-strike-u-
s/?utm_source=adaptivemailer&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=16-09-
07%209/11&org=982&lvl=100&ite=254&lea=32754&ctr=0&par=1&trk= 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Podesta, J., 2016. Re: Happy New Year. [Online]  
Available at: https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/emailid/33752 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
329 
 
Politico, 2017. Theresa May’s Conservatives threaten social media crackdown if 
elected. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.politico.eu/article/theresa-mays-conservatives-threaten-
social-media-crackdown-if-elected/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Pompeo, C. M., 2014. Pompeo to SXSW Organizers: Don't Give Snowden a Platform. 
[Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/03/10/288372317/sxsw-
snowden-speech-has-conference-buzzing-congressman-stewing 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Posen, B. R., 1993. The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict. Survival, 35(1), pp. 27-
47. 
Qin, J., 2015. Hero on Twitter, Traitor on News: How Social Media and Legacy News 
Frame Snowden. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 20(2), pp. 166-184. 
Reform Government Surveillance, 2015. Voices For Reform. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.reformgovernmentsurveillance.com/#may-19 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Reuters, 2014. NSA memo confirms Snowden scammed passwords from colleagues. 
[Online]  
Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security/nsa-memo-
confirms-snowden-scammed-passwords-from-colleagues-
idUSBREA1C1MR20140213 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Rid, T., 2013. Cyber War WIll Not Take Place. London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) 
Ltd. 
Roe, P., 2012. Is securitization a ‘negative’ concept? Revisiting the normative 
debate over normal versus extraordinary politics. Security Dialogue, 43(3), pp. 249-
266. 
Ronald Deibert, M. C.-N., 2012. Global Governance and the Spread of Cyberspace 
Controls. Global Governance, 18(3), pp. 339-361. 
Rosen, J., 2005. The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an Anxious 
Age. s.l.:Random House. 
Ross, L. & Mark Lepper, M. H., 1975. Perseverance in self-perception and social 
perception: Biased attributional processes in the debriefing paradigm.. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 32(5), pp. 880-892. 
Royal United Services Institute, 2015. A Democratic Licence to Operate, London: 
RUSI. 
Royal United Services Institute, 2015. A Democratic Licence to Operate, s.l.: Royal 
United Services Institute. 
Ruane, J. & Todd, J., 1996. The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, 
Conflict and Emancipation. s.l.:Cambridge University Press. 
330 
 
Rudd, A., 2017. Amber Rudd : 'We must be able to access WhatsApp'. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-39398190/amber-rudd-
we-must-be-able-to-access-whatsapp 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Rudd, A., 2017. Amber Rudd accuses tech giants of 'sneering' at politicians. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-41463401 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Rudd, A., 2017. Amber Rudd warns tech firms face 'ticking off' over terrorism. 
[Online]  
Available at: http://news.sky.com/story/amber-rudd-warns-tech-firms-face-more-
than-a-ticking-off-10814608 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Rudd, A., 2017. UK home secretary Amber Rudd says 'real people' don't need end-
to-end encryption. [Online]  
Available at: http://uk.businessinsider.com/home-secretary-amber-rudd-real-
people-dont-need-end-to-end-encryption-terrorists-2017-8 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Rudd, A., 2017. We don't want to ban encryption, but our inability to see what 
terrorists are plotting undermines our security. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/31/dont-want-ban-
encryption-inability-see-terrorists-plotting-online/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Rudd, A., 2017. WhatsApp accused of giving terrorists 'a secret place to hide' as it 
refuses to hand over London attacker's messages. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/26/home-secretary-
amber-rudd-whatsapp-gives-terrorists-place-hide/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Rudd, A., 2017. WhatsApp accused of giving terrorists 'a secret place to hide' as it 
refuses to hand over London attacker's messages. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/26/home-secretary-
amber-rudd-whatsapp-gives-terrorists-place-hide/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Rue, F. L., 2011. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection 
of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue*, s.l.: United Nations 
Human Rights Council. 
Rueter, N., 2011. The Cybersecurity Dilemma, s.l.: Duke University. 
Rueter, N., 2011. The Cybersecurity Dilemma, s.l.: Duke University. 
Ruiz, J., 2016. Data Privacy Day: the new EU Data Protection Regulation explained. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2016/data-protection-day-
and-the-new-eu-regulation 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Ruiz, J., 2016. Javier Interview [Interview] (4 February 2016). 
331 
 
Rusbridger, A., 2013. Lib Dems at war over whether Snowden leaks 'entirely right'. 
[Online]  
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10371769/Lib-
Dems-at-war-over-whether-Snowden-leaks-entirely-right.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Salvo, P. D., 2016. Framing Edward Snowden: A comparative analysis of four 
newspapers in China, United Kingdom and United States. Journalism, 17(7), pp. 
805-822. 
Samson, R., 2017. Twitter. [Online]  
Available at: https://twitter.com/renatesamson/status/892331408466771968 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Savage, M., 2010. Inside GCHQ: 'Caution: Here comes the BBC'. [Online]  
Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/8589664.stm 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Schelling, T., 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. s.l.:Harvard University Press. 
Schmitt, C., 1932. The Concept of the Political. 1 ed. Munich: Duncker and Humblot. 
Schneier, B., 1995. Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code 
in C. s.l.:John Wiley & Sons. 
Schneier, B., 2000. Books - Secretes and Lies - Preface. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.schneier.com/books/secrets_and_lies/pref.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Schneier, B., 2004. Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World. s.l.:John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Schneier, B., 2013. Revealed: how US and UK spy agencies defeat internet privacy 
and security. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-
encryption-codes-security 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Schneier, B., 2015. Bruce Schneier: David Cameron's proposed encryption ban would 
'destroy the internet'. [Online]  
Available at: http://uk.businessinsider.com/bruce-schneier-david-cameron-
proposed-encryption-ban-destroy-the-internet-2015-7 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Schneier, B., 2015. Bruce Schneier: David Cameron's proposed encryption ban would 
'destroy the internet'. [Online]  
Available at: http://uk.businessinsider.com/bruce-schneier-david-cameron-
proposed-encryption-ban-destroy-the-internet-2015-7 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Schneier, B., 2016. New leaks prove it: the NSA is putting us all at risk to be hacked. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.vox.com/2016/8/24/12615258/nsa-security-breach-
hoard 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
332 
 
Schneier, B., 2016. The Importance of Strong Encryption to Security. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/02/the_importance_.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Schneier, B., 2016. The Importance of Strong Encryption to Security. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/02/the_importance_.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Schneier, B., 2016. The Importance of Strong Encryption to Security. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/02/the_importance_.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Schuurman, E., 1997. Philosophical and Ethical Problems of Technicism and Genetic 
Engineering. Techne: Research in Philosophy and Technology, 3(1), pp. 27-44. 
Schwarz, K. J., 2016. The Securitization of Cyberspace through Technification, s.l.: 
Virginia Tech. 
Schwarz, K. J., 2016. The Securitization of Cyberspace through Technification, s.l.: 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. 
Scribble, 2013. Record-Breaking One Million Viewers Simultaneously Stream 
ScribbleLive Coverage of Apple Event. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.scribblelive.com/press-release/record-breaking-one-
million-viewers-simultaneously-stream-scribblelive-coverage-of-apple-event/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Sears, J., 1995. "Crimewatch" and the rhetoric of verisimilitude. Critical Survey, 7(1), 
pp. 51-58. 
Secondat, C. d., 1749. The Spirit of the Laws, Amsterdam: Chatelain. 
Sell, N., 2016. Encrypted Messaging App Co-Founder: Tim Cook Is A 'National 
Security Hero'. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.npr.org/2016/02/18/467253429/encrypted-messaging-
app-ceo-tim-cook-is-a-national-security-hero 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Senft, A. et al., 2014. Information controls during Thailand’s 2014 Coup, s.l.: Citizen 
Lab. 
Senft, A. et al., 2014. Iraq Information Controls Update: Analyzing Internet Filtering 
and Mobile Apps, s.l.: Citizen Lab. 
Shlaim, A., 2007. Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace. 
s.l.:Penguin Books Ltd. 
Shmueli, D., Elliott, M. & Kaufman, S., 2006. Frame Changes and the Management 
of Intractable Conflicts. Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 24(2), pp. 207-218. 
Shore, S. M., 1998. No Fences Make Good Neighbours: The Development of the US-
Canadian Security Community, 1871-1940. In: E. Adler & M. Barnett, eds. Security 
Communities. s.l.:Cambridge University Press, pp. 333-367. 
333 
 
Snowden, E., 2013. Edward Snowden Interview. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.thejustice.org/article/2015/11/reevaluate-international-
opinion-of-snowdens-actions 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2013. Edward Snowden Interview. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.thejustice.org/article/2015/11/reevaluate-international-
opinion-of-snowdens-actions 
Snowden, E., 2013. Edward Snowden, after months of NSA revelations, says his 
mission’s accomplished. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-
snowden-after-months-of-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-
accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523-
fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html?utm_term=.3d770c2120da 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2013. Edward Snowden, NSA files source: 'If they want to get you, in 
time they will. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/nsa-
whistleblower-edward-snowden-why 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2013. Edward Snowden, NSA files source: 'If they want to get you, in 
time they will'. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/nsa-
whistleblower-edward-snowden-why 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2013. Edward Snowden: I'm Still Working for NSA and am not Helping 
Russia. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/edward-snowden-im-still-working-nsa-am-
not-cahoots-russia-1430190 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2013. Edward Snowden: NSA whistleblower answers reader questions. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/17/edward-
snowden-nsa-files-whistleblower 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2013. Edward Snowden: NSA whistleblower answers reader questions. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/17/edward-
snowden-nsa-files-whistleblower 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2013. Edward Snowden: the whistleblower behind the NSA 
surveillance revelations. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-
snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
334 
 
Snowden, E., 2013. Edward Snowden: the whistleblower behind the NSA 
surveillance revelations. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-
snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2013. Edward Snowden: the whistleblower behind the NSA 
surveillance revelations. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-
snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2013. Edward Snowden's Christmas Message 2013. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MjOACWG0oW8 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2013. Interview on NSA Whistleblowing [Interview] (6 June 2013). 
Snowden, E., 2013. NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden: 'I don't want to live in a 
society that does these sort of things' – video. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2013/jun/09/nsa-
whistleblower-edward-snowden-interview-video 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2013. Statement by Edward Snowden to human rights groups at 
Moscow’s Sheremetyevo airport. [Online]  
Available at: https://wikileaks.org/Statement-by-Edward-Snowden-to.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2014. Edward Snowden. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.wired.com/2014/08/edward-snowden/#ch-1 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2014. Edward Snowden interview - the edited transcript. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/18/-sp-edward-
snowden-nsa-whistleblower-interview-transcript 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2014. Edward Snowden tells NBC: I'm a patriot. [Online]  
Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/28/us/edward-snowden-interview/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2014. Edward Snowden: A ‘Nation’ Interview. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.thenation.com/article/snowden-exile-exclusive-
interview/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2014. Edward Snowden: A ‘Nation’ Interview. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.thenation.com/article/snowden-exile-exclusive-
interview/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2014. Edward Snowden’s Motive Revealed: He Can ‘Sleep at Night. 
[Online]  
335 
 
Available at: http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-
interview/edward-snowdens-motive-revealed-he-can-sleep-night-n116851 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2014. Here's how we take back the Internet. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.ted.com/talks/edward_snowden_here_s_how_we_take_back_the_i
nternet/transcript?language=en 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2015. Edward Snowden Supports Apple’s Public Stance On Privacy. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://techcrunch.com/2015/06/17/but-bring-the-hammer-if-it-
betrays-us/#.zoowaq:5Ij7 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2015. Edward Snowden Supports Apple’s Public Stance On Privacy. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://techcrunch.com/2015/06/17/but-bring-the-hammer-if-it-
betrays-us/#.zoowaq:5Ij7 
Snowden, E., 2015. Twitter. [Online]  
Available at: https://twitter.com/Snowden/status/678396357145686016 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2016. Edward Snowden Responds to Critics. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.wnyc.org/story/edward-snowden-responds-critics/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2016. 'Extreme surveillance' becomes UK law with barely a whimper. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/19/extreme-
surveillance-becomes-uk-law-with-barely-a-whimper 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2016. 'Extreme surveillance' becomes UK law with barely a whimper. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/19/extreme-
surveillance-becomes-uk-law-with-barely-a-whimper 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Snowden, E., 2016. Snowden: The 'Myth' of Going Dark. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.gjil.org/2016/11/by-boris-lubarsky-photo-boris-
lubarsky.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Soghoian, C., 2016. Twitter. [Online]  
Available at: https://twitter.com/csoghoian/status/684730921153609728 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Solove, D., 2011. Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff Between Privacy and Security. 
s.l.:Yale University Press. 
336 
 
Southwood, B., 2017. Lackademia: Why do Academics lean left?, s.l.: Adam Smith 
Institute. 
Spectator Events, 2017. Spectator Events. [Online]  
Available at: https://twitter.com/SpectatorEvents/status/914911027422269440 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Statista, 2013. 1.17 Billion People Use Google Search. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.statista.com/chart/899/unique-users-of-search-
engines-in-december-2012/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Stewart, 2016. GCHQ - coming out and proud. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.gchq.gov.uk/news-article/gchq-coming-out-and-proud 
Stewart, J., 2011. Business Insider. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/jon-stewart-mark-zuckerberg-
goldman-sachs-2011-1?IR=T 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Stohl, M., 2006. Cyber terrorism: a clear and present danger, the sum of all fears, 
breaking point or patriot games?. Crime, Law and Social Change, 46(4-5), pp. 223-
238. 
Stowsky, J., 2003. Secrets or Shields to Share? New Dilemmas for Dual Use 
Technology Development and the Quest. s.l., Berkeley Roundtable on the 
International Economy. 
Sullivan, J., 2013. Uncovering the data panopticon: The urgent need for critical 
scholarship in an era of corporate and government surveillance. The Political 
Economy of Communication, 1(2). 
Sullivan, J. L., 2013. Uncovering the data panopticon: The urgent need for critical 
scholarship in an era of corporate and government surveillance. The Political 
Economy of Communication, 1(2). 
Tang, S., 2009. The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis. Security Studies, 18(3), 
pp. 587-623. 
Tarand, I., 2014. Is Russian and Chinese spying a bigger threat to Europe than the 
NSA?. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.debatingeurope.eu/2014/03/24/russian-chinese-spying-
nsa-eu/#.WL_Tu_nyiUk 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Taylor, N., 2002. State Surveillance and the Right to Privacy. Surveillance & Society, 
1(1), pp. 66-85. 
Taylor, P., 2012. What are spies really like?. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-17560253 
Tech Crunch, 2013. Yahoo Will Follow Google In Encrypting Data Center Traffic, 
Customer Data Flow By Q1 ’14. [Online]  
Available at: https://techcrunch.com/2013/11/18/yahoo-will-follow-google-in-
encrypting-data-center-traffic-all-traffic-between-company-and-customers-by-q1-
337 
 
14/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Tech Crunch, 2017. Facebook now has 2 billion monthly users… and responsibility. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/27/facebook-2-billion-users/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Tech Dirt, 2016. James Comey Claims He Wants An 'Adult Conversation' About 
Encryption; Apparently 'Adults' Ignore Experts. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.TechDirt.com/articles/20160831/00094935397/james-
comey-claims-he-wants-adult-conversation-about-encryption-apparently-adults-
ignore-experts.shtml 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Tech World, 2016. Too many UK politicians are clueless about tech. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.techworld.com/security/too-many-uk-politicians-are-
clueless-about-tech-3625100/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
TechDirt, 2014. Peek-A-Boo: GCHQ Has Been Checking You Out Through Your 
Webcam. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.TechDirt.com/articles/20140227/09452426376/peek-a-
boo-gchq-has-been-checking-you-out-through-your-webcam.shtml 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
TED, 2014. Here's how we take back the Internet. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.ted.com/talks/edward_snowden_here_s_how_we_take_back_the_i
nternet 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Telegraph, 2013. Yes, Big Brother is watching you. But for a good reason. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10107489/Yes-Big-
Brother-is-watching-you.-But-for-a-good-reason.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Atlantic, 2016. Public Opinion Supports Apple Over the FBI—or Does It?. 
[Online]  
Available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2016/02/apple-fbi-
polls/470736/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Baha Mousa Public Inquiry, 2011. The Baha Mousa Public Inquiry Report, s.l.: 
House of Commons. 
The Berkman Centre, 2016. Don't Panic. Making Progress on the 'Going Dark' 
Debate, s.l.: The Berkman Centre for Internet and Society at Harvard University. 
The Guardian, 2001. NHS faces huge damages bill after millennium bug error. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/sep/14/martinwainwright 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
338 
 
The Guardian, 2012. Google privacy policy slammed by EU data protection chiefs. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/oct/16/google-
privacy-policies-eu-data-protection 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Guardian, 2013. BT and Vodafone among telecoms companies passing details 
to GCHQ. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/aug/02/telecoms-bt-
vodafone-cables-gchq 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Guardian, 2013. Edward Snowden NSA files: Guardian should be prosecuted, 
says Tory MP. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/oct/22/edward-
snowden-guardian-should-be-prosecuted-tory-mp 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Guardian, 2013. Katharine Gun: Ten years on what happened to the woman 
who revealed dirty tricks on the UN Iraq war vote?. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/03/katharine-gun-
iraq-war-whistleblower 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Guardian, 2013. Mastering the internet: how GCHQ set out to spy on the world 
wide web. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-mastering-the-
internet 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Guardian, 2013. Microsoft and Yahoo voice alarm over NSA's assault on internet 
encryption. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/06/yahoo-nsa-gchq-
decryption-abuse 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Guardian, 2013. Revealed: how US and UK spy agencies defeat internet privacy 
and security. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-
encryption-codes-security 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Guardian, 2013. Revealed: how US and UK spy agencies defeat internet privacy 
and security. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-
encryption-codes-security 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Guardian, 2013. Spy agency chiefs defend surveillance – as it happened. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/07/heads-of-gchq-
mi5-and-mi6-appear-before-intelligence-committee-live 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
339 
 
The Guardian, 2013. UK gathering secret intelligence via covert NSA operation. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jun/07/uk-
gathering-secret-intelligence-nsa-prism 
[Accessed 11 February 2018]. 
The Guardian, 2014. Actors, musicians and journalists sign statement supporting 
Edward Snowden. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/nov/13/edward-
snowden-the-nsa-files 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Guardian, 2014. Facebook reveals news feed experiment to control emotions. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/29/facebook-
users-emotions-news-feeds 
[Accessed 18 February 2018]. 
The Guardian, 2014. Facebook's secret mood experiment: have you lost trust in the 
social network?. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/poll/2014/jun/30/facebook-secret-
mood-experiment-social-network 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Guardian, 2014. GCHQ has tools to manipulate online information, leaked 
documents show. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jul/14/gchq-tools-
manipulate-online-information-leak 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Guardian, 2014. Optic Nerve: millions of Yahoo webcam images intercepted by 
GCHQ. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-
webcam-images-internet-yahoo 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Guardian, 2015. Legal experts call for greater scrutiny of surveillance laws. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/may/26/legal-
experts-greater-scrutiny-surveillance-laws 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Guardian, 2015. MPs David Davis and Tom Watson in court challenge over 
surveillance act. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/04/mps-david-davis-
and-tom-watson-in-court-challenge-over-surveillance-act 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Guardian, 2016. Edward Snowden makes 'moral' case for presidential pardon. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/13/edward-
340 
 
snowden-why-barack-obama-should-grant-me-a-pardon 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Guardian, 2016. Extreme surveillance' becomes UK law with barely a whimper. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/19/extreme-
surveillance-becomes-uk-law-with-barely-a-whimper 
The Guardian, 2016. Google agrees to pay British authorities £130m in back taxes. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jan/22/google-
agrees-to-pay-hmrc-130m-in-back-taxes 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Guardian, 2016. Privacy experts fear Donald Trump running global surveillance 
network. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/11/trump-
surveillance-network-nsa-privacy 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Guardian, 2016. Worth it': FBI admits it paid $1.3m to hack into San Bernardino 
iPhone. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/21/fbi-apple-
iphone-hack-san-bernardino-price-paid 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Guardian, 2017. Who is to blame for exposing the NHS to cyber-attacks?. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/15/who-is-to-
blame-for-exposing-the-nhs-to-cyber-attacks 
[Accessed 11 February 2018]. 
The Independent, 2013. MPs question Guardian editor Alan Rusbridger’s patriotism 
over Edward Snowden leaks. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/press/mps-question-
guardian-editor-alan-rusbridger-s-patriotism-over-edward-snowden-leaks-
8981167.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Independent, 2014. 'Facebook has blood on its hands' for failing to raise alarm, 
says Lee Rigby's sister. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/lee-rigby-
report-facebook-has-blood-on-its-hands-for-failing-to-raise-alarm-sister-says-
9883539.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Independent, 2015. Tory MP Richard Graham accused of quoting Joseph 
Goebbels in defence of new surveillance bill. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.indy100.com/article/tory-mp-richard-graham-accused-
of-quoting-joseph-goebbels-in-defence-of-new-surveillance-bill--bklSCE9nOg 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
341 
 
The Intercept, 2011. Behavioural Science Support for JTRIG’S Effects and Online 
HUMINT Operations. [Online]  
Available at: https://theintercept.com/document/2015/06/22/behavioural-
science-support-jtrig/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Investigatory Powers Tribunal, 2014. Liberty/Privacy No 1, London: The 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal. 
The Register, 2016. FBI Director wants 'adult conversation' about backdooring 
encryption. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/08/31/fbi_wants_adult_conversation_about
_backdoors/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Register, 2017. Home Sec Amber Rudd: Yeah, I don't understand encryption. So 
what?. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/10/03/amber_rudd_still_does_not_understa
nd_encryption/ 
[Accessed 11 February 2018]. 
The Telegraph, 2009. Iraq war: timeline of conflict. [Online]  
Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/6278938/Iraq-
war-timeline-of-conflict.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Telegraph, 2015. George Osborne announces 1,000 extra intelligence staff to 
tackle threat of Isil. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/11984575/George-
Osborne-announces-1000-extra-intelligence-staff-to-tackle-threat-of-Isil.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Telegraph, 2015. George Osborne announces 1,000 extra intelligence staff to 
tackle threat of Isil. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/11984575/George-
Osborne-announces-1000-extra-intelligence-staff-to-tackle-threat-of-Isil.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Telegraph, 2017. Government 'blocked' from accessing Twitter data to help spot 
terrorist plots. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/25/government-
blocked-accessing-twitter-data-help-spot-terrorist/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Telegraph, 2017. Government 'blocked' from accessing Twitter data to help spot 
terrorist plots. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/25/government-
blocked-accessing-twitter-data-help-spot-terrorist/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
342 
 
The TOR Project, n.d. TOR: Overview. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
The Verge, 2015. Edward Snowden issues 'call to arms' for tech companies in secret 
SXSW meeting. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theverge.com/2015/3/15/8218659/edward-snowden-
secret-sxsw-2015-meeting 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Toft, P., 2005. John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between geopolitics and 
power. Journal of International Relations and Development, 8(4), pp. 381-408. 
Tohn, D., 2009. Digital trench warfare. [Online]  
Available at: 
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/06/1
1/digital_trench_warfare/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Torpey, J., 2000. The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and State. 
s.l.:Cambridge University Press. 
Travis, A., 2015. Snowden leak: governments' hostile reaction fuelled public's 
distrust of spies. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/15/snowden-files-us-
uk-government-hostile-reaction-distrust-spies 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Trump, D., 2016. Trump and His Advisors on Surveillance, Encryption, Cybersecurity. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/12/trump-and-his-advisors-
surveillance-encryption-cybersecurity 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Twitter, 2016. Developer Policies to Protect People’s Voices on Twitter. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://blog.twitter.com/developer/en_us/topics/community/2016/developer-
policies-to-protect-peoples-voices-on-twitter.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Twitter, 2016. Developer Policies to Protect People’s Voices on Twitter. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://blog.twitter.com/developer/en_us/topics/community/2016/developer-
policies-to-protect-peoples-voices-on-twitter.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
United States Air Force, 2006. Cyberspace. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.af.mil/About-Us/Speeches-
Archive/Display/Article/143968/cyberspace-as-a-domain-in-which-the-air-force-
flies-and-fights/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
343 
 
US House of Representatives, 2016. Review of the Unauthorised Disclosures of 
Former National Security Agency Contractor Edward Snowden, s.l.: US House of 
Representatives. 
US House of Representatives, 2016. Review of the Unauthorized Disclosures of 
Former National Security Agency Contractor Edward Snowden, s.l.: US House of 
Representatives. 
US House of Representatives, 2016. Review of the Unauthorized Disclosures of 
Former National Security Agency Contractor Edward Snowden, s.l.: US House of 
Representatives. 
US Justice Department, 2016. FBI escalates war with Apple: 'marketing' bigger 
concern than terror. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/19/fbi-apple-
san-bernardino-shooter-court-order-iphone 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
US Justice Department, 2016. FBI escalates war with Apple: 'marketing' bigger 
concern than terror. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/19/fbi-apple-
san-bernardino-shooter-court-order-iphone 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
US Researchers in Cryptography and Information Security, 2014. An Open Letter 
from US Researchers in Cryptography and Information Security. [Online]  
Available at: http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs/Ax14.pdf 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
US Researchers, 2014. An Open Letter from US Researchers in Cryptography and 
Information Security. [Online]  
Available at: http://masssurveillance.info/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Utz, S. & Kramer, N. C., 2009. The privacy paradox on social network sites revisited 
- The role of individual characteristics and group norms. Journal of Psychosocial 
Research on CyberSpace: CyberPsychology, 3(2). 
Vales, T. P., 2016. Brazil´s cyberspace politics: Combining emerging threats with old 
intentions. IAPSS Political Science Journal, 29(1), pp. 295-309. 
Vaughan-Williams, N., 2007. The Shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes: New Border 
Politics?. Alternatives, 32(2), pp. 177-195. 
Verton, D., 2003. Black Ince: The invisible threat of cyber-terrorism. s.l.:McGraw-Hill 
Osborne. 
Vlissidis, P., 2016. Paul Interview [Interview] (30 March 2016). 
Vultee, F., 2010. Securitization - A new approach to the framing of the 'war on 
terror'. Journalism Practice, 5(1), pp. 33-47. 
Waever, O., 1989. Security, the Speech Act - Analysing the Politics of a Word, s.l.: 
Centre of Peace and Conflict Research. 
344 
 
Waever, O., 1995. Securitisation and Desecuritisation. In: On Security. s.l.:Columbia 
University Press. 
Waever, O., 2014. On Securitisation Theory. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ07tWOzE_c 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Waldron, J., 2003. Security and liberty: the image of balance. Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 11(2), pp. 191-210. 
Wallace, B., 2013. Google and Facebook are 'bigger risk to privacy than state 
snooping': Parliament told internet giants are 'harvesting' data. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2482813/Google-Facebook-
bigger-risk-privacy-state-snooping.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Wallace, B., 2013. Google and Facebook are 'bigger risk to privacy than state 
snooping': Parliament told internet giants are 'harvesting' data. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2482813/Google-Facebook-
bigger-risk-privacy-state-snooping.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Washington Post, 2013. Google encrypts data amid backlash against NSA spying. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/google-
encrypts-data-amid-backlash-against-nsa-spying/2013/09/06/9acc3c20-1722-
11e3-a2ec-b47e45e6f8ef_story.html?utm_term=.2d13a42bbdc5 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Washington Post, 2013. How we know the NSA had access to internal Google and 
Yahoo cloud data. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2013/11/04/how-we-know-the-nsa-had-access-to-internal-google-
and-yahoo-cloud-data/?utm_term=.2ee944dc41a7 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Washington Post, 2013. U.S., British intelligence mining data from nine U.S. Internet 
companies in broad secret program. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-
mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-
program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-
d970ccb04497_story.html?utm_term=.0474134380e9 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Washington Post, 2014. Apple, Facebook, others defy authorities, increasingly 
notify users of secret data demands after Snowden revelations. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/apple-
facebook-others-defy-authorities-increasingly-notify-users-of-secret-data-
demands-after-snowden-revelations/2014/05/01/b41539c6-cfd1-11e3-b812-
0c92213941f4_story.html?utm_term=.0089338d3c39 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
345 
 
Washington Post, 2017. NSA officials worried about the day its potent hacking tool 
would get loose. Then it did. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/nsa-officials-
worried-about-the-day-its-potent-hacking-tool-would-get-loose-then-it-
did/2017/05/16/50670b16-3978-11e7-a058-
ddbb23c75d82_story.html?utm_term=.e7a2389742d1 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Watson, S. D., 2012. 'Framing' the Copenhagen School: Integrating the Literature 
on Threat Construction. Millenium: Journal of International Studies, 40(2), pp. 279-
301. 
Webb, A. & Wang, S., 2016. Apple’s Cook Picks Up Where Snowden Left Off. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-29/apple-s-
cook-picks-up-where-snowden-left-off-in-privacy-debate 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Weimann, G., 2016. Going Dark: Terrorism on the Dark Web. Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, 39(3), pp. 195-206. 
Weinstein, M., 2014. Is Silicon Valley More Dangerous to Your Privacy Than the 
NSA?. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-weinstein/silicon-valley-
privacy-concerns_b_5483008.html 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
WhatsApp, 2016. end-to-end encryption. [Online]  
Available at: https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000618/end-to-end-encryption 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
White, R., 1984. Fearful Warriors: A psychological profile of U.S.-Soviet relations. 1 
ed. s.l.:Free Press. 
Williams, M. C., 2003. Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International 
Politics. International Studies Quarterly, 47(4), pp. 511-531. 
Williams, M. C., 2011. Securitisation and the liberalism of fear. Security Dialogue, 
42(4-5), pp. 453-463. 
Williams, M. C., 2011. Securitization and the liberalism of fear. Security Dialogue, 
42(4-5), pp. 453-463. 
Winder, S., 2006. The Man Who Saved Britain. Main Market Edition ed. s.l.:Picador. 
Windsor, P., 1990. Reason and History or only a History of Reason?. s.l.:The 
University of Michigan Press. 
Wired, 2010. Exclusive: Google, CIA Invest in ‘Future’ of Web Monitoring. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.wired.com/2010/07/exclusive-google-cia/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Wired, 2016. The Father of Online Anonymity has a plan to end the Crypto Wars. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.wired.com/2016/01/david-chaum-father-of-online-
346 
 
anonymity-plan-to-end-the-crypto-wars/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Wispe, L., 1968. Sympathy and Empathy. In: D. L. Sills & R. K. Merton, eds. The 
International Encyclopedia of Social Science. 15 ed. New York: Macmillan and Free 
Press, pp. 441-6. 
Wizner, B., 2016. Privacy experts fear Donald Trump running global surveillance 
network. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/11/trump-
surveillance-network-nsa-privacy 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Woods, A. K., 2016. Encryption Substitutes, s.l.: Hoover Institute. 
World Summit on the Information Society, 2003. Declaration of Principles. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.itu.int/net/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html 
[Accessed 11 February 2016]. 
Wray, B., 2015. 35 academics sign letter calling for transparency in new UK 
Government data surveillance proposals. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.commonspace.scot/articles/1439/35-academics-sign-
letter-calling-transparency-new-uk-government-data-surveillance 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Yoon, P. Y., 2016. It’s hypocritical to expect to have it both ways, Mr Zuckerberg. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/8f8eef46-f2a9-11e5-9f20-
c3a047354386 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
YouGov, 2013. Public opinion and the Intelligence Services. [Online]  
Available at: https://yougov.co.uk/news/2013/10/11/british-attitudes-
intelligence-services/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
YouGov, 2014. People in Britain divided over use of torture. [Online]  
Available at: https://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/12/11/people-in-Britain-divided-
over-use-of-torture/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
YouGov, 2015. GCHQ, resource and capability to intercept, invasion of privacy. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/03/13/gchq-resource-and-
capability-intercept-invasion-pr/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
YouGov, 2016. Terrorist attack in Britain expected by 84% of people. [Online]  
Available at: https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/08/04/terrorist-attack-britain-
expected-84-people/ 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
YouGov, 2016. UK is Europe’s favourite tech centre for global tech professionals. 
[Online]  
347 
 
Available at: http://www.londonandpartners.com/media-centre/press-
releases/2016/20160310-uk-is-europes-favourite-tech-centre-for-global-tech-
professionals 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
Zimmerman, P., 1995. PGP Source Code and Internals. 1 ed. s.l.:MIT Press. 
Zovi, D. D. et al., 2016. Brief of amici curiae iPhone security and applied 
cryptography experts in support of apple INC.'s motion to vacate order compelling 
apple Inc. to assist agents in search, and opposition to government's motion to 
compel assistance, s.l.: United States District Court Central District of California 
Eastern Division. 
Zuboff, S., 1989. In The Age Of The Smart Machine: The Future of Work and Power. 
s.l.:Basic Books. 
Zuckerberg, M., 2014. Mark Zuckerberg. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10101301165605491 
[Accessed 15 February 2018]. 
 
  
348 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
My sincere thanks to Professor Pete Adey and Professor Keith Martin for their 
continuous support, mentoring and patience throughout this research. I hope it has 
been as much a journey of discovery for you as it has been for me.  
Many thanks to the Information Security Group, the Department of Geography and 
the Centre for Doctoral Training in Cyber Security at Royal Holloway for providing 
the resources, expertise and ideas that have helped shape my research. It was a 
privilege to have spent a period of my life working within these departments.    
Thanks to the EPSRC for funding my PhD and the whole of the CDT programme. It 
really is a wonderful way to study. Thanks also to GCHQ, Open Rights Group and 
Shine TV for facilitating this research and participating in my interviews and 
ethnographic work. 
Finally, and most importantly a million thanks to my patient wife Felicity, who 
wisely ensured we continued living our lives despite the all-consuming nature of 
thesis writing. PhD’s are a marathon, but I never expected to be married with 3 
children by the time I had finished. 
